

Jeff Champion

ANTIGONUS ^{THE}ONE-EYED

GREATEST OF THE SUCCESSORS

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Jeff Champion



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
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









RHODES



Preface

The Oldest and Greatest of the Successors of Alexander.

Plutarch, Demetrius 3

All dates in this work are *BC* unless otherwise noted.

Few living in the kingdom of Macedonia would have looked forward to the year 382 with much optimism. Once again the kingdom was in turmoil, with rival claimants to the throne and aggressive foreign powers trying to take advantage of the kingdom's disunity. Such a situation would not have surprised most Macedonians. Macedonia was a border kingdom lying between the Greeks of south and the barbarian tribes of the Illyrians, Thracians and Paeonians to the north. For most its history the Macedonians had to fight both to extend its own territory and to defend against the incursions of the barbarians and the Greeks.

It was in this year (or thereabout) that two men were born who would play important roles in the transition of Macedonia from an endangered nation to the most powerful of the Greek states. One was Philip, the youngest son of the king Amyntas III. In 359, Philip would seize the kingship from his infant nephew, Amyntas. He would rule for twenty three years until his assassination in 336. During his reign Philip would hammer the northern tribes into submission and force into subjection the Greeks to the south and east. Philip's son, Alexander the Great, would use his father's legacy to conquer the Persian Empire, creating a Macedonian Empire stretching from Greece eastwards to the Indus River and south to include Egypt. In 323 Alexander would die a premature death, not having produced an obvious successor. His generals, known as the Successors, in Greek *Diadochi*, would then carve up

his empire, creating their own kingdoms.

Foremost of these generals was Antigonos, known as the One Eyed, or by his enemies as Cyclops after the stupid, one eyed giant in the *Odyssey*. He would become the most powerful of the Successor kings but would never rule over his homeland of Macedonia. In 301 he would die in battle at Ipsus and it would appear that his empire had been shattered. The roots of the dynasty he founded did, however, survive. His grandson, Antigonos Gonatas, would return to a Macedonia shattered by civil war and Galatian invasions to seize the throne. The dynasty would save Macedonia from chaos and rule it as a powerful, independent kingdom until it was destroyed by the Romans in the aftermath of the Battle of Pydna in 168.

To properly understand Antigonos' rapid rise it is necessary to place it within the historical context. Alexander the Great had justified his conquest and rule over the Persian Empire as "spear won land". This concept is best summed up in his reply to Darius before the Battle of Gaugamela, 'go tell your king that what he has lost and what he still possesses both remain the prizes of war. It is war that will determine the boundaries of our respective kingdoms.'¹ The Successors would justify their rule by the same ideology. The first generation of the Successors had grown up in a world where there was one Macedonian king and this, along with the extraordinary conquests of Alexander, would shape their world view and their ambitions.

This book is primarily a narrative history of the military campaigns of Antigonos. Any discussion of the administration of the early kingdoms of the Successors is complex, and largely hypothetical, as there is little surviving contemporary evidence. Other than general observations, it is consequently beyond the scope of this work. Military operations do not, however, exist in a vacuum and there will, therefore, be some discussion of the topics that are relevant to the general historical context of the era. Debates relating to the historiographic problems of the period

have been largely placed in the endnotes or the appendices at the end of the book.

Although there were a number of contemporary historians who wrote histories of the period of the Successors, none of their works have survived in any substantial form. Any history of the Successors, and therefore Antigonos, must rely primarily on the work the first century Greek historian Diodorus. Discussion of Diodorus' text will, by necessity, occupy a large part of this work. The problems relating to the historical sources are discussed more fully in [Appendix 2](#).

I have generally used the Latinized version of most names, believing them to be more familiar to most readers. Some quoted works will use different spellings. If the name Alexander is used unqualified in referring to a Macedonian king this will also be Alexander III, better known as the Great. To avoid confusion, Alexander, the son of Polyperchon, will be referred to as Alexandros. Modern place names have generally been placed in brackets after the first use of the ancient name. The term Asia will be limited to those parts of Asia ruled by the Macedonians or bordering this region. The bibliography is a select one, not necessarily based on merit, consisting of those works I have either cited or have found most useful in the composition of this work. A comprehensive bibliography of the period of the Successors would need a volume of its own.

I would like to thank Rod Laves and Rod Hoath for volunteering to produce publishable maps from my crude images. Decision on the designs was mine alone. I am sure they would have liked to have produced more creative works, although I suspect their offer to include mermaids and unicorns were not serious. My philosophy with the maps is that they should clearly show those sites mentioned in the text, where their locations are known. I therefore prefer simple, clear maps.

I would to acknowledge the assistance of Geoff Devitt, especially for the long conversations in which we tried to make

sense of the geography of Antigonus' eastern campaigns against Eumenes. Special thanks go to Dr Pat Wheatley of the University of Otago, a former fellow student of the University of Western Australia, for familiarizing me with the more recent scholarly debates. Finally I would like to thank my wife Janine, who allowed me to take a long break from my day job to finish this work.

Chapter 1

The Macedonian Homeland

The Macedonians had perpetual contests with the Thracians and Illyrians, and, being hardened by their arms, as it were by daily exercise, they struck terror into their neighbours by the splendour of their reputation for war.

Justin 7.2.

In common with many ancient peoples, the history of the Macedonians is shrouded in myth and must be reconstructed from the testimony of much later authors and the limited archaeological evidence. From about 800 the area which later became Macedonia was dominated by the Illyrians who expanded their domain at the expense of both the Thracians and Paeonians. The Illyrians were a powerful people, inhabiting an area stretching across the northern boundaries of Greece and further beyond the Adriatic Sea into southern Italy. They were feared by the Greeks for their warlike nature, piracy and slave trading.

The power of the Illyrians in Macedonia was destroyed in the seventh century by the Cimmerians, a tribe originating in southern Russia, who allied themselves with some of the Thracian tribes and raided deep into Macedonia and Epirus. These campaigns shattered the power of the Illyrians in Macedonia. Three people took advantage of their weakness: the Thracians, the Paeonians and the Macedones.

The Macedones are first mentioned by Hesiod (F3) who names Magnes and Macedon as sons of the god Zeus and the nymph Thyia. They are located in the area of Pierian Mountains and Mount Olympus, the legendary home of the Greek gods. Homer (*Illiad*, 2.4) claims, however that the Magnetes, the Macedonians,

came in forty ships to Troy from the region of Mount Pelion, somewhat further south in Thessaly. Hammond, in his influential history of Macedonia, proposes that prior to the Trojan War the Macedones were driven out of the Pierian Mountains by the Thracians. He concludes 'that the homeland of the Macedones from the latter part of the Bronze Age onwards was the northern part of the Olympus massif'.¹

The ancient Greeks of the classical period believed that the kingdom of Macedonia was founded in the mid-seventh century. According to the tradition, recorded by the fifth century historians Herodotus and Thucydides, the Macedonian kingdom was founded by the aristocratic Temenid family from Argos, who claimed descent for the legendary hero Hercules. The Temenids drove out the Illyrians and created a dynasty of Macedonian kings known as the Argeads. This dynasty would rule the kingdom for over three centuries until the murder of the last Argead king, Alexander the Great's son, Alexander IV, sometime between 311 and 309.

Herodotus records that the first king of the Macedonians was Perdiccas. He and his two older brothers had fled Argos to seek refuge with the Illyrians, where they became farm labourers for the king. After being cheated of their wages, the three fled once again and settled at Mount Bermion, near the site of the later city of Beroea. 'Having taken possession of that region, they made this their starting-point, and proceeded to subdue also the rest of Macedonia.'² Thucydides varies from Herodotus' account by claiming that Alexander, the father of Perdiccas, began the conquest, first capturing Pieria and then all lowland regions of Macedonia to the Strymon River. This region was known as Lower Macedonia. Thucydides also describes a highland region further inland known as Upper Macedonia occupied by 'the Lyncestae, Elimioti, and other tribes more inland, though Macedonians by blood, and allies and dependants of their kindred, still have their own separate governments.'³ Control of Upper Macedonia by the king was often tenuous at best. The archaeological and other

evidence indicates that this process of conquest was gradual and uneven. Upper Macedonia in particular was under constant threat from the incursions of the Illyrians.

Macedonia was an extremely well resourced area of Greece. Timber was abundant and eagerly sought by shipbuilding powers, especially Athens. Lower Macedonia was well watered and very fertile, being one of the few regions in Greece that produced and exported a surplus of grain. There were gold and silver deposits as well as base metals. All of this, in theory, belonged to the king but was often poorly exploited due to the insecurity of the realm and a lack of infrastructure. These resources also made it an attractive target to outside powers.

Perhaps one of the more contentious problems with ancient Macedonian history is whether the Macedonians were in fact Greeks. The narrow meaning of this was whether they spoke Greek, or instead were barbarians who spoke baa baa like sheep. The meaning could, however, be expanded to include the sharing of the Greek religion and cultural values. Herodotus introduces this question when he describes the reaction to entry of the Macedonian king Alexander I into the Olympic Games, an event open only to Greeks. Some of Alexander's 'fellow competitors who were to run against him tried to exclude him, saying that the contest was not for Barbarians to contend in but for Hellenes: since however Alexander proved that he was of Argos, he was judged to be a Hellene, and when he entered the contest of the foot-race his lot came out with that of the first.'⁴ Herodotus uses this incident to claim that the Argead kings were Greeks, but did not state explicitly whether this extended to all Macedonians. This doubt as to the true origin of the ancient Macedonians, whether they spoke Greek and were a part of the wider Greek community, has continued for over two and a half millennia.

There are a few passages in the ancient sources that infer that there may have been a separate Macedonian language. One example comes from a fragment of Arrian, where the Greek

general Eumenes, ‘sent Xennias (a man of Macedonian speech)’⁵ to address a group of defeated Macedonian soldiers. The evidence against a separate Macedonian language are that most recorded Macedonian personal names, the names of the months, the names of the towns and numerous inscriptions are all in Greek. Nor has a written form of a distinct Macedonian language survived. The most likely conclusion is that the Macedonians spoke a local dialect of Greek.⁶ Perhaps the most compelling evidence is the so-called “Pella Curse Tablet”, dating to about 375–350. It contains a love spell written in a dialect of Doric Greek and perhaps best records the speech of the common Macedonians at this time.⁷

Much of the doubt about the Hellenism of the Macedonians may have come from the southern Greeks’ disdain of the Macedonians’ archaic political institutions and perceived lack of culture. Macedonia was a hierarchical society, ruled by a king and dominated by a land owning aristocracy. The primary role of a Macedonian king was to be leader of his nation in war. He would be judged by his success in defending and expanding his kingdom, and by his personal courage in battle. The king’s other powers were wide. The king was chief law giver, judge and head priest. The king had considerable income, he owned huge estates in his own name and controlled the state’s natural resources. He was expected, however, to use some of his wealth, and the spoils of war, to enrich his followers and subjects by gifts and donations. Kings were expected to be overtly generous to their followers. This expectation was expounded by Antigonos himself when: ‘one of his friends, supposed to be a cook’s son, advised him to moderate his gifts and expenses. Your words, said he, Aristodemus, smell of the apron.’⁸

Immediately below the king were the nobility. The power of these men was based on the considerable wealth produced by their landed estates. It is claimed that during Philip II’s reign, the 800 richest Macedonian nobles owned as much land as the 10,000 wealthiest Greeks.⁹ They were expected to serve the king and

provide him with cavalry in time of war. The most trusted or powerful of these served the king as his Companions (*hetairoi*),¹⁰ his inner circle of advisors. The king might consult his Companions before taking action but the final decision was his alone, in a manner not dissimilar to that described in the Homeric *Iliad*. There also existed an assembly of all male Macedonian citizens but this appears to have had little real power and was summoned by the king to express its support or opposition of his policies by shouting. It was mostly summoned after the death of a king to show assent to the succession of the new king. In reality a strong king would have had little real check on his power. Whereas a weak king might find it hard to oppose strong opposition among the Companions as they might unite to rebel in favour of one his relatives.

In effect the king was the state, issuing decrees and concluding treaties in his own name. Ultimately the only avenues of appeal or dissent available to other members of Macedonian society were riot, rebellion, conspiracy and/ or assassination. Of the last eleven Argead kings eight were assassinated or executed, and another died in battle. In all these cases the question of the continued existence of the monarchy and the dynasty was never in dispute. The conflict being rather which member of the royal family should rightfully exercise the traditional powers of the king. The monarchical system was deeply rooted within Macedonian society and as an institution was never questioned, even in times of extreme crisis. This tradition of kingship would long survive the fall of the Argead dynasty.

Ancient Greek society was ferociously competitive, especially among the aristocracy and leading citizens. They competed to win fame and a reputation that would survive beyond the grave. Due to its history and situation Macedonia was a martial society and the main ways to gain a reputation were to display courage and skill in battle, or the closely related pastimes of hunting and sport. This was a way of life shared with the aristocracies of the other

Greek states, even the democracies. Failure, however, was on open display in Macedonia. Men who had not killed a man in battle had to wear a halter instead of a belt. Those who had not slain a wild boar without a net were forced to stand at dinner rather than recline in the normal manner. Another method to attain a reputation was to speak well in the council of the kings or in the assemblies of the people. In most Greek states one had to impress and win over one's fellow citizens, whereas in a monarchy everything depended on winning the eye of the king.

For many Greeks this disparity meant that those ruled by kings were not truly freemen but slaves. This snobbery extended to the Macedonians' way of life. Most lived in the countryside and worked their own lands. The ideal of most Greeks was to live in cities, participate in politics, sport and cultural pursuits, while slaves or servants did the work. Those Greeks who came to the Macedonian court were appalled by the behaviour of the Macedonians, their drunkenness (they drank their wine straight unlike the civilized Greeks who diluted it with water), the coarseness of their manners, their lewdness and the deference they paid to the king. The Athenian politician Demosthenes described the court of Philip II:

Any fairly decent or honest man, who cannot stomach the licentiousness of his daily life, the drunkenness and the lewd dancing, is pushed aside as of no account. All the rest about his court, he said, are robbers and toadies, men capable of getting drunk and performing such dances as I hesitate to name to you here ... low comedians, men who compose ribald songs to raise a laugh against their boon companions – these are the men he welcomes and loves to have about him.¹¹

It is perhaps for these reasons that Demosthenes told the Athenian assembly that they should have 'no such qualms about Philip and his present conduct, though he is not only no Greek, nor related to

the Greeks, but not even a barbarian from any place that can be named with honour, but a pestilent knave from Macedonia'¹² Such accusations need not, however, be taken literally. Demosthenes was a fierce political opponent of Philip and truthfulness was not always an important factor in addressing the assembly. Some scholars argue that the accusations of Macedonian barbarism are mainly a result of third century Athenian hostility.¹³ Not all Athenians viewed Philip this way, the writer Isocrates, an opponent of Demosthenes, sent an open letter (*To Philip*) imploring him to be the champion of the Greeks and to free them from the threat of barbarian domination. Overall it would appear that accusations of Macedonian barbarism made by other Greeks were the result of social snobbery or political expediency.

Periods of stability in Macedonian history were rare. Unpopular kings were often assassinated, hunting "accidents" being a popular method. All too often the death of one king was followed by a bout of civil war with rival claimants competing for the throne. In the succession of kings primogeniture was usual but not always practiced. Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus, described the reality. When asked by one of his three sons, who should inherit the throne, he replied, 'to the one of you who keeps his sword the sharpest.'¹⁴ This was the famous curse of Oedipus, the legendary king of Thebes, that thrones should be won by the sword and not inherited by order of birth. The Macedonians seem to have shared this curse. Foreign powers often took advantage of these conflicts by supporting one of rival claimants in return for territorial or trading concessions.

One king who endeavoured to change Macedonian society was Archelaus who ruled from 413 to 399. He attempted to strengthen Macedonia, and thereby his own rule, through a number of reforms. He did much to improve the economy, introduced coinage, built infrastructure and initiated a lucrative timber trade with Athens. Despite this, Archelaus is characterized by Plato (*Gorgias*) not as a king but as the epitome of a tyrant whose

‘incurably corrupt soul dooms him to suffer unending punishment in Hades, an eternal object lesson for others’. According to Plato, Archelaus was the bastard son of a slave woman, who seized power by murdering, in true Macedonian manner, his uncle, nephew and half brother. These crimes destined him to be murdered in turn as a result of divine justice. Archelaus was eventually killed by one of his young male attendants who he had sexually abused. The more practical Thucydides described how Archelaus, ‘made straight roads and in various ways improved the country. In his force of cavalry and infantry and in his military resources generally he surpassed all the eight kings who preceded him.’¹⁵ Archelaus also drew the court closer to the culture of the southern Greeks, inviting artists and poets to visit, including the famous Athenian playwright Euripides.

Archelaus’ murder led to another six years of chaos. In 393 Amyntas III ascended the throne. After less than a year of rule he was deposed by an Illyrian invasion. Amyntas only recovered his throne with the aid of the Thessalians and Olynthus. The Olynthians had demanded control of some of the Macedonian timber revenues for their aid and after the war refused to give them back. These revenues strengthened Olynthus and Amyntas was not strong enough to confront them directly. Instead he shrewdly used the rivalry of the Greek states to his own advantage. Olynthus was backed by Thebes and Athens, so Amyntas sought help from their enemy, Sparta. Despite Sparta’s military reputation, the Olynthians twice defeated the allied forces of Amyntas and Sparta.

This was the world into which both Philip and Antigonos were born. Macedonia was once again in chaos. The Macedonians were a weak and divided people, preyed upon by stronger powers, prone to civil wars and forced to beg military assistance from foreign powers, who would inevitably demand a price for their aid. The two future kings would turn this world on its head. Forty five years later, Macedonia would be the superpower of the Greek

world.

In 379 the Spartans and their Macedonian allies would finally defeat the Olynthians. Amyntas astutely broke with Sparta and allied with Athens just before Spartan power was destroyed by the Thebans at the Battle of Leuctra in 371. This apparent piece of fine judgment did not, however, bring the expected rewards. Both Athens and Thebes continued to expand their influence in the northern Aegean. Amyntas died in 369 and was succeeded by his oldest son, Alexander II. Alexander was soon challenged by a rival to the throne, his brother in law Ptolemy, and sought help from Thebes. In order to secure their aid he was forced to hand over fifty sons of Macedonian nobles, including his youngest brother Philip. Before this help could arrive, Alexander was assassinated. Alexander's brother, Perdiccas III was chosen as king, but as he was a child and unable to perform the duties of the king, the most important being to command the army. Ptolemy was appointed as his regent. The post of regent was extremely powerful as it held all the powers of the king until he came of age.

Outside powers sought to take advantage of Macedonia's weakness. The Olynthians supported their own claimant to the throne. Ptolemy sought aid from Athens, who expelled the Olynthian pretender. This, however, infuriated the Thebans, who invaded Macedonia and forced Ptolemy to abandon his alliance with Athens. In 365 Ptolemy conveniently died, just as Perdiccas came of age and began to rule in his own right. Perdiccas continued the alliance with Thebes and made war against Athens over the important city of Amphipolis. This war did not go well and the Athenians increased their influence in the region at Macedonia's expense. As a reward for Perdiccas' actions the Thebans released the seventeen year old Philip who was appointed to govern part of the kingdom. In 359 the Illyrians invaded Macedonia. Perdiccas lead out the army but was defeated and killed, along with 4,000 other Macedonians. Once again the kingdom was on the verge of collapse.

Perdiccas' son Amyntas was only a child. In normal circumstances he would have been selected as king and Philip most likely appointed as his regent. These were not, however, normal circumstances. The Illyrians continued their invasion of Macedonia. The Athenians and Thracians decided to capitalize on events and intervene in Macedonian affairs for their own benefit. Both supported pretenders to the throne. The Paeonians joined in the fun and ravaged Macedonian territory. In this period of crisis, the Macedonians decided that a child could not lead them and instead chose the more experienced Philip to be their king.¹⁶

Philip proved to be the man for the job. He addressed the assembled army and 'exhorting them with eloquent speeches to be men, he improved their morale'. Philip knew that he could not fight all his enemies so turned to the methods that would become his trademark, 'by corrupting some with gifts and persuading others by generous promises'.¹⁷ Philip won over the Athenians by abandoning his support for Amphipolis, their pretender was soon crushed in battle. The Paeonians were bought off and the Thracians bribed into abandoning their pretender. Philip then turned on the most dangerous of his enemies and inflicted a decisive defeat on the Illyrians. Through his determined actions the kingdom had been saved.

Over the next two decades Philip would use the same strategies to defeat and subdue his enemies. First, however, Philip needed to thoroughly reform the Macedonian army. Philip's period of confinement at Thebes had occurred during a period of great military transformation and experimentation by the Greeks. The Thebans had revolutionized heavy infantry tactics by increasing the depth of phalanx, as the heavy infantry formation was known. Normally the phalanx formed up with a depth of six to twelve, the Thebans increased this to anything up to fifty deep. Using this formation, they had smashed the power of the Spartans at the Battle of Leuctra. They also developed the battlefield use of cavalry, which had previously been used mainly to cover the

advance of the infantry and protect their flanks. At the battles of Cynoscephalae (364) and Mantinea (362) the Thebans ordered their cavalry to strike against the flanks and rear of the enemy hoplite phalanx.

The contemporary Greek heavy infantryman, the hoplite, was armed with a spear of slightly less than three metres in length and a large shield nearly a metre wide. At about the same time that the Thebans were making their tactical innovations, the Athenian general Iphicrates experimented with hoplite equipment, he rearmed his infantry with a spear four to five metres long and a smaller shield. This combination of a longer spear and smaller shield is possibly the prototype for the introduction of the Macedonian pike armed infantry. Philip was a friend of the family of Iphicrates.

The exact timing of Philip's reforms is more difficult to ascertain. Diodorus' account implies that he did it almost as soon as he claimed the kingship in 359. The key passage describes that one of the first acts of Philip's reign was to improve the 'organisation of his forces, and, having equipped the men suitably with weapons of war, he held constant manoeuvres of the men under arms and competitive drives. Indeed he devised the compact order and the equipment of the phalanx.'¹⁸ Given the immediate threats to Philip at the time it is unlikely that he would have had the time to introduce such broad reforms in his first year. Diodorus is probably describing a series of contests to improve the morale of the troops and looking ahead to later events.

The most urgent reform was to improve the quality of the infantry. The Greeks saw the Macedonian infantry as almost militarily useless, poorly equipped and ill disciplined. The kings had often taken to the field leading only cavalry forces. Philip was able to remodel them into a disciplined force, armed with a smaller shield than that of the traditional Greek hoplite, and a longer, five and half metre long pike (*sarissa*), wielded in both hands. The phalanx also formed up deeper, usually sixteen ranks

deep. Through thorough training the infantry was also turned into a more disciplined and professional force. Polyaeus describes how 'Philip accustomed the Macedonians to constant exercise, as well in peace, as in actual service: so that he would frequently make them march three hundred furlongs, carrying with them their helmets, shields, greaves, and *sarissa*.'¹⁹

The introduction of the longer weapon changed the nature of infantry fighting in the Macedonians' favour. The traditional hoplite fight had involved combat at very close quarters, often shield to shield. As well as stabbing with their spears, the opposing hoplites would push and shove with their shields. Fighting with a pike was quite different. The length of the *sarissa* allowed five spear points to extend beyond the first rank. The extra weight of the pike and its long blade also made it a fearsome weapon: 'piercing those who fell upon them, armour and all, since neither shield nor breastplate could resist the force of the Macedonian long spear.'²⁰

Closing to chest to chest combat was impossible as long as the pike phalanx maintained good order. This led to all sorts of methods being used to overcome the wall of pikes. One was to hack at the pikes with swords. Another, more extreme method was to grasp the spearheads by hand and to try to render them useless. One commander ordered his first line troops 'not to use their weapons, but with both hands to seize the enemy's spears, and hold them fast. ... by this manoeuvre of Cleonymus, the long and formidable *sarissa* was rendered useless and became rather an encumbrance, than a dangerous weapon'.²¹ If both sides were pike armed they would stand apart and fence with their weapons.

Philip also reorganized and rearmed the Macedonian cavalry. Traditionally Greek cavalry had been armed with a helmet, breastplate and javelins, sometimes supplemented with a longer thrusting spear. Their main method of combat was to fight from afar by throwing their javelins. This suited their main roles as raiders, scouts and a screen for the infantry phalanx. Their

increasing use as a strike force during the mid to late fourth century rendered this form of armament as less appropriate. Philip re-equipped his cavalry with a longer, four metre lance, and trained them to fight in a wedge formation. These reforms were possibly modelled on the Thracian cavalry Philip had fought, and been wounded by, in 339. Whatever the inspiration for the changes, the newly equipped cavalry were far more effective in the charge, greatly enhancing their role as shock troops.

These Macedonian troops would be the core of Philip's armies, Alexander the Great's and those of the Successors. Other specialist troops, missile armed light infantry and siege engineers were also required. These could be levied from subjugated allies or hired as mercenaries. In 341 Demosthenes warned the Athenians of the new professionalism of Philip's army and the threat it posed to Greek freedom:

On the other hand you hear of Philip marching unchecked, not because he leads a phalanx of heavy infantry, but because he is accompanied by skirmishers, cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and similar troops. When, relying on this force, he attacks some people that is at variance with itself, and when through distrust no one goes forth to fight for his country, then he brings up his artillery and lays siege. I need hardly tell you that he makes no difference between summer and winter and has no season set apart for inaction.²²

The cost of waging war in the ancient world was great, especially when maintaining such a professional force for long periods in the field (see [Appendix 4](#)). Fortunately for Philip, early in his rule he captured Amphipolis and thereby won control of rich gold and silver mines at Mount Pangaea. Exploitation of these mines alone brought Philip an income of over 1,000 talents per year.²³ Philip's conquest of neighbouring territories further increased his income through the increased levying of land taxes. Through his conquests

Philip was also able to curb the power of the nobility. His military success meant that they too could share in the booty, giving them reason to stay loyal. Philip's success also allowed him to permit widespread migration into Macedonia by other Greeks, further strengthening his power, as such settlers would have no local allegiances and be personally loyal to the king. The most important of these immigrants was Eumenes, from the city of Cardia. He became the secretary of both Philip and Alexander the Great and was renowned for his loyalty to the house of the Argeads.

Demosthenes' speech would be prophetic, three years later, at the Battle of Chaeronea, Philip would defeat an alliance of the Greek states. The overwhelming nature of this success meant that Philip could impose whatever terms he chose on those cities that had opposed him. Aelian described the Greeks as surrendering 'city by city in terror'.²⁴ Determined to break the military power of the Thebans he imposed upon them a garrison and an oligarchy of former exiles. Athens, more distant and with a fleet which would be vital for the coming war against the Persians was treated far more leniently. No Macedonian troops entered Attica, the democracy was allowed to remain provided they ally themselves with Philip. Nonetheless the Athenians were reduced to impotence by being forced to renounce their former alliances and the loss of control of the Thracian Chersonesus. Philip's success also allowed factions supporting him to seize control in a number of cities. Garrisons were placed in Corinth, Ambracia and perhaps Chalcis, ensuring continued Macedonian military and political dominance. Once these political changes had been made, Philip formalized his control in the traditional way. During the winter of 338/7 he forced the Greek states to enter an alliance, known as the League of Corinth, with him as the commander in chief. Only Sparta refused to join.

The justification for the League's creation was to allow Philip to lead a war of retribution by the Greeks against the Persians. In

reality Philip had ensured his supremacy and the survival of those regimes favourable to him, while presenting himself as a champion of the Greeks. Two decades after Philip came to power, Macedonia was now supreme in Greece.

In the spring of 336 Philip sent an advance guard of Macedonian troops to Asia to begin his campaign against the Persians. He did not, however, live long enough to lead the proposed expedition. In the summer of the same year, Philip met the fate of so many of his predecessors, he was struck down by an assassin. One reason given by the ancient sources is another tale of homosexual intrigue. Like Archelaus before him, Philip was then murdered by a wronged former lover. Justin claims that the assassin acted at the instigation of one of Philip's wives, Olympias, the mother of his eldest son Alexander. He further claims that Alexander knew of the plot.²⁵ Such accusations cannot be proved but there is no doubt who benefited most from the death of Philip, within days Alexander was proclaimed king.

Chapter 2

Under Alexander

Athens was stretching forth a helping hand to join with Thebes. All Macedonia was festering with revolt and looking toward Amyntas and the children of Aeropus; the Illyrians were again rebelling, and trouble with the Scythians was impending for their Macedonian neighbours, who were in the throes of political change; Persian gold flowed freely through the hands of the popular leaders everywhere, and helped to rouse the Peloponnesus; Philip's treasuries were bare of money, and in addition there was owing a loan of two hundred talents. In such poverty and in circumstances fraught with such uncertainty, a stripling, scarcely older than a boy, had the daring to hope for Babylon and Susa.

Plutarch, *Moralia* 327C.

Although Alexander was the eldest son of the king there was always the possibility that he would be overlooked or a pretender would come forward. Amyntas, who Philip had usurped, was still alive. Philip also had sons by other wives. Alexander's cause was not helped by the fact that he had long been out of favour with his father and had only recently returned from exile.

On this occasion it would be Alexander who had the sharpest sword. Alexander and his friends armed themselves and seized the palace. He expected problems from the family of Attalus, father of Philip's last wife, Cleopatra, who had recently given birth to a son. There was also a reputed plot by an exiled family of nobles from the former royal family of Lyncestis. In the end Alexander was proclaimed king, almost certainly with the support of Antipater, one of Philip's most powerful companions. Alexander consolidated

his position by disposing of anyone seen as a potential rival. The Lyncestians were executed immediately and Amyntas within a year. A half brother, Caranus, was put to death and the family of Attalus was eliminated. This included the last wife and child of Philip, roasted to death over a brazier by Alexander's mother Olympias.

The threats to Alexander's rule did not only come from within Macedonia but also from without. Revolts broke out in Greece, perhaps stirred by Persian gold. The Thracians and Illyrians decided to test the strength of the new king. Alexander quickly disposed of the northern threat but while he was away Thebes rebelled and other Greek states threatened to join the revolt. He raced south before Thebes could receive any aid and stormed the city. Alexander decided to make the city an example to the rest of Greece. Thebes was destroyed, and the surviving population sold into slavery. The Greek cities, other than Sparta, would remain firmly under Alexander's thumb for the rest of his life.

The campaigns of the first year of Alexander's rule showed how professional and powerful the Macedonian army had become under Philip. In his northern campaigns Alexander forced his way across defended rivers, stormed mountain passes and captured towns. The pike armed phalanx proved irresistible against the tribesman of the Illyrians and Thracians. Alexander then forced marched his army against Thebes, taking the city by surprise. The Theban hoplites, victors over the Spartans, were some of the finest infantry in Greece but they were again defeated by the Macedonian pikes. Alexander was now free to lead this army against the Persian Empire.

In 334, Alexander crossed the Hellespont and led his army into Asia. That year he won his first victory over the Persians at the Battle of Granicus in what is now north western Turkey. Alexander was then able to march south unopposed, capturing the cities of the coast and winning control of the territories of western Asia Minor. The Persian Empire had been divided into a number of

administrative regions known as satrapies, each governed by a satrap appointed directly by the Persian king. Alexander decided to rule his new conquests by the same method, he appointed Macedonian commanders as satraps. It was during these campaigns that the first definite reference to Antigonus occurs, in an inscription from Priene, dated to the late summer of 334. The inscription accords Antigonus, son of Philip, a series of privileges, presumably as an overt demonstration of gratitude for the end of Persian dominance of Priene, and the restoration of the democracy.¹ It is probable from this decree, that Antigonus had led an expedition to Priene, similar to other detached forces that Alexander sent out to free the Greek cities from Persian rule.

Little is known of Antigonus' early life up to this point. It is only after the death of Alexander in 323 that the surviving sources proceed to provide a comprehensive and chronologically coherent set of information. Given this, the details that we have of Antigonus' background are fragmentary, and open to diverse interpretations.

The popularity of the name Philip makes it impossible to identify Antigonus' father with any certainty, and consequently we cannot be certain of his antecedents, nor the status of his family. The source tradition concerning Antigonus' origins are contradictory. Aelian states that he was of humble birth, a common labourer or farmer.² The evidence against this proposal is circumstantial, but overwhelming. We know of two other sons of Philip, named Ptolemaeus and Demetrius. Ptolemaeus was, most likely, a commander at the battle of Granicus, in 334.³ Nothing is known of his brother Demetrius other than he was the first husband of Antigonus' wife Stratonice. It is possible that he was the natural father of Antigonus' oldest son Demetrius. As Demetrius' birth was close enough to his uncle's death for his paternity to be doubted, the marriage of Antigonus to Stratonice can be dated to 335/4.⁴ Antigonus would have been aged about forty seven. It is, therefore, possible that he may have been

married previously. However, there is no record in the sources of a previous marriage, nor of children older than Demetrius.

Sometime prior to 356, Antigonus' mother, whose name is not recorded, married a second time and produced another son, Marsyas. This Marsyas was later chosen as a *syntrophos*, one of those boys selected to be brought up together at court with Alexander the Great.⁵ Antigonus and Stratonice had a second son, Philip. Ptolemaeus had a son, also named Ptolemaeus, who later served as a general under his uncle, Antigonus. Another nephew of Antigonus is recorded, a certain Dioscorides, who in all likelihood was a son of Ptolemaeus.⁶ By the time of his death, in 301, Antigonus had two grandchildren by Demetrius and his first wife Phila, named Antigonus and Stratonice. Demetrius also had a step son, Craterus, the son of his first wife Phila and her first husband Craterus.⁷ Asander, the satrap of Caria, may have been a relative, but it is impossible to determine his exact relationship with Antigonus.⁸

Antigonus is claimed to have been a Companion, of both Philip II and Alexander.⁹ During the early part of Alexander's campaign Antigonus commanded the allied Greek infantry.¹⁰ This would indicate that Antigonus was included within the close circle of associates and advisers of Alexander, rather than the more general definition of a Companion as a member of the heavy cavalry component of the army. Although the expansion in the size and wealth of Macedonia under Philip II led to a considerable growth in the number of Companions, this increase most likely took place in the broader definition of the term, the national heavy cavalry regiments.¹¹ The Macedonian court was extremely aristocratic, and only those from the most important families entered into the king's immediate entourage. High command was also limited to those of noble backgrounds. That the inner circle of Companions was drawn from the nobility is commonly accepted.¹² The claims of Antigonus' common birth can be confidently discounted. It is included in a list of equally unlikely base origins for famous men,

and can be seen as part of the common Hellenistic practice of creating low class backgrounds for men who rose to power.¹³ On balance it seems beyond doubt that Antigonus' family was a part of the Macedonian aristocracy, and most likely from one of its leading families.¹⁴

Antigonus' youth would then have been as part of a privileged, wealthy elite. Despite its resemblances to the old Homeric warrior aristocracy, and supposed coarseness of manners, the Macedonian aristocracy had long been influenced by Greek culture. Anecdotes of Antigonus show him being able to quote and paraphrase the Athenian playwright Euripides.¹⁵ His youth, however, must have had its insecurities, as after the death of the king Amyntas in 370/369 Macedonia was repeatedly racked by civil wars and foreign invasions. These continued after Philip II assumed the kingship in 359. Although Antigonus was a Companion of Philip II there is no record of his career during that king's reign.¹⁶ As a Companion of the king, Antigonus must have played a part in the continual expansion of the kingdom which took place under Philip II. Antigonus' friendship with both Antipater and Eumenes would make it likely that he supported Alexander's succession after Philip's murder.¹⁷

Although many images were made of Antigonus during his life none have survived. From the sources we know that he was exceptionally tall for his time, probably over six feet and imposing in stature. In later life he ran to fat and became rather immobile, often having to be carried about in a litter. His imposing size was made more formidable by his loss of one eye. Antigonus consciously used his size and appearance to both intimidate and instil courage into his troops, striding around his camp before battle:

He was wont to be lofty and boastful as he engaged in his conflicts, making pompous speeches in a loud voice, and many times also by the utterance of a casual jest or joke when the enemy was close at hand he would show the

firmness of his own spirit and his contempt for them.¹⁸

The ancient authors characterized Antigonus as a harsh, arrogant man with an overweening pride and love of power (*philarchia*). Antigonus could be ruthless and at times cruel. He was more than willing to murder his opponents. After the battle of Gabene he brutally had Antigenes, one of the enemy commanders, burned alive for reasons that are never explained. On another occasion, when a part of his army tried to desert, 'he captured some of the deserters and tortured them frightfully, wishing to intimidate any who were contemplating such an attempt as this.'¹⁹ Unfortunately brutality and mass murder were common forms of intimidation in the ancient world, as Alexander's destruction of Thebes so readily shows. It is always easy to be impressed by the civilisation of the ancient Greeks but underneath the sophisticated veneer it could be a cruel and pitiless world. Antigonus appears to have been no worse than his fellow Successors in this regard and perhaps better than many.

The same sources also record the more attractive aspects of Antigonus' personality. A number of surviving anecdotes record him as having a quick and ready sense of humour. He could even make fun of his own deformity. Once, after he had received a report in large letters, joking that, 'even a blind man can read this'. He also appears to have had the gift of the common touch when relating to his troops. On one occasion: 'Seeing some soldiers playing ball in helmets and breastplates, he was pleased, and sent for their officers, intending to commend them; but when he heard the officers were drinking, he bestowed their commands on the soldiers.'²⁰

In an era when Hellenistic kings married numerous wives for political reasons and kept mistresses, Antigonus was unusual in his devotion to his wife, Stratonice. After marrying her, Antigonus took no other wife and there is no record of him keeping any mistresses. In a world where kings and tyrants mostly saw their adult sons as rivals and potential assassins, Antigonus and his son

Demetrius were renowned for their affection and trust of one another. One anecdote records how visitors to Antigonos' court were shocked when Demetrius entered the room armed after hunting and sat down next to his father.²¹ Another records how, after a long absence, Demetrius greeted his father with such a passionate kiss that Antigonos 'laughed aloud and said, 'anybody would think, my boy, that you were kissing Lamia',²² (one of Demetrius' many mistresses).

Perhaps the most important characteristics of Antigonos were his immense physical and mental energy. Antigonos' rise to power began in 323, when he was nearly sixty years of age. Yet he embarks on a series of campaigns over the next twenty two years that would have challenged a much younger man. Plutarch uses him a classic example of a tough and vigorous old man. Diodorus introduced Antigonos to his narrative by describing him as 'the most energetic ... and daring'²³ of the Successors.

It is always difficult to attempt to analyse the characters of persons such as Antigonos. The surviving sources are patchy and often contradictory. The authors generally record those anecdotes that support their own arguments. From the surviving stories Antigonos appears to have been a complex character. On the one hand he could be charming, intelligent and loving and on the other completely ruthless. This is hardly surprising for a man of his position and times.

In the spring of 333, Antigonos was appointed satrap of the province of Phrygia, an inland region of western Turkey. This appointment was prestigious but it also isolated Antigonos from the king and court. The satrapy was of significant strategic importance as all the major roads of Asia Minor passed through its territory. Alexander's passage over many of the interior satrapies had been fairly superficial. Celaenae, the capital of Phrygia, had not yet surrendered but had promised to if not relieved within sixty days. Antigonos was left with 1,500 mercenaries with which to complete the siege.

Meanwhile, Alexander pressed further east and in November he defeated the Persian king Darius at the Battle of Issus fought in southeastern Turkey, near the border of Syria. Alexander followed up this victory by conquering Syria and the coastal cities of Phoenicia. During this campaign he was forced to besiege Tyre and the city did not fall until the mid summer of 332.

While Alexander was so occupied, a number of Persian commanders gathered some of the survivors of Issus and launched a counter attack behind him in western Asia Minor. As the governor of Phrygia, Antigonus was to bear the brunt of the fighting against this offensive. The only direct references to this campaign are found in Curtius:

The recapture of Lydia was now attempted by the generals of Darius who had survived the battle of Issus, together with all the troops who had followed them as well as some young Cappadocians and Paphlagonians enlisted for the purpose. Alexander's general, Antigonus, was in command of Lydia and, although he had dispatched to the king most of the soldiers of his garrison, he nevertheless showed his contempt for the barbarians by taking the field with his men. In that theatre, too, the fortune of the two sides remained unaltered; the Persians were defeated in three battles in various locations.²⁴

Meanwhile, not only did Alexander march against the cities still refusing the yoke of domination, but the excellent leaders who served as his generals had also made inroads into several districts. Calas into Paphlagonia and Antigonus into Lycaonia; Balacrus defeated Darius' general Idarnes and recaptured Miletus.²⁵

From these limited references a number of historians have attempted to reconstruct this campaign. The main problem in any such attempt comes not only from the scant details but also Curtius' choice of language. He claims that Antigonus was *'praetor*

praeerat of Lydia but Asander not Antigonus had been appointed governor of the province of Lydia. The expression “*praetor praeerat*” is difficult to translate but is best rendered as supreme commander. This expression has caused some historians to propose that Antigonus was given command over his neighbouring governors in order to organize the defence against the Persian incursion. It is further argued that Curtius used Lydia to mean the old kingdom of Lydia, everything west of the river Halys, including Phrygia. It is proposed that the Persians had a grand strategic plan, with the offensive aimed at breaking through to the Aegean Sea, linking up with the fleet and carrying the war into Europe.²⁶

The eminent historian Tarn, has a simpler explanation. He argues that Curtius, or his copyists, have simply made an error, replacing Phrygia with Lydia. He suggests that the Persians’ objective was the cutting of the Royal Road, running through Phrygia, thereby disrupting Alexander’s land based communications to Europe.²⁷ A more recent examination of the problem is by Anson. He accepts the broader definition of Lydia, but rejects the proposition that Antigonus was made supreme commander. Anson argues that the Persian objective was simply the reconquest of western Asia Minor, and the bulk of the fighting took place in Phrygia. As the satrap on the spot Antigonus bore the brunt of the fighting, and thereby won the credit. On balance Anson’s reconstruction appears to be the best argued and inherently most likely.²⁸

Whatever it’s real objective, the Persian offensive is accepted by all commentators as a serious threat, needing as it did three battles and a full campaigning year to be put down. The invading army may have been in excess of 20,000 troops. Somehow Antigonus managed to cobble an army together from his own bodyguard, any available mercenaries and by raising the levies of his own satrapy. Antigonus managed to use this *ad hoc* force to defeat the Persians.²⁹ He followed up his victories by capturing

the region of Lycaonia and adding it to his satrapy. Antigonus' success in this campaign must have increased his reputation, but it was largely ignored by our sources who were preoccupied with recording the deeds of Alexander.

Anson has used these events to argue that Antigonus was able, over the next ten years of Alexander's absence in the east: 'to create a personal empire in Asia Minor; one based on direct control of an extended satrapy, alliances with native rulers, and the recruitment of native forces. As a result, after Alexander's death Antigonus was a major force with which to be reckoned.'³⁰ Although this argument is attractive, it needs to be tempered. Antigonus' satrapy, although geographically large, was mainly pastoral and not particularly wealthy.³¹ Phrygia was bordered by peoples who still considered themselves unconquered. The Cappadocians, Pisidians and Isaurians were finally conquered in 321, after Alexander's death. The area's main advantage was its strategic location, dominating the main east to west and north to south routes through western Asia Minor. Following his defeats of the Persians, Antigonus once again vanishes from the historical record for another decade.

While Alexander was away campaigning in the east, many of his governors used his absence as an opportunity to enhance their own positions, raising private armies, extorting money and mistreating their subjects. After his return from India in 324 Alexander began a major overhaul of his satraps, in the course of which a number were executed, replaced or called into the king's presence. Only two of the existing satraps escaped the attention of Alexander, Cleomenes in Egypt and Antigonus in Phrygia.³² To have survived such an extensive purge, Antigonus must have refrained from the large scale corruption of his fellow governors.

During the last year of his reign, Alexander had made a number of decisions that had alienated many of his Macedonian followers outside of the inner circle of his court. He had begun to adopt many of the trappings of the Persian court, including

prostration before the king. This was deeply resented by many of the more traditional Macedonians, used to the more robust nature of Philip II's court. Ten thousand Macedonian veterans were sent home under the command of Craterus and replaced in Alexander's army by Persians. Craterus had been one of the more outspoken of the traditionalists, having 'clung fast to his native ways' and was therefore exceedingly popular among the troops.³³ Craterus' orders were twofold. He was to march to Cilicia and prepare a fleet for further campaigning. Alexander had grand ambitions of future conquests, first Arabia and then Carthage. After making preparations for the invasion of Carthage, Craterus was to return to Macedonia and replace Antigonos' old friend, Antipater, as regent in Europe.

The relationship between Alexander and Antipater had deteriorated over the years, mostly as a result of a campaign of complaints from Alexander's mother Olympias and the subject Greeks. Antipater was ordered to march to Babylon with reinforcements. Given the fate of many of the satraps of Asia, Antipater likely had some sense of foreboding. Instead of coming himself, he cautiously sent his oldest son, Cassander, to Babylon. Another son, Iollas, was already at the court where he served as Alexander's cup bearer. Cassander's appearance at court was a complete disaster. Unused to the ways of the eastern court, he openly laughed at the sight of people prostrating themselves before the king. This enraged Alexander, who grabbed him by the hair and smashed his head into a wall. Later, when Cassander sought to defend his father from charges of misconduct, Alexander ominously replied, 'you shall rue the day if it appears that you have done these men even a slight wrong.'³⁴ From his treatment at the court, Cassander supposedly developed a deep fear and long lasting hatred of the king.

In the summer of 323 Alexander developed a serious fever from which he did not recover. After ten days of illness, on the 10 of June, 323, Alexander died. Several accounts of Alexander's

death survive but unfortunately they are sometimes contradictory. The most likely cause of his death was malaria or a ruptured stomach ulcer. Murder was not immediately, or at least openly, suspected but later events caused accusations to be levelled at Antipater and his sons. Cassander is supposed to have brought poison to Babylon, where it was administered by Iollas. In Athens, where Alexander was extremely unpopular, they later voted honours to Iollas. Foul play was possible but the evidence is insufficient for any certainty.

Alexander's death was met with a genuine outpouring of grief. For many, however, there must also have been a sense of relief. Alexander's grandiose and expensive building projects and further plans for conquest were quickly shelved. Those nobles who had been ostracized or overlooked by the king would have looked forward to fresh opportunities. Many of his veterans probably looked forward to returning home and enjoying their considerable wealth. It is ironic that his death would, therefore, begin over two decades of further war as rival commanders fought for control of his empire. These events were supposedly foretold by Alexander, who on his death bed predicted that his kingdom would be inherited by 'the best man; for I foresee that a great combat of my friends will be my funeral games.'³⁵

Chapter 3

The Rise of Antigonus

Cassander, when he met his father in Phrygia, advised him not to get too far from the kings, and to keep watch on Antigonus; but the latter by his quiet behaviour, courtesy and good qualities, did all he could to remove suspicion. Arrian, Successors.

During his reign Alexander had conquered a vast empire, stretching from Greece to the borders of India. Despite the urgings of his mother, and many at court, Alexander had died before producing a legitimate heir. This, along with the ruthless removal of any rival to the throne, left the Macedonians with no obvious successor to the kingship. Possible and potential claimants did, however, exist. There was a reputed bastard son, Hercules, whose mother was a Persian noble. One of Alexander's widows, Roxane, was six months pregnant. Another son of Philip II, Arrhidaeus, also survived, probably because 'he was inflicted with an incurable mental illness', perhaps as a result of being poisoned by Olympias.¹

The principal players at Babylon were the seven bodyguards of Alexander, all leading nobles and holders of high military commands: Aristonous, Lysimachus, Pithon, Leonnatus, Perdiccas, Ptolemy and Peucestes. The most important of these was Perdiccas, a descendant of the ruling family of the Macedonian province of Orestis. In 324 he was appointed as *chiliarch*, commander of a thousand men, but as these were the first regiment of the Companion cavalry it made him, in effect, Alexander's second in command. During his illness Alexander had given his signet ring, his seal of state, to Perdiccas, appointing him

as temporary regent.

Given the traditions of the Macedonian state, the appointment of a permanent regent was urgent. The bodyguards summoned the leading nobles and commanders to a council. Perdiccas laid down his ring of office and then suggested that he should remain regent until Roxane's child was born. Hercules was suggested as a possible king but this was howled down as he was both a bastard and a barbarian. Roxane's expected child was also ridiculed for being half barbarian. Some of Perdiccas' supporters then repeated his claim that he should remain regent until Roxane's child was born. This met with much acclaim but, as Perdiccas was about to pick up the ring, his courage appears to have deserted him and he hesitated. This lapse allowed his enemies to interject, accusing Perdiccas of 'going to seize the throne anyway by pretending to act as regent'.²

By now the council had degenerated into pandemonium, with many of the common soldiers, the infantry, having gatecrashed the meeting. The leader of the infantry was one of the phalanx commanders, Meleager, who hated Perdiccas. At this point, one of the infantry called out that Arrhidaeus should be king, on the grounds that they would never find another Alexander but they had his next of kin. This proposal met with great support among the infantry who shouted their acclamation for the new king. In doing so they had probably overstepped their traditional role by electing their own king but thirty years of successful military service had given them a new political confidence. The nobles, supported by the cavalry, were strongly opposed and continued to support Perdiccas' proposal.

The two factions separated with the situation being undecided. They soon came to blows over control of Alexander's body as it lay in state. The infantry, being more numerous, drove the nobles and cavalry out of the city. The cavalry laid siege to the city and soon the infantry began to go hungry. Finally the two sides came to an agreement, Arrhidaeus, now called Philip Arrhidaeus, would

remain king and share the throne with Roxane's child should it be a son. The child would be a boy and was named Alexander for his father. After his birth the two would rule jointly as Philip III and Alexander IV.

In a further compromise the regency would be shared between Perdiccas, Meleager and the absent Craterus. To formally recognise the settlement a traditional purification settlement would be performed. A bitch would be cut in two and her entrails scattered around a field, the cavalry and the phalanx would stand separately within that area.

Perdiccas had, however, no intention of honouring the agreement and had judged correctly that Meleager's support was not steady. Not only did he bring the cavalry to the ceremony but also the corps of elephants. The field chosen was flat and outside the city, perfect ground for mounted troops. Perdiccas seized control of the king and in his name ordered the execution of the ringleaders of Meleager's revolt. Apparently abandoned by their king, and intimidated by the elephants, the infantry did nothing to defend their leaders. Three hundred were executed by being trampled by the elephants. Meleager escaped but was later dragged from the temple where he had sought sanctuary and murdered. According to Curtius, 'this proved to be both a forewarning and the commencement of civil war for the Macedonians.'³

Perdiccas now convened a new council. The compromise regarding the kingship remained but as Philip Arrhidaeus was deemed not fit to rule, Perdiccas would be his regent. As such he would hold all the powers of the king. He immediately exercised these by distributing the satrapies. Contrary to Alexander's instructions, Antipater was given command of Macedonia and Greece. Craterus was removed as co-regent and the order to replace Antipater was rescinded. Instead, Craterus was given the vague but honourable title of *prostates*.⁴ Although Perdiccas was now acknowledged as supreme by the army at Babylon there were

still two independent forces of Macedonian soldiers – those in Cilicia with Craterus and those in Macedonia with Antipater. No one could be certain as to how they would react to events in Babylon. It is likely that Perdiccas kept Craterus' position, and the relationship between him and Antipater, deliberately vague, hoping to stir up trouble between them.

Of the future major figures, Ptolemy was given Egypt at his own request. Lysimachus was appointed to Thrace and Eumenes to Paphlagonia and Cappadocia, all of which were still largely unconquered. Seleucus was appointed commander of the Companion cavalry. Antigonos was confirmed as governor of Phrygia. Once all this was completed, Alexander was finally given his funeral rites. His body was preserved for eventual burial in Macedonia. Even in this state it continued to be a prize for the Macedonians to fight over. Later, Ptolemy would hijack the funeral carriage and intern the body in the city of Alexandria in Egypt.

Ptolemy was born about 367 and although about eleven years older, became a trusted friend of Alexander. A generally discredited rumour, perhaps spread by himself, suggested that he may have been a bastard son of Philip II and therefore another half brother of Alexander. At some stage he earned the displeasure of Philip and was exiled from Macedonia, only returning after Alexander became king. He served with distinction in the Persian campaign and was promoted to be one of Alexander's bodyguards, and his food taster. Later in life he wrote a history of Alexander's campaigns in which it is believed he exaggerated his own heroics.

Seleucus, born about 358, was the son of Antiochus, one of Philip II's generals. In his youth he was sent to the court for his education and to be a companion of Alexander. During the Persian campaign he rose to be commander of the elite infantry unit, the *Hypaspists*, (Shield Bearers) and later became one of Alexander's bodyguards. One of the many myths surrounding Seleucus was that his mother, Laodice claimed that she had dreamed that his real father was the god Apollo. This is probably later propaganda,

imitating Alexander's claim that his real father was Zeus.

Antipater appears to have accepted the Babylonian settlement and offered his daughter Nicaea in marriage to Perdiccas. Craterus, whose position was more problematic, tarried in Cilicia awaiting events. He did not have to wait long. The cities of Greece, forced into submission by Philip II and later cowed by Alexander's destruction of Thebes, saw his death as an opportunity to re-assert their freedom. Led by Athens and Aetolia they quickly built a strong alliance and began a war of independence against Macedonia known as the Lamian War. Macedonia had been weakened by Alexander's constant need for reinforcements and Antipater was initially defeated by the Greeks. Over the winter of 323/322 Antipater was besieged in the Thessalian city of Lamia. From there he launched a cry for help from his fellow Macedonian commanders. Craterus eventually decided that his future lay in Europe and crossed into Macedonia to assist Antipater. He accepted Antipater's supremacy and after they had defeated the Greek uprising sealed the alliance by marrying Antipater's daughter Phila.

The settlement at Babylon, although confirming Antigonus' position, also laid the foundation for his future conflict with Perdiccas. Antigonus and Leonnatus, the satrap of Hellespontine-Phrygia, were ordered by Perdiccas to aid Eumenes in securing his satrapy. Antigonus refused to obey and Leonnatus decided to cross into Europe to support Antipater. According to Plutarch, Antigonus was already displaying independent ambitions of his own and refusing to obey the central authority: 'Now, Antigonus paid no heed to the edicts of Perdiccas, being already lifted up in his ambitions and scorning all his associates.'⁵ Such an accusation does appear to be premature, Antigonus was still only a regional governor and in no position to defy the central authority. What is more likely is that after the desertion of Leonnatus, who had been given troops for the expedition, Antigonus could not provide sufficient forces to contribute to the campaign.⁶

In 322 Perdiccas led the royal army into Cappadocia. Ariarathes, the Cappadocian king, was defeated and executed, with the province then handed over to Eumenes. Although Perdiccas initially accepted Nicaea as his bride and recognized Antipater as supreme in Europe, he began to negotiate marriage with Cleopatra, the sister of Alexander the Great. Diodorus claims that his success convinced him to grasp for even greater power, perhaps the throne itself:

Perdiccas had formerly planned to work in harmony with Antipater, and for this reason he had pressed his suit when his position was not yet firmly established; but when he had gained control of the royal armies and the guardianship of the kings, he changed his calculations. For since he was now reaching out for the kingship, he was bent upon marrying Cleopatra, believing that he could use her to persuade the Macedonians to help him gain the supreme power. But not wishing as yet to reveal his design, he married Nicaea for the time, so that he might not render Antipater hostile to his own undertakings.⁷

Perdiccas also attempted to prevent a marriage between Philip Arrhidaeus and Philip II's grand-daughter Eurydice. A bungled attempt to intercept Eurydice led to the death of her mother, Cynane. The army revolted in disgust and forced Perdiccas to allow the marriage. Perdiccas' machinations, and his arrogance, led to a growth in suspicion of his ultimate ambitions among the other commanders, including Antigonus. Perdiccas began his campaign for power by bringing charges against Antigonus, the closest and most immediately accessible of his opponents.⁸ The limits of Antigonus' power can be seen here, in that despite the size of his satrapy he was no match for the central power as represented by Perdiccas. Rather than confront the royal army he and his family boarded some ships of the Athenians, and fled to Antipater in Europe.

After arriving in Macedonia, Antigonus exposed Perdiccas' intrigues with Cleopatra and claimed that, 'Perdiccas, after marrying Cleopatra, would come at once with his army to Macedonia as king and deprive Antipater of the supreme command.'⁹ Antigonus must have been convincing, as Antipater and Craterus broke off their campaign against the Aetolians and made plans to move against Perdiccas. Ptolemy, the new satrap of Egypt, had already fallen out with Perdiccas, and was approached to join the coalition. The alliance was sealed by Ptolemy marrying another of Antipater's many daughters, Eurydice.¹⁰

Craterus and Antipater planned to cross the Hellespont into Asia with a large army, sometime in the spring or summer of 320, leaving Polyperchon in charge of Macedonia. Prior to this Antigonus had already returned separately to Asia, landing in Caria with 3,000 troops. During his exile his satrapy had been assigned to Eumenes. Antigonus was joined by the local satrap Asander and Menander the satrap of Lydia. Antigonus secured Ephesus and the Greek cities of Ionia in preparation to march against Sardis, the capital of Lydia. Learning that Eumenes was in Sardis paying court to Cleopatra on behalf of Perdiccas, Antigonus took a picked force of 2,000 men and attempted to ambush Eumenes on his way back to Phrygia. As is so often the case in civil wars, both camps were leaking information to the enemy. Cleopatra was told of Antigonus' plan and warned Eumenes, who was able to avoid the ambush by doubling back west and then fleeing south to join Perdiccas. Robbed of his prey, Antigonus returned to his original plan and captured Sardis. Antigonus brief campaign had effectively secured the western coast of Asia Minor and opened the road to his satrapy of Phrygia.

After taking Sardis, Antigonus does not seem to have played any further role in the campaign against Eumenes. Instead he appears to have fought against the allies of Perdiccas on Cyprus.¹¹ Antigonus may have conducted this campaign as part of the alliance but it is possible that he was acting on his own behalf.

Cyprus was in close proximity to the coast of Asia, and would later become a constant target of efforts to remove his enemies from it. Antigonus' actions in this campaign can reasonably be attributed to motives of self interest and aimed primarily at the recovery and expansion of his territory. In general it is sensible to attribute self interest as the primary motivation for all the Successors and see alliances as temporary convergences of interest. Alliances between the Macedonian nobility were transitory and based purely on expediency. All the participants would look out for their own interests at all times.¹²

Perdiccas responded to the threat of Antipater and Craterus by sending Eumenes and the fleet to the Hellespont to block their entry into Asia. He would lead the main part of his army against Ptolemy in Egypt. Antipater's and Craterus' campaign got off to a splendid start. The Perdiccan fleet sent to the Hellespont to prevent their crossing was surrendered by its commander Cleitus. Other local commanders also changed sides. Eumenes was forced to retreat back into the interior. Made overconfident by their success, Antipater and Craterus made the basic military mistake of dividing their forces. Antipater pressed on south to chase Perdiccas while Craterus was detached to pursue Eumenes. In his first command of a major battle, Eumenes surprised everyone by defeating and killing Craterus. His victory was won due to the skilful use of his superiority in cavalry. Unfortunately for Perdiccas the news of this victory did not reach Egypt in time. After an initial defeat and heavy losses while trying to cross the Nile, Perdiccas was murdered by his own commanders.

The death of Perdiccas left the Macedonians with another leadership crisis. A new regent was required but there was no obvious successor. Similar to the situation in 323 there was also another Macedonian army in existence and one of the foremost leaders, Antipater, was absent. Matters were further complicated as the leaders of the Macedonians were at war with one another. An army under Eumenes and a fleet commanded by Perdiccas'

brother in law, Attalus, remained hostile.

The most likely successor to Perdiccas was his conqueror Ptolemy. He, however, perhaps out of fear of a future confrontation with Antipater, declined the post, preferring to retain his grip on the wealthy satrapy of Egypt. Instead he proposed Pithon and Arrhidaeus (not the king), who were appointed joint regents without opposition.¹³ Immediately after these events, news of Eumenes' victory and Craterus' death reached the army at the Nile. The response was savage, Perdiccas' supporters and his sister Atlante were massacred. Eumenes, Perdiccas' brother Alcetas and fifty others were condemned to death in their absence. Attalus escaped with his ships to Tyre and gathered together a force of Perdiccan refugees.

In the late summer of 320, the royal army then moved to Triparadeisus in upper Syria, after summoning Antipater and Antigonus to join them. While the army awaited Antipater, Eurydice, the wife of Philip Arrhidaeus, supported by Attalus, used her royal status to win over the army against the new regents. Pithon and Arrhidaeus were unable to stand against her and resigned.

Antipater arrived at Triparadeisus a few days later, accompanied by Antigonus, but encamped his army separately – obviously forewarned of events. When Antipater entered the camp of Perdiccas' former army he was confronted by rebellious troops demanding their arrears of pay. Antipater responded by claiming that he was unable to pay them immediately, but he would search the royal treasuries for funds. Eurydice continued her agitation, and the army rioted and threatened to stone Antipater. He was rescued only by the personal intervention of Antigonus who used his imposing bulk and reputation to rescue his friend:

Antigonus, who advised him to leave the camp, and undertook to assist his escape. Antigonus accordingly crossed the bridge in full armour, and rode directly through the phalanx, thereby dividing it; he turned first to one

division, and then to the other, as if he was going to harangue them. The Macedonians paid every attention due his rank and character; and followed him with great interest, to hear what he had to offer. As soon as they formed around him, he began a long harangue in defence of Antipater; promising, assuring, and urging every consideration to induce them to wait patiently, until he should be in a situation in which he could satisfy their demands. During this prolix harangue, Antipater crossed the bridge with some horsemen; and thus escaped the soldiers' resentment.¹⁴

Arrian has Antipater rescued by the joint efforts of both Antigonus and Seleucus.¹⁵ Once Antipater was safe he sent his cavalry to put down the revolt. With the rebellion crushed Antipater called a new assembly of the army where he 'put an end to the tumult by addressing the crowd, and by thoroughly frightening Eurydice he persuaded her to keep quiet.' The assembly then appointed Antipater to be regent.¹⁶

Antipater distributed the satrapies and offices anew. Seleucus was appointed satrap of Babylon, Pithon was given Media, and Arrhidaeus Hellespontine Phrygia. Antigones, the commander of the elite infantry guard, the "Silver Shields", and the first to strike Perdiccas, was rewarded by being appointed to Susiane and ordered to transfer the royal treasury from Susa to Cilicia. Antigonus, in addition to his satrapy, was appointed supreme commander of Asia, general of the former army of Perdiccas and charged with completing the war against the surviving Perdiccans. He was also given the guardianship of the kings.¹⁷ Antigonus' appointments made him the second most powerful leader after Antipater, having command of the only other large body of Macedonian troops in Asia and control of the royal court.

It is clear that Antigonus had now succeeded to the position that was allotted to Craterus before his death. The alliance between Antipater and Antigonus was sealed in a similar manner

to that of Antipater and Craterus, the recently widowed Phila was married to Antigonus' son Demetrius.¹⁸ Antigonus' position, however, was inferior to that of Antipater as regent, and as long as Antipater remained in Asia, Antigonus would continue to be subordinate. Antipater also took steps to curtail Antigonus' power by appointing his son Cassander as *chiliarch* in order that Antigonus would be unable 'to pursue his own ambitions undetected'. Antigonus' friend Menander was also replaced as satrap of Lydia by Cleitus.¹⁹

Arrian tells us that Antigonus was given the command of the war in Asia 'at his own request'.²⁰ It is interesting to speculate on the impact that earlier events had had on the two rescuers of Antipater. At Babylon, Seleucus had been appointed *chiliarch* of cavalry, second in command to Perdiccas. The murder of Perdiccas may have demonstrated all too sharply to him the transitory nature of power which relied on the fickleness of a rebellious army and the support of jealous and suspicious officers. Ptolemy's defeat of Perdiccas appears to have convinced Seleucus to seek his future as the satrap of a wealthy province, home of an ancient civilisation, and isolated geographically by two great rivers, marshy terrain and deserts. The comparisons between Babylon and Egypt would have been obvious to Seleucus. Antigonus, who had been forced to flee his satrapy by the strength of the royal army, drew the opposite conclusion. In order to secure his future he sought and received a share of the power concentrated in the central authority and the army.

Through his appointment as the commander of the army Antigonus was clearly the second most powerful Macedonian general after Antipater and his most likely successor as regent. Antigonus' rise to power had been spectacular, and his prestige at Triparadeisus obviously high. He had been able to address the troops of Perdiccas' former army and diffuse their anger where Antipater had failed. The reasons for his influence are difficult to ascertain, as Antigonus had not been in contact with the royal

army for over thirteen years. His high rank, the fame gained by victories over the Persians and his successful campaign to capture Sardis may be the explanation.²¹

Antigonus had been advanced ahead of those who had been leaders of the royal army and taken leading roles in the betrayal of Perdiccas.²² Perhaps Antipater had no trust in those who had been closely associated with the intrigues of the royal court and who had recently bloodied their hands with murder and betrayal. Antigonus, an old friend from the days of Philip II, and an associate in the recent civil war, may have appeared a much more reliable subordinate, especially when curbs to his independence had been installed. Craterus' death was also fortuitous for Antigonus' ambitions, as it had been determined that he would be given the command of Asia.

Despite Antipater's intentions to return home, the war in Asia was not yet over. The Perdiccans had regrouped. Alcetas had gathered an army in Pisidia and Eumenes, with his victorious army, had occupied Hellespontine Phrygia. Attalus, with the fleet, attacked Rhodes but was defeated by the Rhodians and fled to Alcetas in Pisidia. Antipater, determined to continue his march home, dispatched Asander to attack Alcetas and Attalus but he was defeated. Antipater's route home went via Sardis where he was able to reconcile with Cleopatra.

Meanwhile Eumenes had invaded Aeolia where he extorted money from the enemy cities and raided the royal horse stud at Mount Ida. He then marched to Sardis in an attempt to gain the support of Cleopatra. Here he was confronted by Antipater and withdrew east to Celaenae. Eumenes then resorted to a highly successful guerrilla campaign where he supported his army by ravaging the countryside and raiding Antipater's garrisons, winning an 'unexpected abundance of resources'.²³ According to a fragment of Arrian's *Successors* Antipater's failures in this campaign caused him to be held in contempt by his enemies:

At the same time, they began to despise Antipater, because

he brought with him much larger and stronger forces to contend the war, after he set up camp near to their enemies he was unable to offer any assistance to his allies. Within sight of him and his army the allies were captured and destroyed and sold off as booty, while Antipater was nothing better than a spectator to their sufferings.²⁴

Antigonus' role in this campaign is not recorded, most likely he accompanied Antipater and shared in the shame of failure: 'after failing so far to achieve anything worthy of mention, they were not surprisingly regarded with contempt.'²⁵

The aging Antipater had clearly tired of the campaign against Eumenes and during the winter of 320/19 decided to finally quit Asia and return to Macedonia. His trials were not yet over. The army was again rebellious due to his failure and continued lack of pay. Cassander had quarrelled with Antigonus and warned his father of Antigonus' ambitions. Antigonus managed to allay most of Antipater's suspicions and retained his command of Asia. Nevertheless, Antipater heeded Cassander' advice and took the kings with him, depriving Antigonus of any immediate claim to the regency.

Before leaving, Antipater reinforced Antigonus' army with troops from his own forces, 8,500 infantry, 8,500 allied cavalry and seventy elephants, so that 'the war against Eumenes might be brought to an end more easily'.²⁶ Although Antigonus had survived Cassander's accusations and remained commander of Asia he had been left with an uncertain legacy. His reputation had taken a battering, the royal court had been removed, his army was mutinous and the Perdiccans full of confidence from their successful campaigns.

Chapter 4

The Destruction of the Perdiccans

Antigonus learned that Antipater had died in Macedonia, and that matters were in confusion owing to the dissension between Cassander and Polyperchon. He therefore cherished no longer an inferior hope, but embraced the whole empire in his scheme.

Plutarch, *Eumenes* 12.

During his campaign against Antipater, Eumenes had attempted to unite the forces of the surviving Perdiccans. Rivalry among the commanders, all of who ‘strove emulously with him for the chief command’¹ made any agreement impossible. Antigonus, who was to show himself a much more energetic commander than Antipater, was therefore able to attack them individually.

During the winter of 320/19, Eumenes had withdrawn to Cappadocia. Alcetas and Attalus were still in Pisidia. In the spring of 319 Antigonus gathered together his army. Now in sole command of the war, he acted aggressively. His first target was Eumenes and he marched into Cappadocia to confront him. Meanwhile, Eumenes was having trouble keeping his army together. Over 3,000 of his troops had deserted and had to be forced back into the ranks by force of arms and the execution of their leaders. Eumenes had been beset by similar desertions during his campaign against Craterus. The Macedonian contingents of the various commanders believed that they owed loyalty only to the royal family, not to the generals who commanded them. Others fought mostly for pay. The fact that Eumenes was a Greek interloper into Macedonian affairs did not help his cause.

Eumenes was not, however, the only commander beset by such problems. The armies of Perdiccas and Antipater had earlier

rebelled against their commanders. In the preceding winter 3,000 Macedonians had deserted Antigonos and ravaged his own province. Perhaps because they were Macedonians, 'Antigonos thought it cruel to put such a number of men to death'.² He allowed them to surrender on condition that they return home to Macedonia. Justin summarizes the position that all the Successors found themselves in when dealing with their troops: 'nor did they fear one another more than the soldiery, whose licence was less controllable, and whose favour was more uncertain'.³

Eumenes prepared to meet Antigonos in battle by making camp on a plain near the Cappadocian town of Orcyni. Here he believed he would once again be able to make use of his superiority in cavalry. Eumenes infantry were less reliable, being 'men of every race', stiffened by a small but unreliable core of Macedonians.⁴ His army totalled 20,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry.

Antigonos' army numbered about 10,000 infantry, half of whom were Macedonians, 2,000 cavalry and thirty elephants. This is less than the force given to him by Antipater but presumably he had left some troops to cover Alketas. Another possibility, made more likely by one of the accounts of the battle and Antigonos' reputation as a hard marcher, is that his army had become strung out during its pursuit of Eumenes. Despite his disadvantage in numbers, Antigonos had good reason to feel confident. No doubt informed of the sedition within Eumenes' army, he had already suborned Appollonides, one of Eumenes cavalry commanders, who promised to desert during the battle. Antigonos had a further trick up his sleeve. According to Polyaeus:

Antigonos was encamped opposite to the enemy, who were commanded by Eumenes, and his force was inferior in numbers. While frequent embassies passed between the two camps, Antigonos directed that, as soon as the next embassy arrived, a soldier should abruptly introduce himself, panting, and covered with dust; and inform him, the allies were at hand. Antigonos, hearing this, jumped up in

pretended jubilation, and dismissed the ambassadors. The next day he extended the front of his army twice its former length, and advanced beyond the trenches. The enemy were informed by their envoys of the arrival of the allies, and when they observed the *phalanx* so much extended, which they supposed had a similar depth, they did not dare to hazard an engagement, but made a precipitate retreat.⁵

Diodorus has a different account of the decisive point of the battle:

But when the battle became hot and Apollonides with his cavalry unexpectedly deserted his own side, Antigonus won the day and slew about eight thousand of the enemy. He also became master of the entire supply train, so that Eumenes' soldiers were both dismayed by the defeat and despondent at the loss of their supplies.⁶

The two accounts are easy to reconcile. Antigonus lured the enemy into believing he was about to receive reinforcements. He then led his phalanx out at half depth to fool the enemy into thinking the reinforcements had arrived. When Eumenes' infantry hesitated to engage the Macedonians of Antigonus' phalanx, he attempted to win the battle with his superior numbers of cavalry. At the critical moment Apollonides changed sides and the battle became a rout.

The result of the battle was a decisive victory for Antigonus. Eumenes fled eastwards towards Armenia and attempted to repeat the tactics he had used a year earlier. As Antigonus pursued Eumenes, he was 'severely harassed by him on the march, nor could he ever come to an engagement with him except in places in which a few could resist many.' Nonetheless, Antigonus' pursuit was relentless and he managed to curtail Eumenes' retreat and 'at last, when he could not be taken by manoeuvring, he was hemmed in by numbers'.⁷ With his army deserting around him Eumenes decided to stand siege at the fortress of Nora, with a picked force of 600 of his most loyal supporters. The location of Nora is

uncertain but was probably somewhere in the mountains of southern Cappadocia.

Nora was a small fortress, but well fortified, and occupied a strong position on top of a high crag. The two generals met to parley outside the walls but the depth of feeling against Eumenes, the Greek who had slain Craterus, was soon displayed by Antigonus' Macedonians. In order to protect his former friend, Antigonus 'first loudly forbade the soldiers to approach, and pelted with stones those who were hurrying up, but finally threw his arms about Eumenes and, keeping off the throng with his bodyguards, with much ado removed him to a place of safety.'⁸ Antigonus offered to lift the siege and pardon Eumenes if he would acknowledge him as his superior. Eumenes demanded that the satrapy of Cappadocia be restored to him and his death sentence lifted. Antigonus, eager to march against Alcetas, referred the matter to Antipater. Later Eumenes also dispatched a delegation to Macedonia, which included the historian Hieronymus of Cardia.

Antigonus decided that the fortress was too strong to take without a long siege. Despite the fact that Eumenes was still unconquered, Antigonus' victory had won for him control of Eumenes' satrapies and great amount of booty. Diodorus claims that from this point:

He aspired to greater things; for there was no longer any commander in all Asia who had an army strong enough to compete with him for supremacy. Therefore, although maintaining for the time being a pretence of being well disposed toward Antipater, he had decided that, as soon as he had made his own position secure, he would no longer take orders either from the kings or from Antipater.⁹

This is much the same accusation that Cassander had made to his father less than a year earlier. Again the accusation appears to be somewhat premature, as Alcetas was still at large and Antigonus' control over Asia was not yet secure. This sort of allegation may

stem from hindsight and the belief that Antigonus was driven by *philarchia*.

If correct, however, Antigonus was not acting any differently to his fellow Successors. Ancient power politics was a brutal dog-eat-dog game. Smaller powers were always at risk of being absorbed or destroyed by larger powers. The surest way to be secure was to be the biggest dog in the fight. Many of the other Successors were acting in much the same way. Pithon had attempted and failed to 'become the ruler of the upper satrapies'.¹⁰ Lysimachus was expanding his satrapy in Thrace by conquest. Ptolemy, ruler of Egypt, had stolen Alexander's body and brought it to Egypt to increase his prestige. He had expanded his own realm by seizing the Greek cities of Libya and the satrapies of Phoenicia and Coele-Syria. All could equally be accused of ignoring the central authority and acting in their own interest.

Believing that Eumenes was no longer a threat, Antigonus resolved to deal with Alcetas, the last remaining Perdiccan with an army in the field. After surrounding Nora with a wall and leaving sufficient forces for the siege, Antigonus' force marched the bulk of his army into Pisidia. Antigonus marched about 450 kilometres in seven days in an effort 'that strained the endurance of his men to the utmost'.¹¹ In doing so he achieved complete surprise and came upon the enemy before they were aware of his presence. Antigonus' forces vastly outnumbered the enemy. After recruiting many of Eumenes' defeated army, and collecting the rest of his forces along the way, his army totalled 40,000 infantry, 7,000 cavalry and thirty elephants. Alcetas, caught unprepared, commanded only 16,000 foot and 900 cavalry.

Antigonus took advantage of the situation and seized the high ground overlooking Alcetas' army. Before this manoeuvre was complete, Antigonus' elephants cried out and warned the enemy of their approach. Alcetas tried to buy time for his phalanx to draw up by leading an immediate attack with his cavalry to drive Antigonus' troops from the high ground. Antigonus responded by

wheeling around one of the hills with 6,000 cavalry and surrounded Alcetas' infantry before they could properly form up. Alcetas' army was now effectively split into two segments.

Antigonus launched a downhill attack, led by his elephants, against Alcetas' cavalry and quickly destroyed them. Alcetas, in the confusion of battle, managed to find a way to join his infantry. Nonetheless the situation was hopeless for Alcetas' army. His phalanx, still in disarray, was attacked on all sides by Antigonus' superior forces and surrendered. Alcetas and his guards, along with 6,000 Pisidians, managed to escape the rout and flee to the city of Termessus. The remaining survivors were enrolled into Antigonus' army. Attalus was captured and imprisoned.

Antigonus marched on Termessus and demanded Alcetas' surrender. The younger men of the Pisidians were devoted to him and ready to fight. The older, and wiser citizens, saw that Alcetas was defeated and isolated, and were not prepared to see their city destroyed 'for the sake of a single Macedonian'. Unable to persuade the younger men to betray Alcetas they came to a secret arrangement with Antigonus. He withdrew someway from the city and enticed the young soldiers out of the city in a series of skirmishes. Having stripped away his protection, the older men murdered Alcetas and handed his body over to Antigonus. Alcetas had been voted an outlaw at Triparadeisus and Antigonus treated his remains as such:

He took the body of Alcetas and maltreated it for three days; then as the corpse began to decay, he threw it out unburied and departed from Pisidia. But the young men of Termessus, still preserving their goodwill for the victim, recovered the body and honoured it with splendid obsequies.¹²

The remains of Alcetas' tomb can still be visited in the ruins of Termessus. They include a reasonably well preserved rock carving of a Macedonian cavalryman, presumably Alcetas. The city is

stunningly located and well worth a visit for anyone travelling through Turkey.

In one season of hard campaigning Antigonus had destroyed all the surviving forces of the Perdiccans in two spectacularly successful battles. Antigonus now returned to his satrapy of Phrygia. Here he received the news that Antipater had died. Before his death Antipater had appointed one of Alexander the Great's former bodyguards, Polyperchon, to be his successor as regent. His eldest son, Cassander was overlooked and appointed as *chiliarch* to Polyperchon. One reason given was that Cassander was too young to hold such an important position. Cassander was, however, at least thirty five by the time of his father's death and certainly not too young for high office. In the later tradition maligning Cassander, Athenaeus states that Cassander was an embarrassment to his father as he was not allowed to recline at banquets due to his failure to spear a wild boar: 'Cassander therefore at the age of 35 continued to sit at meals with his father, being unable to accomplish this feat.'¹³

Various arguments have been put forward to explain Antipater's apparent rejection of his son. Most seem to be based on the negative portrayal of him by many of the ancient authors. The usual arguments go that Antipater had come to distrust his son's impetuous nature, inexperience in high command and personal ambition.¹⁴ Instead he chose Polyperchon, the man he had left to rule Macedonia in his absence and who had since enjoyed military success by crushing a revolt of the Thessalians.

This explanation does, however, assume that the decision was Antipater's alone to make. Such decisions appear to have been made as matter of consensus among the leading Macedonian nobles,¹⁵ as was attempted after Alexander's death. As he returned to Macedonia, Antipater was already ill and near to death. His reputation had taken a battering after his failure to finish off the last of the Perdiccans. Cassander was known to have been held in contempt by Alexander whereas Polyperchon had served

successfully under the king, rising to command one of the battalions of the phalanx. Diodorus continually emphasizes the advantages those close to Alexander had in prestige.¹⁶ Given all his advantages there is little wonder that the Macedonians opted to select Polyperchon as regent. Rather than overlooking his son, Antipater may have been getting him the best deal possible.

Cassander is perhaps one of the more interesting of the Successors, in that he is possibly one of the most maligned. Later writers, Pausanias, Plutarch and Justin, working during the period of the Roman emperors, saw him as the man who had murdered Alexander and would later destroy his legacy and family. For these crimes he duly received divine justice. As Pausanias claims: 'Cassander was mainly influenced by hatred of Alexander. He destroyed the whole house of Alexander to the bitter end ... But he himself was not to come to a good end. He was filled with dropsy, and from the dropsy came worms while he was yet alive.'¹⁷ This particularly gruesome fate was reserved by the ancient writers for only the worst of tyrants, such as Sulla and Herod Antipater.

The Roman emperors tended to view themselves as the elect of Jupiter and therefore idealized Alexander as the prototype of the divine conqueror, an enlightened autocrat with a broad imperial vision. With this official view of Alexander, it is not surprising that those writing during the empire would portray the man accused of his regicide as the victim of divine vengeance.

Pausanias' bile does not end there, he goes on to denounce Cassander's character and treacherous nature: 'Of the kings who put down Antigonus I hold that the most wicked was Cassander, who although he had recovered the throne of Macedonia with the aid of Antigonus, nevertheless came out to fight against his benefactor.'¹⁸

This hostile tradition does not appear in the earlier work of Diodorus who described Cassander's actions, good and bad, objectively. Cassander is portrayed as willing to risk everything to obtain his goal, refusing to take second place to Polyperchon. He

carries out his campaigns with determination and energy and thereby deserves his success. In contrast Polyperchon is shown as being weak and indecisive, easily demoralized by any setback and willing to accept second place. Rather than being an arch villain, Cassander is portrayed as the archetype of a successful commander.

With the death of Antipater, and his defeat of the Perdiccans, Antigonus could justifiably consider himself the foremost of the Macedonian commanders. Materially he was certainly the most powerful – his army consisted of 70,000 men and thirty elephants. His treasury contained enough money to pay them and any other mercenaries he might care to hire. Reportedly Antigonus was delighted by the news of Antipater's death and determined 'to maintain a firm grip on the government of Asia and to yield the rule of the continent to no one'.¹⁹

With Antipater's death the legitimacy of Antigonus' command was in question. Polyperchon could, as the regent of the kings, claim the right to appoint his own commander in Asia, as he would soon do. Antigonus saw things differently. As the commander of the only other sizeable Macedonian army, Antigonus might well have believed that on traditional grounds that without his, and the presence of other leading Macedonians, Polyperchon's appointment was illegitimate. The precedent for such an action had already been established by Antipater's and Craterus' revolt against Perdiccas. Whatever the legal position, Antigonus had control of a large army and the support of its commanders. Only force could remove him from his position.

Antigonus no longer saw any need to disguise his ambitions. He called a meeting of his *philoí*²⁰ (Friends) where he announced that he intended to reassign the satrapies and commands to them and vowed never to surrender his control of Asia or take orders from the kings or their regents. According to Diodorus, Antigonus schemed not only to dominate Asia but to gain sole power. Diodorus' expression for Antigonus' ambition is ambiguous, but it

is also used to describe Polyperchon's position as regent.²¹ Antigonos' intention to re-assign the satrapies may be seen as an annexation of the prerogatives of the kings or their regent. The only persons to have appointed satraps prior to this were Alexander and the two regents Perdiccas and Antipater. Antigonos' plans can only lead to the conclusion that he was rejecting Polyperchon as the legitimate regent and claiming the position, and its powers, for himself.

While Antigonos was thus planning his future, the first challenge to his supremacy in Asia occurred. Fearful of Antigonos' plans to re-assign the satrapies, Arrhidaeus decided to secure his own realm by garrisoning its Greek cities. For a free Greek city the imposition of a foreign garrison was an anathema. Arrhidaeus marched on the strategically important city of Cyzicus, located near the eastern end of the Hellespont, with an army of 12,000 men and a well equipped siege train. Catching the city unprepared, most of its citizens were in the countryside tending their farms, he demanded the surrender of the city. The people of Cyzicus decided:

Nevertheless, to maintain their freedom, they openly sent envoys to confer with Arrhidaeus about raising the siege, saying that the city would do anything for him except receive a garrison; but secretly, after assembling the young men and selecting the slaves who were suitable for the purpose, they armed them and manned the wall with defenders.²²

Learning of the attack on Cyzicus, Antigonos marched to relieve the city with 23,000 of his best troops. He arrived at the city to find that his assistance was unnecessary, the people of Cyzicus, with the aid of the city of Byzantium, had already driven off Arrhidaeus. Antigonos charged Arrhidaeus with rebellion and ordered him to resign his position, offering him control of a single city as a residence. Arrhidaeus refused, garrisoned those cities that

were unable to resist him, sent a force to attempt to relieve Eumenes in Nora and declared war on Antigonos.

Although keen to settle with Arrhidaeus, Antigonos decided that Cleitus, and his satrapy of Lydia, was a more important target. Leaving a force to deal with Arrhidaeus, he marched into Lydia. Cleitus did not try to resist. After garrisoning the cities he emulated Antigonos and fled Asia to Macedonia with tales of Antigonos' arrogance and ambitions. Antigonos quickly stormed Ephesus and captured the rest of the cities of Lydia, some by force and others by persuasion. Meanwhile a convoy carrying 600 talents of silver from the royal treasury in Cilicia docked in Ephesus. Antigonos seized the money to pay his troops. By this act Antigonos was openly exercising the powers of the regent.

Meanwhile in Macedonia, Cassander had also refused to accept Polyperchon's authority. In secret he had sent letters to the commanders of his father's garrisons in Greece and Ptolemy in Egypt, urging them to support him. In a masterstroke he sent his cousin, Nicanor, to take control of the Macedonian garrison of Munychia, the citadel of the Athenian port of Piraeus, before news of his father's death was widely known. Athens was dependent on imported grain by which to feed its population. By controlling the port, Cassander could hope to starve Athens into submission.

When all was in place, Cassander fled to Antigonos for assistance. There, Cassander claimed that Ptolemy had already agreed to support an alliance against Polyperchon. Seeing an opportunity to weaken Polyperchon, Antigonos agreed to assist Cassander, although his stated pretext was to aid the son of his old friend. Previous quarrels were tactfully forgotten. Antigonos promised to assist Cassander's return to Europe.

Polyperchon was well aware of the threat that Cassander posed. Antipater, following his victory in the Lamian War, had imposed oligarchies of his friends and Macedonian garrisons to rule over the Greek cities. In Athens the democracy, which had been tolerated by Philip II and Alexander, was overthrown and an

oligarchy established. In order to cement its power, 12,000 of the poorer and more radical Athenians were exiled to Thrace. Polyperchon rightly feared that Cassander, reinforced by Antigonos, would hold the Greek cities against him. At a meeting with his Friends:

It was decided to free the cities throughout Greece and to overthrow the oligarchies established in them by Antipater for in this way they would best decrease the influence of Cassander and also win for themselves great glory and many considerable allies. At once, therefore, they called together the envoys who were present from the cities, and after bidding them be of good cheer, they promised to reestablish democratic governments in the cities.²³

Late in 319, Polyperchon issued a decree, which formally announced this policy to an assembly of Greek envoys. It met with resounding success. Throughout Greece most states threw out their oligarchies and established democratic regimes favourable to Polyperchon. In doing so, Polyperchon was initiating a risky policy. Traditionally it was the democratic elements within the cities that were most strongly opposed to Macedonian domination.

Whatever hopes the Macedonians may have held for a peaceful settlement, following Antigonos' destruction of the last of Perdiccans, were now shattered. Antipater's death had once again divided the Macedonians with Antigonos, Cassander and Ptolemy determined to bring down the regency of Polyperchon.²⁴

Chapter 5

The Outbreak of the Second Successor War

After the naval victory in the Hellespont, Antigonus ordered his fleet to cruise towards Phoenicia. The sailors were adorned with garlands, and the ships were decorated with the ornaments of the enemy's fleet. He ordered his captains to sail as near as they could to the harbours, and cities, that they passed; so that the victory might be broadcast throughout all Asia.

Polyaneus 4.6.9.

The year 318 began with the two main protagonists, Antigonus and Polyperchon, at loggerheads but not yet involved in open war. Both were busy securing their own domains and recruiting allies. In the spring of that year Antigonus sent a delegation to Eumenes in an attempt to win him to his side and ‘after receiving an oath-bound pledge, freed him from the siege.’ Eumenes returned to Cappadocia where ‘he gathered together his former friends and those who had once served under him and were now wandering about the country.’¹ Or so Diodorus claims. Plutarch and Nepos have a different version of events. They record that Eumenes escaped from Nora by outwitting Antigonus’ commanders and changing the wording of the oath from swearing loyalty ‘not to Antigonus alone, but also to Olympias and the kings, and to have the same enemies and friends as they.’² Antigonus, learning of the change of oath, immediately sent troops to pursue Eumenes. This latter version of events is not tenable. The gap between Eumenes surrendering at Nora in the spring and then changing sides sometime in the summer is too great. Eumenes must have come to some sort of agreement with Antigonus and returned with his goodwill to Cappadocia.³ Perhaps he later used a loophole in the

oath to justify his change of allegiance.

Meanwhile Polyperchon was attempting to win allies with a campaign of letter writing. He wrote to the Greek cities:

Ordering them to exile those who had been leaders of the governments in the time of Antipater – even to condemn certain of them to death and to confiscate their property – in order that these men, completely stripped of power, might be unable to cooperate with Cassander in any way. He also wrote to Olympias, the mother of Alexander, who was staying in Epirus because of her quarrel with Cassander, asking her to return to Macedonia as soon as possible, to take charge of the son of Alexander, and to assume responsibility for him until he should become of age and receive his father's kingdom.⁴

Olympias responded to Polyperchon's letter by sending one of her own to Eumenes, asking his advice about returning to Macedonia. Eumenes advised Olympias to remain in Epirus until the situation was clear. He also promised that he would always remain loyal to the royal house. Eumenes' loyalty to the kings was not purely selfless, however, for 'he perceived that he himself was a foreigner and had no claim to the royal power'. Only by attaching himself to the royal house could he hope for high office and protect himself from the ambitions of the Macedonian commanders, who 'despised and at the same time envied him.'⁵

Polyperchon also sent a letter to Eumenes informing him that in the kings' names he had restored to him the satrapy that the rebel Antigonus had stolen from him. He requested that Eumenes return to Macedonia and become a joint guardian of the kings, 'or if he preferred, to remain in Asia and after receiving an army and money fight it out with Antigonus'. If he chose the latter course Polyperchon would supply him with soldiers and money, 500 talents from the treasury in Cilicia and the 3,000 Silver Shields. If this was insufficient and he 'needed greater military power,

Polyperchon promised that he himself and the kings would come from Macedonia with the entire royal army.’⁶ Eumenes decided that his future lay with the kings and marched with 2,500 men to Cilicia. Antigonos, learning of Eumenes betrayal, sent a force to arrest him but it arrived three days too late. Eumenes had already crossed the barrier of the Taurus Mountains into Cilicia. There he was joined by Antigenes, commander of the Silver Shields and satrap of Susiane. Along with Antigenes came Teutamus, an otherwise unknown figure who is identified as co-commander of the Silver Shields.

The Silver Shields (*Argyraspids*) brought by Antigenes were Alexander’s elite foot guards, formerly known as the *Hypaspists* (Shield Bearers). Their name was changed when Alexander decorated their shields with silver in India. Both Diodorus and Plutarch claim that ‘the youngest of the Silver Shields were about sixty years old, most of the others about seventy, and some even older; but all of them were irresistible because of experience and strength, such was the skill and daring acquired through the unbroken series of their battles.’⁷

Although the Greeks and Macedonians expected their citizens to fight as long as they were physically capable, they were not normally expected to serve in foreign campaigns over the age of fifty. It is also difficult to accept on purely demographic grounds that there were 3,000 Macedonian infantry who had survived healthy and unwounded to the age of sixty. More likely there was a core of hardened campaigners who after nearly two decades of constant campaigning knew no other life other than the army. They no doubt occupied the positions of minor officers and the most important positions in the phalanx, the front rank and the final rank. The rest of the Silver Shields probably consisted of the best of the infantry who had been promoted into the guard unit. Some historians do, however, accept their age as recorded in the ancient sources, claiming that their elite status and ‘their access to an optimum, diet, water supply and shelter – would be other

factors in their longevity.’⁸

Despite Polyperchon’s orders, Eumenes believed that he would be despised by the Macedonian commanders. This appraisal proved to correct, for although Antigones and Teutamus ‘ostensibly treated Eumenes with friendliness,’ they ‘were plainly full of envy and contentiousness, disdaining to be second to him.’⁹ In order to retain command Eumenes was forced to resort to a charade which preyed upon the superstitions of the Macedonians. He claimed that he had a dream where:

Alexander the king sat in his pavilion in the midst of the camp, holding his sceptre in his hand, and distributing justice. He commanded his generals to transact no public business of any kind except in the royal pavilion; which he ordered to be called the pavilion of Alexander.¹⁰

Digging around the royal treasury Eumenes managed to find a suitable golden throne. From that time on, all of Eumenes’ command meetings would take place in tent before a throne with the royal insignia of a sceptre and a crown upon it. The commanders would ‘receive their orders in the name of the king just as if he were alive and at the head of his own kingdom.’¹¹ It was, perhaps, a face saving device by which the Macedonians could accept orders from a Greek. Only through this fiction of being commanded by the ghost of Alexander was Eumenes able to maintain his position of command.

Once he had the situation under control, Eumenes began to recruit mercenaries with the proceeds of the royal treasury and soon gathered an army of 18,000 soldiers. Making war was one of the greatest expenses of any ancient state. Soldiers expected to be paid and paid well.¹² As has already been observed, failure to provide pay often lead to mutiny. Although the 3,000 Silver Shields were a valuable core for Eumenes’ army, it was the 500 talents that enabled him to raise an army so quickly, and to maintain it. At this time mercenaries were easy to find provided

one had the money to pay them. Normally the major source of revenue for ancient governments was the control and exploitation of agricultural land. Alexander's conquests had, however, distorted this reality, placing enormous wealth in the hands of his Successors. The capture of Persepolis alone had brought in 120,000 talents, about a decade of tribute for the entire Persian Empire. This amount of cash allowed those Successors who could get their hands on it, to raise and maintain much larger armies than would be usual.

Eumenes activities and problems in Cilicia had not gone unnoticed by Ptolemy and Antigonus. Ptolemy sailed to Cilicia with a fleet and attempted to undermine his position. However, the fiction of Alexander's ghost and the letters of Polyperchon and Olympias proved to be effective. Ptolemy's pleas to the Macedonian commanders were ignored.

Antigonus decided to take a more direct approach, one that had already proven to be successful. He sent one of his Friends, Philotas, and 'thirty other Macedonians, meddlesome and talkative persons' to attempt to bribe Antigenes and Teutamus into betraying Eumenes. Teutamus was tempted but Antigenes persuaded him to remain loyal to Eumenes on the basis that: 'since he was a foreigner, would never dare to advance his own interests, but, remaining a general, would treat them as friends and, if they cooperated with him, would protect their satrapies for them and perhaps give them others also.'¹³

When this tactic failed Philotas made one more attempt to win over the Macedonians. He gave them a letter written by Antigonus in which he: 'exhorted the Macedonians to seize Eumenes quickly and put him to death. If they should not do this, he said that he would come with his whole army to wage war against them, and that upon those who refused to obey he would inflict suitable punishment.'¹⁴ While the Macedonians were discussing Antigonus' terms, Eumenes entered the assembly and urged them to remain loyal to the kings and to ignore the threats of a rebel. Again the

Macedonians chose to support Eumenes, perhaps out of loyalty to the royal family. Many, however, probably believed, as Antigenes did, that their future prospects were better served following Eumenes rather than Antigonos, who already had his own entourage of Friends to reward.

While Polyperchon had been undermining Antigonos' position in Asia, Antigonos had been doing the same to Polyperchon in Europe. Nicanor had been holding the fort of Munychia for Cassander despite Polyperchon's edict. While the Athenians were arguing about what to do, Nicanor secretly hired mercenaries and in a night assault captured Piraeus. This was too much for the Athenians, they overthrew the oligarchy, restored the democracy and executed those who had been friends of Antipater. At this crucial time, Antigonos gave Cassander thirty five ships and 4,000 men, sending him back to Greece. Cassander sailed into the Piraeus and took control of the port.¹⁵

Fearing Cassander's influence among his father's allies, Polyperchon marched on Athens with an army of 25,000 men, mostly Macedonians and 65 elephants. Polyperchon's decree had been a great success and in most cities 'the friends of Antipater were destroyed, and the governments, recovering the freedom of action that came with autonomy, began to form alliances with Polyperchon.'¹⁶ In the Peloponnesus supposedly only one city, Megalopolis, held out for Cassander. Not having sufficient supplies to remain in position for a long siege of Piraeus, Polyperchon decided that his best course of action was to march against Megalopolis. He left a small force under his son Alexandros to assist the Athenians.

Megalopolis proved, however, to be a tough nut to crack. Under the command of one of Alexander's veterans, they drove off repeated attacks by Polyperchon's forces. It is here that Polyperchon first displays his indecision. He 'repented of the siege; and as he himself could not wait there for a long time, he left a part of the army for the siege, while he himself went off about

other more necessary business.’¹⁷ Twice in a few weeks Polyperchon had abandoned the assault on strongholds held by Cassander’s allies. In doing so he appeared weak, which allowed Cassander’s allies to survive and undermine his position.

No detailed record survives of Antigonus’ actions in the spring of 318 but it is clear that he, or one of his commanders, had been campaigning successfully against Arrhidaeus. Arrhidaeus had fled with his surviving forces to the city of Cius at the eastern end of the Propontis. With the Hellespont under his control, Antigonus would be able to enter Europe if he chose.

Fearing an attack by Antigonus, Polyperchon decided that it was time to assault his rival directly. He sent his entire fleet, commanded by Cleitus,¹⁸ to the Propontis to link up with Arrhidaeus’ army. The campaign would have a twofold objective, to prevent Antigonus’ forces from entering Europe and to open a land route to Eumenes. The campaign started well, the two commanders united and gained control of most of the cities of the Propontis. They then advanced upon the city of Byzantium, which was allied with Antigonus and controlled the Bosphorus.

Learning of the threat to Byzantium, Antigonus took position in the city of Chalcedon, across the Bosphorus from Byzantium, with both his army and his fleet. There he was joined by Nicanor, who had been sent by Cassander with all his ships. Nicanor was given command of the combined fleet of 130 ships.

The two fleets clashed off Byzantium. Cleitus was the more experienced admiral, having defeated the Athenians during the Lamian War. He engaged Nicanor with the swell of tide in his favour. Cleitus inflicted a heavy defeat on Nicanor, destroying or capturing 70 ships. The remnants of the defeated fleet fled to Chalcedon.

Displaying his usual confidence and courage, Antigonus refused to accept defeat. While Cleitus celebrated his victory, Antigonus spent the night in hectic activity. Using small vessels supplied by his allies, he ferried archers, slingers and other light troops across

to Byzantium. The plan was to launch a two pronged assault on Cleitus' ships which were beached outside the city. The infantry would attack from the land and Nicanor would lead the surviving sixty warships to assault the enemy from the sea. When all was ready the attack was launched against Cleitus' ships:

At day break a shower of javelins and arrows was poured upon the enemy. While they were just arising, and scarcely awake, they were seriously injured, before they realised where the attack was coming from. Some cut their cables, and others weighed their anchors; while nothing prevailed but noise and confusion. Antigonus at the same time ordered the sixty ships to bear down upon them. Under attack both from the sea, and from land, the conquerors were obliged to yield their victory to the conquered.¹⁹

Antigonus' victory was complete, only Cleitus' ship managing to escape the disaster. He fled to the shore and abandoned his ship. Trying to escape back to Macedonia he was captured by the troops of Lysimachus and executed. Once again Antigonus' energy had won a decisive victory. Diodorus succinctly sums up the results of battle: 'As for Antigonus, by inflicting so disastrous a blow upon the enemy, he gained a great reputation for military genius. He now set out to gain command of the sea and to place his control of Asia beyond dispute.'²⁰

With his destruction of Polyperchon's fleet, Antigonus was now safe from any interference from Europe. The victory had also effectively isolated Eumenes from his allies. The war was now to be fought on two separate fronts. Antigonus could leave the campaigning in Europe to Cassander, while he dealt with Eumenes. He collected a select force of 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. Keeping the baggage to a minimum, Antigonus rapidly marched to Cilicia, hoping to destroy Eumenes before he could recruit a stronger force. At the same time the fleet was ordered to ensure control of the sea. To do this the ships were to sail along

the coast of Asia Minor to Phoenicia, with the ships adorned with the symbols of victory and the ornaments of the defeated enemy ships, displaying Antigonus' victory to all.

Learning of Antigonus' advance, Eumenes quit Cilicia and marched to Phoenicia in order to recover it for the kings from Ptolemy. The Phoenicians were a skilled seafaring people and their cities provided much of the Persian Empire's navy. Eumenes' plan was to assemble a fleet in Phoenicia, win back control of the seas and 'be able to transport the Macedonian armies safely to Asia against Antigonus whenever he wished.'²¹ This plan soon collapsed. A squadron of Phoenician ships bringing money to Eumenes encountered Antigonus' victorious fleet and changed sides. As a result 'Antigonus obtained both great treasures and new allies.'²² With the desertion of the Phoenician ships, Eumenes position in Phoenicia had become untenable. Cut off from Europe by Antigonus' control of the sea, he decided that his only course of action was to march to the east and try to build a larger army by winning over the local satraps.

Eumenes would have been encouraged to embark on this endeavour by earlier events in the eastern satrapies. The local satraps, isolated from events in the west, had recently been engaged in their own civil war. Pithon, the satrap of Media, was a man with a burning ambition to create his own empire by uniting the eastern satrapies under his own rule. He had already murdered one satrap and replaced him with his own man. Fearing a similar fate, the other commanders had united against Pithon and defeated him in battle. Pithon had withdrawn to Babylon in an attempt to recruit Seleucus to his scheme. The army of the other satraps had remained together under the command of Peucestes, satrap of Persia, 'who had been a Bodyguard of Alexander and had been promoted by the king because of his courage.'²³ Peucestes was reported to be popular among his subjects as:

He had held the satrapy of Persia for many years and had gained great favour with the inhabitants. They say that for

this reason Alexander permitted him alone of the Macedonians to wear the Persian raiment, wishing to please the Persians and believing that through Peucestes he could keep the nation in all respects obedient.²⁴

If Eumenes could win them over he would have a force of 23,000 men and 120 elephants to add to his own army.

Eumenes marched to the area of Babylonia where he went into winter quarters. While encamped in Babylonia, Eumenes sent embassies to Seleucus and Pithon asking them to join him against Antigonus in the name of kings. Both satraps, however, had taken part in the murder of Perdiccas and were present when Eumenes had been condemned to death. Seleucus replied 'that he was willing to be of service to the kings, but that nevertheless he would never consent to carrying out the orders of Eumenes, whom the Macedonians in assembly had condemned to death'. In response they sent 'an embassy to Antigenes and the Silver Shields, asking them to remove Eumenes from his command.'²⁵ Again they remained steadfast in their loyalty to Eumenes and the kings.

While Antigonus was pursuing Eumenes, Polyperchon's failures at Athens and Megalopolis had caused him 'to be regarded with contempt'. As a consequence 'most of the Greek cities deserted the kings and went over to Cassander.'²⁶ The Athenians, strangled by Cassander's hold of the Piraeus, were forced to come to terms. They were allowed to keep their territory and fleet but otherwise Cassander's terms were tough. Athens was to become an ally of Cassander, the garrison of Munychia was to remain and the democracy replaced by an oligarchy overseen by a tyrant appointed by Cassander. Later, Nicanor returned to Athens from Phoenicia, with his fleet still ostentatiously decorated with the rams of the defeated enemy vessels. Cassander soon came to suspect Nicanor's ambitions and had him murdered.

After Eumenes had fled Phoenicia, Antigonus continued his pursuit but soon realized that he could not catch him before

winter set in. As a result, he went into winter quarters in Mesopotamia. The following year Antigonos would have to quit the familiar region of Asia Minor and chase Eumenes to the far eastern expanse of Alexander's empire.

Chapter 6

The March East

Eumenes therefore assembled troops, and prepared for war against Antigonus. But as there were with him several noble Macedonians, amongst whom were Peucestes, who had been one of Alexander's body-guard, and was then governor of Persia, and Antigenes, under whose command the Macedonian phalanx was, dreading envy (which, nevertheless, he could not escape), if he, being a foreigner, should have the chief authority rather than others of the Macedonians.

Nepos, *Eumenes* 7.

In the early spring of 317, Eumenes broke camp with the intention of marching to Susiane where he could unite with the forces commanded by Peucestes, an old friend, and draw money from the royal treasury. Eumenes had already sent copies of letters from the kings to the eastern satraps 'in which it was written that they should obey Eumenes in every way.'¹ First, however, he had to cross the Tigris River, as he had already plundered the immediate area and his army was badly in need of supply. Crossing the Tigris was, however, no easy feat. The attempted crossing was successfully blocked by Seleucus and Pithon and the two armies skirmished for some time. Eventually Seleucus tired of his satrapy being pillaged. He made an agreement to allow Eumenes to cross if he would immediately march away.

Eumenes arrived in Susa about the beginning of summer where he met the combined army of the satraps. The reasons for them joining Eumenes are not fully explained. Loyalty to the kings and fear of Pithon's return probably played a part, but the familiar fear of Antigonus stripping them of their satrapies appears to have

been foremost. Peucestes, and probably many of the others, believed 'that should Antigonus be victorious the result would be that he himself would lose his satrapy and also be in danger of his life.'²

The combined army now numbered around 34,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry and 120 elephants. At first, the sight of such a large force raised the spirits of all concerned but immediately the leaders began to fall out over who should command the army. Diodorus gives a succinct description of the motives of the rival leaders:

Peucestes thought that because of the number of soldiers who followed him on the campaign and because of his high rank under Alexander he ought to have the supreme command; but Antigenes, who was general of the Silver Shields, said that the right to make the selection ought to be granted to his Macedonians, since they had conquered Asia with Alexander and had been unconquered because of their valour.³

Plutarch, however, uses these events to lecture on the supposed decay of the Macedonians' character since the death of Alexander:

The leaders themselves had been made unmanageable by their exercise of power, and effeminate by their mode of life, after the death of Alexander, and they brought into collision spirits that were tyrannical and fed on barbaric arrogance, so that they were harsh towards one another and hard to reconcile. Moreover, by flattering the Macedonian soldiery extravagantly and lavishing money upon them for banquets and sacrifices, in a short time they made the camp a hostelry of festal prodigality, and the army a mob to be cajoled into the election of its generals, as in a democracy.⁴

Eumenes was once again forced to fall back on the image of Alexander's ghost in order to retain command. His access to the

royal treasury was to prove vital, as he was able to use cash to buy off the most important parts of the army. He won over the Macedonian troops by giving them six months pay. Eudamus, the commander of the elephants, received a substantial bribe, 'for he would tip the scales decisively in favour of any one of the rivals to whom he might attach himself, since the employment of the beasts strikes terror.'⁵ Perhaps just as important for Eumenes' survival as commander, was that his two rivals, Peucestes and Antigenes, appear to have despised one another.

Fortunately for Antigonus, having been appointed commander by the assembly at Triparadeisus and being controller of the purse strings, such command problems played only a small part in his deliberations. Ambitious subordinates may need to be watched carefully but generally he could expect his orders to be obeyed. Antigonus was still in winter quarters in Mesopotamia when he received a summons for help from Seleucus. He immediately prepared to march but when he heard that Eumenes had broken through to Susa, and been joined by the eastern satraps: 'he checked his speed and began to refresh his forces and to enrol additional soldiers, for he perceived that the war called for large armies and for no ordinary preparation.'⁶ At the very least Antigonus would have waited until his elephants and baggage train had joined him.

In the summer of 317 Antigonus finally assembled sufficient forces and marched to Babylonia. He enlisted Seleucus and Pithon to his cause and received reinforcements of cavalry. Antigonus' engineers built a pontoon bridge and the army crossed the Tigris. Eumenes believed that his forces were not strong enough to confront Antigonus. He responded by marching his army away towards Persia, leaving orders that the citadel and treasury of Susa were to be denied to Antigonus. The weather in Susiane, which is unbearably hot in summer, may also have convinced Eumenes to move his army to a more temperate area.⁷ Eumenes crossed the Pasitigris River, probably the modern Karun River, and encamped

behind it, intending to oppose Antigonus' crossing.⁸ Meanwhile he requested Peucestes to bring another 10,000 troops from Persia.

Antigonus arrived in Susa in late June. It was now the height of summer and despite marching largely at night the extreme heat caused his army a number of casualties. Finding the citadel held against him, he left Seleucus to besiege it. Antigonus continued to march in pursuit of Eumenes. He arrived at the Coprates River, a tributary of the Pasitigris. The river was about 100 metres wide at this point but deep and swift flowing, needing boats to cross. Arriving about sunrise, Antigonus seized whatever local boats he could find and sent an infantry force across the river with orders to fortify the other side in preparation for the arrival of the rest of the army.

Eumenes' camp was about fifteen kilometres from Antigonus' attempted crossing. Learning of Antigonus movements from his scouts, he advanced back across the Pasitigris with a force of 4,000 infantry and 1,300 cavalry to dispute Antigonus' crossing of the Coprates. Meanwhile Antigonus had managed to get a force of 3,000 infantry, 400 cavalry, and 'not less than 6,000 of those soldiers who were in the habit of crossing in scattered groups in search of forage.' From the description of these troops it has been suggested that they may have been specialist light infantry skilled in river crossings, most likely using inflated animal skins.⁹ Antigonus appears, however to have been ignorant of the proximity of Eumenes' troops. Eumenes' attack caught Antigonus' force by surprise and routed them. The survivors fled to the boats but in their panic they overloaded and capsized them. Some attempted to swim the river but the strong current swept most away. Others, around 4,000, chose to surrender to Eumenes. Most of the rest perished. Antigonus, without sufficient boats to send assistance, was forced to watch impotently from the other side of the river.

Although treated as little more than a skirmish in Diodorus' short narrative, this battle was a substantial defeat for Antigonus.

He had lost nearly 10,000 men, perhaps a fifth of his army, in one morning. Antigonus faced a dilemma. It was impossible to cross the river in the face of opposition without further heavy losses. To remain where he was would cause further suffering from the heat. Antigonus had little option other than to retreat. He decided to march north to Ecbatana (Hamadan, Iran), in the cooler high country of Pithon's satrapy of Media. Again his troops suffered terribly from the heat and Antigonus was forced to rest them for several days at the river city of Badace. From there to Ecbatana there were two possible routes. One went along the royal highway through the Tigris valley. This was a forty day march again through the extreme heat of the river valleys. The other, through the mountains was shorter, less than a month's journey, and cooler. The central part of this route was, however, mountainous and narrow. This section was occupied by the Cossaeans who had remained largely independent and traditionally demanded a toll for strangers to pass peacefully through their territory.

The Cossaeans were described as a cave dwelling people, living mainly by foraging and hunting. Antigonus refused to pay the toll and determined to fight his way through. Diodorus uses this incident to demonstrate the arrogance that is reputedly a part of Antigonus' character: 'Antigonus regarded it as beneath his dignity to use persuasion on these people or to make them presents when he had so great an army following him.'¹⁰ His decision may well have been largely forced upon him by Alexander having earlier subdued a part of the Cossaeans' territory. Antigonus would not have wished to look weak in comparison to the former king.

Antigonus sent forward an advance guard of light infantry to seize the passes. More light infantry were detached to protect the flanks of the main column. The advance guard, however, was constantly defeated by the Cossaeans, who using their local knowledge, were able to seize most of the important passes. Occupying the high ground the Cossaeans bombarded the column by rolling down large rocks and firing arrows into it. 'Since the

road was precipitous and nearly impassable, the elephants, the cavalry, and even the heavy armed soldiers found themselves forced at the same time to face death and to toil hard, without being able to help themselves ... nevertheless, after losing many men and endangering the entire undertaking, he came with difficulty on the ninth day safe into the settled part of Media.’¹¹

Antigonus’ army, having suffered forty days of hard marching and heavy casualties, was in a mutinous state. The soldiers openly ‘became so critical of him that they let fall hostile remarks.’ Once again Antigonus demonstrated his common touch and rapport with his troops. ‘Nevertheless, by mingling with the soldiers on friendly terms and by making ready an abundant supply of all provisions, he restored the army from its miserable state.’¹²

Despite the abundance of supplies available in Media, Ecbatana was a strategically risky base for Antigonus’ army. It was too far north to prevent Eumenes from marching back to Asia Minor should he choose to do so. Like all good commanders, however, Antigonus had a shrewd insight into the characters of his opponents. He gambled correctly that the eastern satraps would never abandon their provinces to march west.

Antigonus’ retreat worsened the divisions within Eumenes’ army. Eumenes and Antigones wished to march west. The satraps wished to remain to defend their own territories. The argument became heated and not wishing to divide his forces, Eumenes conceded to the wishes of the satraps. Instead Eumenes marched his army further east to resupply it in Peucestes’ fertile province of Persia. There Peucestes threw an enormous feast to impress the army and once again pressed his claims for the command. Eumenes was forced to use deception to secure his position. He forged a letter claiming that Polyperchon had defeated and killed Cassander, and crossed into Asia. Taking advantage of the prestige this letter conveyed, he intimidated the supporters of Peucestes by bringing to trial and condemning one of his supporters. This was still not enough and Eumenes was forced to devise another ruse to

control his faithless subordinates:

Perceiving that, while they despised one another, they feared him and were on the watch for an opportunity to kill him, pretended to be in need of money, and got together many talents by borrowing from those who hated him most, in order that they might put confidence in him and refrain from killing him out of regard for the money they had lent him. The consequence was that the wealth of others was his body-guard, and that, whereas men generally preserve their lives by giving, he alone won safety by receiving.¹³

This is a part of Plutarch's theme of the consistent threat to Eumenes being overcome by his craftiness. It is possible that Eumenes used this brief period of security to extort the money from his fractious subordinates as a form of good behavior bond.

Once his army had recuperated, perhaps by October, Antigonus decided to march into Persia and settle the matter by battle. Learning of Antigonus' advance, Eumenes too 'made up his mind to meet the enemy and risk the issue.'¹⁴ Both had compelling reasons to seek such a decision before winter set in. Eumenes would hope to win a decisive battle to solidify his position before his army fell apart from its internal divisions.

Although it might appear that Antigonus had much to gain from delay, he too had reasons to seek a decision before winter. He was operating a long way from his heartland with stretched lines of supply and communications. Although his command was not yet directly challenged, he would have been wary about being reliant for provisions on the ambitious Pithon. Political considerations would also have played a part. The centre of power in the Macedonian world was now Macedonia, in the persons of the kings and their regent. In order to play a significant role in the politics of the regency, Antigonus needed to quit the backwater of the eastern empire and return to the west.

News of Antigonus' march had reached Eumenes even before

he had left Media. He gathered his forces and advanced to confront Antigonus. The two armies met in the lands of a Median tribe, the Paraetaceni. They occupied the fertile plain of the Zayandeh River, at the foothills of the Zagros mountain range, near the central Iranian city of Isfahan.

The two armies encamped about 600 metres apart and prepared for the battle. Their commanders desire to reach a conclusion was, however, thwarted by the terrain. The area was crisscrossed by rivers and ravines. Both had positioned their armies with a gully protecting their front. Neither was prepared to attack at such a disadvantage. For four days they skirmished and plundered the countryside until both ran out of supplies. Antigonus made one last attempt to divide Eumenes' forces. He sent envoys to the enemy satraps with promises to respect their positions, and made offers of land, or gifts and repatriation, to the Macedonian soldiers. They rejected his offers and threatened his ambassadors. Battle was now certain, all that was needed was a suitable field.

The two commanders continued their attempts to gain an advantage over the other. Antigonus planned a night march to Gabene, an area well provisioned and protected by rugged terrain. Deserters warned Eumenes of this plan and he decided to steal a march before Antigonus could implement it. He paid agents to enter Antigonus' camp, posing as deserters, and tell him that Eumenes planned a night attack. Antigonus drew up his forces for battle while Eumenes used the delay to get a head start on the march to Gabene.

Learning from his scouts that Eumenes had marched away, Antigonus force marched his army in pursuit but the lead was too great. Realizing that he could not catch Eumenes with his whole force, Antigonus lead his cavalry in hurried pursuit. At daybreak Antigonus' detachment caught up with the rear of Eumenes' army as it was descending from some hills. Antigonus drew up his cavalry in full view along the ridges overlooking Eumenes' army.

Eumenes, seeing the enemy horse, supposed that the entire army was near. Halting his march, he drew up his entire army for battle. Having gained time, Antigonus was now able to bring up his army and draw it up for battle. As Diodorus describes, ‘the generals of the two armies each outwitted the other as if they were taking part in a preliminary contest of skill and showing that each placed his hope of victory in himself.’¹⁵

Diodorus opens his account of the coming battle with a catalogue of the troops of both armies. Antigonus’ army included Macedonians, Greeks, Thracians, Medians, Parthians, Lycians, Pamphylians, Phrygians and Lydians. There were certainly other nationalities not mentioned. Although there are obvious gaps and inconsistencies in the numbers, the surviving text provides one of the most detailed descriptions of the varied origins and types of troops serving in the armies of the Successors. It is generally supposed that Diodorus’ account of the battle is drawn mainly from the historian Hieronymus of Cardia, who was a member of Eumenes’ inner circle and later served Antigonus. He was probably present at the battle and would have had access to the records of both sides.

Antigonus’ heavy infantry consisted of Macedonians, *pantodapoi* – ‘mixed troops in Macedonian equipment’, Lycians brigaded together with Pamphylians, and mercenaries. The Macedonians would have been armed with pike and shield. The *pantodapoi* were probably of Asian origin and also armed as pikemen. They may have been the remnants of the Asiatic troops trained at the orders of Alexander. Tomb paintings from Lycia show soldiers armed with a large shield and short spear. Although perhaps not as well equipped as a Greek hoplite, they were considered well enough armed to stand in the phalanx.

The equipment of the mercenaries is much debated but, as Diodorus does not describe them equipped as Macedonians, it is unlikely that they were pike armed. Some believe that the most mercenaries of this time were a troop type known as a *peltast*.

Earlier in the campaign Diodorus (19.19) mentions *peltasts* in Antigonos' army. This is a difficult term to translate as it simply means someone who carries a light shield, a *pelte* in battle.

The most common form of *peltast* is a light infantryman armed with a small shield and javelins. Diodorus' reference is to light infantry. Such troops were unlikely to form up in the phalanx of heavy infantry. However, some heavy infantry, also carry *pelte*, including Macedonian pikemen and the spear armed infantry of Iphicrates are, at times, referred to as *peltasts*.¹⁶ Understanding of the term is further complicated by the surviving works of ancient military theory. Aelian (*Tactics* 2) describes *peltasts* as wearing armour lighter than of a Macedonian pikeman and carrying a shorter spear. Later he goes out of his way to differentiate them from the *psiloi*, infantry skirmishers who relied on missile weapons. The simplest answer is perhaps the best. Most of those mercenaries who fought in the phalanx were hoplites, who were still the most common form of Greek heavy infantry.

Diodorus' list does not include any light infantry but they were a usual part of any Hellenistic army. As he later describes a unit of selected light infantry supporting the elephants of the right wing, there is most likely an omission in the text. At other times, Antigonos' army included *peltasts*, Cretan archers and Persian light infantry.

Antigonos' cavalry were much more varied in origin. The heavy cavalry, men wearing body armour and fighting in close order, and at close quarters, included the Macedonians of the Companions and the bodyguards of the various satraps, Greek allied and mercenary cavalry, and some of the locally raised Asiatic cavalry. The Macedonians were the best troops, armed with their long lance. Some the Persian and Median cavalry were rearmed by Alexander in this way. The Greeks and other Asian heavy cavalry would have carried the usual combination of shorter spears and/or javelins.

The light cavalry are described as those 'who, drawn up in

open order, were to avoid a frontal action but maintain a battle of wheeling tactics.’¹⁷ They preferred to fight at a distance with missile weapons, mostly with javelins but some with bows. These included the Tarentines, a troop type that took their name from the Italian city of Taras. They were armed with javelins but, unusually for cavalry of the time, also carried a shield for protection.¹⁸ Thracian horsemen were present in both armies, these may have been either heavy or light cavalry.

Both armies included elephants from India. Antigonos’ were survivors from Alexander’s army and Eumenes’ came from India with Eudamus. One of the advantages of elephants in battle is that their size, noise and smell frightened horses that were unfamiliar with them. The first Hellenistic general to face elephants was Alexander at the battle of Hydaspes in 326. The Indian king Porus attempted to deploy his elephants so as ‘to spread terror among the cavalry of Alexander’ as it would ‘make the horses uncontrollable’. Alexander took considerable care to ensure that his mounted troops avoided them. He had also enquired into the best way to fight the beasts. This was to attack them with infantry, ‘giving ground when they charged’, and ‘shooting the drivers and pouring in a hail of missiles from every side upon the elephants themselves.’ Despite this the elephants, unlike other troops, were able to force themselves into the phalanx by their sheer strength and did considerable damage to the Macedonian infantry. ‘The monster elephants plunged this way and that among the lines of infantry, dealing destruction to the solid mass of the Macedonian phalanx.’¹⁹ The biggest weakness of elephants in battle was the danger they posed to their own side if wounded or panicked. At the Hydaspes the Macedonian infantry managed to box the elephants up and ‘with no room to manoeuvre ... they trampled to death as many of their friends as the enemy.’²⁰

Although Alexander gathered a considerable force of his own he did not use them in battle, most likely because he lacked the time to train his own troops to fight effectively alongside them.

This was left to his Successors. Their usual method was to deploy the elephants along the front of their armies. They generally spaced them about fifteen to thirty metres apart, depending on numbers, and filled the gaps with light infantry. The coming encounter would be the first recorded battle between Macedonians in which both sides fielded elephants against one another.

Now that the two tired armies had drawn up, all that was left for them was to engage in the battle that their commanders hoped would decide the issue.

Chapter 7

The Battle of Paraetaceni

The generals employed different formations in drawing up the armies, vying with each other in regard to their competence in tactical skill as well.


Diodorus 19.27.


With the two generals determined on battle, all that was necessary was to get their troops into a battle line. Both would draw up their armies in the traditional manner, with infantry in the centre, cavalry on the wings and light infantry screening the line. The best troops and the commander would occupy the position of honour on the right. Alexander had, however, added refinements to this standard formation by protecting his vulnerable wings with separate detachments of cavalry and light infantry.¹ Both generals incorporated such detachments in their battle lines. What was new in Macedonian warfare was the use of elephants by both armies in a battle. They would have expected to fight each other but Diodorus' account describes no such combat. Perhaps both sides were nervous of such an encounter given the double edged danger that a wounded elephant posed.

Eumenes drew up his army first under the watchful eye of Antigonus. At the extreme left of his line, with his flank protected by hilly terrain was Eudamus with his bodyguard of 150 cavalry protected by an advance guard of 100 horsemen. The rest of the left wing cavalry were 2,650 troops from Aria, Bactria, Arachosia, Drangiane, Parapamisus and Mesopotamia, and 500 Thracians. These would have been a mixture of local levies, bodyguards and military colonists left by Alexander, they were a mixture of light and heavy cavalry. In all the left wing cavalry totaled 3,400 men.

In front of the cavalry he 'drew up forty-five elephants in a curved line with a suitable number of bowmen and slingers in the spaces between the animals.'² Eudamus appears to have been in overall command of the left wing.

In the centre were the infantry of the phalanx. On the left were 5,000 mercenaries and in the centre were 6,000 *patapadoi* pikemen. To their right were the 3,000 Silver Shields. Next were 3,000 Hypaspists, they were probably Macedonian pikemen gathered together from the contingents of the satraps. These 6,000 veteran pikemen were the elite of Eumenes' infantry. They were commanded by Antigenes and Teutamus. In front of the phalanx were forty elephants also supported by light infantry.





As was traditional, Eumenes placed his best troops on his right wing. To the immediate right of the infantry were 800 cavalry from Carmania, most likely Asiatic heavy cavalry. Next were 900 Companions and the 300 bodyguard cavalry of Peucestes and Antigones. To the right of them were Eumenes and the 300 cavalry of his bodyguard. Eumenes was protected by 100 cavalry detached as an advance guard. The Companions and bodyguard units were probably lance armed Macedonians or their equal. Another '300 men selected from all the cavalry commands for swiftness and strength' covered his rear. At the extreme right of the line and angled forward was a flank guard of 200 'selected horsemen.'³ In total the cavalry of the right numbered 2,900 of which about half were elite Macedonian style heavy cavalry. Positioned ahead of them were forty elephants.

Eumenes battle line was formed in a defensive manner. As Antigonus had the advantage of the high ground, he would be at a disadvantage attacking uphill. Better for him to wait for Antigonus to descend and hope that the advance might open gaps in his battle line.

Diodorus (19.28) states that Eumenes force numbered 35,000 infantry, 6,100 cavalry, and 114 elephants. These numbers do not

accord with those given in his dispositions which instead total 18,000 infantry, 6,300 cavalry and 125 elephants. The latter two numbers can easily be explained by considering them to be errors caused by rounding the numbers. The missing 17,000 infantry are probably the light infantry skirmishers who did not form part of the phalanx. Most would have been the Persian archers and slingers provided by Peucestes, many being deployed to support the elephants.

From his position on the hill Antigonus was able to observe the dispositions of Eumenes and make his plans accordingly. According to Diodorus he planned to form up his army in an oblique order, 'for he thrust forward the right wing, in which he had most confidence, and held the left back, having determined to avoid battle with the one and to decide the contest with the other.'⁴ This was the same formation that had won the Battle of Gaugamela for Alexander.

He observed that Eumenes' had placed his best cavalry on his open right wing. Antigonus decided to counter this by placing most of his light cavalry on his left: 'who, drawn up in open order, were to avoid a frontal action but maintain a battle of wheeling tactics and in this way thwart that part of the enemies' forces in which they had the greatest confidence'. The left wing was commanded by Pithon. At the extreme end of his left wing he stationed 1,000 mounted archers and javelin men from Parthia and Media. Alongside them were 2,200 Tarentines, 'men selected for their skill in ambushing.'⁵ Next, from the left came the heavier cavalry, 1,000 men from Phrygia and Lydia, 1,500 with Pithon, 400 under Lysanias, and 800 colonists. A few elephants were stationed with the left wing.

Antigonus' infantry phalanx occupied the centre of his line. From the left they were 9,000 mercenaries, 3,000 Lycians and Pamphylians, 8,000 mixed troops in Macedonian equipment and 8,000 Macedonians. In front of the phalanx were stationed about 30 elephants. Antigonus phalanx outnumbered Eumenes' but from

the description of the battle does not appear to have outflanked it. The most likely explanation is that, as Antigonus was relying on his cavalry to win the battle, he matched the length of Eumenes' phalanx by deepening his own formation or parts of it. Antigonus perhaps believed that greater depth would increase the resilience of his own infantry, particularly the mercenaries who would face Eumenes' veteran Silver Shields.⁶

To the right of the phalanx were the cavalry commanded by Antigonus. Next to the phalanx were 500 mercenaries, then 1,000 Thracians and 500 allied cavalry. Then came 1,000 Companion cavalry, commanded by Antigonus' son Demetrius who, at about eighteen years of age, was about to fight in his first battle. At the end of his right wing was Antigonus with his bodyguard of 300 men. Protecting him as an advance guard were three troops, probably 150 troopers, known as *paidos*. This is often translated as slaves but in this instance a better translation would be youths. There were probably the sons of Antigonus' friends and allies serving at his court, partly for education and partly as hostages.⁷ Behind Antigonus, acting as a rearguard, were a similar number of *paidos*, reinforced by 100 Tarentines. In front of the right wing were 30 elephants supported by light infantry.

Diodorus numbers Antigonus' force as 28,000 infantry, 8,500 cavalry and sixty-five elephants. Again Diodorus' total does not tally with figures given for his contingents, nor does it include any light infantry although he describes them as accompanying the elephants on the right. Not including the *paidos*, the cavalry total comes to 10,300. Most commentators suggest that the discrepancy is caused by the number of the Tarentines on the left being corrupted by tenfold and if the total was reduced to 200, the numbers would tally. This appears to be a very selective emendation of Diodorus' account.⁸

The disposition of the two armies shows the improvements in command that had taken place over the preceding century, particularly since the reign of Alexander the great. In classical

times the main role of a Greek commander was to draw up his army in the most advantageous position and formation, and then inspire his men by personally leading the attack on the enemy. Getting the best troops to assault the most vulnerable point of the enemy line was about the limit of tactical finesse. Slightly more complex tactics gradually developed, and generals might attempt to outflank the enemy left wing, while refusing their own weak left wing as long as possible.

It was not until the reigns of Philip and Alexander that generals would regularly demonstrate greater control over the course of the battle. Generals were still expected to fight but only after they had done everything possible to ensure victory. At the Battle of Gaugamela Alexander had initially retained control of the battle, feeding units into the fighting in order to neutralize any Persian threats. Only once a gap had opened in the Persian line did he commit himself into combat, leading the decisive charge of the Companion cavalry against the exposed flank of the Persian centre. The large numbers of cavalry available to Alexander and the Successors had also changed battlefield tactics. Battles were now more often won by the cavalry on the wings rather than the traditional clash of the heavy infantry phalanxes.

Both Antigonus and Eumenes were clearly planning to attack with the best troops on the right wing while attempting to delay the enemy with their left. Antigonus intended to use light cavalry to delay the enemy. Eumenes had stationed light infantry and elephants ahead of his outnumbered cavalry while anchoring his left wing against hilly ground. Both Eumenes and Antigonus had protected their own initial position with both advance and rear guards.

Once Antigonus had drawn up his army into formation he advanced down from the hills. Now that all was ready, 'the troops shouted the battle cry alternately several times and the trumpeters gave the signal for battle.'⁹ Our knowledge of the course of the Battle of Paraetaceni relies wholly on the account of Diodorus,

Plutarch ignores the battle completely and Nepos records only the location and result. Although Diodorus' account is detailed, it has omissions as it concentrates mostly on the clash of the cavalry on Eumenes' right.

Given Antigonus' plan and deployment the first to have engaged should have been his right wing. Inexplicably this did not happen. The first attack was launched by Pithon on the left wing. His light cavalry harassed the elephants in front of them 'by riding out around the wing and making an attack on the flanks, they kept inflicting wounds with repeated flights of arrows, suffering no harm themselves because of their mobility but causing great damage to the beasts which because of their weight could neither pursue nor retire when the occasion demanded.'¹⁰ Although their weapons were too light to easily kill an elephant, a wounded animal can create disarray in its own ranks and soon Eumenes' right wing was hard pressed.

Eumenes now demonstrated how much battlefield control had advanced in the last half century. He sent a message to Eudamus, ordering him to send his light cavalry to assist the right wing.¹¹ Once they had arrived, Eumenes launched a counter attack. 'Leading the whole squadron in a flanking movement, he made an attack upon his opponents with light armed soldiers and the most lightly equipped of the cavalry.'¹² Eumenes supported this attack with his elephants and 'easily routed the forces of Pithon, and pursued them to the foothills.'¹³ Unlike Antigonus and Eumenes, Pithon appears to have made no use of any flank or rear guards to protect his formation.¹⁴ Once his light cavalry had been outflanked, and thereby lost their advantage in mobility, they were an easy target for Eumenes' elephants and presumably his heavy cavalry.

At the same time, the fighting in the centre between the infantry phalanxes had also begun. There are no details recorded of any fighting involving the elephants positioned in front of their infantry. The most likely conclusion is that neither side was

prepared to risk the dangers involved and withdrew their elephants prior to the start of the fighting.

Combat between two phalanxes was usually decided in favour of the side who could better maintain their formation while opening a breach in the enemy line. This would expose vulnerable flanks which the victor could exploit. The other side would then usually break and flee the battlefield. This moment of collapse was the most dangerous, the beaten troops would expose their unprotected backs to the enemy, and it was here that the heaviest casualties often occurred.

Both sides clearly hoped that their Macedonians would defeat the mercenaries opposed to them. Antigonus had advanced with his right forward while Eumenes used his Silver Shields 'although there were then only three thousand of them, they had become, so to speak, the spearhead of the whole army.'¹⁵ Given the longer reach of their weapons the Macedonians would have a considerable advantage over the shorter spears of the mercenaries. At first the fighting was indecisive but eventually it was the veteran Silver Shields who made the breakthrough 'because of the great number of battles they had fought they were outstanding in hardihood and skill, so that no one confronting them was able to withstand their might.'¹⁶ Once the initial breach had been made, Antigonus' infantry line broke and fled. Eumenes infantry pursued them to hills behind.

While all of this had been occurring Antigonus appears to have remained unaccountably inactive on his own wing, not even interfering when Eudamus sent his light cavalry to Eumenes. Perhaps being hemmed in by the hills to his right meant that he was unable to launch his cavalry assault due to the over seventy elephants between the two opposing wings. Antigonus' friends, seeing the carnage to their left, advised him to cut his losses by retiring to the hills, preserving his own command and rallying those who had fled. This was perhaps sound advice but Antigonus was never one to accept defeat easily. Polyaneus relates how,

‘Antigonus when in force superior to the enemy, always engaged cautiously; but if inferior, attacked with all possible vigour, because he considered a glorious death preferable to an ignominious life.’¹⁷ Perhaps his caution on the right had led to the disaster before him, but now, faced with defeat, he decided to risk all by attacking.

The pursuit by Eumenes’ infantry had left open the flank of Eudamus’ wing. Antigonus led his cavalry forward into the gap and struck Eudamus’ force on its inside flank. His heavy cavalry smashed through the outnumbered enemy and drove them off the field. Antigonus now set about saving the rest of his army. Leading the swiftest of his cavalry, he galloped back five kilometres across the plain to rally his routed men sheltering in the hills. Eumenes, learning of the fate of his left, ‘recalled the pursuers by a trumpet signal, for he was eager to aid Eudamus.’¹⁸ He may also have feared an attack by Antigonus into the rear of the pursuers.

Although night was now falling both sides were able to rally their fleeing troops. Many of Antigonus’ infantry would, however, have been largely disarmed. It was common for infantry in a rout to throw away anything heavy, especially their shields, to assist in their flight. Those at the point of the immediate break, would certainly have done this. Others may have retreated by counter marching, keeping good order and retaining their arms as this assisted their survival. As Socrates, a survivor of the Athenian defeat at Delium, observed ‘those only are pursued who are running away headlong.’¹⁹ Nonetheless, Antigonus managed to get most of his surviving army into some form of a battle line and the two armies faced off about 130 metres apart. By that time it was nearly midnight and both sides were exhausted from their march, the stress of battle and a lack of food. Both decided to retire to their respective camps.

Eumenes, having had the better of the fighting, wished to retire back to the scene of the main clash and secure the dead. By Greek tradition whoever held the battlefield, and controlled the fallen,

was considered to be the winner of the battle and received the prestige of victory. The loser acknowledged his defeat by sending heralds to the victor requesting permission to recover their dead for burial. The victor would set up a trophy to celebrate their win, usually a tree trunk decorated with captured arms from a fallen enemy. It was normally placed at the point where the enemy line had first turned and run, in Greek, *trope*. Eumenes' soldiers refused to stay on the field and insisted on returning to their camp. He was forced to yield to the majority.

Diodorus uses the episode to again contrast the varying control of the commanders over their armies:

On the other hand, Antigonus, who firmly held the command without need of courting popular favour, forced his army to make camp by the bodies; and since he gained control of their burial, he claimed the victory, declaring that to possess the fallen is to be victorious in battle.²⁰

Antigonus' control of the bodies did, however, demonstrate to him the magnitude of his losses. His losses are recorded as 3,700 infantry and fifty four cavalry killed, and more than 4,000 wounded. Eumenes lost 540 infantry and a small number of cavalry dead, as well as 900 wounded. The discrepancy was so great the Antigonus chose to conceal the extent of his losses to the enemy:

After an engagement between Antigonus and Eumenes, in which the victory was undecided, Eumenes sent a herald to Antigonus, to arrange with him a mutual agreement to bury their dead. Antigonus, who had been informed that his own loss exceeded that of the enemy, to conceal the fact, detained the herald, until his own dead had all been cremated. After they had been buried, he let the herald go, and agreed to the proposal.²¹

The stratagem did not fool Antigonus' own soldiers who were

disheartened by the magnitude of their losses. Antigonos decided to retreat from Eumenes' army as quickly as was possible. He immediately evacuated his wounded and baggage to a nearby city. As soon as the post-battle rites were complete he retreated by forced marches back to Media. Eumenes refrained from pursuing Antigonos' army as his troops were exhausted and short of food. After giving the dead a magnificent burial he renewed his march to Gabene. Despite both sides seeking a decision to their conflict, they were forced to go into winter quarters with the struggle unresolved.

Chapter 8

The Battle of Gabene

And eventually, there was such a change of sentiment and fortune as a result of this circumstance, that the Silver Shields delivered up Eumenes as a prisoner to Antigonus; who thereby became king of all Asia.

Polyaenus 4.6.13


The lack of discipline shown by Eumenes' troops after the Battle of Paraetaceni continued after their withdrawal. Once the threat of the enemy was at a distance, they 'once more acted like a capricious mob, and, mocking at their leaders, distributed themselves in winter quarters over almost the whole of Gabene'¹ ... 'not from regard to convenience for warfare, but for luxurious indulgence.'² So scattered were they, that some of the detachments were separated by six days march. After his army had recovered, Antigonus decided that this presented him with an opportunity to launch a surprise attack on Eumenes' army and defeat it in detail.

The two armies were separated by twenty five days march by an easy route through inhabited country but only nine days across a waterless desert. Antigonus knew that the easier route would be patrolled by Eumenes' scouts so decided to take the shorter but more difficult route. Polyaenus describes the hostile nature of the terrain and the careful preparations that Antigonus made for the crossing:


Below was a level plain that contained nothing but sulphur mines, and stinking bogs, barren and uninhabited; it afforded neither water, nor grass, nor wood, nor plant.

Antigonus decided to march through this plain, and thereby to escape the forces that were posted on the roads, as he passed through the midst of the generals, whose station was on either side of the plain. For this purpose he ordered ten thousand casks to be got ready and filled with water, and provision for ten days; with barley for the horses, and whatever fodder they might have need of.³


Antigonus gave orders for the troops to prepare ten days of food that would not require cooking. In order to disguise his intentions, he spread rumours that he was planning to retire north to Armenia. Once all was ready, he set out across the desert about the time of the winter solstice, December 317. In order to conceal his movement, Antigonus ordered that no fires were to be lit at night.



BATTLE of GABENE - Second phase



BATTLE of GABENE - Final phase



In the freezing cold of the desert winter the lack of heat and warm food caused tremendous hardship among Antigonus' troops. It is perhaps during this march that Plutarch records an anecdote demonstrating the easy rapport that Antigonus had with his troops. 'In the winter being forced to pitch his camp where necessities were scarce, some of his soldiers reproached him, not knowing he was near. He opened the tent with his cane, saying: Woe be to you, unless you get you farther off when you revile

me.’⁴ The icy winds become so bad, however, that Antigonus could no longer maintain discipline. On the fifth night some of his soldiers disobeyed orders and lit fires during the night. The fires were observed by those who lived on the edge of the desert and they sent messengers to warn Eumenes and Peucestes.

Alarmed at the approach of Antigonus’ entire army, Peucestes decided to withdraw. Eumenes, however, ordered him ‘to take courage and to remain on the borders of the desert.’⁵ He would delay Antigonus while the rest of the army gathered and they could confront Antigonus while his army was tired from its ordeal and out of supply. Eumenes occupied the high ground at the edge of the desert. He ordered his troops to build fires across a front of about a kilometre and a half, with three rows of fires, each about ten metres apart, ‘making the outward fires very large, another range of fires less, and a third still smaller, in imitation of a real camp.’⁶ This cunning use of perspective made it appear to Antigonus that the Eumenes had succeeded in gathering together his entire army.

Peucestes lack of courage on this occasion is clearly at odds with his reputation for bravery. The passage displays the bias in the sources towards Eumenes, who is constantly portrayed as more clever and courageous than his rebellious subordinates. Much of this bias is believed to have derived from the pen of his countryman, Hieronymus of Cardia.⁷

Antigonus believed that his advance must have been betrayed and the enemy was waiting for him. Although all the ancient writers praise Eumenes cleverness, he only achieved half of his objectives. Eumenes did gain enough time to gather his army but he could not prevent Antigonus from escaping the desert. Eumenes managed to attack the enemy’s rearguard but did little damage. The constant emphasis in the sources of Eumenes’ guile also ignores the boldness of Antigonus’ stratagem, ‘which was so cleverly conceived; that had it been properly executed, not a man would have been lost.’⁸

Having exited the desert, Antigonus plundered the unspoiled countryside around Gabene in order to renew his supplies and refresh his army. Rather than return to winter quarters both sides again decided to settle the issue. Parts of Eumenes' army were still scattered. Learning that Eumenes' elephants were slow to come up and isolated, Antigonus decided to attempt to capture them. He sent a mobile force of 2,000 Median cavalry, 100 Tarentines and all his light infantry to intercept them. Eumenes responded by sending his own detachment of 1,500 cavalry and 3,000 light infantry to the rescue. Antigonus' men arrived first. The commanders of the elephants took a defensive position. They arranged the elephants in a square with all the baggage inside. To the rear they placed the 400 cavalry who accompanied them. The cavalry were quickly driven off by the superior numbers of Antigonus' horse. Antigonus' light troops were then able to attack the elephants with missiles. Before they could force the elephants' commanders to surrender, Eumenes' relief force arrived in time to save them. As with the lead up to Paraetaceni, both commanders had attempted to win an advantage over the other, but had been foiled by the other's talent.

A few days later the two armies were encamped about seven kilometres apart, in the area of Gabene, and prepared for battle. The likely site of the battle is somewhere south of modern Isfahan. With Eumenes' army once again gathered together the tensions around the command re-emerged. Plutarch recounts that most of the satraps met and determined to use Eumenes' skill in the coming battle but then to murder him. Warned of these plans Eumenes:

Went off to his tent, where he said to his friends that he was living in a great herd of wild beasts. Then he made his will, and tore up and destroyed his papers; he did not wish that after his death, in consequence of the secrets contained in these documents, accusations and calumnies should be brought against his correspondents. After this business had

been finished, he deliberated whether to give over the victory to the enemy, or to take flight through Media and Armenia and invade Cappadocia.⁹

The site of the battle was on a salt encrusted, sandy plain. The movement of masses of troops over the ground threw up huge clouds of dust which largely prevented the two armies from observing each other's movements.

Diodorus' account of the dispositions of the two sides for Gabene is much briefer than that of Paraetaceni. Antigonus formed up in the conventional manner, infantry in the centre and cavalry on the wings. The elephants were spread out evenly along his entire front. Pithon commanded the left and Antigonus took position on the right. The army consisted of 22,000 infantry, 9,000 cavalry and sixty-five elephants. Again the infantry total appears to exclude light troops. His army was clearly much reduced by its losses at Paraetaceni and its hard winter march. At Paraetaceni Antigonus' heavy infantry totalled 28,000. He lost 3,700 infantry dead plus wounded. Allowing for further attrition, 22,000 men would seem to be a reasonable total for the heavy infantry alone. Antigonus' heavy infantry no longer significantly outnumbered Eumenes' and was probably lower in morale after its earlier mauling at the hands of the Silver Shields. Antigonus' most likely plan was to win on the wings where his cavalry still outnumbered those of Eumenes.

Eumenes decided to reverse the normal order. He placed himself and the best of the cavalry on the left, directly opposed to Antigonus. Alongside him was Peucestes and the other suspect satraps. In front of the left wing he stationed sixty elephants. He also reversed the order of his infantry, placing the Silver Shields and the Hypaspists on the left, opposite Antigonus' Macedonians. The weakest of the cavalry was placed on the right. The rest of the elephants were stationed in front of the centre and right. The army totalled 36,700 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 114 elephants. Again the infantry total probably includes a large number of light

infantry. Eumenes' plan appears to be to attack directly with his best troops against those of Antigonos. Perhaps he hoped that the death or rout, of Antigonos would win him a quick victory just as the death of Craterus had three years earlier.

Unlike Paraetaceni we do have other accounts of the battle, or parts of it, recorded by Plutarch and Polyaeus. At this point in the narrative both Diodorus and Plutarch use the opportunity to describe the abilities and prestige of Alexander's foot guards, the Silver Shields. Antigenes sent forward a messenger to abuse the Macedonians opposed to them: "wicked men, are you sinning against your fathers, who conquered the whole world under Philip and Alexander?" and added that in a little while they would see that these veterans were worthy both of the kings and of their own past battles.¹⁰ The thought that they were about to fight not only their countrymen, but the Alexander's guardsmen, appears to have disturbed Antigonos' Macedonians, whereas the Silver Shields were keen to prove their superiority. Hearing a cheer come from his men, Eumenes 'gave the sign by which he directed the trumpeters to sound the signal for combat and the whole army to raise the battle cry.'¹¹

The battle opened on Antigonos' right with the clash of the elephants and the cavalry of both sides. The fighting threw large amounts of dust into the air and soon the visibility was reduced to the immediate area. It was now that Antigonos decided on a stratagem that 'might prevail over the enemy without labour.'¹² He sent a detachment of Median cavalry and Tarentines to circle round the fighting and attack the baggage of the enemy. As many of the soldiers in Eumenes' army would have stored their entire wealth and families with the baggage, its loss might persuade them to surrender. Antigonos' cavalry found Eumenes' camp, 'packed with a multitude of persons who were useless for fighting but had few defenders',¹³ about a kilometre behind the battlefield. They quickly overwhelmed the few who resisted, captured the camp and carried away the portable wealth and the people.

This time the elephants of both sides opened the battle. Perhaps Eumenes hoped to negate Antigonos' superiority in cavalry numbers with his own superiority in elephants. If so, he was to be disappointed. Eumenes' 'leading elephant fell after having been engaged with the strongest of those arrayed against it.'¹⁴ Wild elephants fight head to head until the weaker turns away when it is gored, sometimes fatally, by the tusks of the victor. Polybius describes how this natural behavior is continued by war elephants:

The way in which these animals fight is as follows. With their tusks firmly interlocked they shove with all their might, each trying to force the other to give ground, until the one who proves strongest pushes aside the other's trunk, and then, when he has once made him turn and has him in the flank, he gores him with his tusks as a bull does with his horns.¹⁵

Elephants are herd animals and the loss of their leader would have caused panic among others of Eumenes' animals.

While this was happening, Antigonos bypassed the fighting elephants and launched a ferocious cavalry charge against that part of Eumenes' line held by Peucestes. The attack 'struck panic into Peucestes, satrap of Persia, who in retiring from the dust cloud with his own cavalry drew away fifteen hundred others as well.' Diodorus attributes Peucestes' withdrawal to the strength of Antigonos' attack. Plutarch is more suspicious, accusing Peucestes of fighting 'in a way that was altogether lax and ignoble.'¹⁶

Eumenes was now isolated on the extreme left of his line. Feeling it shameful to flee, he launched a ferocious charge in a desperate attempt to either kill Antigonos or die heroically in the attempt. The attack was in vain. Antigonos' superior numbers told and he swept away Eumenes' left wing. Eumenes, taking advantage of the dust, led what remained of the cavalry to his right wing where he assumed command.

Meanwhile the fighting between the two infantry centres had gone much better for Eumenes. The Silver Shields had routed their dispirited Macedonian opponents. Due to the length of their spears, fighting between two pike armed phalanxes could not be the close, shield to shield combat of hoplites. Instead the two bodies would fight at a short distance, fencing with their weapons. In this fight the Silver Shields:

Were not to be checked in their charge and engaged the entire opposing phalanx, showing themselves so superior in skill and strength that of their own men they lost not one, but of those who opposed them they slew over five thousand and routed the entire force of foot soldiers, whose numbers were many times their own.¹⁷

It is of course impossible for the 3,000 Silver Shields to have fought Antigonos' entire phalanx head on. What probably happened is that after defeating Antigonos' Macedonians, rather than pursuing them too far, they maintained discipline and halted. Turning to their right, they then rolled up the rest of Antigonos' infantry by charging them in their vulnerable flanks. The sources focus exclusively on the courage of the Silver Shields in battle in order to contrast it to their later treachery off the field of battle. Eumenes' other infantry, especially the Hypaspists, must have played their own part in the fighting.

As in the previous encounter both sides' battle lines were scattered. Antigonos' centre had fled but so too had Eumenes' left. On the other wing the sides stood unengaged and intact. Having learned of the capture of his baggage train, Eumenes attempted to gather together his surviving cavalry and renew the mounted battle against Antigonos. He consciously emulated Alexander who, after losing part of his baggage at Gaugamela, encouraged his troops by declaiming, 'that if we win this battle we shall not only recover our own baggage but also capture the enemy's'.¹⁸ Eumenes did not, however, have the same control over his army that

Alexander did. He ordered Peucestes, who had not withdrawn far, to rejoin him. Peucestes, however, ignored him and retreated further away.

Antigonus had rallied his own command from the pursuit. He joined Pithon and divided his cavalry into two detachments. One, under his own command he used to counter any moves by Eumenes. The other, commanded by Pithon, was sent to harass the Silver Shields, who were now isolated from their own cavalry support. The Silver Shields, and presumably Eumenes other heavy infantry, formed a square to protect their flanks from mounted attack and withdrew across the battlefield to Peucestes' position. There they abused Peucestes, blaming him for the defeat of the cavalry.

As night fell, Eumenes retired to their position. Once again he was keen to continue the fight, pointing out that although the cavalry numbers were about even, the enemy infantry were shattered. His commanders, however, had no stomach for further fighting and wished to quit the battlefield and withdraw further east to the safety of their own satrapies. 'The Macedonians, however, refused to heed either party since their baggage had been taken, and their children, their wives, and many other relatives were in the hands of the enemy.'¹⁹ The meeting broke up without any decision having been made.

During the battle Antigonus lost 5,000 men, mostly from the infantry, whereas Eumenes' losses were only three hundred. The Silver Shields victory was so overwhelming that none were reported to have been killed. Eumenes had the better of the fighting, but again the lack of discipline in his army had meant that he had been unable to force a decision on the battlefield. The issue would now be settled by treachery.

After three days of this standoff, the Macedonians of Eumenes sent Teutamus to Antigonus to demand the return of their baggage. Knowing the effect that the loss of their possessions and families would have had, Antigonus responded:

With a proclamation, that he would let every soldier recover his property without a ransom. After this proclamation, many of them immediately revolted to him – not only Macedonians, but also ten thousand Persians under the command of Peucestes. For as soon as he saw that the Macedonians inclined to Antigonus, he followed their example.²⁰

Learning of their betrayal Eumenes attempted to escape but was captured and bound. He tried to address his army, reminding them that they had taken an oath of loyalty to him. He begged them to release him or otherwise to allow him a sword to kill himself. The Silver Shields were unmoved, they shouted him down and called out to:

Pay no attention to his babbling; for it was not so dreadful a thing, they said, that a pest from the Chersonesus should come to grief for having harassed Macedonians with infinite wars, as that the best of the soldiers of Philip and Alexander, after all their toils, should in their old age be robbed of their rewards and get their support from others, and that their wives should be spending the third night now in the arms of their enemies.²¹

They then dragged Eumenes, in chains, to the camp of Antigonus.²²

According to Plutarch, Antigonus could not bear to have Eumenes brought before him in case he was swayed in his decision as to Eumenes fate ‘by reason of their former intimate friendship.’²³ He did ease his imprisonment by removing the heaviest of his shackles and allowing his friends to visit him. Antigonus considered forgiving and recruiting his former friend but eventually decided to have him executed. The various sources give different reasons for this decision. Diodorus states that Antigonus believed that he could never truly trust Eumenes due to

his loyalty to Olympias and the kings but even more so because of his breach of faith after his release from Nora. Plutarch and Nepos claim that it was Antigonus' Friends who insisted on his death, 'for they saw that if Eumenes were admitted to his councils, they themselves would be of small account in comparison with him.'²⁴ No doubt all these reasons played a part in Antigonus' decision but in the end he had no real choice but to execute his enemy. Nonetheless, after his death Antigonus, unlike his treatment of Alcetas' corpse, allowed Eumenes friends to collect his ashes and send them to his wife and children.²⁵

Eumenes was not the only commander to be removed. Antigonus also executed Antigenes, Eudamus and 'certain others of those who had always been hostile to him.'²⁶ A number of others had simply fled. The bulk of Eumenes' troops had their baggage returned and were recruited into Antigonus' army. The future historian Hieronymus of Cardia, who was wounded in the battle, was taken into Antigonus' service and loyally served the family for three generations.

At first Antigonus liberally rewarded the Silver Shields for delivering Eumenes to him. Despite this he never trusted them, nor forgave their betrayal of Eumenes, believing them to be 'impious and bestial men.'²⁷ Now that his enemies had either been killed or rendered no threat, Antigonus was free to settle affairs in Asia as he saw fit.

Chapter 9

The Causes of the Third Successor War

Perdiccas and his brother, with Eumenes ... and other leaders of the opposite party, being killed, the contention among the successors of Alexander seemed to be at an end; when, on a sudden, a dispute arose among the conquerors themselves; for Ptolemy, Cassander, and Lysimachus, demanded that "the money taken amongst the spoil, and the provinces, should be divided."

Justin 15.1.

The death of Eumenes and the surrender of his army now meant that Antigonus was supreme in Asia. He could settle the east as he saw fit. His first task was to re-organize his army which, including Eumenes forces, now numbered over 60,000 men. It would have been difficult to keep together and feed such a large force, especially in the middle of winter. Many of the local troops were probably released and sent home. Antigonus returned to Media and wintered in a village near Ecbatana. The army was scattered throughout the region, in areas so far untouched by the war.

One possible rival to Antigonus' command was Pithon. He had the prestige of being a former bodyguard of Alexander and was popular in his satrapy of Media. In the two battles he had served as Antigonus' second in command. Any claims he made to be appointed as overseer of the eastern satrapies, a role he had coveted since the death of Alexander, would be hard to deny. Antigonus would have been wary of appointing such an ambitious man to such powerful position.

According to both Diodorus and Polyaeus, Pithon now began to plot against Antigonus. When news of his intrigues was brought

to Antigonus he concealed his thoughts and publicly announced:

That he was about to leave Pithon as general of the upper satrapies with an army sufficient for their safety. He even wrote to Pithon himself a letter asking him to come as soon as possible, so that he might discuss the necessary matters with him in person and then quickly make his journey to the sea.¹

The reality was quite different, Antigonus planned to permanently remove his rival.

Pithon believed, somewhat naively, that his ambitions were about to be realized. Perhaps he thought that in his own satrapy, surrounded by his friends and subjects he would be safe. If so, he was to be cruelly disappointed. As soon as he came to Antigonus, he was arrested and prosecuted for treason. There could be no doubt of the verdict, Antigonus' friends found him guilty. He was executed immediately to prevent any attempt at rescue.

Both our surviving sources record the details of Pithon's treason as fact. Polyaeus claims that Pithon 'had raised a foreign army and was planning to revolt', presumably the local Median troops from his own satrapy. Diodorus adds that he 'was winning the support of many of the soldiers in the winter quarters by promises and gifts and that he planned to revolt.'² It is sometimes argued that the rumour of Pithon's planned rebellion was simply a conspiracy concocted by Antigonus to remove a powerful rival.³ This is not impossible, but given Pithon's history, the accusations are credible and the planned rebellion was probably genuine.

Further evidence of that the conspiracy was real was the later revolt by Pithon's supporters, after the Antigonus had departed Media. Before leaving Media, Antigonus appointed a Mede, Orontobates to be satrap but limited his power by appointing a Macedonian general to command the garrison. Neither would be able to fully control the wealthy and strategically important satrapy. Nonetheless, the two combined to crush the revolt of

Pithon's friends.

Pithon's death ended the career of one of the most active intriguers and perennial losers of the era of the Successors. Four times he made an attempt to establish himself as an independent power and each time he had failed. First he was thwarted by his Macedonian troops after putting down a colonist revolt in the east following Alexander's death, next he was dismissed as co-regent at Triparadeisus, then defeated by Peucestes and finally he failed in his revolt against Antigonos. Each time he had fallen short and finally he had paid the usual cost of failure in Macedonian civil wars.

From Media Antigonos marched to Persia where, in recognition of his victory over Eumenes, he was proclaimed king of Asia by the local population. The title was probably the traditional Persian title of "King of Kings", which recognized his superiority over any local rulers. Antigonos sat down with his friends to decide on the distribution of the satrapies. Many of the satraps who served with Eumenes, and had fled after the battle, kept their former positions. Antigonos decided that it was too difficult to remove them 'since they had conducted themselves well towards the inhabitants and had many supporters'.⁴ Their survival might also infer that any treachery at Gabene was not limited to Peucestes. The vacant satrapies were distributed to his friends.

In appointing satraps Antigonos was once again exercising royal powers. Despite being proclaimed king by his Persian subjects, Antigonos was not yet ready to adopt the title while an Argead still ruled in Macedonia. Documents from Babylonia continue to refer to him as royal general not king. He appears, however, to have adopted some of the outward trappings of royalty.⁵ As supreme commander of Asia, Antigonos no doubt believed that he had the right to exercise the powers of a regent.

While in Persia, Antigonos decided that, like Pithon, Peucestes was too popular among his subjects and carried too much prestige as a former bodyguard of Alexander. He could not be allowed to

continue to rule such an important region. As with Pithon, he was lured into a sense of security by empty promises of advancement before he was removed. Peucestes' removal created great anger among his Persian supporters. When one of the Persian nobles 'said frankly that the Persians would not obey anyone else',⁶ Antigonus cowed the opposition by the simple expedient of executing him as an example to the others. He appointed a new satrap and provided him with a sufficiently strong garrison to control the region. By this display of force, Antigonus demonstrated to his new subjects exactly who ruled them. Unlike Pithon, Peucestes was allowed to live and joined Antigonus' court. It was probably while he was in Persia that Antigonus appointed one of his Friends, Nicanor, as commander of the eastern satrapies, the role coveted by both Pithon and Peucestes.

It was also in Persia that Antigonus dealt with the Silver Shields. In order to destroy their influence he split them up as a unit. He dispatched the ringleaders of the betrayal of Eumenes to Arachosia and gave orders 'that not a man of them might ever come to Macedon, or so much as within sight of the Greek Sea.'⁷ The rest were scattered about the eastern satrapies in various garrisons.

Next stop on Antigonus' march was Susa with its royal treasury. Within it he found 15,000 talents of gold and silver objects of art and 5,000 talents of cash. This was added to another 5,000 talents taken from the treasury of Media. Antigonus now controlled in total 25,000 talents in weight of treasure and money. In money terms, based on silver, this would have been much greater, as gold was roughly twelve times the value of silver. This was a truly tremendous sum, many times the annual revenue of 11,000 talents that Antigonus controlled now that he was undisputed ruler of Asia.⁸

The 9,880 talents of silver paid in tribute to the Persians (Herodotus 3.95) is similar to the 11,000 talents of revenue able to be collected by Antigonus in 316 from the same area, excluding

Egypt but adding Persia which was exempt under the Persian kings. This supports the idea that Alexander, and his immediate Successors, had not yet had time to re-organize the collection of revenue from their domains and simply continued to collect the previous Persian tribute. This revenue was used by the central authority for making war, supporting the court and administration, large scale public works and relief for communities suffering from natural disasters or the ravages of war. This was only a part of their subjects' tax burden. The local rulers would also need revenue to support their own administrations.

Having brought the eastern satrapies firmly under his control, and expropriated the contents of the royal coffers, Antigonos now turned his attention towards his ally Seleucus, another who had served with distinction under Alexander. Seleucus welcomed Antigonos to Babylon and 'honoured him with gifts suitable for a king and feasted the whole army.'⁹ Antigonos had already decided that Seleucus was too powerful and independent. He exerted his authority by demanding that Seleucus account for his revenues from the satrapy. Seleucus refused, claiming he held the province by virtue of his service under Alexander. The dispute became a heated contest of wills. Seleucus, 'reasoning from the fate of Pithon, feared that Antigonos would someday seize a pretext and undertake to destroy him',¹⁰ fled to Ptolemy in Egypt.

It is at this point that Diodorus decides to relate one of the many anecdotes in his work that show the influence of the gods over the lives of mortals. At first Antigonos was relieved at Seleucus' escape as it saved him from the ignominy of having to execute another ally. Then he was told by some Babylonian astrologers that if he let Seleucus escape the consequence would be that Seleucus would become ruler of all Asia. He sent troops to chase Seleucus but was too late. Appian (*Syrian Wars* 56) records a number of other prophecies predicting Seleucus future rule over Asia. The most famous being Seleucus rescuing Alexander's diadem, the symbol of kingship, during a river trip and placing it

on his head to avoid getting it wet. This predicted both Alexander's death and Seleucus' rise. These stories of prophecy are common enough for future rulers, particularly during this era. They are most likely apocryphal.

Diodorus does, however, end this passage by giving us another interesting insight into Antigonus' character. He relates that 'Antigonus was accustomed to despise prophecies of this kind.'¹¹ This was a very unusual trait in such a superstitious age. One usually limited to well educated people. Plutarch describes how Dion, a student of Plato, dismissed a prophesy, as he 'knew that eclipses recurred at regular intervals, and that the shadow projected on the moon was caused by the interposition of earth between her and the sun.' This is contrasted to the Athenian general, Nicias, who when he saw an eclipse of the moon believed that it 'was a great terror to Nicias and all those who were ignorant or superstitious enough to quake at such a sight.'¹²

Once he had arrived in Egypt, Seleucus accused Antigonus of overthrowing anyone of rank, particularly those who had served under Alexander. He claimed that Antigonus was aiming at the control of the entire kingdom of the Macedonians. Seleucus' accusation that Antigonus was removing anyone who posed a potential threat to him was well supported by the facts. Since the death of Antipater, Antigonus had expelled or executed a number of Alexander's bodyguards and commanders, including such notables as Arrhidaeus, Cleitus, Eumenes, Antigenes, Pithon, Peucestes and Seleucus. With the exception of Eumenes, all had been appointed satraps by Antipater at Triparadeisus. Antigonus clearly felt far more confident with his own Friends in positions of power.

This would have been unwelcome news to Ptolemy who may have feared for his own position. Ptolemy had illegally annexed Phoenicia and Coele-Syria (Israel and Palestine) in Antigonus' absence. Both regions were considered essential to the defence of Egypt by Ptolemy and his successors. He had no intention of

giving them up and therefore a future clash with Antigonus was almost inevitable. Seleucus was therefore given a warm welcome by Ptolemy. He would be a valuable asset, being an experienced commander and a convenient *casus belli*, living proof of Antigonus' supposed illegal actions.

With his removal of Seleucus, Antigonus had completed the plan outlined to his friends after the death of Antipater. The satrapies had all either been assigned to his supporters or the incumbents sufficiently cowed by his victories. Where local opposition had been encountered, such as in Persia, his response had been swift and merciless – the ringleader executed and a large garrison put in place. Anyone with sufficient prestige to oppose him had been neutralized or killed. Apart from Ptolemy's occupation of Phoenicia and Coele-Syria, Antigonus' rule in Asia was now complete.

Antigonus arrived in Cilicia in late 316 and appears to have spent the winter there. He added to his coffers by drawing another 10,000 talents from the royal treasury at Cyinda. Many changes had taken place in the west over the preceding year. In the autumn of 317, while Antigonus was confronting Eumenes at Paraetaceni, Eurydice, wife of Philip III, had launched a coup against Polyperchon. She sent a letter, in her husband's name, to Polyperchon, ordering him to surrender his command to Cassander. Her seizure of power caused Polyperchon to again invite Olympias to return to Macedonia. Fearing for the safety of her grandson, this time Olympias agreed. The two women met at the borders of Macedonia. Olympias' status as the mother of Alexander prevailed and Eurydice's army deserted.

The Macedonians soon had cause to regret their decision. Olympias used her triumphant return to remove her rivals and settle old scores. Philip and Eurydice were soon murdered, making her grandson, Alexander IV, sole king. None of the Macedonian soldiers would lay hands on their king, so Olympias employed Thracian mercenaries to hack Philip to death. Eurydice was

allowed to commit suicide. She was given a choice of poison, a knife or a noose. Having chosen to hang herself, Eurydice died praying 'that like gifts might fall the lot of Olympias.'¹³ Once these two were removed, Olympias murdered a hundred of Cassander's supporters, including his brother Nicanor. Even this was not enough to satiate Olympias' vengeance, she desecrated the tomb of another of Cassander's brothers, Iollas, for his alleged role in the death of Alexander. These atrocities soon caused many Macedonians 'to hate her ruthlessness.'¹⁴

Learning of Olympias' murders and her unpopularity, Cassander evaded the army of Polyperchon and marched into Macedonia in the winter of 317/6. Olympias, having lost most of her support through her cruelty, retreated to the coastal city of Pydna. Cassander besieged the city closely by land and sea. The garrison, overpopulated with Olympias courtiers, was soon reduced to starvation. A relief expedition from Epirus rebelled and deserted, deposing their king and making an alliance with Cassander. Polyperchon also attempted to relieve Pydna but as he approached, Cassander 'corrupted most of Polyperchon's soldiers by bribes so that there remained only a few.'¹⁵

With her situation now hopeless, Olympias surrendered on the promise that she would be spared. Cassander now controlled Macedonia but was nervous of allowing Olympias to survive due to the 'fickleness of the Macedonians.'¹⁶ Nonetheless, he wished to avoid breaking his oath publicly. Cassander's solution was simple and effective, he persuaded the relatives of those Olympias had murdered to condemn her in an assembly. When some of the Macedonians soldiers again balked at executing a member of the royal family, he sent the same relatives to kill her.

Cassander did not always show such scruples. One of Olympias' garrison commanders, Aristonous, who surrendered on a similar promise of safety was murdered. Cassander feared him as he 'was respected because of the preferment he had received from Alexander.'¹⁷ Aristonous was another of Alexander's bodyguards.

Antigonus was not the only commander who, having been an outsider to Alexander's court, was securing his rule by removing the friends of the former king.

Cassander further secured his position by marrying one of the surviving Argeads, Thessalonice, a daughter of Philip II. Alexander IV and his mother Roxane were isolated by being placed in custody in Amphipolis and stripped of any royal privileges. His only possible rival, Polyperchon had fled with a few supporters to Aetolia. Cassander was now supreme in Macedonia. He acted in a royal manner by presiding over the funerals of Philip III and Eurydice. Diodorus claims that he now 'began to to embrace in his hopes the Macedonian kingdom,'¹⁸ an accusation similar to that he has Seleucus make against Antigonus. Although both were assuming the powers and trappings of royalty, they could claim they were merely acting as regent. None of the Successors would claim to be king over the Macedonians while Alexander IV lived.

In the spring of 315 Antigonus moved into Syria. Here he was met by envoys from the three surviving rulers with any real power, Ptolemy, Cassander and Lysimachus. Since his flight from Babylonia, Seleucus had been encouraging the others to take action against Antigonus, claiming that his victories had made him arrogant, pointing out the magnitude of his forces and resources, and accusing him of a desire to seize the entire kingdom at the expense of the others.

The envoys presented Antigonus with a series of demands and an ultimatum. They insisted that he hand over the satrapies of Cappadocia and Lycia to Cassander, Hellespontine-Phrygia to Lysimachus, Syria to Ptolemy, Babylonia to Seleucus, and distribute the treasure he had captured. The other rulers argued their entitlement to a share in the spoils as they too had participated in the war. They threatened that they would wage war against Antigonus if their demands were not met. If Antigonus accepted these demands his domains in Asia Minor would have been separated from each other in a patchwork manner and

isolated from the eastern satrapies by Ptolemy in Syria and Seleucus' control of Babylonia.

None of the demands, except perhaps the re-instatement of Seleucus, were justified. They were clearly designed to force Antigonos into war. The reasons for the rival leaders' ultimatum were clear. They feared that the size of Antigonos' armies and his resources would enable him to seize complete power. If Antigonos was allowed to do this they would be removed from their positions, or worse. Seleucus gave the examples of himself, Pithon and Peucestes, who although they had performed services for, or been allied with Antigonos, had been replaced in their satrapies by his friends. Given Antigonos' actions throughout Asia Minor and the eastern satrapies since Antipater's death, such fears appear to be well grounded. Individually none were strong enough to stand against Antigonos. Their best hope of maintaining their independence was to stand together.

Antigonos replied angrily with accusations of his own, stating that:

“He would admit no partners in the advantages of a war of which he alone had undergone the perils.” And that he might seem to engage in an honourable contest with his confederates, he gave out that “his object was to avenge the death of Olympias, who had been murdered by Cassander, and to release the son of Alexander, his king, with his mother, from their confinement at Amphipolis.”¹⁹

Following Antigonos' refusal of the other commanders' terms, armed conflict between the rival dynasts was inevitable. Wars, however, do not occur without motives. This war appears to have been fought for the age old incentives of wealth and power, and can be seen as a continuation of the first two Successor Wars. Even after the death of Alexander the Great, power within Macedonian society was centred on the person of the monarch. The question of who should be regent and wield the royal powers had been the

cause of the first two wars of the Successors and would be the primary cause of the third.

At the start of 315 three people were able to lay claim to the position of regent. Polyperchon had been appointed to the office in Macedonia after Antipater's death. Cassander, after driving Polyperchon out of Macedonia, had taken Alexander IV into his charge. Although the sources are silent as to the exact nature of his rule he was certainly wielding powers usually associated with the king and should be seen as a rival regent. Having custody of the king, control of Macedon and command of a large army of Macedonians undoubtedly gave him the basis from which to assume the office.

Antigonus had never accepted Polyperchon's appointment, and if he had not formally claimed the office immediately after Antipater's death in 319, he had clearly been acting as *de facto* regent since. At an assembly of his army at Tyre in 315 Antigonus denounced Cassander as a criminal, declaring that he was the legitimate regent. Polyperchon's defeat by Cassander and his later acceptance of an alliance with Antigonus would effectively remove him as a creditable candidate. This narrowed the field down to the rival claims of Antigonus and Cassander.

The satraps of Asia had little choice other than to accept Antigonus, as they were all either his friends or sufficiently in awe of his power. Conversely the surviving commanders outside of Asia were in a position to exercise a choice. Polyperchon, attempting to resurrect his fortunes in Greece at the expense of Cassander, elected to ally himself with Antigonus. Lysimachus, who was bordered by both claimants, chose to support Cassander. Ptolemy, who had seized Coele-Syria and Phoenicia during the recent war, was in direct conflict with Antigonus over who should control these regions. Having greatly enlarged his realm by means of these annexations, Ptolemy appeared determined to maintain his rule regardless of any orders from the regent.

To both Lysimachus and Ptolemy, Cassander would have

appeared a more desirable choice of regent in preference to the powerful and ambitious Antigonos. The support of these commanders, however, should not be seen as unconditional or permanent. Despite being allies of Cassander events would show that Ptolemy and Lysimachus had their own agenda, primarily the continued rule over and expansion of their own domains. In 315 their mutual fear of Antigonos forced them to act in concert. An ancient version of the modern maxim, my enemy's enemy is my friend.

The question of who should control the wealth of Alexander's empire was also at stake. One of the main demands made on Antigonos was that he share the wealth he had seized from Asia. Then, as always, wealth and power were interlinked. The direct relationship between the two was expounded by Caesar: 'declaring that there were two things which created, protected, and increased sovereignties, – soldiers and money, – and that these two were dependent of each other ... and in case either one of them were lacking, the other also would be overthrown at the same time.'²⁰ In order to defend and increase one's domains armed forces were necessary and these could cost considerable amounts of money.

Military conquest also played an important role in the legitimizing of leadership. Above all a Macedonian ruler was a war leader. This legitimization of rule was even more essential for the Successors, who ruled by benefit of their victories over rival leaders. Preceding the battle of Gaugamela, Alexander had challenged Darius to stand and fight for his crown if he thought he deserved it. Military success was crucial for personal prestige and the right to rule. Although the Third Successor War would primarily be fought over who had the right to act as regent for Alexander IV, the capture of each other's domains would assume increasing importance. Already the rival commanders were seeing their conquests as "spear won land" in the same way that Alexander had assumed the rule of Asia after his defeat of Darius at Gaugamela.²¹

It has been argued by some scholars that the main cause of the outbreak of the war in 315 was the desire of Antigonos to make a bid for supreme power and to unite the empire of Alexander the Great under his own leadership. This ambition is compared to the supposedly more modest and regional ambitions of the other Successors, especially Ptolemy and Cassander. Ptolemy in particular is singled out as having purely limited goals.²²

Such arguments, however, appear to ignore the later actions of Ptolemy between the years 310 to 308. Portraying himself as the defender of Greek liberty, he invaded Cilicia and Lycia, and campaigned in Greece, attempting to win over the cities controlled by his former ally Cassander. He also intrigued with Alexander's sister Cleopatra, seeking to bring her to Egypt and to enter the royal family by marrying her.²³ These are not activities one would normally equate with limited ambitions.

Nor does the struggle to carve up the realms of both Antigonos and Cassander after their respective deaths, show any tendency to purely regional interests on behalf of any of the surviving dynasts. The very nature of Macedonian leadership and Hellenistic kingship demanded that all the major participants must aim for the dominant position or risk being destroyed. In theory there was no limit to their ambitions, as shown those attributed to Pyrrhus of Epirus who, after annexing all of Italy, desired to conquer Sicily, Carthage, Libya, Macedonia and all of Greece.²⁴ At least Pyrrhus' grandiose schemes had a limit, the poet Alcaeus of Messene claims that after conquering the land and the sea Philip V planned to march on Olympus itself.²⁵

A more realistic appraisal might well be that all the Successors aimed at dominating the entire Macedonian and Greek world, and anyone else over whom they could impose themselves. In 315 only Antigonos had the wealth and power to attempt such a course, the others were forced by their relative weakness to have more limited goals. To claim otherwise would appear to mistake necessity for policy. Following Antigonos' rejection of the demands of the other

commanders, war was inevitable.

Chapter 10

The Outbreak of the Third Successor War

Ptolemy and Cassander, forming an alliance with Lysimachus and Seleucus, made vigorous preparations for war by land and sea. Ptolemy had possession of Egypt, with the greater part of Africa, Cyprus, and Phoenicia. Macedonia and Greece were subject to Cassander. Antigonus had taken possession of Asia and the eastern countries.

Justin 15.1.

Once the decision had been made to go to war, both sides set about preparing for the conflict. Antigonus' victories had put enormous financial resources at his disposal. This allowed him to recruit and maintain a large army. Antigonus had returned to the west with perhaps 30–40,000 troops. To these could be added any troops he had left to garrison Asia Minor. The size of this force is not recorded but 10–20,000 men appears to have been the norm for this type of detached operation.¹ All things considered, Antigonus' army at the start of 315 was probably around 50–60,000. Although having large numbers of troops immediately under his command was useful, it was not a limit on the potential size of Antigonus' forces. The enormous amount of funds in Antigonus' hands meant that in addition he could hire large numbers of mercenaries.²

Antigonus' land forces were superior to those of any of his opponents, although it is difficult to assess accurately their numbers. It is unlikely that Cassander, at this time, could have fielded many more troops than the 25,000 who followed Polyperchon in 318, although he may have been able to call on his Greek allies. Ptolemy brought 22,000 troops to Gaza in 312.

Lysimachus had commanded only 6,000 soldiers against the Thracians in 323 which had increased to around 40,000 by Ipsus in 301.³ None had the financial resources to hire mercenaries on the same scale as Antigonus. One area where Antigonus was inferior to his opponents was in naval forces. In 315 Ptolemy was able to put 200 ships to sea while Antigonus lamented that he had none, but he was able to use his financial resources to rectify quickly this situation.⁴ All this would have been known to Antigonus and his rivals. Diodorus describes how 'Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Cassander, after making a mutual alliance, gathered their forces and prepared stocks of arms, missiles, and the other needful things.' Antigonus seeing that 'many men of great repute had combined against him, and computed the extent of the war that was springing up.'⁵

Nowhere does Diodorus tell us the strategies that would be adopted by the different sides but it is possible to deduce from future events what was decided. By denouncing Cassander and promising to free Alexander IV, Antigonus had publicly announced that removing Cassander and taking Macedonia were his main objectives. The coalition would respond by harassing Antigonus in Asia, making it difficult for him to concentrate his forces for a decisive blow. Cassander had, however, already shown that he took his claim to Cappadocia seriously. He had sent an army to besiege the Black Sea city of Amisus (Samsun).

Such strategies should, however, only be seen as general intentions. Ancient Hellenistic warfare was often conducted in a manner that would have modern military theorists shaking their heads in disbelief. The concept of maintenance of aim was rarely adhered to, and usually ignored due to the result of political events. The major powers were often forced to change their plans in order to save an important ally or to take advantage of an opportunity for an easy victory, usually as the result of political turmoil within an enemy city. Treachery among one's own allies and ambitious subordinates could unhinge the best laid plans.

Although Antigonus' main political opponent at the start of 315 was Cassander, he did not direct his initial military attacks against him. Instead he concentrated on securing the whole of Asia. Ptolemy needed to be removed from Phoenicia and Coele-Syria and Cassander's troops driven out of Cappadocia. Antigonus could not be everywhere at once. He dispatched his nephew, Ptolemaeus, to relieve the siege of Amisus. Once that task was completed he was to march to the Hellespont, to guard against any potential crossing by Cassander. Agents were sent to Cyprus to build an alliance against the most powerful king, Nicoreon, an ally of Ptolemy.

The war against Cassander in Greece was to be conducted by Polyperchon with financial assistance from Antigonus. Aristodemus, one of Antigonus' oldest and most trusted friends, was dispatched to the Peloponnesus with sufficient money to raise mercenaries and to establish an alliance with Polyperchon and his son Alexandros. The third of his enemies, Lysimachus, appears to have been discounted as a serious threat. His forces were small and his realm was constantly threatened from the north by the Scythians and Thracians. The Greek cities of Thrace resented their Macedonian overlords and were ready to rebel. Any threat from Lysimachus could be contained by Ptolemaeus once he had reached the Hellespont.⁶ In order to keep himself adequately informed of any further threats to his realm, Antigonus 'established at intervals throughout all that part of Asia of which he was master a system of fire-signals and dispatch-carriers, by means of which he expected to have quick service in all his business.'⁷

Once all these preparations had been made, Antigonus led his main army into Phoenicia. Ptolemy appears to have evacuated his garrisons in the Phoenician cities, except the strong fortress city of Tyre, at the same time as he had withdrawn the Phoenician ships and their crews to Egypt.⁸ Antigonus occupied the cities before halting at Tyre which was still occupied by Ptolemy's garrison.

While he was establishing his camp Seleucus deliberately sailed past with one hundred of Ptolemy's ships – an action which was supposed to have demoralized Antigonus' allies as they feared that their homelands would be plundered. 'Antigonus, however, bade them be of good courage, affirming that in that very summer he would take the sea with five hundred vessels.'⁹ To keep this promise he began to construct a fleet in order to challenge Ptolemy's dominance of the sea. The naval traditions of the Phoenician cities and the availability of suitable timber for ship construction may also have influenced Antigonus' decision to initiate military activity in the region.

Once he had seized these cities, Antigonus began the construction of ships in the Phoenician ports of Tripolis, Byblus and Sidon. More ships were to be built in Cilicia and Rhodes.¹⁰ After leaving a holding force at Tyre, Antigonus stormed Gaza and Joppa which were still occupied by Ptolemy's garrisons. He then returned to Tyre and began the siege of that city, a major undertaking which would last for a year and three months, ending in the autumn of 314.

Meanwhile, Ptolemaeus had relieved the siege of Amisus, allowing Cassander's invading army to surrender on terms and leave Asia. He then intervened in a war between the Bithynians and the local Greek cities, forcing both to ally themselves with Antigonus. After receiving new orders from Antigonus he continued into Ionia in order to counter the threat posed by Seleucus' naval activities, forcing him to lift his siege of Erythrae. Ptolemaeus had proved himself to be one of Antigonus' most talented subordinates. In a brief campaign he had driven Cassander's forces out of Asia, secured northern and western Asia Minor and won new allies for Antigonus. In Greece, Aristodemus had succeeded in raising 8,000 mercenaries and bringing Polyperchon, and Alexandros, into an alliance with Antigonus. Polyperchon was appointed general over the Peloponnesus and Alexandros came to Asia to meet with Antigonus.

Upon the arrival of Alexandros at Tyre, Antigonos began in earnest his political campaign against Cassander. He called together an assembly of his soldiers and any other Macedonians present. To this gathering he denounced the supposed crimes of Cassander: the murder of Olympias; his treatment of Roxane and the king; his forcible marriage to Thessalonice through which he obviously hoped to appropriate the throne; and his rebuilding of Olynthus and Thebes, both of which had been bitter enemies of the Macedonians.¹¹

After inciting the crowd against Cassander, Antigonos proposed a decree, which was carried by a vote of the assembly, to declare Cassander an enemy unless he released Roxane and the king, and destroyed Thebes and Olynthus. This part of the speech concentrated on denouncing Cassander's supposed betrayals of the policies of Philip II and Alexander the Great, and his disloyalty to their descendant. Antigonos demanded that Cassander was to render obedience to him, the duly established general who had succeeded to the regency.

The second part of the speech was aimed at winning over the cities of Greece to Antigonos' side. The allegiance of the Greek cities would give Antigonos access to considerable military manpower and further revenue. In another obvious attack on his enemies, Antigonos declared the cities of the Greeks to be free, autonomous and ungarrisoned. Antigonos was careful to include all major concerns of the cities. Not only was the somewhat abstract concept of freedom (*eleutheria*) promised but the more concrete guarantees of self government (*autonomia*) and to be free from garrisons (*aphrourtoi*) were given. Given the language of the time, the first promised to support some form of democratic government. More important, however was the last promise, without which the Greeks would have seen the first two as largely worthless. The biggest threat to a city's freedom and autonomy was the imposition of a foreign garrison. Even if the city retained its own government its freedom of action was curtailed by the

garrison which would allow immediate military action against the city if it stepped out of line.¹² This promise was no doubt again directed primarily at Cassander who had installed both garrisons and governors in the cities of Greece, most notably Athens. Ptolemy had also placed a garrison in the Greek city of Cyrene. As with Polyperchon's similar declaration three years earlier it was immensely popular. Ptolemy soon attempted to emulate it and disseminated his own decree pronouncing the freedom of the Greeks.

Copies of the decree were then widely distributed to many areas. Diodorus gives two plausible motives for this decree: that through their desire for freedom the Greeks would become willing allies in the war; and that the fickle eastern satraps, who suspected Antigonos of plotting to overthrow the king would remain obedient. There can be little doubt that Antigonos' proclamation was a piece of propaganda designed at undermining his enemies, particularly Cassander.¹³ To assist in his campaign in Greece, Antigonos gave Alexandros 500 talents and sent him back to the Peloponnesus.

Antigonos' Tyre proclamation soon had effect among the populations of the Greek cities. The opponents of Cassander in Argos, probably the city's democratic faction, rebelled and called for Alexandros to help them. He came too late, Cassander's troops arrived first and burned alive 500 of the rebels who had occupied their city hall. More were arrested and killed or exiled. This was the beginning of a series of bloody civil wars in the cities of Greece as political rivals sought help from the opposing sides. With his Tyre proclamation, Antigonos had in essence promised to support democratic factions, whereas Cassander had consistently supported oligarchies and tyrannies.

Political struggle, *stasis*, within the Greek cities was always rife. At its basic level it was a class struggle between rich and poor, democrat and oligarch. In reality, however, things were always more complicated. Both factions would be led by the rich, often

aristocrats, as only such individuals had the time to involve themselves fully in politics. Family ties and traditions, as well as personal rivalries, would often be more important than any professed ideology. This often led to increasingly bitter, often violent struggles, with the winning side massacring and exiling their opponents. These tendencies were always exacerbated in war time as both sides could find support from opposing outside powers. The rival factions' hatred for one another was often greater than their fear of foreign domination. Both sides were often willing to accept their freedom being compromised if it meant they got to rule the city internally and annihilate their opponents. As Thucydides observes:

In peace there would be neither the pretext or the wish to make such invitations; but in war, with an alliance always at the command of either faction for the hurt of their adversaries and for their own corresponding advantage, opportunities for bringing in the foreigner were never wanting to the revolutionary parties. The sufferings that revolution entailed upon the cities were many and terrible.¹⁴

In response to Aristodemus' initiatives in southern Greece, Cassander attempted but failed to win over Polyperchon. Realizing that for now Antigonos was fully occupied in Asia, Cassander decided to wage an offensive war in Greece. He took the field himself, capturing a number of Peloponnesian cities held by Polyperchon and ravaged the territory of Corinth. Next he attacked Orchomenus and was admitted by a faction hostile to Alexandros. A garrison was installed and the supporters of Alexandros were massacred. Finally he displayed his predominance in the region by presiding over the Nemean games, most likely held in the late summer. His position apparently restored, he returned to Macedonia.

Once Cassander had gone, Alexandros and Aristodemus

attempted to drive out Cassander's garrisons but with little success. Believing that Cassander was winning, Alexandros decided to betray his father and join the winning side. He deserted to Cassander after being given command of all the Peloponnesus.

Elsewhere, Asander the satrap of Caria rebelled against Antigonus and made an alliance with Ptolemy, breaking his complete hegemony over Asia Minor. Ptolemy scored a success in Cyprus where Seleucus had won a number of victories over Antigonus' allies on the island. Such was the success of Seleucus that 10,000 mercenaries sent by Ptolemy were able to be re-directed to assist Asander. Ships were also sent to assist Cassander's forces in Greece. In response, Antigonus had ordered Ptolemaeus to march to Caria but due to the lateness of the year, he had been unable to make any headway against the now reinforced Asander.

Towards the end of the year Antigonus was finally able to assemble a fleet, not quite the 500 he had promised but a significant force of 240 warships. Of these some were probably the traditional warship of the Greeks, the trireme. The trireme (a three) was an oared ship with 3 banks of oars, each with a single rower. It was about thirty seven metres long and crewed by between 210 and 240 men, depending on how many marines were carried. During the fourth century larger ships were being built, quadriremes (fours) and quinqueremes (fives), their names coming from the number of rowers per bank. Although about the same length as a trireme these ships carried considerably more crew and marines. A quinquereme fully crewed for battle carried 420 crew and marines.¹⁵

Antigonus' new fleet consisted of thirty small undecked vessels, ninety four quadriremes, ten quinqueremes and three larger vessels, one nine and two tens. Presumably the other 103 ships were triremes. This was all done at significant cost. The building and fitting out of the vessels would cost at least 480 talents, probably much more. The wages for the crews would have been

about seven talents per day.¹⁶ Antigonus sent fifty ships to the Peloponnesus while the rest, commanded by his nephew, Dioscorides, were to make an expedition to win over those islands in the Aegean that had not already allied with him. The islands were probably organized into a formal alliance with Antigonus.¹⁷

A final defeat for the year was suffered by Antigonus, when a combined naval and land force sent to reinforce Ptolemaeus was ambushed and defeated off Lycia by Ptolemy's forces. Ptolemy celebrated this event as a great victory. After this setback, Antigonus met with Ptolemy on the border of their lands, between Egypt and Coele-Syria at his own initiative, most likely in an attempt to divide his enemies and isolate Cassander. Unfortunately the sources do not record what was discussed but Diodorus implies that Ptolemy was in a belligerent mood, probably exalted after his recent victories. Ptolemy made a number of demands but Antigonus refused to make any concessions. It is possible that Ptolemy re-iterated his claims to Phoenicia and Coele-Syria and to share Antigonus' spoils, but this can only be speculation. The desire to possess Coele-Syria and Phoenicia appears to have been an ongoing obsession for both Ptolemy and his successors. After Antigonus' death, repeated wars would be fought over the region by the Ptolemaic and Seleucid dynasties.¹⁸

The campaigns of 315 had begun well for Antigonus – his enemies had been driven out of Asia Minor, Coele-Syria and Phoenicia except for Tyre, which was under siege. Antigonus' fortunes reached their zenith with the propaganda success of his Tyre decree. From that point onward, in this year, his position rapidly deteriorated, partly due to Ptolemy's military successes but mostly through the defections of his allies. The war against Cassander in Greece had also begun promisingly but had eventually been undermined by Cassander's victories, Polyperchon's ineffectiveness and Alexandros' defection. The allies' main strategic goal appears to have been to contain Antigonus within Asia and to undermine his position by

subverting his subordinates. If this is an essentially correct analysis, they were largely successful. The most serious threat to Antigonos was Asander's rebellion in Caria. This, along with the siege of Tyre, would divert much of Antigonos' energy in the coming year and curtail his capacity to take decisive military action against his enemies.

Chapter 11

The Third Successor War Continues (314–313)

We displayed zeal for the freedom of the Greeks and ... as long as there was agreement on this point, we took part in the meeting at the Hellespont and if certain men had not raised difficulties, the matter would have been settled then.

Antigonus to the people of Scepsis.

The year 314 began with Antigonus still tied down by the continuing siege of Tyre. Ptolemaeus remained in Ionia, keeping watch on Asander in Caria. Aristodemus in Greece began the year with a considerable political victory, convincing the Aetolians to ally themselves with Antigonus. This broadened the war into central Greece and threatened to cut off Cassander in Macedonia from his allies in Boeotia and the Peloponnesus. Marching south from Aetolia with an army of mercenaries, Aristodemus crossed over to the Peloponnesus and defeated Alexandros at Cyllene. Next he advanced into Achaea driving Cassander's garrisons out of Patrae and Aegeum before returning to Aetolia.

Despite Aristodemus' departure, Antigonus' policy of freedom for the Greek cities bore fruit as the populace of Dyme rose against Cassander's garrison, only to be put down brutally by Alexandros, who punished the rebels with imprisonment, exile and execution. In response the Dymaeans called for assistance from Aristodemus' troops stationed in Aegium who drove out Alexandros' garrison. The victorious Dymaeans then proceeded to massacre both the garrison and those citizens who had supported Alexandros. The citizens of Sicyon joined the revolt against Cassander. They rebelled against Alexandros and assassinated him. His widow,

Cratesipolis, took command of the garrison, slaughtering the rebels and governing Sicyon and Corinth in her own right.

Cassander responded to Antigonus' alliance with the Aetolians by allying himself with their traditional enemies the Acarnanians, who were already engaged in a border war with the Aetolians. Cassander ravaged Aetolia with a large army and left a force behind to aid the Acarnanians. Cassander now decided to secure his western borders. He marched west to the Adriatic Sea, winning over the island of Leucas. Pushing north, through Epirus, he defeated the Illyrians, forcing a treaty upon them, and captured the city of Epidamnus. From there, his mission accomplished, he returned to Macedonia.

As soon as Cassander had departed, the Aetolians retaliated, capturing the Acarnanian city of Agrineum and massacred the inhabitants in violation of the terms of their surrender. In the northern Aegean, Dioscorides had succeeded in winning the islands of Lemnos and Imbros away from Athens, threatening their all important grain route from the Black Sea. Cassander ignored the plight of his new Acarnanian allies, deciding instead to concentrate his efforts against Antigonus. He sent an army to Caria as he 'was eager to force Antigonus into distracting undertakings so that he might not have leisure for crossing over into Europe.'¹ In addition, Cassander ordered the Athenians to send a fleet of twenty ships to Lemnos to unite with Seleucus and to force the islanders to abandon their alliance with Antigonus. The expedition to Lemnos was a disaster. Seleucus departed for the island of Cos, off the coast of Caria, to assist Asander. In his absence Dioscorides' fleet swooped down upon the Athenians driving them from the island and capturing most of their ships.

Having been reinforced by Ptolemy's mercenaries and Cassander's troops, Asander decided to attack Ptolemaeus after the latter had sent his army into winter quarters. Ptolemaeus was absent, burying his late father. The attack was another disaster, Ptolemaeus was forewarned by deserters and quickly returned,

gathering his army. Once again he showed his skill as a general. He surprised a part of Asander's army and stormed their camp in a night assault, capturing over 8,000 prisoners.

While all this was going on, Antigonus had been stubbornly besieging Tyre. Now that he had his own fleet he was able to complete the blockade of the city. Finally the city was starved into submission in the autumn of 314. Antigonus was now free to take the field in person. He decided it was time to settle affairs in Caria. Leaving his son Demetrius in Syria with 18,000 troops to guard against any invasion from Egypt, Antigonus marched his main army into Phrygia. He was, however, delayed and experienced some losses due to a sudden snowstorm while crossing the Taurus Mountains. Arriving too late in the year to continue campaigning, Antigonus went into winter quarters. Antigonus had ordered his navy in Phoenicia to join him. Along the way this fleet surprised and defeated thirty six ships of Cassander sent from Macedonia. Cassander's Carian offensive had been a complete debacle, he had lost both his army and fleet.

Diodorus records only limited activity for the year in Asia and the Aegean until the closing months of the year. With Antigonus tied down before Tyre, it was difficult to understand why his enemies were so apparently inactive. One must be cautious, however, in making an assessment of the year as our major source, Diodorus, concentrates on events in Sicily, and may have overly abridged his narrative, excising much of what occurred. Diodorus covers the campaigns of the Successors in 314 in only four books. This is minimal when compared to the twenty three books written to record the campaigns of 317. It is possible that the scarcity of coverage reflects an actual lack of action or alternatively that Diodorus did not find events interesting or dramatic enough to record in detail.

The second year of the war had been one of solid but unspectacular improvement for Antigonus. He had finally captured Tyre and won some gains in Greece and the islands. Cassander's

offensives in Lemnos and Caria had both been failures. Antigonos' biggest problem was the continued rebellion of Asander in Caria which provided a foothold in Asia for his enemies to exploit.

The year 313 began with a revolt of the Black Sea cities, lead by Callantia, against Lysimachus. They expelled their occupying garrisons and allied themselves with the Thracians and Scythians. It is often assumed that Antigonos instigated the rebellion.² Although he certainly benefited from the revolt, nowhere does Diodorus, our only detailed source for these events, claim that Antigonos instigated the revolt, simply that he sent aid to Callantia after the revolt had begun. Rather Diodorus (19.73) states that the cities rebelled to drive out Lysimachus' garrisons and regain their autonomy. Nonetheless, they were probably encouraged by Antigonos' Tyre proclamation and could reasonably have expected assistance.

Lysimachus, however, acted decisively. He marched through Thrace and forced the surrender of Odessus and Istria. He then marched on Callantia where the allied Thracians and Scythians had gathered. The Thracians were frightened into changing sides. Lysimachus defeated the Scythians in battle and drove them back over the frontier. He then recaptured all the rebellious cities, except Callantia which was placed under siege.

Meanwhile, Antigonos had dispatched an army under Pausanias and a fleet to aid the rebels. Encouraged by Antigonos' intervention, Seuthes, king of the Thracians again changed sides and occupied the important pass through the Haemus Mountains. Lysimachus, after leaving a force to continue the siege of Callantia,³ marched against the Thracians. In a fierce battle he won an overwhelming victory over the tribesmen. Following up his success, he caught Pausanias' army by surprise, killing him and capturing his force. Some of the prisoners were ransomed, the rest Lysimachus enrolled in his own army. An opportunity for Antigonos to seize a bridgehead across the Hellespont, while Lysimachus was distracted, had been lost.

After the failure of his forces in Thrace, Antigonus took steps to revitalize his expedition on the Greek mainland. Aristodemus was replaced by the apparently more energetic Telesphorus with reinforcements of fifty ships and a force of infantry. His orders were to free the cities and demonstrate the authenticity of the Tyre decree. Taking advantage of Cassander's pre-occupation with events in Aetolia and Epirus, Telesphorus quickly drove out all the garrisons installed by Alexandros, except those of Sicyon and Corinth. Next he brought the Boeotians into alliance with Antigonus. This must have been a major campaign but unfortunately we have few details.

Meanwhile, Cassander's brother, Philip, who had been campaigning in Aetolia, learnt of a revolt lead by Aeacides in Epirus. Aeacides was a former ally of Olympias and Polyperchon in the Second Successor War and had been driven from the kingship of Epirus by a rebellion of his own people. Circumstances must have changed, as on his return he quickly gathered a large army. Philip moved rapidly to prevent Aeacides from joining with the Aetolians and defeated the Epirotes in a pitched battle, inflicting heavy casualties. Aeacides rallied the survivors and was able to unite with the Aetolians. Philip advanced and defeated the allies in another battle fought a few days later in Acarnania, killing Aeacides. The two victories were decisive, Epirus again came under Macedonian control and the Aetolians were neutralized. Many of the Aetolians were forced to flee from their villages to the mountains. Aeacides' son, Pyrrhus, sought refuge with the Illyrians, later he joined Antigonus and eventually regained his father's crown.

In the early part of 313, Antigonus' problem of Caria seemed to be solved. Frightened by Antigonus' overwhelming strength, Asander came to terms with Antigonus. He was allowed to keep his satrapy on the conditions that he free the Greek cities, surrender his forces and hand over his brother as a hostage. A few days after accepting these conditions, Asander changed his mind.

He rescued his brother, rebelled against Antigonus and called for aid from Ptolemy and Seleucus.

Not surprisingly Antigonus was enraged at this betrayal and determined to solve the Carian problem permanently. Most likely Antigonus had been hoping to use the revolt against Lysimachus to cross into Europe. Instead he again found himself distracted by events in Asia. Antigonus gathered his forces and attacked by both land and sea in overwhelming force. After capturing Tralles, Antigonus marched south to the city of Caunus. As he went he detached columns west to capture the coastal cities of Miletus and Iasus with the support of his fleet. It was a brilliant campaign, co-ordinating multiple attacks by both land and sea. Antigonus' forces won a complete victory over Asander, who vanishes permanently from the historical record. Seleucus, who had ended 314 at Cos with a fleet, appears to have played no part in the campaign, either he had withdrawn or had insufficient forces to oppose Antigonus' fleet.

For the first time since the beginning of the war Antigonus was master of all Asia. The campaign had, however, been an unwelcome distraction, costing Antigonus valuable time and allowing Lysimachus to retain his control of the northern coast of the Hellespont. Any crossing into Europe would be opposed.

Following his victories in Caria, Antigonus received word of his new alliances with the Aetolians and Beotians. With his situation in Greece deteriorating, Cassander agreed to discuss peace with Antigonus. They met at the Hellespont but could not agree on terms. Presumably Lysimachus was also present. Antigonus would later claim that the sticking point was failure to agree on the treatment of the Greek cities.⁴ It is also possible that Antigonus demanded that Cassander surrender any claims to the regency and become a subordinate. Antigonus would show time and again that when he was in the ascendant he had a tendency to impose harsh terms.⁵

Rebuffed by Antigonus and encouraged by Philip's victories,

Cassander decided to resurrect his position in Greece. Setting out with thirty ships he attacked the city of Oreus in northern Euboea. This was a strategically important city as it dominated the channel between Euboea and Thessaly. Telesphorus responded to the threat, arriving from the Peloponnesus with twenty ships and 1,000 soldiers, and was reinforced by another 100 ships sent from Asia. He attacked immediately, burning four of Cassander's ships. After being reinforced by ships sent by the Athenians, Cassander counter attacked, catching the enemy by surprise, sinking one ship and capturing three. Having driven off the relieving forces he was able to continue the siege.

Antigonus responded to this defeat by dispatching his best general, Ptolemaeus, to Boeotia with 150 ships, 5,000 foot, 500 cavalry and orders to take overall command in Greece. Landing at Bathys in Boeotia, Ptolemaeus was reinforced by 2,000 infantry and 1,200 horse from the allied Boeotian cities. Rather than confront Cassander directly he drew him away from Oreus, further south in Euboea, by launching an attack against Chalcis. This city, held by one of Cassander's garrisons, was even more important as it dominated the narrow strait between Euboea and Boeotia. Cassander was forced to respond. He ordered reinforcements be sent from Macedonia and marched south to save Chalcis.

Antigonus now recalled his fleet and led his army in a dash to the Hellespont, hoping to draw Cassander away from central Greece. On this occasion, Diodorus describes a clear strategy on the part of Antigonus:

At once with his armies set out at top speed for the Hellespont as if intending to cross over into Macedonia, in order that, if Cassander remained in Euboea, he might himself occupy Macedonia while it was stripped of defenders, or that Cassander, going to the defence of his kingdom, might lose his supremacy in Greece.⁶

Cassander proved equal to the threat. Leaving a garrison to hold

Chalcis, he stormed the port city Oropus and marched across Boeotia. Thebes returned to its alliance with its saviour Cassander and the rest of the Boeotians were frightened into concluding a truce. His position in central Greece apparently secure, Cassander force marched his army to Macedonia to confront any attack by Antigonus.

Now that Cassander had retreated back into Macedonia, Ptolemaeus was able to carry out Antigonus' plan. He secured the surrender of Chalcis and, despite its important position, followed Antigonus' promise and left it ungarrisoned. The rest of the cities of Euboea allied themselves with Antigonus. Ptolemaeus then captured Oropus, returning it to the Boeotians. At the invitation of a secret faction of the Athenians, he invaded Attica. Demetrius of Phalerum, the tyrant of Athens imposed by Cassander, was forced to make a truce and to send an embassy to Antigonus to offer an alliance. Ptolemaeus then pushed on into Boeotia and Phocis, capturing Thebes and winning over most of the cities of the Phocians. He ended the year campaigning in Locris. The people of Corcyra also took advantage of Cassander's pre-occupation, expelling his garrisons from Apollonia and Epidamnus, handing the latter over to the Illyrians.

After arriving at the Hellespont, Antigonus attempted to facilitate his passage by bringing the Byzantines into his alliance, but pressure from Lysimachus persuaded them to remain neutral. With the weather closing in Antigonus dispersed his army into winter quarters. Diodorus' description of Antigonus' move to the Hellespont infers that it was a feint rather than a serious attempt to cross. Given the lateness of the year, it is unlikely that Antigonus would attempt to launch such a major seaborne operation in the face of serious opposition.

Ptolemy was faced by a revolt in the summer of the people of Cyrene who besieged his garrison. He sent a delegation to Cyrene to negotiate surrender but the people murdered his ambassadors. Enraged, Ptolemy sent both an army and a fleet to recapture the

city.⁷

Overall 313 had been a successful if frustrating year for Antigonus. At the start of the year he had probably hoped to cross into Europe and confront Cassander directly. The betrayal of Asander and the failure of Pausanias had, however, forced him to postpone his advance until late in the campaigning year. Because of these delays Antigonus was required to lower his expectations. His march to the Hellespont forced Cassander to confront him and abandon his position in central Greece. Ptolemaeus was then able to carry out successfully the objective of Antigonus' plan and overrun most of central Greece and Euboea. Although Antigonus was likely disappointed at not being able to cross into Europe that year, it had ended with Cassander threatened on three fronts – by Antigonus at the Hellespont, by Ptolemaeus wintering in Locris and by the Corcyrians and Illyrians to the west. Upon entering winter quarters Antigonus could well have looked forward with confidence to a successful campaign against Cassander the following year.

Chapter 12

The Battle of Gaza

But since he was young and inexperienced, and had for his adversary a man trained in the training-school of Alexander who had independently waged many great contests, he met with utter defeat near the city of Gaza.

Plutarch, *Eumenes* 5.

At the end of 313, Antigonos was in position at the Hellespont with an army and a fleet, poised to embark upon an invasion of Macedonia. The next we read of him is the autumn of 312, where he is preparing to winter in Celaenae. No details for Antigonos' actions during this period are recorded by Diodorus. This is one of the biggest problems in trying to reconstruct a narrative when it is almost totally reliant on the work of one author. It may be that nothing did happen. It is also possible that Antigonos attempted to find a way across the Hellespont but was thwarted by Lysimachus' control of the northern shore and the neutrality of the Byzantines. Diodorus may have decided that any desultory skirmishing involved was not dramatic enough to record, being more interested in the later battle of Gaza. The gap in the sources makes it impossible to know for certain.¹


Therefore any attempt to reconstruct the events of 312 prior to the battle of Gaza in the autumn of that year² is extremely difficult, given that our major source Diodorus covers the period in only three chapters. The only account of any actions taken by the forces of Antigonos concerns the rebellion of his commander Telesphorus. Resentful of the obvious preference shown to Ptolemaeus, Telesphorus sold his ships, occupied Elis, plundered Olympia and raised a force of mercenaries for his own purposes.

Ptolemaeus, hearing of Telesphorus' treachery, recaptured Elis and returned the treasure to Olympia. Telesphorus appears to have come to some sort of arrangement with Ptolemaeus, surrendering Cyllene and rejoining Antigonus.


At the same time as Telesphorus' revolt the people of Epirus bestowed the kingship on Alcetas, who was hostile to Cassander. Cassander invaded Epirus only to find that his local forces from Leucas had already defeated the Epirotes. He came to terms and made an alliance with Alcetas. Deciding to recapture Apollonia, Cassander moved against the city but was defeated, suffering heavy losses. The Corcyrians took advantage of Cassander's defeat to liberate Leucas.

The apparent lack of activity in Europe may again be due to the condensed nature of Diodorus' narrative, or may reflect an actual reduction in campaigning due to exhaustion and caution on both sides following the heavy fighting of 313. Cassander's freedom of action was limited by the multiple threats he faced, the continuing crises in Epirus and along the Adriatic coast. He does, however, seem to have maintained his control over Athens, as Demetrius of Phalerum and a Macedonian garrison were still in place in 307. Lysimachus was still involved in the siege of Callantia and was always faced by threats from the Thracians and Scythians to his north.

BATTLE of GAZA Opening moves



BATTLE of GAZA Final phase



In addition to putting down the revolt of Telesphorus, Ptolemaeus had to maintain a watch on the surviving garrisons of Cratesipolis and Cassander. That Ptolemaeus offered terms to Telesphorus rather than risk crushing him militarily implies the possibility that the revolt was a serious challenge to Antigonus' control of the Peloponnesus. Given the numerous local threats, Ptolemaeus may have been fully occupied protecting Antigonus' new allies in the Peloponnesus, Euboea, central Greece and

Aetolia.

Following the suppression of the revolt of Cyrene in the summer of 313, Ptolemy had campaigned successfully in Cyprus, placing his own ally as governor of the island. This campaign had ended sometime between the spring and autumn of 312. From Cyprus Ptolemy launched damaging raids against the coasts of Syria and Cilicia. Demetrius raced from his position in Coele-Syria to intercept Ptolemy's incursions but arrived too late. Antigonos may also have marched south in response to Ptolemy's raids only to find that he also was too late. Having failed to contact his enemy, he then went into winter quarters in his capital of Celaenae, probably disappointed that more had not been achieved during the year but still in a strong position.

The major part of Diodorus' narrative for 312 describes Ptolemy's invasion of Coele-Syria during the autumn. After his successful raids in Asia, Ptolemy had returned to Cyprus laden with booty and then sailed back to Egypt. There he decided, at the urging of Seleucus, to invade Coele-Syria and attack Demetrius. Perhaps Seleucus' long absence from his satrapy was making him doubt that he could ever recover it. For Ptolemy the return of Seleucus to Babylon would create a diversion for Antigonos at small cost to himself. If Seleucus were to fail he would lose little but if he were to succeed he has opened another front against his powerful enemy. Diodorus simply states that Ptolemy's objective was 'to make a campaign into Coele-Syria and take the field against the army of Demetrius.'³ Whether this was a raid to create a diversion for Seleucus' return or a genuine attempt to reconquer Phoenicia is not stated. If the latter, it was either a daring move on the part of Ptolemy or the balance of forces had altered in way that has not been recorded.

It was clearly late in the year when Ptolemy marched from Alexandria to the outskirts of Gaza, as Demetrius had to respond by gathering his army from winter quarters. The cooler weather may have made the march through the Sinai far more pleasant as

the region cools down after August. Ptolemy would also have hoped to gain the element of surprise. His army consisted of 18,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry.

Demetrius gathered his army at Gaza and prepared to confront Ptolemy. Plutarch describes the young Demetrius as being devoted to his mother and fond of his father 'from genuine affection rather than out of deference to his power.' He was tall, but not as tall as his father. Unlike his father's frightening appearance he 'had features of rare and astonishing beauty, so that no painter or sculptor ever achieved a likeness of him.'⁴ In a society that was obsessed with physical beauty, and equated it with goodness, this was always an advantage. Diodorus adds that he had 'a certain gentleness becoming a youthful king, which won for him the devotion of all.'⁵ According to Pausanias, Demetrius, 'for all his youth had already a reputation for good sense.'⁶

Despite Demetrius' obvious talents, Antigonus had appointed a number of his experienced friends to advise him. They all urged Demetrius to avoid a confrontation with so 'great a general and a superior force.'⁷ It was, nevertheless, an era where everyone measured themselves against Alexander. Demetrius was twenty four years of age, his father's heir but he had yet to command a battle. No doubt he remembered stories of Alexander who had been his father's regent and defeated the Thracians at the age of sixteen. On this occasion Demetrius' good sense abandoned him. As 'his father was already an old man, the hopes of the kingdom centring on his succession,'⁸ Demetrius resolved to prove himself worthy of command. He ignored the advice of his advisors and determined to do battle against Ptolemy.

The two armies faced one another on a plain just south of Gaza. Demetrius' army consisted of about 4,400 cavalry, 13,000 infantry and 43 elephants. He placed himself on the left wing with about 2,900 cavalry, including 800 Companions and 500 of his own guard. Protecting his main body were advance and flank guard detachments. In front of his left wing cavalry were stationed

thirty elephants supported by 1,500 light infantry armed with javelins and slings. The infantry centre consisted of 2,000 Macedonians, 1,000 Lycians and Pamphylians, and 8,000 mercenaries. In front of the phalanx were thirteen elephants and more light infantry. On the right were 1,500 cavalry, held back at an angle and ordered to avoid fighting. Demetrius' plan was obvious, he would attack with his strong left and refuse his right.

Ptolemy and Seleucus first drew up their line in a similar way to Demetrius, with a strong left, but when their scouts reported Demetrius' formation they decided to change their plan. They reformed their army so that their greatest strength was on the right, directly opposed to Demetrius. On this wing they paced their 3,000 strongest cavalry under their own command. In the centre was their infantry phalanx of Macedonians, mercenaries and some Egyptians 'armed and serviceable for battle.'⁹ On the left were the remaining 1,000 cavalry. Demetrius had erred by refusing his right and making his plan too obvious. Ptolemy was able to weaken his left to the point where, despite having less cavalry, he could gain parity on his right wing, where the battle would be decided.

Ptolemy and Seleucus had both fought against elephants under Alexander and knew their strengths and weaknesses. To counter Demetrius' elephants, they prepared a number of portable spiked obstacles to place in front of their advance. The men carrying them were placed with the right wing cavalry.

The battle opened on Demetrius extreme left wing where his cavalry had the best of the fighting. Ptolemy and Seleucus responded by charging personally with their own bodyguard cavalry. The clash soon became a whirling cavalry melee as both sides threw fresh units into the clash:

In the first charge indeed, the fighting was with spears, most of which were shattered, and many of the antagonists were wounded; then, rallying again, the men rushed into battle at sword's point, and, as they were locked in close

combat, many were slain on each side.¹⁰

With the cavalry battle at a stalemate, Demetrius ordered forward his elephants. They ‘advanced for a certain distance in a way for to inspire terror, just as if no one were going to withstand them.’¹¹ The barrier of spikes was set up before the elephants and behind it were light infantry javelin throwers and archers. The light infantry fire began to wound some of the elephants and their riders, who responded by driving their elephants forward over the spikes. Some were wounded in their tender feet by the barbs and others by the missiles. Their injuries enraged some of the elephants, causing disorder and panic among Demetrius’ cavalry who fled. The abandoned elephants were all captured by Ptolemy’s infantry. Demetrius tried in vain to rally his cavalry but was forced to quit the field. Demetrius did manage to keep the cavalry around him in good order, ‘so that no one of those who were pursuing at random lightly risked attacking,’¹² and escaped the field in safety.

The collapse of Demetrius’ left wing panicked his infantry centre who routed, throwing away their arms as they fled. The battle was over and it was a resounding victory for Ptolemy and Seleucus. Demetrius’ losses were more than 500 dead, mostly cavalry, including many nobles and two of Demetrius’ Friends. There were more than 8,000 captured, presumably mostly infantry. These were sent to Egypt to take service with Ptolemy, probably because Demetrius still held their baggage and they were not trusted to desert back to him to recover their belongings.¹³

After the battle, as Demetrius’ cavalry were passing Gaza some broke ranks and entered the city to recover their baggage. The gates soon became blocked with pack animals as each man attempted to escape with his own possessions. As a result of this break down in discipline the gates could not be shut and Ptolemy’s pursuers were able to enter and capture the city unopposed. Demetrius continued his retreat to the city of Azotus, fifty kilometres to the north. Ptolemy behaved in a generous way, he returned to Demetrius his baggage and those of his friends who

were captured without ransom, saying that 'their warfare must not be waged for all things alike, but only for glory and dominion.'¹⁴ He also used the opportunity to justify the war. He repeated his charges that despite them being allies, Antigonus had not shared his spoils and had illegally removed Seleucus.

Whatever Ptolemy's original objective had been, the completeness of his victory allowed him to continue his advance, over-running the countryside, winning over Sidon, and capturing Ace, Joppa and Samaria. Ptolemy approached Tyre but failed in his attempt to bribe the commander into surrendering the city, receiving insults in return. Perhaps most importantly for future events, Ptolemy consented to Seleucus' request to send him back to Babylonia, giving him a force of about a thousand soldiers and promising further aid.

Antigonus' strong strategic position had been undermined by Demetrius' impetuosity. Despite being outnumbered and facing two veterans of Alexander's campaigns, Demetrius insisted on fighting a completely unnecessary battle against the advice of his subordinates, who had been appointed by Antigonus to prevent just such a rash action. If Demetrius had refused battle, and awaited reinforcements, it is unlikely that Ptolemy could have achieved much given the lateness of the season and the proximity of Demetrius' army. Instead he would have been forced to maintain himself in hostile territory over the winter, or pillage the countryside and retreat to Egypt, as he later did when confronted by Antigonus.

Demetrius, however, through his apparent desire to prove himself, lost all of Coele-Syria, much of Phoenicia, and no doubt diminished his father's prestige, placing seeds of doubt in the minds of his allies and subordinates. His defeat meant that Antigonus was again forced to campaign in Asia the following year, rather than invade Europe. It also opened a route for Seleucus to return to Babylon. Of the two consequences the first likely appeared at the time to be the greater threat, but future

events would show the seriousness of the latter.

After retreating to Cilicia, Demetrius:

Took his disaster, not like a stripling thwarted at the outset of an undertaking, but like a sensible general acquainted with reverses of fortune, and busied himself with the levying of men and the preparation of arms, while he kept the cities well in hand and practised his new recruits.’¹⁵

He rebuilt his army and returned to Syria. Ptolemy detached a force under one of his commanders, Cilles, with orders to either crush Demetrius or drive him out of Syria. Cilles, perhaps because of Demetrius’ poor showing at Gaza, was overconfident and camped without precautions. Demetrius made a forced march during the night and took Cilles’ camp without a struggle, capturing the commander. Demetrius used the opportunity to show that he could be just as noble as Ptolemy, he released Cilles and his friends loaded with gifts. Expecting Ptolemy to march against him, he then took up a defensive position and requested that his father send reinforcements.

Chapter 13

The Peace of 311 and the End of the Third Successor War

With this small force Seleucus took Babylon, the inhabitants receiving him with enthusiasm, and within a short time he augmented his power greatly. Nevertheless Antigonus warded off the attack of Ptolemy.

Appian, *Syrian Wars* 54.

Antigonus was wintering in Celaenae when he learnt of his son's defeat at Gaza. Supposedly he took it all in good humour, joking that 'Ptolemy had conquered beardless youths, but must now fight with men.'¹ In the spring of 311 Antigonus left his winter quarters and marched rapidly into Syria to join Demetrius. Not prepared to face the overwhelming might of Antigonus' army Ptolemy decided to retreat to Egypt, abandoning all the territorial gains of his campaign but well laden with booty from looting the cities he had captured. In an inscription dated to the summer of 311, Ptolemy followed the tradition of earlier Pharaohs, described his failed campaign as an enormous success:

They fought with him, and he pressed into them, his heart strong, like that of a falcon among little birds. He grasped them all together and brought their great ones and their horses and their ships and all their precious articles to Baket (Egypt).²

Apparently ignorant of Seleucus' departure for Babylonia, Antigonus now attempted to take advantage of his presence in Syria by planning an invasion of Egypt. First, however, he decided

to protect his eastern flank by subduing the hostile Nabataeans. These were an Arab people who occupying an area roughly equating to modern Jordan. They are described as nomads who valued their freedom and were wealthy as a result of their control of the spice trade. When faced by invaders it was their usual strategy to retreat into the waterless desert, surviving on underground cisterns.

Antigonus sent two expeditions against them, both during a time when the Nabataeans were gathered for a traditional festival and market at a certain rock, which may have been at the location of the later city of Petra. The first expedition of 4,600 troops, commanded by Athenaeus, captured The Rock and much booty, including spices, prisoners and 500 talents of silver. Athenaeus marched hard to return to Antigonus but was careless. His force was destroyed in a night attack while they slept.

The Nabataeans sent a letter to Antigonus defending their action as self defence. Antigonus artfully replied that the attack was made contrary to his orders. The Nabataeans wisely did not trust Antigonus' word and remained alert. Antigonus was not one to give up his objectives so easily or to appear weak. For a time he desisted from a further attack until he believed that he had lulled the Nabataeans into a false sense of security. He then sent a second expedition of 4,400 soldiers commanded by Demetrius.

Demetrius' troops marched rapidly for three days but were then detected by lookouts who raised the alarm with fire signals. The Nabataeans removed most of their flocks and garrisoned The Rock. It was a strong position, high and approachable from only one direction. Demetrius assaulted the stronghold but was repulsed. The Nabataeans then offered terms, offering gifts, hostages, and to become friends of Antigonus. They also pointed out the difficulty of Demetrius maintaining his force in such a waterless region. Convinced, Demetrius made peace and returned to his father.

Antigonus was not impressed by his son's decision. He

described to him the philosophy of power in the Hellenistic world, stating that strong rulers should not accept terms from weaker peoples, as it made: 'the barbarians much bolder by leaving them unpunished, since it would seem to them that they had gained pardon not through his kindness but through his inability to overcome them.'³

During his return Demetrius had discovered a rich asphalt bed, a precious commodity sold to the Egyptians to embalm their dead. Antigonus, always having a keen eye for revenue, sent another expedition under Hieronymus to gather the asphalt. The expedition was attacked and driven off by the local Arabs. In keeping with his own belief, Antigonus probably would have sent a further expedition to punish the attackers. At this point, however, Antigonus was distracted by more important matters. A dispatch came to him from Nicanor that Seleucus was at large in the eastern satrapies.

Diodorus appears to have been particularly fascinated by Antigonus' Arabian campaigns as it occupies seven chapters of his work, whereas any events in Europe are not recorded at all. This omission leaves unanswered what Cassander and Lysimachus were doing while Antigonus was absent in Syria.

At first Antigonus' Arabian campaign appears to have been a major and unnecessary distraction. A closer reading shows that it was, however, merely a sideshow. Athenaeus' expedition was clearly a punitive expedition designed to intimidate the Arabs into submission before he marched on Egypt.⁴ It was Athenaeus' failure that caused Antigonus to send another expedition to punish the Nabataeans. The rock was only three days away. The whole incident would have been completed in less than a month and involved only small forces. Despite his father's displeasure at the loss of status, Demetrius' campaign appears to have secured most of its objectives.

The news that had come from the east was indeed grave. After the victory at Gaza, Seleucus had crossed the desert during the

winter accompanied by his Friends and 1,000 men supplied by Ptolemy. Seleucus confidently expected to be supported by the Babylonians as he had been popular while satrap of the province. On the march he recruited a body of Macedonians at the Mesopotamian city of Carrhae. These were possibly one of the detachments of the surviving Silver Shields and if so would have had no love for Antigonus.⁵ When he arrived in Babylon he was welcomed by most of the inhabitants. Another thousand troops deserted and joined Seleucus. Those who remained loyal to Antigonus, seeing the popularity of Seleucus, retreated back into the citadels of Babylon. Seleucus stormed the citadels, capturing Antigonus' supporters and releasing his own who had been imprisoned after his flight to Egypt.

Nicanor, Antigonus' general in Media, raised an army of 10,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry to put down the rebellion. Seleucus, with a force of 3,400 troops did not wait to be attacked but marched against Nicanor. When Nicanor approached, Seleucus concealed his army in the marshes. Nicanor made camp, but neglected to post sufficient guards. Seleucus launched a surprise attack, defeating Nicanor and recruiting many of his soldiers. He pursued the fleeing Nicanor, defeating him again in battle and killing him with his own hand. After these victories Seleucus easily won over Susiane and Media 'and some of the adjacent lands.'⁶

Antigonus having received only the initial dispatch from Nicanor, would not have been aware of his death and the extent of Seleucus' further conquests. Believing that Seleucus was still in Babylon, Antigonus dispatched Demetrius with an army of 19,000 troops to recover the city. He further ordered him to return to Syria as quickly as possible. Faced with overwhelming numbers, Seleucus' commander, Patrocles, evacuated the civilian population from Babylon but left garrisons in the two citadels. Outnumbered by Demetrius, Patrocles fought a guerilla war, 'with what soldiers he had, using river courses and canals as defences, kept moving about in the satrapy, watching the enemy.'⁷ Demetrius took one of

the forts but was unable to capture the second. Obeying the orders of his father he left a detachment of 6,000 men to continue the siege and returned to Syria.⁸

The motive for Antigonos' order to his son to return quickly to Syria is not given in the sources. Most likely Antigonos was planning an invasion of Egypt, and after Perdikkas' debacle determined that he needed all the troops he could muster. Although planned as a limited campaign, Demetrius' march and return from Babylon must have taken at least two months.⁹ Antigonos probably spent this time, the summer of 311, preparing his forces for the major undertaking of an invasion of Egypt.

Demetrius' failure to capture Babylonia and Seleucus' gains in the east made Antigonos realize that he was faced with a serious threat. Antigonos' control of the eastern satrapies had always been somewhat tenuous and he now risked losing them to Seleucus. These regions had contributed a total of over 5,000 talents in annual tribute to the Persians.¹⁰ Their loss would greatly reduce Antigonos' revenues and thereby his ability to make war. He was now prepared to come to terms with his other enemies in return for a free hand to deal with Seleucus.

Diodorus concludes his account of the year by stating that Ptolemy, Cassander and Lysimachus came to terms with Antigonos and made a peace treaty, known as the Peace of 311. The terms of the peace were that:

Cassander be general of Europe until Alexander, the son of Roxane, should come of age; that Lysimachus rule Thrace, and that Ptolemy rule Egypt and the cities adjacent thereto in Libya and Arabia; that Antigonos have first place in all Asia; and that the Greeks be autonomous.¹¹

A remarkable piece of primary evidence has survived that gives us an insight into Antigonos' publicly stated reasons for making peace at this time. It is an inscription from the city of Scepsis in north western Asia Minor recording a letter sent by Antigonos

after the peace was made. The Scepsis letter makes clear that peace was initially made with Cassander and Lysimachus. Ptolemy's isolation, and the threat of imminent invasion by Antigonus, would have been strong inducements for him to sue for peace.

Despite Antigonus' reservations, 'we saw that it was no small matter to give up part of the goal for which we had taken great trouble and spent much money,' he eventually made peace with Ptolemy. It appears from the letter that he may have done a deal with Ptolemy abandoning Seleucus in return for Antigonus discarding Polyperchon.¹²

Although the treaty promised autonomy to the Greek cities, and what is left of the inscription begins with Antigonus repeating his 'zeal for the freedom of the Greeks', by recognizing Cassander's rule in Europe and Lysimachus' in Thrace he was in effect abandoning the Greek cities of these regions. Antigonus tries to justify this by claiming that as: 'we were anxious to see the affairs of the Greeks settled in our lifetime we thought it imperative that questions of detail should not prevent the implementation of the essential points'. He finishes by adding that 'we saw that you and the other allies were burdened by military service and by expenses, we thought it was right to give way.' Noticeably absent from the agreement was Seleucus. It is clear that Antigonus had done a deal whereby he recognized the right of the others to rule, disowned Polyperchon and gave way on the issue of the Greeks in return for them abandoning their ally Seleucus. As a sop to his Greek allies Antigonus claimed to have:

Written a clause into the agreement that all the Greeks should join together in protecting their mutual freedom and autonomy, in the belief that in our lifetime they would in all human expectation be preserved, but that in future with all the Greeks and the men in power bound by oath, the freedom of the Greeks would be much more securely guaranteed. To join in the oath to protect what we agreed

with each other did not seem to us inglorious or without advantage to the Greeks. It therefore seems to me right that you should swear the oath which we have sent to you. We shall endeavor in future to achieve whatever is in your interests and that of the other Greeks.¹³

Antigonus would have known, however, that without his forces to protect them the cities of Greece would once again fall prey to Cassander. The oath to protect the Greek cities would also be a useful excuse for any future war against the other dynasts. It would also give just cause for them to attack Antigonus. In reality the guarantees in the treaty were cynical pieces of *realpolitik*.

Exactly when the Peace of 311 was finalized is not certain. The negotiations were conducted by ambassadors, not in person as earlier discussions had been, and must have taken some time. The autumn of 311 is the most likely date.

The wars of the Successors until this point had been fought primarily over who should wield the royal powers of the regent, yet this is not mentioned in Diodorus' description of the treaty. Although in effect *de facto* rulers of their domains, the four had to this point legitimized their rule through the person of the king. Alexander IV's coming of age would have been an embarrassment to them all. There can be little doubt that the Peace of 311 sealed the fate of the last Argead king.

Diodorus concludes his description of the peace with notice of the murder, which would infer that it took place shortly after, perhaps in the same year. Alexander IV was then in his twelfth year, and although he would perhaps not achieve his majority until the age of eighteen, he would soon be expected to play some public role in the running of the state.¹⁴ Diodorus records that 'word was being spread throughout Macedonia by certain men that it was fitting to release the boy from custody and give him his father's kingdom.'¹⁵ Any assumption of the royal powers by Alexander IV would have most directly affected Cassander, as he ruled personally over Macedonia and Greece. It could also call into

doubt the legitimacy of the rule of the others. Cassander, with either the approval or acquiescence of the other three, had the king and his mother murdered – although the death was concealed for some time.¹⁶ The pretence of ruling their domains as the representative of king was over, all now ruled their domains as “spear won land”.

Antigonus had gone to war with the publicly stated objectives, voted for by the assembly of his army, that Cassander yield ‘obedience to Antigonus the duly established general who had succeeded to the guardianship of the throne’ and that ‘all the Greeks were free, not subject to foreign garrisons, and autonomous.’¹⁷ By these criteria, Antigonus had failed. By abandoning his claim to the regency and accepting Cassander’s supremacy in Europe Antigonus was, at least for the time being, agreeing to limit his domains to Asia. He had, of course, good reason for making such a compromise. The Peace of 311 had excluded Seleucus and asserted Antigonus’ control over the whole of Asia. Antigonus was apparently willing to give up his original demands in order to win back the riches of the east. Although the question of the regency had been the primary motive for the outbreak of the war, it was largely a non-issue in 311.

His enemies had gone to war demanding that Antigonus hand over satrapies and a share of the booty to them, and that Seleucus be reinstated to his satrapy. They had failed in the first demand and abandoned the second. Of the major contestants in the war only Seleucus had realized his goal of 315. Like many wars before and since, the initial causes of the conflict had been largely overtaken by the course of events.

Ptolemy, Cassander and Lysimachus had made peace in order to buy time and recover from their losses. Antigonus was, for the moment, willing to relinquish his demands in order to concentrate on Seleucus. The fact that none of the four signatories to the peace had realized their ambitions, and the dynamic component of military success and conquest inherent in Macedonian leadership,

made further conflict inevitable.

Chapter 14

Antigonus' Campaign against Seleucus

Year 7 of Alexander ...Month Abu ... The troops of Antigonus did battle with the troops of Seleucus in the surrounding area of Babylon.

Diadochi Chronicle.

No sooner had Peace of 311 been signed than fresh conflict broke out between the dynasts. Using the guarantee of respecting the freedom of the Greeks, Ptolemy invaded Cilicia on the pretext of liberating the cities from Antigonus' garrisons. He also tried to win over the Greek cities controlled by Cassander and Lysimachus. Antigonus responded by once again stirring up trouble in Cyprus but without success.

In Greece, Ptolemaeus rebelled against Antigonus and allied himself with Cassander, as he saw himself being replaced in the pecking order by Demetrius. This betrayal not only robbed Antigonus of his most talented subordinate but completely undermined Antigonus position in Greece. Like others before him, Ptolemaeus attempted to create his own realm by seizing and garrisoning the cities allied with Antigonus. He also won over Antigonus' satrap of Hellespontine-Phrygia, Phoenix, who joined the rebellion.

Antigonus was, however, determined to settle matters with Seleucus. Rather than respond to these provocations in person, he sent Demetrius to Cilicia and his second son, Philip to deal with Phoenix. Other than this command little is known of Philip except that he 'was a few years younger'¹ than his brother. Demetrius quickly recovered Cilicia and Philip appears to have dealt with Phoenix.

In order to keep Cassander off balance, Antigonus resurrected the career of Polyperchon who had been hiding out in the Peloponnnesus. Hercules, the supposed bastard son of Alexander, was sent from Pergamum to Polyperchon to undermine Cassander's position. This must have been done with the approval of Antigonus. The Aetolians, Antigonus' allies, also joined with Polyperchon.

Once Antigonus had dealt with these various distractions, he determined to once again march on Babylon. Unfortunately, if there are large holes in Diodorus' history for the years 312 and 311, there is complete vacuum regarding this campaign. Antigonus largely vanishes from the narrative from 310 until 308. In 311, Antigonus had agreed to a peace with Cassander, Lysimachus and Ptolemy in order to have his hands free to deal with Seleucus. No account of this campaign survives in any of the surviving histories. Diodorus was more interested in recording the career of the Syracusan tyrant Agathocles. Although our knowledge of the period of the Successors largely depends on Diodorus' history, on this occasion we are forced to rely on fragments of inscriptions that have survived from Babylon, particularly the 'Diadochi Chronicle'.² This document records fighting between Antigonus and Seleucus, taking place in Babylonia from the summer of 310 until the autumn of 309. Unfortunately the inscription is very fragmentary and open to various reconstructions and interpretations. Any attempt to recreate the campaign can only be rudimentary at best.

For such an important campaign Antigonus would have raised a large force. The Chronicle records Antigonus as having 'numerous troops'.³ Generally Antigonus appears to have had a standing force of about 80,000 troops but he had to detach forces for Philip's and Demetrius' campaigns. So the army he took to Babylon was probably no greater than 50,000 men but would have included most of his eighty or so elephants.

Since Demetrius' withdrawal, Seleucus had managed to

recapture Babylon. His forces are harder to calculate. He had defeated Nicanor with 3,400 men and had captured most of his 17,000 men. Since that victory, Seleucus had won control over Media, Susiane and other areas. He may also have captured some, or all, of the 6,000 men left by Demetrius in Babylon. From these sources Seleucus may have been able to field around 25,000 troops. In addition he could call out the local Babylonian levies. Babylonians had fought at the Battle of Gaugamela only twenty years earlier.⁴

According to the Chronicle, the fighting between Antigonus and Seleucus began in August/September of 310 and continued unabated until February 309, in and around Babylon. At some stage Antigonus broke into Babylon and damaged several of the temples but did not capture the entire city. The fighting then appears to have spilled beyond the city as Antigonus went out from Babylon and 'plundered city and countryside.'⁵

Outnumbered, at least in troops capable of standing in open battle, Seleucus probably adopted the same tactics that Patrocles had against Demetrius the previous year, avoiding a full scale battle and using the broken nature of the terrain, crisscrossed by waterways, to harass the enemy. The usual response to this strategy by Hellenistic generals was to devastate the countryside in order to force the enemy to defend their own property. This form of warfare was much more destructive than fighting a battle to quickly decide the issue.

This situation presented a dilemma for Antigonus. A year earlier he had admonished Demetrius for looting Babylonia as it had left 'Seleucus more confirmed than before in his possession of the realm; for by ravaging the country Demetrius was thought to admit that it no longer belonged to his father.'⁶ This concept was important for the Successors who claimed their realms by right of conquest rather than any traditional or ethnic connection. Such qualms had not, however, prevented Ptolemy from pillaging Phoenicia and Coele-Syria, areas to which he had permanent

ambitions to hold. As is often the case, philosophy took second place to a perceived military necessity. From the descriptions in the Chronicle it does not appear that Antigonus hesitated for long before unleashing a campaign of devastation.

In March 309 the city of Cuthah, 40km northeast of Babylon, was taken, sacked and set alight. They are frequent descriptions of how Antigonus 'plundered city and countryside' and the destruction of 'numerous houses.' In this form of warfare it is always the population who suffers the most. There is repeated mention of 'weeping and mourning in the land.'⁷

At some stage Antigonus' control of the province was such that he appointed his own satrap and there are records of legal documents being signed in his name. The Chronicle breaks off by recording that on the 'month Abu day 25 (= 10 Aug. 309) did battle with the troops of Seleucus.'⁸ This may well have been the final encounter of the campaign as Antigonus is recorded as being back in Asia Minor in 308. Perhaps Seleucus grew weary of his realm being pillaged or possibly Antigonus' army had been worn down by continuous campaigning in a hostile land. Whatever the reason, it appears that Seleucus had finally decided to risk an open battle with Antigonus. It has been plausibly suggested that this battle is that described by Polyaneus:

A pitched battle between Seleucus and Antigonus was undecided. When night came, it seemed best to both sides to postpone the fighting until the next day. Antigonus' men encamped unarmed, while Seleucus ordered his soldiers to eat wearing their armor and to sleep in battle order. Just before daybreak, Seleucus' men advanced armed and in formation. Antigonus' men, caught without arms and in disorder, quickly gave the victory to the enemy.⁹

The campaign of 310/309 would appear to be the only possible circumstance for this battle. Several historians have doubted the connection, mainly due to the unlikelihood of Antigonus falling for

such an obvious and well used stratagem. Jona Lendering observes that: 'Although it is possible that this happened during the Babylonian war (311–308), there is something odd with this anecdote: Antigonos was probably the most competent of Alexander's Successors, and is caught blundering. This is too stupid to be true.'¹⁰ Militarily, however, this campaign appears to have been a watershed in Antigonos' career. Before, as far as can be determined, he had never lost a battle or a campaign. After, he would never again win one. On the other hand, Seleucus' victory founded a dynasty that would rule the greater part of Asia for the next two and a half centuries.

Antigonos was now seventy three years old and already overweight. He may well have been past his prime as a fighting commander, both mentally and physically. Shortly after this campaign, Plutarch observes that Antigonos' 'great size and weight, even more than his old age, made it difficult for him to conduct expeditions.'¹¹ After his return to the west he would spend most of his time in his new capital of Antigonía, ruling his empire rather than taking the field in person. Three years later his youngest son, Philip would die. Having been consistently betrayed by his nephews, Antigonos would come to rely on his eldest son to command on his behalf. Fortunately, Demetrius would demonstrate that he was more than up to the task. Although Antigonos had lost about half of his empire and its revenues, he would show in the coming years that he was still the most powerful of the Successors and a force to be reckoned with.

After a year of hard campaigning, this defeat convinced Antigonos to accept the loss of the eastern satrapies, at least temporarily. He may have been further persuaded by bad news from the west. Ptolemy had won victories along the coast of Asia Minor and Polyperchon's campaign in Greece had fizzled out. Antigonos must have been keen to cut his losses and return to the sea. There is no record of how the campaign had ended or any treaty signed. It is undeniable, however, that Antigonos accepted

defeat and acknowledged Seleucus' rule over the east. Presumably some agreement must have been reached for there was no further conflict between the two for another six years. During that time, Seleucus was fully occupied securing his control of the eastern satrapies.

While Antigonus was fully occupied in Babylonia his enemies were winning victories in the west. Ptolemy disappointed by his generals' failures against Demetrius the previous year, took the field himself. He captured a number of cities in Lycia and Caria, only being thwarted in an attempt to take Halicarnassus by Demetrius. Retiring to the island of Cos, Ptolemy was joined by his new ally, Ptolemaeus, who sailed from Chalcis. The ambitious Ptolemaeus appears to have developed a taste for treachery and began to conspire against Ptolemy. Learning of the plot, Ptolemy arrested and executed Ptolemaeus by the Athenian method of forcing him to drink hemlock.

In Greece, Polyperchon had attempted to march on Macedonia accompanied by Hercules. With no other possible candidates for the throne, some of the Macedonians 'regarded the restoration of the king without disfavour.'¹² Again Cassander was more than a match for Polyperchon. He confronted him at the border of Macedonia and convinced his opponent to murder Hercules in exchange for a hundred talents and command of the Peloponnesus. Polyperchon, who had consistently shown himself to be a leader of limited talent and ambition, agreed. Hercules was invited to dinner and strangled. Given troops by Cassander, Polyperchon attempted to march across Boeotia only to meet defeat at the hands of the Greeks. He then fades into obscurity as a subordinate of Cassander. Plutarch describes Polyperchon's murder of Hercules in his discussion of the trait of *dysopia*¹³ which can be translated as spinelessness, perhaps a suitable epitaph for Polyperchon's career.

In 308 Ptolemy sailed from Caria through the Cyclades Islands to the Peloponnesus. There he took Sicyon and Corinth from

Cratesipolis. Ptolemy then announced that he would free the Greek cities from his former ally Cassander. He soon found the Greeks to be unreliable allies, for 'having agreed to contribute food and money, contributed nothing of what had been promised.'¹⁴ In disgust Ptolemy made peace with Cassander, each keeping the cities they held. Ptolemy placed garrisons in Sicyon and Corinth and sailed for home.

Antigonus, back in Asia Minor, became tired of the marriage intrigues of Alexander's sister Cleopatra. As one of the last of the Argeads, she was a politically desirable bride and all the dynasts had at some time sought her hand. She had been married, and widowed, in turn to King Alexander of Epirus, Leonnatus and Perdiccas. Antigonus conspired to have her murdered by her own female attendants. Not wishing to be held publicly responsible for the crime he punished some of the murderers and buried Cleopatra with royal honours. Cleopatra joined the long list of Argead women who had been murdered during the wars, Olympias, Cynane and Eurydice. To these might be added Alexander's wives Roxane and Statira.¹⁵ Only Thessalonice, the wife of Cassander, still survived. She would outlive her husband only to be murdered by her son. The lives of the leading women of the Successors appear to have been equally as hazardous as those of the men.

Presumably during 308 Demetrius had recovered the lost cities of Lycia and Caria,¹⁶ for Antigonus determined that in 307 he would once again challenge Cassander for the control of Greece. Instead of being sidetracked in the Peloponnesus or central Greece, Antigonus decided to strike directly at the cornerstone of Cassander's control of Greece, Athens.

Chapter 15

The Liberation of Athens

The glory won by this noble deed inspired father and son with a wonderful eagerness to give freedom to all Greece, which had been reduced to subjection by Cassander and Ptolemy. No nobler or juster war than this was waged by any one of the kings; for the vast wealth which they together had amassed by subduing the Barbarians, was now lavishly spent upon the Greeks, to win glory and honour.

Plutarch, *Demetrius* 8.

When planning his new European campaign, Antigonos took great pains to portray himself not as a new conqueror but as the champion of Greek liberty. In line with his Tyre decree, none of the cities, no matter how strategically important, were to be garrisoned. This policy would draw a clear line between his policies and those of Cassander and Ptolemy. Cassander's control of his Greek allies relied on his placement of garrisons and support of oligarchies. Demetrius was given command of the expedition with the ambitious order 'to free all the cities throughout Greece.'¹

In line with this strategy, Antigonos' first target would be the traditional centre of Greek democracy, Athens, and its important port of Piraeus. Strategically the control of Athens and Piraeus would give Antigonos' forces a strong base in central Greece. From this position Demetrius could strike either north or south by land or sea. One of Antigonos' friends advised him that as the city was so important he must garrison it once he had taken it. Antigonos refused, he had already decided that the best strategy to win over the Greeks was to portray his campaign as one of bringing freedom and democracy to the cities. He replied that 'the goodwill

of a people was a noble gangway which no waves could shake, and that Athens, the beacon-tower of the whole world, would speedily flash the glory of their deeds to all mankind.’²

Antigonus’ plan to take Athens was bold. Demetrius would make a direct assault on the port of Piraeus, the key to Athens. In order to make such a plan work it is likely that Antigonus was already assured of support from the Athenian democrats.³ Athens had been governed for ten years by a tyrant imposed by Cassander, Demetrius of Phalerum, whose regime excluded all but the very rich from any role in the government. The overthrow of the tyrant would also be a propaganda coup in Antigonus’ attempt to portray himself as the champion of freedom.

Demetrius, son of Antigonus, was perhaps just the man to lead such a crusade to cosmopolitan Athens. Plutarch describes him as a man ‘who bore most ample testimony to the truth of Plato’s saying that great natures exhibit great vices also, as well as great virtues.’ He was ‘amorous, bibulous, warlike, munificent, extravagant, and domineering.’⁴ He had inherited his father’s energy and was perhaps an even more talented general. He did, however, lack his father’s common touch and realistic view of what was possible, most likely a result of being brought up in the obsequious courts of Asia.

Although Demetrius of Phalerum had been a student of the Peripatetic school of philosophy, which advocated an avoidance of sensual pleasures, he was accused in antiquity of squandering Athens revenues ‘not on the management of the city but ... on his innate indulgence.’⁵ He was infamous for his magnificent feasts and love affairs with both women and youths. He was also incredibly vain, dying his hair, wearing makeup and erecting 360 statues of himself around the city. All this was done while he introduced legislation to prevent extravagance among the population.

Such stories of hedonism are, however, the stock portrayal of tyrants who were supposedly devoid of any self discipline or

morality. Other, more favourable sources, claim that he 'governed his country for a long time in a most admirable manner. For he aggrandized the city by increased revenues and by new buildings.'⁶ Whatever the truth of his governance, his regime would have been hated by most of the poorer citizens for being a narrow oligarchy. Many Athenians, including some of the rich, would also have seen him as little more than a pro-Macedonian puppet.

In order to conduct his Greek campaign, Antigonos assigned Demetrius 250 ships and 5,000 talents with which to hire mercenaries and influence allies. Great care was taken to conceal the target of the campaign. The captains of the ships were given sealed orders with their destination only to be opened if they became separated from the fleet.⁷ The invasion fleet arrived intact off the eastern most point of Attica, at Cape Sunium, in May or June of 307. Leaving the bulk of his fleet concealed at the Cape, Demetrius detached twenty of his best ships and sailed as if heading towards the Corinthian port of Cenchreae. The stratagem worked: 'Demetrius of Phalerum, the Athenian general, belonged to the party of Cassander; and from the acropolis observed those ships, which he supposed to be some ships of Ptolemaeus, and to be steering to Corinth.'⁸ The Athenians took no precautions. At a signal, Demetrius' ships then rapidly changed course and sailed unopposed into Piraeus.

Demetrius announced from his flagship to the surprised inhabitants that he had come on a 'happy errand, to set Athens free, and to expel her garrison, and to restore to the people their laws and their ancient form of government.'⁹ He could not have found a more receptive audience, the people of Piraeus, the so-called "sailor rabble" had always been the backbone of the democracy and the opponents of oligarchy. Most of his audience 'at once threw their shields down in front of them, and with clapping of hands and loud cries urged Demetrius to land, hailing him as their saviour and benefactor.'¹⁰ After ten long years of

tyranny it was a long awaited chance for the Athenians to restore their democracy.

Despite the enthusiastic reception, the capture of the wharves was only the beginning, Piraeus and the fortress of Munychia had to be taken. Demetrius ordered the rest of his fleet to join him and the assault on Piraeus began. The defense was led by the tyrant, who despite being a dandy was no coward. The defenders resisted strongly but once Demetrius' men had breached the walls they abandoned the city of Piraeus and fled to Munychia.

Demetrius of Phalerum withdrew to the city of Athens but his position was now untenable for he 'was more afraid of his fellow-citizens than of the enemy.'¹¹ He sent envoys to discuss his surrender. The tyrant and his followers were granted safe conduct and departed to Thebes. The jubilant Athenians would later sentence him to death *in absentia* and tear down all his statues except one. To show their contempt many were made into chamber pots. Later Demetrius of Phalerum was forced to flee Thebes and found refuge at Ptolemy's court in Egypt. There he became involved in the succession politics of the Egyptian court, was exiled to the wilds of southern Egypt and died of snakebite.

Demetrius, who would later be known as *Poliorcetes*, the Besieger, now began the siege of Munychia. For two days he battered the walls with artillery and assaulted the fortress with relays of men. A breach was opened and the garrison forced to surrender. In obedience to his father's decree, Demetrius levelled Munychia, the symbol of Cassander's domination. After the surrender of Demetrius of Phalerum, the Athenians restored their democratic government, 'the constitution of the fathers,'¹² and allied themselves with Antigonos. In gratitude for their liberation, the Athenians, lead by Stratocles, decided to honour their saviours. They voted:

To set up golden statues of Antigonos and Demetrius in a chariot near the statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, to give them both honorary crowns at a cost of two hundred

talents, to consecrate an altar to them and call it the altar of the Saviours, to add to the ten tribes two more, Demetrias and Antigonis, to hold annual games in their honour with a procession and a sacrifice, and to weave their portraits in the peplos of Athena.¹³

The first of these honours was extraordinary. Harmodius and Aristogeiton were the assassins of an earlier Athenian tyrant Hipparchus and were the pre-eminent symbol of democracy to the Athenians. Previously it had been forbidden to place other statues near those of the tyrannicides. The Athenians also addressed them as kings, before they formerly adopted the title. Stratocles would earn a terrible reputation as a sycophant towards Antigonus and Demetrius. While Demetrius resided in Athens, divine honours continued to be heaped upon him and his father. Many despised Stratocles for his actions, considering the worship of men to be sacrilegious. Only a generation earlier the Athenian orator Hyperides had seen such honours paid to Philip II as hubris and an attack on traditional religious institutions: 'sacrifices being made to men; images, altars, and temples carefully perfected in their honour, while those of the gods are neglected.' He further adds that 'if reverence for the gods has been removed by Macedonian insolence, what fate must we conclude would have befallen the rules of conduct towards man?'¹⁴ One of the comic poets wrote verses ridiculing Stratocles 'because he gave the gods' own honours unto men. Such work undoes a people, not its comedy.'¹⁵

All this was done because most Athenians believed that without outside assistance they could not stand against Cassander. Stratocles, and many others, probably thought that flattering Demetrius and his father was a small price to pay in order to maintain their democracy. The policy certainly brought immediate results, for when Antigonus heard of the alliance, and the honours, he rewarded the Athenians with timber for a hundred ships, 6,000 tonnes of grain and handed back to them the control of the island of Imbros.

This last gift does expose an obvious discrepancy in Antigonus' policy towards the freedom of the Greeks. Diodorus records that 'Antigonus withdrew his garrison from Imbros and gave the city back to the Athenians.'¹⁶ This action clearly violates two of his guarantees: the existence of a garrison on Imbros and the violation of the islander's autonomy by returning them to Athenian rule. Antigonus had earlier placed garrisons in some of the Carian cities, giving Ptolemy an excuse to invade the region. Yet his generals had been ordered to demonstrably place no garrisons in the strategically important cities of Chalcis and Athens. Security issues may have overridden his preferred policy. One thing the cities of Caria and Imbros had in common was that they were vulnerable to attack by Ptolemy's fleet.¹⁷ Antigonus may have been able to claim that he had placed garrisons at the request of his allies. This may be true, and their vulnerability makes it plausible, but the invitations may well have been made under pressure. Either way it would outwardly appear not to be a breach of his promises. What is clear is that Antigonus was not always consistent in applying his policy. He did, however, appear to apply it consistently enough for it to have been credible, unlike Ptolemy whose claim to be liberating the Greeks of the Peloponnesus had been met with distrust and indifference.

After he had secured Athens, Demetrius marched on Megara, captured the city and expelled Cassander's garrison.¹⁸ On this occasion he appears to have had some difficulty in controlling his troops who were determined to plunder the city. Only the intervention of his Athenian allies prevented the city from being sacked. Nonetheless most of the city's slaves were either carried away or escaped in the confusion. Plunder, particularly from sacking a captured city, was always an important addition to a soldier's income. Many of Demetrius' troops, Macedonians and mercenaries, were probably more interested in their own profit than liberating the cities of strangers. Demetrius granted the city its autonomy and was voted honours by the people. The campaign

had got off to a good start, both Athens and Megara had been liberated from Cassander's garrisons. Then Antigonos decided to change his strategy. Demetrius was ordered to return to Asia Minor to prepare for a war in Cyprus against Ptolemy's forces.

Before returning to Asia, Demetrius was to 'call together counselors from the allied cities who should consider in common what was advantageous for Greece.'¹⁹ Just who these allies were, other than Athens and Megara, is not stated. Presumably they included the Aetolians and some of Antigonos' earlier allies who had managed to retain their independence, despite Ptolemaeus' treachery, and had once again rallied to his cause. One possible example of this is the city of Chalcis whose garrison commander, appointed by Ptolemaeus, handed the city over to Demetrius.²⁰

Before he departed Greece, Demetrius made an attempt to bribe Ptolemy's commander into surrendering Corinth and Sicyon but failed. Antigonos does not appear to have completely abandoned his Greek allies, an Athenian inscription for the year 306/5 records a donation of 140 talents from Antigonos.²¹ Another thanks one of Demetrius' Friends for 'sharing in the struggle for freedom and democracy.'²² Money and a few generals were not enough. Without Demetrius' leadership, and substantial numbers of troops, the war in Greece would swing back in Cassander's favour over the next four years. Athens was subjected to repeated attacks by Cassander, who was determined to force the Greeks back into 'slavery'.²³

Plutarch claims that Demetrius was reluctant to abandon his Greek allies as he believed that 'the war for the liberation of Greece, which was a nobler and more glorious war'²⁴ than that against Ptolemy. It is also possible that Demetrius, as the man on the spot, realized that without assistance the Greeks would struggle to hold their own against Cassander. Nonetheless, as an obedient son he obeyed his father's summons. No reason is given in the sources for Antigonos' abrupt change in strategy. Perhaps Ptolemy had again been using Cyprus to raid Asia Minor or the

islands and Antigonus' patience had finally worn out. This is a sound strategic reason for the invasion, it is the timing that appears to be questionable.²⁵

While Demetrius had been campaigning in Greece, Antigonus had occupied himself with the foundation of his new capital, Antigonía, on the Orontes River in Syria, slightly northeast of the later city of Antioch (Antakya, Turkey). The site was selected with strategic considerations in mind: 'for the location was naturally well adapted for watching over Babylon and the upper satrapies, and again for keeping an eye upon lower Syria and the satrapies near Egypt.'²⁶ One of the privileges of a ruler was to found new cities in conquered regions. The new colonists of these cities would receive land grants making them financially independent and thereby liable for military service. The most likely, and most valuable, candidates for these colonists would be the soldiers of the king's army. The new colonists would be a valuable source of manpower for the bureaucracy and the army. When established in non-Greek areas, the cities did, however, impose a foreign ruling class on the native populations and expropriate their lands. Other foundations were the forced integrations of previously existing Greek cities and were often resented by their former inhabitants.

Nonetheless the foundation of these new cities was of great benefit to the kings. The new citizens would be both grateful to and dependent upon their benefactor. This in turn made them loyal to the king and helped to solidify his rule in the conquered regions. There are only three certain foundations by Antigonus, in Syria, Bithynia and Hellespontine-Phrygia. It is likely that there were many more.²⁷

It is possible that the location of his new capital, about twenty five kilometres from the coast, also influenced Antigonus' decision to conquer Cyprus. The island, only about 100 km from the coast of Syria, was the base for many of Ptolemy's raids. The destruction of a city named after himself would have been a blow to Antigonus' reputation and perhaps his ego. Whatever the reasons,

the decision had been made. Antigonus' next major operation would be an invasion of Cyprus.

Chapter 16

The Conquest of Cyprus and the Kingship

And when Antigonus heard of the victory that had been gained, elated by the magnitude of his good fortune, he assumed the diadem and from that time on he used the style of king; and he permitted Demetrius also to assume this same title and rank.

Diodorus 20.53.

Demetrius left Athens and returned to Asia in the spring of 306. Along the way he ‘summoned the Rhodians for the war against Ptolemy.’ Rhodes had earlier allied itself with Antigonus in 313. They refused to obey, ‘preferring to maintain a common peace with all.’¹ This slight would not be forgotten, or forgiven, but for now Antigonus was focused on the campaign in Cyprus. The Rhodians could await his displeasure.

In Cilicia Demetrius assembled a fleet of 110 triremes and fifty three heavier ships, and an army of 15,000 infantry and 400 cavalry. The fleet included thirty quadriremes supplied by the Athenians from the timber supplied by Antigonus. Plutarch notes that Demetrius:

Was actually thought to be a better general in preparing than in employing a force, for he wished everything to be at hand in abundance for his needs, and could never be satisfied with the largeness of his undertakings in building ships and engines of war, or in gazing at them with great delight.²

In his logistical preparations Demetrius was very much like his father who always ensured that sufficient troops and supplies were ready before embarking on a campaign. It was Antigonus’ large

revenues and carefully accumulated wealth that made such preparations possible.

The strategic importance of the coming campaign is explained by Plutarch who states that 'all the other potentates, awaited with great expectancy the uncertain issue of the impending struggle; they felt that not Cyprus, nor yet Syria, but the absolute supremacy would at once be the prize of the victor.'³ This is perhaps an exaggeration but the outcome of the battle was critical. If Demetrius' fleet were to be defeated, the entire coast of the Antigonos' Asian empire would be wide open to the incursions of Ptolemy. If he were to win then Cyprus would fall to Antigonos.

Holding Cyprus was crucial to Ptolemy's ability to expand his naval power beyond Egypt. An ancient warship's range was limited due to their inability to carry large amounts of supplies, especially drinking water for their large crews. Their range was limited to about 550 kilometres across open seas. With the coast of Phoenicia now lost to him, Cyprus, 400 kilometres from Egypt, was vital as a staging point for Ptolemy's fleets when operating against Asia Minor, the Aegean islands or Greece. The loss of Cyprus would effectively isolate Ptolemy. Cyprus was also a major source of timber for Ptolemy's shipbuilding activities as Egypt was largely devoid of forests.⁴

Demetrius landed on Cyprus near Carpasia, close to the end of the northeastern cape. He beached his ships and built a strongly fortified camp to protect them and his stores. Demetrius then stormed the cities of Urania and Carpasia before marching south west against the city of Salamis. Menelaus, Ptolemy's brother and governor of Cyprus, gathered his army and marched to meet Demetrius. As Demetrius approached the environs of Salamis, Menelaus confronted him to the north of the city with an army of 12,000 infantry and 800 cavalry. There is no detailed account of the battle but it was short and brutal. Demetrius routed Menelaus' forces, killing 1,000 and taking 3,000 prisoners. The survivors fled back into Salamis. The prisoners refused to join Demetrius as their

belongings remained in Egypt under the care of Ptolemy. It appears that the commanders had learned a lesson from Eumenes' betrayal and were holding their troops' baggage as a surety for their good behaviour.

Demetrius now settled down to besiege Salamis. It is here that we first get to see the sophistication of Antigonos' siege engineers and the massive engines that would earn Demetrius his epithet. As well as the usual rams, towers and catapults, Demetrius built an enormous device known as the *helepolis*, "city taker". The sides of its base measured about twenty metres in length, it was forty metres high, divided into nine stories and each of its four wheels was nearly four metres in diameter. The largest of the artillery pieces shot missiles weighing seventy kilograms and needed 200 men to operate. None of this equipment was novel, the Greeks of Sicily had first used mobile towers and catapults a century earlier at the siege of the Carthaginian city of Motya. What was new was the massive size of Demetrius' engines.

Demetrius began his attack on the city by concentrating his artillery on clearing the walls of defenders and attacking the walls with rams. As the walls began to shatter, Menelaus decided to counter attack. He gathered firewood, threw it down upon the enemy engines and then shot fire arrows into the wood. Many of Demetrius' engines and men were lost in the ensuing blaze but, showing his father's determination, he shrugged off the losses and stubbornly continued the siege.

Before he had been cut off, Menelaus had sent urgent messages to Ptolemy requesting assistance. Ptolemy quickly gathered both land and sea forces and sailed to Cyprus. He landed at Paphos on the western end of the island. After receiving reinforcements from his local allies, he sailed along the southern coast to Citium. This was forty kilometres by land from Salamis but nearly double that distance by sea around Cape Pedalium.

Ptolemy's fleet of 140 warships was somewhat smaller in numbers than Demetrius', but all were quadriremes or

quinqueremes, larger than the triremes that made up most of Demetrius' fleet. To these could be added the sixty ships commanded by Menelaus in the harbour of Salamis. Ptolemy had 10,000 infantry and stores carried aboard 200 transport vessels. Ptolemy felt confident, the combined fleets were larger and more powerful than that of Demetrius and he had previously defeated him in battle. He sent a herald who contemptuously demanded that Demetrius 'sail away before the entire force should assemble and crush him.'⁵ Demetrius boldly retorted that he would allow Ptolemy to retreat if he withdrew his garrisons from Sicyon and Corinth.

After these preliminaries were over, Ptolemy, set sail for Salamis before sunrise, in an attempt to take Demetrius by surprise. He sent orders to Menelaus 'to put out from Salamis with sixty ships, and when the struggle was fiercest, to assail the ships of Demetrius in the rear, and throw them into confusion.'⁶ Demetrius, either through good scouting or treachery, learned of Ptolemy's plan and made careful preparations for the coming battle. He left part of his army to continue the siege and put the best of his troops aboard the fleet to reinforce the marines. The night before the battle he entered the harbour of Salamis with his entire fleet to prevent Menelaus from putting to sea. The next morning, as Ptolemy's fleet approached, Demetrius left ten quinqueremes to block the narrow mouth to the harbour while he, with the remaining ships, sailed out to surprise Ptolemy. By doing so he gained a considerable tactical advantage as his rowers were well rested whereas Ptolemy's would be tired from their long journey. Nonetheless, Demetrius' plan was a gamble, if Menelaus escaped the harbour too soon then he would be taken in the rear and his fleet destroyed.

Demetrius drew up his fleet for battle. He would take command on the left wing, that bordered by the open sea. Demetrius planned for this squadron to fight the decisive action and it was therefore the strongest. It consisted of seven Phoenician

“sevens” and thirty Athenian quadriremes in the first line, and ten “sixes” and ten quinqueremes behind them. The centre consisted of the lightest ships, the triremes, commanded by his uncle Marsyas. The rest of the fleet took station on the right, closest to the shore. No numbers are given for these squadrons and Diodorus claims that the fleet, not counting the ten at Salamis, numbered only 108 ships. This number is almost certainly corrupt. Earlier Diodorus had stated that Demetrius had taken 163 ships to Cyprus. Plutarch states that Demetrius’ fleet consisted of 190 ships and Polyaeus records 180 vessels.⁷ The total of the larger vessels, fifty seven, is also greater than the earlier number of fifty three. Presumably the right and centre numbered about fifty ships each, mostly or entirely triremes.

When Ptolemy saw the fleet of Demetrius ready for action he realized that he had lost the element of surprise. He halted his advance and drew up his own fleet into line of battle. Ptolemy took command of his own left wing, that closest to the shore. The transports were placed behind the warships.

Demetrius’ plan was clearly to overwhelm Ptolemy’s right on the seaward flank then to trap the rest of the enemy fleet against the shore. Unfortunately there is no record of Ptolemy’s dispositions or his plans. Perhaps he had no time to make any complicated plan and simply divided his fleet into the usual three squadrons.

During the fifth century, and for much of the fourth, the standard Greek warship had been the trireme. Sea battles had been decided by either ramming tactics or boarding actions. More skilful navies had relied on ramming which required manoeuvrability and well trained crews. Less expert fleets tended to make their ships heavier and rely on boarding. Long range missile attacks had been limited to the few archers on the vessels. The new, larger warships were now able to carry artillery. They were also less manoeuvrable. Demetrius’ fleet included a number of ships larger than quinqueremes, these would have acted largely

as mobile fortresses. Sea battles were now more likely to be won by boarding actions, supported by missile fire, rather than ramming tactics. From Diodorus' description of events, this is the type of battle that was fought off Salamis.

When the fleets were about 600 metres apart both commanders gave the signal to attack. As the ships rapidly approached one another a shower of missiles was exchanged, first from the catapults, then the bows and finally, at close range, the throwing of javelins. The better handled ships managed to sweep the sides and destroy the oars of their enemies but most collided prow to prow. The battle became a series of confused and desperate boarding actions as the marines:

Leaped aboard the ships of the enemy, receiving and giving severe wounds; for certain of them, after grasping the rail of a ship that was drawing near, missed their footing, fell into the sea, and at once were killed with spears by those who stood above them; and others, making good their intent, slew some of the enemy and, forcing others along the narrow deck, drove them into the sea. As a whole the fighting was varied and full of surprises: many times those who were weaker got the upper hand because of the height of their ships, and those who were stronger were foiled by inferiority of position and by the irregularity with which things happen in fighting of this kind. For in contests on land, valour is made clearly evident, since it is able to gain the upper hand when nothing external and fortuitous interferes; but in naval battles there are many causes of various kinds that, contrary to reason, defeat those who would properly gain the victory through prowess.⁸

Demetrius' own flagship, a "seven", was boarded. He fought courageously in the thick of the fighting, throwing javelins and fighting hand to hand with his spear. The fighting was desperate, of Demetrius' three bodyguards, one was killed and two were

seriously wounded. Eventually his ship was cleared of the enemy. The greater size of the ships in Demetrius' squadron eventually told against their smaller opponents and his wing routed the right of Ptolemy's line.

On the other flank, Ptolemy, with the best of his ships, drove off Demetrius' right. However, seeing that Demetrius had routed his right and was advancing towards him, Ptolemy feared that he would be trapped against the shore and fled the battle. He set sail for Citium, abandoning the rest of his fleet. Meanwhile, Menelaus' ships had attempted to sail out of Salamis harbour but had been delayed by the ships left by Demetrius. Eventually he forced his way out but arrived too late to take any part in the battle. Demetrius' plan of massing his heaviest ships on the seaward flank had succeeded. He had crushed Ptolemy's fleet before its victorious left could unite with Menelaus.

Of Ptolemy's fleet, forty ships were captured with their crews, and eighty disabled and towed away.⁹ Demetrius' losses were twenty disabled but all were recovered and repaired. After Ptolemy had fled, Demetrius was able to capture 100 of the abandoned supply ships, including 8,000 soldiers. He also ensured that those of both sides who had fallen into the sea were saved, dispatching ships to rescue them from the sea. Included among the booty was 'all Ptolemy's arms, money, and engines of war, absolutely nothing escaped Demetrius, but he took everything and brought it safely to his camp.'¹⁰ Demetrius matched Ptolemy's earlier compassion in victory. He gave the enemy dead burial and freed Menelaus, Leontiscus, one of Ptolemy's illegitimate sons, and many of his Friends, along with their personal belongings. The Athenians were given 1,200 suits of captured armour for their role in the victory.

The above narrative has been based on the account of Diodorus. Polyaeus has a different, more condensed version of the battle. He describes Demetrius as hiding his fleet behind a headland to the north of Salamis and then surprising Ptolemy's

fleet as it was disembarking troops on the shore. Diodorus has Ptolemy surprised by the sudden appearance of Demetrius' fleet but with plenty of time to form his line of battle. The supply ships are ordered to take station behind the war fleet. Perhaps Ptolemy had begun to disembark his troops and Polyaeus has simply exaggerated the surprise factor. As Polyaeus was not the most careful of compilers it appears best to accept the more detailed account of Diodorus.

Demetrius' victory was overwhelming both tactically and strategically. Ptolemy quit Cyprus and fled to Egypt. Menelaus was isolated and forced to surrender both his fleet and army. The whole of Cyprus surrendered to Demetrius. The island, which had been a constant thorn in Antigonos' side, had finally been taken. For Ptolemy the defeat had been costly, he had lost around 120 warships and around 20,000 soldiers. For the moment his fleet was effectively destroyed and Antigonos was master of the sea. Demetrius would glorify his victory for many years to come by issuing coins from the mint of Salamis, depicting the winged goddess Nike (Victory) alighting on a warship's prow.

Plutarch describes that news of the victory was brought to Antigonos in Syria who had been 'anxiously awaiting news of the battle'. His old friend Aristodemus, 'the arch flatterer', refused to make any comment:

But step by step and with a solemn face drew near in perfect silence. Antigonos, therefore, thoroughly frightened, and no longer able to restrain himself, came to the door to meet Aristodemus, who was now escorted by a large throng which was hurrying to the palace. Accordingly, when he had come near, he stretched out his hand and cried with a loud voice: "Hail, King Antigonos, we have conquered Ptolemy in a sea-fight, and now hold Cyprus, with twelve thousand eight hundred soldiers as prisoners of war."¹¹

Antigonos was spontaneously crowned by 'the multitude' with the

diadem, the definitive symbol of the kingship. Appian adds that it was 'on account of this very notable exploit the army began to call both Antigonus and Demetrius kings.' Having the army proclaim both Antigonus and Demetrius kings was the most important part of the show as it gave the appearance of popular acclamation. It was in keeping with the Macedonian tradition of having a new king acclaimed by an assembly.¹² Demetrius soon after received his diadem in a letter from his father which addressed him as king. It is a wonderful piece of story telling by Plutarch but if it did happen this way the whole incident was certainly stage managed.

Despite calling themselves regents or supreme commanders, all the leading dynasts had effectively been ruling as kings since the death of Alexander. Many of their local subjects, including the republican Athenians, were already calling them king. Most, if not all, had already adopted the trappings of royalty. Within a year of Alexander's death, Craterus, the supposed champion of Macedonian traditions, was already dressing like Alexander, wearing a purple cloak and holding court on an elevated golden couch.

The Macedonians had been without a king since the death of Alexander IV, yet a king was central to their form of government. All that was needed was somebody to have enough confidence to formally accept the title and wear the diadem. Above all, Macedonian kings were war leaders and needed to demonstrate their prowess in war. Antigonus' conquest of Cyprus had provided the necessary victory for him to now accept the title of king.

The legitimacy bestowed by the title was also important. Antigonus could now formally pass his office to his son, Demetrius, hence the quick acknowledgement of his royal status. He was also declaring that he was the true heir to Alexander's empire and ruler of all the Macedonians and the others were merely pretenders. Of course this latter claim meant little unless he could impose his rule by force.

The other dynasts could not allow this claim to go unopposed:

Ptolemy, however, not at all humbled in spirit by his defeat, also assumed the diadem and always signed himself king. And in a similar fashion in rivalry with them the rest of the princes also called themselves kings: Seleucus, who had recently gained the upper satrapies, and Lysimachus and Cassander, who still retained the territories originally allotted to them.¹³

The adoption of the title of king did not, however, occur immediately. All the dynasts would wait for a suitable victory before allowing themselves to be proclaimed king by their followers. Nonetheless, by 302 at the latest, Ptolemy, Lysimachus, Cassander and Seleucus had all adopted the title. When the Successors elevated themselves to the diadem they were not claiming to be kings of any defined geographic region, they were asserting that they were the king of all the Macedonians, all the lands conquered by the Macedonians and any that they would capture in the future.

Antigonus and Demetrius would of course reject the regal claims of the others as false. Demetrius is supposed to have mocked the pretensions of:

Those who gave the title of King to anyone except his father and himself, and was well pleased to hear his revellers pledge Demetrius as King, but Seleucus as Master of the Elephants, Ptolemy as Admiral, Lysimachus as Treasurer, and Agathocles of Sicily as Lord of the Isles.¹⁴

The other kings were apparently amused by Demetrius joke, except Lysimachus. Traditionally treasurers were eunuchs. It also inferred that Lysimachus was mean with money, when kings were supposed to be generous to their followers.

A diadem was not the only reward that his victory at Cyprus brought Demetrius. Included among the captives was Lamia, an aging courtesan renowned for her beauty. Despite being much

younger, Demetrius became besotted with Lamia to the extent that 'she so mastered and swayed him by her charms that he was a lover for her alone.'¹⁵ Lysimachus when sneering at Demetrius' infatuation remarked 'that he had never before seen a courtesan act a queen's part.'¹⁶ Despite his numerous marriages, Demetrius was notorious for his many love affairs. He 'consorted freely with many courtesans, as well as with many women of free birth, and as regards this indulgence he had the worst reputation of all the kings of his time.'¹⁷ Despite being married to Phila he had already taken another wife, an Athenian noble woman Eurydice, to please the Athenians. Like Philip II before him, he would marry many more times, although always for dynastic reasons.

His father, Antigonus, despite appearing to have had a spotless reputation in this area, appears to have taken a benign attitude to his son's affairs. Having grown up in the supposedly licentious court of Philip II this liberal attitude is perhaps not surprising. As long as Demetrius continued to remain married to Phila, and marry whoever Antigonus deemed necessary, he was prepared to turn a blind eye to his affairs. Plutarch observes that Demetrius' failings were treated 'with such lenity by his father because the young man was so efficient otherwise.'¹⁸ This bigheartedness does not appear to have extended to Antigonus' younger son, Philip, if another anecdote of Plutarch is to be believed. When Philip wanted 'to quarter at a widow's house that had three handsome daughters, Antigonus called the quartermaster to him: Please, said he, help my son out of these straits.'¹⁹

Of Demetrius' wives, however, his first, Phila, the daughter of Antipater, would always enjoy 'the greatest esteem and honour' because of her standing among the Macedonians. On her part, Phila remained determinedly loyal to Demetrius, even in his wars against her brother Cassander. Later in life, when Demetrius' fortunes hit their nadir and all appeared hopeless, she committed suicide as she 'was full of grief and could not endure to see her husband, that most afflicted of kings, once more in private station

and in exile.’²⁰ Much of her loyalty may have been due to the fact that she was the mother of Demetrius’ oldest son and acknowledged heir, Antigonus, who had been born around 319. They also had a daughter, Stratonice, who would later be married to both Seleucus and his son Antiochus.

After becoming kings, Ptolemy, Lysimachus and Seleucus would also follow the royal example and take multiple wives for political reasons. This generally led to problems, both domestic and for the succession, as the rival households would vie for supremacy. Such rivalries could become so vicious that they eventually destroyed Lysimachus’ dynasty. Only Cassander and Antigonus appear to have remained loyal to their wives. As Cassander had married an Argead it perhaps would have been unpopular inside Macedonia for him to have courted another wife. The anecdotes suggest that Antigonus was genuinely happy with his wife Stratonice.²¹ He also had the advantage of a son he trusted and was able to pass on this responsibility, and liability, to Demetrius.

The ancient Greeks believed that their jealous gods would punish those who dared to climb too high. Soon after Antigonus had taken the crown he suffered the greatest misfortune of any parent, his youngest son, Philip, died. He was buried with royal honours.²² Such personal tragedies were not, however, to be allowed to interfere with military necessity. Demetrius was recalled from Cyprus. With Ptolemy in such a weakened state, Antigonus had decided to finish him off. After three years of city building, Antigonus would once again take the field. He would lead his armies into Egypt.

Chapter 17

The Invasion of Egypt

Antigonus, elated by the achievements of Demetrius at Cyprus, at once made an expedition against Ptolemy; he himself led his forces by land, while Demetrius with a great fleet cooperated with him by sea ... he returned without accomplishing anything.

Plutarch, *Demetrius* 19.

Demetrius' victory over Ptolemy in Cyprus had given Antigonus a great opportunity. Ptolemy's land forces had been greatly reduced and his fleet almost destroyed. It must have seemed like the perfect time for Antigonus to invade Egypt and end Ptolemy's rule.

The strategic situation had, however, altered over the seventeen years since Alexander had died and his generals had been involved in almost continuous warfare to carve out their own realms. Over this time the nature of the wars had gradually changed. No longer were there fights between rival claimants to the regency or the suppressing of rebellious satraps. Alexander's empire had been split apart and had coalesced into five new kingdoms. The earlier opportunities to carve out a realm with lightning attacks designed to eliminate an opponent were over. Future wars would be fought between kings who controlled considerable territories or against rebellious members of their own families. It would be a quarter of a century before the Attalids of Pergamum would found a new dynasty, and another half a century before they would adopt the title of king.

Antigonus' preparations were massive. At his new capital of Antiochia he gathered an army of 80,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry and eighty three elephants. From there he marched to Gaza where he was joined by Demetrius with a fleet of 150 warships and 100

transports.

The next part of the march would be through the desolate wilderness of the northern Sinai Peninsula. This is a flat, sandy coastal plain which acts as a drainage basin for the run off from the mountains to the south. In summer it is dry and intensely hot but in autumn is prone to strong winds and occasional torrential rains. The nature of the terrain and run off can make the coastal area extremely dangerous as it is swampy, laced with quicksand and prone to treacherous tides. The most dangerous section is that around Lake Serbonis situated about forty kilometres to the east of the fortress of Pelusium which was located on the most eastern mouth of the Nile Delta.

The desolate and treacherous nature of the Sinai had exaggerated its dangers to legendary proportions. Diodorus claims that, 'many who were unacquainted with the peculiar nature of the place have disappeared together with whole armies, when they wandered from the beaten road.'¹ The geographer Strabo adds to the myth claiming that it was possible for a wave, possibly from the description a tsunami, to submerge whole armies:

A wave from the sea, like a flood-tide, submerged the fugitives; and some were carried off into the sea and destroyed, whereas others were left dead in the hollow places; and then, succeeding this wave, the ebb uncovered the shore again and disclosed the bodies of men lying promiscuously among dead fish. Like occurrences take place in the neighbourhood of the Mt. Casium situated near Egypt.²

Although such freak events might occur, the reality was less dramatic. Armies had successfully crossed the Sinai and invaded Egypt for centuries. All that was needed was careful preparation. As usual Antigonos' preparations for the campaign were thorough. In order to cross the barren landscape, he gathered an enormous baggage train to carry supplies including wagons to carry his

weapons and camels to carry 5,000 tonnes of grain for the men to eat as well as fodder for the animals.³ In addition the men were to carry ten days rations.

Antigonus' force was ready to march from Gaza in late October. The relatively cooler weather would have made the march easier for the army. The pilots of the fleet were worried, however, about the possibility of the autumn storms which traditionally began after the setting of the Pleiades, in eight days time. So concerned were they that Medius, one of Antigonus' closest friends and a former admiral, was supposed to have had a dream foretelling failure:

That Antigonus himself, with his whole army, was competing in a race over the course and back; he ran vigorously and swiftly at first, then, little by little, his strength failed him; and at last, after he had made the turn, he became weak, breathed heavily, and with difficulty made the finish.⁴

As was his want, Antigonus ignored the prophecy. Perhaps less sensible was his reply to the predicted bad weather. He scorned the pilots 'as men afraid of danger.'⁵

The pilots of the fleet were soon shown to be correct in fearing the weather, for within a few days of departing Gaza a storm struck the fleet near Raphia, a city without a safe anchorage and surrounded by shoals. Some of the warships were lost and others forced to flee back to Gaza. The heavy ships pressed on to Casium, less than fifty kilometres from Pelusium, but were again struck by storms. Once more there was no safe landing and the fragile galleys were forced to ride out the storm, anchored about 400 metres offshore for several days. Soon the drinking water had run out and the crews 'were reduced to such straits that, if the storm had continued for a single day more, all would have perished of thirst.'⁶ Finally the storm blew itself out and the fleet was able to land and be resupplied from the army which had just arrived.

Three more warships had been lost but most of the crews had managed to swim ashore. The fleet was allowed several days rest at the camp while it waited for any stragglers to arrive. Antigonus pressed on with the army until he reached the Nile. There he made a new camp 400 metres from the river.

Despite his losses on Cyprus, Ptolemy had prepared well for the advance of Antigonus. He had stripped the rest of his kingdom of troops and had occupied the most important points with garrisons of his most loyal forces. The forts had been well supplied with artillery. Even with the loss of most of his fleet he had been able to gather a large number of light river craft on which he mounted artillery. As he had done when confronted with Perdiccas' invasion, he attempted to suborn Antigonus' troops. He sent boats across the river to address Antigonus' soldiers, offering two *minae*, roughly four months pay, for any soldier who would desert and thirty times that for any commander. Many of Antigonus' mercenaries were tempted and he was forced to line the river bank with artillery, archers and slingers to drive off the boats and to prevent desertion. Antigonus made an example of any deserters he caught, torturing them horribly to intimidate the rest of the army.

Now that Antigonus had reached the Nile two strategies were possible. He could fight his way across the Delta to Alexandria or he could strike south to the important city of Memphis, at the head of the Delta. The first strategy would involve numerous river crossings and hard fighting. The second strategy was perhaps the best. It would almost prove successful in a later invasion of the Seleucid king Antiochus IV, only the intervention of the Romans saving the Ptolemies. We are not told which strategy Antigonus planned but either would first require the capture of Pelusium and control of the river. Pelusium was the key to Egypt. It had been a victory there in 525 that had enabled the Persians to conquer Egypt.

Antigonus' tactics appear to have been to avoid the dangers of the direct assaults across the Nile which had led to Perdiccas'

disasters. Instead he would use Demetrius' fleet to first secure a bridgehead on the western side of the river and outflank Ptolemy's position before moving his army across. When Demetrius and the fleet arrived they were ordered to capture a position known as Pseudostomon (False Mouth). The position was, however, strongly held by a garrison and Demetrius' ships were driven off by artillery fire.

Demetrius then sailed through the night to another mouth of the Nile, further west at Phatniticum. Many of the ships failed to follow the lamp of the lead ship and became lost in the dark. Having arrived at the target, Demetrius was forced to postpone his attack while he searched for the stragglers. Diodorus records that: 'Since this caused considerable delay, Ptolemy, hearing of the arrival of the enemy, came quickly to reinforce his men and after drawing up his army, stationed it along the shore.'⁷ Faced by Ptolemy's army drawn up along the shore, Demetrius abandoned the planned assault and retreated back to the east. Once again his armada was hit by a storm, losing three warships and some transports. The fleet eventually straggled back to Antigonus' main camp.

The problem with Diodorus' account is that it leaves a number of questions unanswered. If Ptolemy had been at Pelusium, his army would have force marched over 100 kilometres to Phatniticum. If he had marched his main force over this distance, the question must be asked what was Antigonus doing at Pelusium for the days that Ptolemy and his army were absent? There is no record of him making any attacks, even if only diversions to support Demetrius' outflanking manoeuvres. Perhaps Ptolemy had merely gathered the local garrisons into a single force at the crucial point. Either way the operation appears to have lacked any co-ordinated effort between Antigonus and Demetrius.

Ptolemy's garrisons, his large fleet of small river craft, large numbers of artillery and the width of the Pelusiatic branch of the Nile had made a landing impossible without risking crippling

casualties. Demetrius' attempts to turn the position had been thwarted by the weather and Ptolemy's prompt response to the threat. Antigonus, frustrated by Ptolemy's well prepared defence now sat before Pelusium seemingly lacking any strategy for 'many days' as 'food for the men and fodder for the beasts were falling short.'⁸ Lack of food and activity soon sapped the morale of Antigonus' forces. He called together a meeting of his commanders to debate whether to remain or retreat and return at a time when the Nile was at its lowest point, around June. The decision was made to withdraw and the army marched away with all speed, the fleet sailing along with them. This council smacks of a face saving effort by Antigonus, an attempt to share the responsibility for his decision to retreat. Many of Antigonus' disheartened troops, remembering Ptolemy's offers and perhaps not keen to march back across the Sinai, deserted to the enemy.

Ptolemy was jubilant at Antigonus' retreat. He made sacrifices to the gods, threw lavish feasts for his friends and wrote letters to Seleucus, Lysimachus and Cassander proclaiming his victory. Twice he had defeated an invasion of Egypt and Ptolemy was 'convinced that the country was his as a prize of war.'⁹ It is most likely that it was as a result of this victory that 'Ptolemy's army also saluted him as king.'¹⁰ In doing so he was claiming to be the legitimate ruler of all his domains as "spear won land" and the equal in status to Antigonus.

Billows, in his influential biography of Antigonus, places the blame for the defeat squarely on Demetrius. He claims that the expedition had every chance of success but that: 'Its ignominious failure must be clearly laid at the door of Demetrius and the pilots of the fleet, whose poor performance in seeking to make a landing beyond the Pelousiac Nile scotched Antigonus's strategy for the campaign and forced the retreat.'¹¹ He also maintains that Antigonus was unwise in taking such a large army when one half its size would have been sufficient for the task and much easier to maintain.¹² Grainger agrees with Billows' assessment and further

concludes that by bringing such a large army was showing signs ‘of the same megalomania which had shown up in Alexander in his last years.’¹³ From a strictly military point of view perhaps both are correct, but their assessments are somewhat anachronistic as they ignore the imperative for Hellenistic kings to display their power on a grand scale. Ancient generals were firm believers in gathering large armies to overwhelm the enemy both physically and psychologically. As Polyaeus would later observe:

Demetrius, though very short of money, doubled his army by new levies. And when some of his friends in surprise asked him, how he expected to pay them, when he found it difficult to support a smaller force; “the more powerful we are,” he replied, “the weaker we shall find our enemies; and the more easily make ourselves masters of their county. From thence tribute and free gifts will come in, that will soon fill our coffers.”¹⁴

Their analysis appears to be far too hard on Demetrius and too lenient towards Antigonus. Prior to the invasion Antigonus was warned of the dangers of sailing a fleet along ‘a rough coast which had no harbours’ at a time when the autumn storms were to be expected. The seasonal rise and fall of the Nile was also well known, yet Antigonus chose to invade when the Nile would be close to its highest point.¹⁵ Yet Antigonus decided to attack at the worst possible time knowing that his strategy would rely on the fleet. More than six warships and a considerable number of transports were lost to the storms. Antigonus had never shown himself to be a sailor, preferring to leave command of the fleet to subordinates. Perhaps he believed that the high water would assist his large warships to operate in the river. If so, he was to be proved wrong by Ptolemy’s careful preparations. It would appear that it was his overconfident disregard of the problems of conducting naval actions in this area, at that time, that led to his defeat. This is tacitly admitted by his resolution to return when

the river was at its lowest point.

Rather than point the finger at Demetrius it might be more pertinent to discuss the role of Antigonus as commander of the army. He had skillfully gathered and supplied a large army, then led it without incident across the dangerous wastes of the Sinai. Once there, however, 400 metres from the enemy, he appears to have become bereft of ideas on how to use it. The audacity and energy of his earlier campaigns with their forced marches, stratagems and hard fought battles appears to have deserted Antigonus.

Perhaps the memories of Perdiccas' murder and the earlier desertions from his army had made him too anxious to risk heavy casualties. Possibly three years of the more pleasant and humane pastimes of city building and enjoying the fruits of victory had removed the fire from his belly. Perhaps it was simply a product of age and ill health. It is hard to believe that the same general who snatched victory from the jaws of defeat at Byzantium and Paraetaceni would have so meekly taken down his tent and crept away. Whatever the reason, Antigonus, having assembled his mighty army, appears to have no longer possessed the ruthlessness necessary to risk it in battle. The campaign, at least on land, appears to have been more of a triumphal procession designed to impress the world with his power rather than a military operation. As Plutarch had claimed, Antigonus no longer belonged on active campaign.

Nonetheless, for Antigonus his defeat was a major setback but not a disaster. Losses in men and ships had been light. The financial cost would have been substantial but does not appear to have placed any limitations on future campaigns. Despite Ptolemy's victory, his losses at Cyprus were still crippling and prevented any major offensive action for several years. What was more important was the loss of prestige. Antigonus' failure, coming so soon after his triumph at Salamis, had shown again that he was not invincible. Both Seleucus and Ptolemy had

demonstrated that despite his resources, he could be resisted successfully. Ptolemy was also able to use his success to legitimately call himself king and claim to be the equal of Antigonus.

Such a loss of reputation had to be remedied. Antigonus needed a new victory to regain his reputation and to intimidate his allies as well as his enemies. Egypt had proven to be too hard a nut to crack and plans for another invasion were to be delayed for another six months. Antigonus, in keeping with his belief that weaker peoples should not be allowed to defy kings, would seek to punish the people of Rhodes for their defiance.

Chapter 18

The Siege of Rhodes: The Naval Assault

For the soldiers of the Rhodians, occupying their several positions on the walls, were awaiting the approach of the hostile fleet, and the old men and women were looking on from their homes, since the city is shaped like a theatre; and all, being terror-stricken at the magnitude of the fleet and the gleam of the shining armour, were not a little anxious about the final outcome.

Diodorus 19.83.

Following his defeat in Egypt, Antigonos returned to Syria in the winter of 306/5. Once again he seemed content to go into semi-retirement and allow Demetrius to command military operations. It would be three years before Antigonos would again take the field, and then only because his empire was threatened by invasion and Demetrius was absent in Europe.

Antigonos' next target would be the city of Rhodes. He had not forgotten, or forgiven, their refusal when Demetrius had requested them to join the campaign against Cyprus. Such defiance could not be allowed to go unpunished as it might encourage other allies to follow suit. An attack on Rhodes could also be seen as part of the ongoing campaign against Ptolemy. Now that Cyprus had fallen, Rhodes could become a replacement transit point for Egyptian ships sailing to Greece.

During the coming conflict the assembly of the Rhodians would point out the hypocrisy of Antigonos, who while 'setting free the cities throughout Greece, which had displayed no goodwill at all towards their benefactors, they were manifestly trying to enslave the city that in practice showed itself most constant in repaying

favours.’¹ This last claim is perhaps a little artful given Rhodes’ policy over the preceding few years and ignored the lessons of history.

Over a century and a half earlier the allies of the Athenians, who had joined a coalition to fight against Persia, soon found out that attempts to leave their “voluntary” alliance would be met with force. Naxos, after attempting to leave the coalition was attacked, placed under siege and forced back into the alliance. As Thucydides observes it was ‘the first of the allied cities which was enslaved contrary to Hellenic right; the turn of the others came later.’² In attempting to punish Rhodes, Antigonus was adhering to the political realities of the Hellenistic world as expressed by the fifth century Athenian imperialist Cleon, that in dealing with recalcitrant allies:

Whenever you yield to them out of pity or are misled by their specious tales, you are guilty of a weakness dangerous to yourselves, and receive no thanks from them. You should remember that your empire is a despotism exercised over unwilling subjects, who are always conspiring against you; they do not obey in return for any kindness which you do them to your own injury, but in so far as you are their masters; they have no love of you, but they are held down by force.³

A decade after this speech was given, the Athenians massacred the people of Melos for attempting to remain neutral, even though they had never been a part of their alliance. After a siege: ‘the Melians were induced to surrender at discretion. The Athenians thereupon put to death all who were of military age, and made slaves of the women and children.’⁴ It was a lesson well learnt by the Romans who punished the Sicilian city of Enna in the same way for having the temerity to claim that ‘as free men we accepted the Roman alliance’⁵ and as such could demand the withdrawal of the Roman garrison. Over the centuries, the philosophy of great

powers in regards to their weaker allies is that you are either with us or against us. Neutrality, unless backed by strength, is rarely tolerated.

The island of Rhodes lies close to the coast of Caria, with the city of Rhodes occupying the northern most point of the island. The city was roughly triangular in shape with the eastern and western sides bordered by the sea. Diodorus (19.83) compares it to a theatre, with the houses sloping down from the acropolis in the southwest to the port. To the southern, landward side, the city was protected by walls over two kilometres long. On the eastern side were three harbours of which the northern “small harbour” was the best protected and most important.

Traditionally the people of Rhodes believed themselves to be descended from the legendary hero Hercules. Although the Mycenaean Greeks had occupied the island in the fifteenth century, the city of Rhodes had only been founded in 408 when all the cities of the island united to form one territory. Its plan had been laid out by the Athenian architect Hippodamus who also designed the Athenian port of Piraeus. According to Strabo, who admittedly wrote three centuries later, Rhodes was ‘far superior to all others in harbours and roads and walls and improvements in general that I am unable to speak of any other city as equal to it.’⁶ The Rhodians had a long history as skilled sailors, having sent out colonies as far afield as Spain. For much of the previous half century the island had been subject to various conquerors, falling to the Carians in 357, the Persians in 340 and taken by Alexander in 332.

In his introduction to the coming conflict Diodorus praises Rhodes’ strength and its supposed neutrality. He also claims that Rhodes had a special relationship with Alexander who honoured ‘Rhodes above all cities’⁷ and deposited his will there. It is generally believed that in his coverage of the coming struggle Diodorus relied not on Hieronymus as his main source but on a later, pro-Rhodian source. Much of his introduction is fanciful and

portrays Rhodes' much stronger position of a century later.⁸

In reality Rhodes relationship with the Macedonian kings, particularly Alexander, had been far more problematic. The city had supplied ships to the Persian fleet fighting Alexander and as a result had been occupied by a Macedonian garrison. This garrison was still in place at the time of Alexander's death, after which 'the Rhodians drove out their Macedonian garrison and freed the city.'⁹ Wisely the Rhodians did not take part in the Lamian War and were largely ignored until attacked by Attalus in 319. In 316 the city was struck by floods which did considerable damage and killed 500 people.

Despite Diodorus' claim that the Rhodians 'took no part in their [the Successors] wars with each other'¹⁰ from 315 the Rhodians clearly favoured the cause of, and later allied themselves with, Antigonos. In 315 they had built ships for Antigonos and later in 313 they had formally allied themselves with him, sending ten ships to join his forces in Greece. Their allegiance was probably a result of Antigonos' Tyre decree regarding the freedom of the Greeks, particularly the promise not to impose garrisons. Their close proximity to Antigonos' realm, after the defeat of Asander, may also have influenced their decision, especially as Rhodes controlled a section of the mainland known as the Peraea. Nonetheless, their earlier support for Antigonos had never involved direct confrontation with the forces of Ptolemy. Their alliance with Antigonos was, however, complicated by their close economic ties to Egypt. This meant that the Rhodians 'inclined chiefly toward Ptolemy, for it happened that most of their revenues were due to the merchants who sailed to Egypt, and that in general the city drew its food supply from that kingdom.'¹¹ Until 306 Rhodians had been able to navigate a careful position of support for Antigonos while maintaining close ties with Ptolemy.

In the years following 311 the alliance with Antigonos had clearly become strained. The Rhodians may have chosen to believe that one of the terms of the Peace of 311, 'that the Greeks be

autonomous', freed them from their former obligations.¹² Antigonus' demand for assistance in the invasion of Egypt was clearly the breaking point in their relationship.

During his campaign against Ptolemy, Antigonus had sent a naval squadron to place a partial economic blockade against Rhodes, ordering his commander to seize the cargoes of any merchant ships sailing to Egypt from Rhodes. The Rhodians responded by attacking and driving off Antigonus' forces. Antigonus may have, although it is unlikely, overlooked a refusal to supply troops but military aggression could not go unpunished. As Antigonus had explained to Demetrius, armed defiance could not be forgiven as doing so would appear to be as a result of weakness not generosity. They must make an example of the Rhodians. Their armed defiance had given Antigonus a legitimate cause, he accused them of being the 'authors of an unjust war.'¹³ Antigonus may have provoked the incident for just such a reason. He most likely hoped for a quick victory which would both increase his prestige and power, and weaken Ptolemy. Once Rhodes was dealt with then a new invasion of Egypt could be contemplated.

The fearful Rhodians tried to appease Antigonus. They voted him great honours and sent envoys to explain their position. Antigonus refused to hear them out and began preparations for an attack on the island. The Rhodians were so 'frightened by the superior power of the king'¹⁴ that they caved in to the threat and offered to ally themselves with Antigonus against Ptolemy. This concession was no longer sufficient, Demetrius demanded 100 hostages from the leading citizens and that his fleet be allowed to use Rhodes' harbours as a base. The demand for access to the harbours was the crucial point. The Rhodians would have seen this as a garrison by stealth and the end of their independence, 'concluding that he was plotting against the city, they made ready for war.'¹⁵

Antigonus placed Demetrius in command of his forces which

gathered at the port of Lorymea in Caria, about thirty kilometres across the sea from Rhodes. The expedition gathered was again impressive:

Two hundred warships of all sizes and more than one hundred and seventy auxiliary vessels; on these were transported not quite forty thousand soldiers besides the cavalry and the pirates who were his allies. There was also an ample supply of ordnance of all sorts and a large provision of all the things necessary for a siege.¹⁶

Following the regular forces were nearly 1,000 privately owned vessels, belonging to carpetbaggers hoping to profit from the pillaging of Rhodes.

In an effort to demoralize the Rhodians, Demetrius sailed his entire fleet past the harbour of Rhodes before landing in the Gulf of the Ialysus to the southwest of the city, just outside of artillery range. There he built a fortified camp while his forces plundered the rest of the island. He then recalled his forces and in three days built a breakwater to protect his entire fleet.

While this was occurring, the Rhodians sent constant delegations to Demetrius seeking peace. Their overtures were ignored. Realizing that the war had finally come to their city they sent out ambassadors to Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Cassander, 'begging them to give aid and saying that the city was fighting the war on their behalf.'¹⁷ Surprisingly, the Rhodians appear to have been caught unprepared and took immediate steps to bolster the defence of the city. The walls and artillery were quickly repaired. In the case of the artillery this may have involved the expedient cutting of their women's hair for rope, rather than using the usual horse hair. Those foreigners who lived in the city and were willing to fight were enrolled and the rest expelled. This was done both to reduce the number of hungry mouths and to prevent treachery from within the walls. Once this was done a roll call was taken and it was found that they had 6,000 citizens and 1,000 foreigners

fit for service. This number probably only included the city's hoplites. Other, poorer citizens would have served in the fleet and as light armed troops. It was decided that these forces were not sufficient and a decree was voted to purchase and free slaves willing to fight. The Rhodians' three fastest warships were sent out to prey on the merchant ships supplying Demetrius' forces.

The people of Rhodes passed a number of decrees to encourage those fighting. The fallen were to be given public funerals, their dependants were to receive pensions, their unmarried daughters dowries and their sons arms on reaching manhood. In true Greek democratic fashion, the taxes to pay for all this were levied against the rich. Craftsmen were conscripted to prepare arms and others to repair the walls. An agreement was made with Demetrius for the ransoming of any prisoners who could pay at 1,000 drachmae for a free man and 500 for a slave. Although perhaps good for his own troops' morale, this arrangement appears to favour the Rhodians who would thereby replenish their already stretched manpower. Antigonus also promised to protect any Rhodian ships and sailors caught in his ports so long as they did not attempt to return home.

Demetrius had determined that his first attacks would be directed against the harbours. If they could be taken then Rhodes would be isolated from any outside help or supply. Its fall would then only be a matter of time. Most of the fighting appears to have occurred in or around the northern "small harbour" which was protected to the east by a mole.

To attack the harbour Demetrius built two floating platforms for his artillery by lashing two cargo ships together. Upon these he built two towers four stories high which were taller than the defensive towers of the harbour. They were to be protected from attack by the Rhodian ships with a floating boom. More artillery and archers were placed upon small craft. The Rhodians responded by placing artillery upon the mole of the harbour, their walls and upon their own light vessels.

Control of the mole was crucial to control of the harbour and

Demetrius seized a foothold upon its seaward end in a night attack. This position was quickly fortified and 400 soldiers landed. It lay about 250 metres from the city's walls. The next day Demetrius moved his floating platforms into the harbour and commenced the bombardment of the city. The fighting largely consisted of an artillery duel. At sunset, as Demetrius withdrew his platforms, the Rhodians attempted to destroy them with small boats packed with burning firewood but failed.

The following day Demetrius resumed his attacks in the harbour but attempted to stretch the defence by also attacking from the land. For eight days he kept up these tactics. Several times his soldiers gained footholds on the fortifications but each time they were driven off by the determination of the defenders. Operations in the harbours were also dangerous due to the rugged shoreline and hidden rocks which claimed many ships. Heavy losses and exhaustion finally caused Demetrius to temporarily call off the attacks while he repaired his damaged equipment and rested his troops. This delay allowed the Rhodians to bury their dead and dedicate the prows of the destroyed enemy ships to the gods. More importantly, it allowed them to repair their damaged defences.

After seven days of rest and repair, Demetrius renewed his assault on the harbour. His first attack targeted the walls with artillery and the Rhodian ships with fire arrows. These tactics were meeting with such success that the Rhodians determined on a desperate sortie. They manned three warships and targeted Demetrius' floating platforms. They managed to breach the boom and destroy two of the platforms but the third was saved by being towed away. Presumably Demetrius had constructed a third platform during the break in the fighting. The Rhodian ships pursued but were attacked by Demetrius' ships, the commander's vessel was captured but the other two managed to escape. Demetrius responded to the losses by building an even larger platform 'three times the size of the former in height and width.'¹⁸

This was destroyed by a sudden storm as it was being towed into position, perhaps the extra height made it unseaworthy.

The storm also threw Demetrius' fleet into disarray. The Rhodians used the opportunity to launch an attack on Demetrius' position on the mole. Due to the weather Demetrius was unable to assist or reinforce the garrison. The Rhodians were able to attack in relays and finally the exhausted defenders surrendered. Over 400 prisoners were taken. By recapturing the mole the Rhodians had regained control of the harbour. Soon supplies and reinforcements were able to come into the city. Ptolemy sent 500 soldiers, many were Rhodians who had served him as mercenaries. With the re-capture of the mole and the weather worsening, Demetrius gave up his attempts to capture the harbours and decided to attack the city by land.

Chapter 19

The Siege of Rhodes: The Land Assault

As for the Rhodians, they continued their strenuous resistance in the war until Demetrius, who wanted a pretext for abandoning it, was induced to make terms with them by a deputation of Athenians, on condition that the Rhodians should be allies of Antigonos and Demetrius, except in a war against Ptolemy.

Plutarch, *Demetrius* 22.

Having decided to attack the city's land walls, Demetrius made his usual thorough preparations. He also demonstrated his ability, and predilection, for building massive war machines. To take Rhodes he built an even larger *helepolis* than that he had used at Salamis. Both Diodorus and Plutarch describe it in great detail. It stood about forty five metres high, each side of its base was about twenty metres long and it tapered up to a platform, nine stories high, whose sides were about nine metres long. It was protected on the three sides facing the enemy by iron plates. The machine was carried on eight solid wheels about four and a half metres in diameter. It is estimated that the construction weighed about 150 tonnes and needed 3,400 men to move it, most pushing and others turning a capstan from inside. According to Plutarch it was so stable that 'it did not totter or lean when it moved, but remained firm and erect on its base, advancing evenly with much noise.'¹

As well as the *helepolis*, Demetrius built the usual array of towers, rams and penthouses. To allow all these engines to be used effectively 30,000 labourers were employed to clear a swathe of the ground, 700 metres wide, over which he would launch his attack. This frontage was protected by seven towers and six curtain walls between them. Such were the energy and resources

that Demetrius threw into the project that the preparations were finished ahead of schedule. There is a hint in the ancient sources that Demetrius tended to build large engines of war merely to impress, as he 'could never be satisfied with the largeness of his undertakings in building ships and engines of war, or in gazing at them with great delight.'² There is, however, a more practical reason for the size of his *helepolis*, the higher it towered over the walls that it was attacking, the more effective it would be.

The scale of Demetrius' preparations alarmed the Rhodians so much that they took the precaution of building a second wall behind the portion of the wall that Demetrius was about to attack. To clear space and obtain materials for the new wall, 'they used stones obtained by tearing down the theatre's outer wall and the adjacent houses, and also some of the temples, vowing to the gods that they would build finer ones when the city had been saved.'³ They also sent out another nine warships to harass Demetrius' supply ships.

These privateers met with some success, including the capture of a number of ships, aboard which were nine of Demetrius' engineers 'men of outstanding skill in making missiles and catapults.' They also captured Demetrius' 'royal robes and the rest of the outfit that Demetrius' wife Phila had with great pains made ready and sent off for her husband.'⁴ Not being interested in aristocratic displays of camaraderie, the more practical, democratic Rhodians sent the robes to Ptolemy as thanks for his support. They also sold the captured crews into slavery, probably to help cover the costs of the war. Presumably the crews, coming from the poorer classes, had no ability to pay their ransom which amounted to about three years pay. The people of Rhodes also discussed in their assembly whether, as Demetrius was attacking them, they should repeal the honours voted to him and his father, and to destroy their statues. This proposal was voted down on the basis of 'fame and self interest'. By not being petty, they both increased the reputation of the city and did not aggravate their

enemies unnecessarily should the city fall, 'as a means of gaining mercy, the memory of the friendship they had preserved.'⁵

Earlier in the siege, Demetrius had refrained from destroying a painting of the local hero Ialysus by the famous artist Protogenes of Caunus, saying that 'he would rather burn the likenesses of his father than so great a labour of art.'⁶ The painting was still on view in Cicero's time, two and a half centuries later, but soon after was stolen by the Romans and destroyed in a fire. Protogenes continued painting in the suburbs of Rhodes throughout the siege, protected by Demetrius' soldiers.

As well as preparing his engines, Demetrius utilized the other main tactic of besieging armies, mining under the enemy's walls. The purpose was either to gain direct access into the city or undermine and bring down a section of wall. The latter was achieved by excavating a large, supported chamber under the walls and destroying the props by fire. If done correctly the weight of the walls could no longer be supported by the void below and the walls would collapse. As Demetrius' tunnels were approaching the walls, his plan was betrayed by a deserter. The Rhodians responded in the usual manner of defenders, 'by digging a deep trench parallel to the wall which was expected to collapse and by quickly undertaking mining operations themselves, made contact with their opponents underground and prevented them from advancing farther.'⁷ The fighting that occurred when the two tunnels met was usually brutal, being at close quarters with no room to manoeuvre.

Having been betrayed himself, Demetrius then resorted to another tried and true method of taking a city, bribery. Philip II had once boasted that he had won more cities with money than with soldiers, 'for he had learned by experience that what could not be subdued by force of arms could easily be vanquished by gold.'⁸ Demetrius attempted to suborn one of Ptolemy's mercenary commanders, Athenagoras, into betraying the city. Athenagoras instead betrayed Demetrius and was rewarded by the Rhodians

with the enormous sum of a golden crown and five talents of silver as ‘their object being to stimulate loyalty to the city on the part of the other men who were mercenaries and foreigners.’⁹ In the bribery stakes the Rhodians had clearly managed to outbid Demetrius. With mining and bribery having failed Demetrius now determined to take the city by storm.

Even at this late moment, Demetrius was willing to make terms. Envoys from the Carian city of Cnidos attempted to broker a peace. Demetrius ceased his attack and negotiations took place for a considerable time but in the end no agreement could be reached. Nowhere are Demetrius’ terms recorded but, given his position of apparent strength, they are unlikely to have been easy. He most likely repeated his demand for hostages and access to Rhodes’ harbours. Whatever the terms, the Rhodians were clearly not prepared to surrender their freedom and autonomy.

The Rhodians were probably made confident in their refusal by the help they were receiving from outside of the city. As well as troops, they had received supplies of grain and legumes from Ptolemy, Cassander and Lysimachus totalling about 15,000 tonnes. As a result of the arrival of these provisions ‘the besieged, who were already disheartened, regained their courage.’¹⁰ Demetrius’ failure to capture the harbours meant that Rhodes could not be starved into submission. The fragile nature of ancient warships meant that imposing a permanent blockade by sea was nearly impossible. Provided there was a safe landing available, blockade runners would simply wait for a favourable wind and sail into the harbour while the intercepting galleys were left floundering. One such incident is clearly described:

While these ships were on their way to the city, Demetrius attempted to dispatch ships to bring them to his own camp. But a wind favourable to the Egyptians sprang up, and they were carried along with full sails and brought into the friendly harbours, but those sent out by Demetrius returned with their mission unaccomplished. ¹¹

Demetrius now put his plans for the assault in place. The *helepolis* was placed in the centre of the assault with two rams, protected by penthouses on either side. While the land wall was being assaulted the fleet would launch simultaneous attacks against the harbour. 'Then, when all at a single command and signal had raised the battle cry together, he launched attacks on the city from every side.'¹²

Demetrius' artillery destroyed one of the Rhodian towers and a section of wall. With their defences in danger of being breached, the Rhodians decided on a counter attack aimed at the *helepolis*. They concentrated their artillery against the tower and gathered a large supply of fire bearing missiles. Soon after sunset they launched an artillery barrage against the *helepolis* and managed to dislodge some of its armour plating. Fearing that his prize machine would be destroyed by fire, Demetrius ordered it to be withdrawn out of artillery range. He again stopped operations while he buried his dead and repaired his equipment. While this was occurring, Demetrius decided to conduct an intelligence gathering exercise. He had collected all the artillery missiles fired during the night by the Rhodians and was astounded by the total of 2,300. This exercise made him realize the resources available to the Rhodians and the difficulties ahead.

This delay gave the Rhodians another opportunity to strengthen their defences. They covered the weakened wall with a third wall behind and a moat in front. They also sent out a further squadron of fast warships which defeated the lighter vessels of Demetrius' pirate allies in battle.

Demetrius resumed the assault, targeting the already damaged section of the walls. His engines advanced to the walls and their firepower cleared the battlements. As a result his rams destroyed two more sections of wall. The tower between these two sections now became the key point. From its height the Rhodians could cover the damaged walls with fire. If it fell, then Demetrius' troops could advance through the gap with the Rhodian defensive fire

being less effective. Despite repeated attacks, Demetrius' troops were unable to capture the tower. Yet again the Rhodian defences had held.

With no immediate end to the siege in sight, another embassy, this time from the Athenians came to Rhodes to attempt to broker a peace. It was over two years since Demetrius had quit the city and the war with Cassander had not been going well for the Athenians. The Greeks wanted Demetrius to leave the island and renew his campaign against Cassander. A truce was agreed upon but once again Demetrius and the Rhodians could not come to terms.

Demetrius determined that his best chance of success was to launch a night attack against the damaged sections of wall. He selected 1,500 of his best troops to lead the onslaught. The main assault would be supported by feints against other parts of the walls and the harbour. His picked troops crossed the moat and pressed on through the breach into the city. They penetrated as far as the theatre, on the eastern side of the acropolis, about 500 metres into the city. This was the crucial moment of the siege, if Demetrius could reinforce those within the breach then the city would fall. Inside Rhodes the mood was desperate, 'the throng of children and women were in fear and tears.'¹³ Siege warfare was always horrible for the civilians as well as the defenders. Not only did they have to watch their sons, brothers, fathers and husbands fight and die, they knew their likely fate if the city fell. If it was taken by storm it was normal for all the men to be massacred and the women and children sold into slavery.

The Rhodian generals, seeing the threat, gathered their own best men, and fresh mercenaries newly arrived from Egypt. They launched a desperate attack against the invaders. The fighting was determined at first, with neither side giving ground. The Rhodians had the courage of 'men fighting for their native land and their precious things.'¹⁴ More importantly, they also had the advantage of being able to more rapidly reinforce their soldiers. The

attackers were finally overwhelmed and few managed to escape. Rhodian losses were also heavy, with the president of their council, their head of state, Damoteles, being killed in the defence of his city.

Despite realizing 'that Fortune had snatched from his hand the capture of the city', Demetrius steadfastly prepared to continue the siege. Antigonus had, however, lost patience and 'wrote to him to come to terms with the Rhodians as best he could, he awaited a favourable opportunity that would provide a specious excuse for the settlement.'¹⁵ The pretext was supplied by the Aetolians who, eager to have Demetrius return to Greece, led another delegation to broker peace. On the other side, Ptolemy had informed the Rhodians that he would continue to provide men and supplies but it would be better for them to make peace. The terms finally agreed were:

That the city should be autonomous and ungarrisoned and should enjoy its own revenue; that the Rhodians should be allies of Antigonus unless he should be at war with Ptolemy; and that they should give as hostages a hundred of their citizens whom Demetrius should select, those holding office being exempt.¹⁶

After a year of war the only concessions that Demetrius had won from the Rhodians was the surrender of the hostages and the renewal of their alliance with Antigonus. The latter, significantly, excluded war with Ptolemy. For all Antigonus' and Demetrius' efforts the siege had achieved little, weakening them more than the enemy. The failure at Rhodes, and the deteriorating situation in Greece, meant that the proposed fresh invasion of Egypt had to be shelved indefinitely. Despite a second successive failure, Antigonus would yet again show how resilient he was and how great were the resources that he commanded. The defeat would in no way prevent him from immediately renewing the offensive against Cassander in Greece.

In his analysis of the failed siege, Billows again blames Demetrius for his mistakes and inactivity at crucial times. First was his breaking off of the assault on the harbour to rest and refit his forces and later his inability to effectively blockade the port. It is true Demetrius' failure to capture or close the harbours allowed the Rhodians to sustain their resistance. It does, however, appear to be difficult to accept unconditionally Billows' claims that the 'respite was a mistake' and Demetrius' 'naval operations seem to have been conducted highly negligently.'¹⁷ All sorts of factors influenced naval operations in the pre-industrial age, particularly the weather. Nor is it possible for soldiers to maintain effective military activity while in contact with the enemy over prolonged periods. Effectiveness tends to decline rapidly after about three weeks of constant fighting. During a long siege periods of inaction and rest would be essential unless the participants' morale degenerated into what are known as the 'emotion exhaustion stage' and 'vegetive phase.'¹⁸

It should also be remembered that the siege ended for strategic and political reasons, not military ones. When he received the orders from Antigonus, Demetrius was prepared to continue the operation. Unless captured quickly by assault, a well fortified and supplied ancient city could hold out for years against the best commanders. Tyre had resisted Antigonus for over a year before surrendering on terms. Even the mighty Alexander had failed to capture the Pisidian city of Termessus or the citadels of Halicarnassus. In his account of the siege, Diodorus stresses Demetrius' 'energy and ingenuity in conducting sieges' and how in war 'he devoted both body and mind to the task.'¹⁹ Plutarch, in his brief comment on the outcome of the siege stresses the importance of the Rhodians 'vigorous resistance'.²⁰ Perhaps it is more accurate to emphasize the great courage and ingenuity displayed by the people of Rhodes in the defence of their homeland.

Given enough time, however, Demetrius would probably have

either taken Rhodes by assault or ground it into surrender. Antigonus had decided, however, that his resources could be used in better ways. His Greek allies were screaming for assistance. The continuation of the siege was undermining both his prestige and his credibility as the self-professed liberator of the Greeks. It was time to look for more profitable operations.

For the Rhodians the siege was a tremendous victory. They had beaten the most powerful king in their world. More importantly they had secured their freedom and were to remain ungarrisoned. The victors kept their promise and granted freedom and citizenship to those slaves that had fought bravely. They dedicated statues to Cassander and Lysimachus in thanks for their support. Beyond that, for all his assistance, they honoured Ptolemy as a god, calling him *Soter* (Saviour), just as the Athenians had honoured Antigonus and Demetrius.

When he quit Rhodes, Demetrius was forced to abandon much of his siege equipment. This was sold off by the Rhodians and they used the money to rebuild the damage done to their city and its walls. Their most famous celebration of their victory was the construction of the so called Colossus of Rhodes, one of the seven wonders of the ancient world. It was a colossal bronze statue of the God Helios, the Sun. It was thirty two metres high and stood on a fifteen metre high marble base. The statue cost 300 talents and took twelve years to construct. It was probably located near the harbour although this is not certain. Unfortunately it only stood for fifty six years before it was toppled by an earthquake. After consulting an oracle the people of Rhodes decided not to repair it. Its ruins remained a tourist attraction for at least eight centuries.

On its base the Rhodians included an inscription celebrating their victory:

To you, o Sun, the people of Dorian Rhodes set up this bronze statue reaching to Olympus, when they had pacified the waves of war and crowned their city with the spoils

taken from the enemy. Not only over the seas but also on land did they kindle the lovely torch of freedom and independence. For to the descendants of Heracles belongs dominion over sea and land.[21](#)

Their fellow Greeks may have attributed the fall of the monument to this piece of hubris.

Chapter 20

The Liberation of Greece

*I bind, bury and cause to vanish from men, Pleistarchus,
Eupolemos, Cassander and Demetrius of Phalerum.*

Athenian Curse Tablet¹

Now that Antigonos had ordered the end of the campaign against Rhodes, he could return to his chosen position of liberator, ‘since he was intent on freeing the Greeks.’² It was two years since Demetrius had departed Athens in the spring of 306. There is no detailed account of what had occurred in Greece during this time but from the limited information available it appears that the conflict, known as The Four Years War had swung distinctly in Cassander’s favour. Diodorus’ narrative largely ignores this struggle, recording simply that during this period Cassander and Polyperchon had been ‘engaged in plundering the greater part of Greece.’³

From the few fragments of evidence only a brief outline of the war can be reconstructed. In 306, after Demetrius’ departure, Cassander had advanced south from Thessaly, winning over Boeotia and invading northern Attica. The Athenians called on their old anti-Macedonian allies the Aetolians and between them they forced Cassander back. In 305 the allies took the offensive and won back Boeotia.

Just as things were going well, the rivalry of the Greek cities, which the Macedonian kings were always able to exploit, split the coalition. The Athenians and the Aetolians squabbled, and Boeotia again changed sides. It is probably during this time that Cassander won back control of Chalcis on Euboea. In 304 Cassander again attacked Athens. He captured the Athenian border forts that

guarded the passes between Boeotia and Athens, and laid siege to the city. The Athenians became split politically between supporters and opponents of Antigonos. An Athenian painting, later described by Pausanias, portrayed a 'victory of Athenian cavalry over Pleistarchos, who held command of cavalry and mercenaries under his brother Kassander.'⁴ The incident is often attributed to this period but the dating is uncertain. If the dating is correct, it was only a minor victory, for by the summer of 304 Athens' situation was desperate.

It appears that Demetrius sailed directly to Greece from Rhodes, with a force of 'three hundred and thirty ships and a great number of men-at-arms.'⁵ He cruised via the islands, no doubt to reassure Antigonos' allies and intimidate his enemies. Rather than enter Athens directly, Demetrius decided to land at Aulis in Boeotia, where he could threaten Cassander's rear and his line of communications back to Macedonia. Demetrius took Chalcis and the Boeotians, for the third time in three years, changed sides. The Aetolians too rejoined his alliance.

With central Greece secure, Demetrius then marched on Athens to relieve the siege. Cassander fled north, through the passes into Thessaly, with Demetrius in hot pursuit. He took the city of Heraclea where 6,000 Macedonians deserted to him. Demetrius then turned south again, capturing the Corinthian port of Cenchreae and some Athenian border forts still garrisoned by Cassander. He then returned to Athens to go into winter quarters.

For the campaigning season of 303, Demetrius decided to first attack Cassander's garrisons in the Peloponnesus:

For he believed that the freeing of the Greeks would bring him great honour, and at the same time he thought it necessary to wipe out Prepelaus and the other leaders before attacking Cassander, and then to go on against Macedonia itself if Cassander did not march against him.⁶

Prepelaus was one of Cassander's generals in the Peloponnesus.

Previously he had helped win over Alexandros and commanded Cassander's ill fated expedition to Caria.

Demetrius marched southwest from Athens and attacked Ptolemy's last stronghold in Greece, the city of Sicyon. He stormed the city with a night attack and drove the garrison back into the citadel. The garrison decided to surrender on terms and returned to Egypt. Demetrius now re-organized the city of Sicyon. He destroyed a section of it close to the sea as 'its site was quite insecure'⁷ and new houses were built with his assistance. A democratic government was established. The people of Sicyon now voted the usual obsequious honours and changed the name of the city to Demetrias. The name change did not survive but the new layout did as: 'it had plenty of water by the aid of which they developed rich gardens, so that the king in his design seems to have made excellent provision both for comfort in time of peace and for safety in time of war.'⁸

Once Sicyon had fallen, Demetrius marched on Corinth which was held by Prepelasus. Corinth was an important site as it dominated the Isthmus, the land bridge between central Greece and the Peloponnesus. Demetrius' supporters among the Corinthians opened a gate and allowed his forces into the city unopposed. The garrison retreated to the strongholds of the Acrocorinth and Sisyphium. The Acrocorinth was a monolithic rock 575 metres high which dominated the city. Sisyphium was a fort on its lower slopes. Demetrius brought up his siege engines and stormed Sisyphium. The garrison of the Acrocorinth surrendered soon after. The Corinthians requested that Demetrius place a garrison in Acrocorinth, since they 'wished the city to be protected by the king until the war with Cassander should be brought to an end.'⁹ This request would certainly have been made by Demetrius' supporters and perhaps under some pressure. Corinth was unfortunate in its strategic location, after Philip II had imposed a garrison it remained under continuous Macedonian occupation for nearly a century.

Both cities had fallen quickly in the spring of 303. Demetrius' Athenian allies were so impressed with his rapid victories, gained with few Athenian casualties, that they voted annual sacrifices to Athena Nike, Fortune and their saviour gods Demetrius and Antigonos.

Demetrius now marched into the Argolid. Troezen and Epidaurus were taken. Argos possibly fell to treason.¹⁰ This was all achieved by the end of June, for while in Argos, Demetrius presided over the festival of Hera. He also celebrated a new marriage with Deidameia, the sister of the exiled king Pyrrhus of Epirus who had been expelled from his homeland by the allies of Cassander.

Demetrius then marched into Achaia, storming a number of towns, removing their garrisons and restoring their autonomy. He next marched south against the city of Orchomenus. The garrison commander, Strombichus, had originally been appointed by Polyperchon. When Demetrius called for the surrender of the city, Strombichus 'poured much abuse upon him from the wall in an insulting manner.'¹¹ Demetrius stormed the city and having captured 2,000 mercenaries took them into his own service. Strombichus and eight of his officers were crucified, either for their insults or because of their link to Polyperchon which may have made them traitors in Demetrius' eyes. Whatever Demetrius' reason, the example had the desired effect, all the neighbouring garrisons surrendered whenever he approached 'with a great army and with overwhelming engines of war.'¹²

In two summers' campaigning, Demetrius had shattered Cassander's position in Greece. Plutarch states that, 'on his return, he gave their freedom to the Greeks on this side of Thermopylae.'¹³ In the spring of 302, Demetrius gathered his Greek allies at Corinth. There they agreed to ally themselves together and proclaim Demetrius as commander in chief of the Greeks. In doing so, Antigonos and Demetrius were imitating both Philip and Alexander by reviving the League of Corinth, thereby

claiming to be the true heirs to the Macedonian throne and the traditional policies of former kings.

Many of the terms of the alliance are preserved in fragments of an inscription from the city of Epidaurus. The members were to swear an oath to have the same friends and enemies as Antigonos, Demetrius and their descendants. Anyone who made war on, or imposed a garrison on, any of the allied states was to be an enemy of all. The council of the allies was to meet during the sacred games in peacetime and whenever necessary in war time. The quorum was set at half the members. There were to be five presidents for the council but no more than one from any city. Punishments were set out for failing to abide by the terms of alliance, failure to attend the council meetings and failure to provide the agreed troops.

It has been claimed that in forming the League, Antigonos did 'not appear to have intended to rule the Greeks as a master, but rather to lead them as a friend.'¹⁴ This appraisal appears to be somewhat optimistic. Although it appears to have made some concessions to protect the political autonomy of the cities, the key point of the agreement was that anyone who attempted to harm the kingdom of Antigonos was to be an enemy to all. The cities could run their own internal affairs but not their foreign policy when it came to war. As in all such alliances between the cities and the kings it was in reality an agreement to bind the states militarily to the leaders. Once a state had joined the alliance, membership was no longer an option. Failure to live up to the agreement, or any attempt to leave the alliance, would be punished. Individuals opposed to the alliance risked arrest and exile (see below).

Demetrius again returned to Athens to spend the winter. During his two stays in Athens, his supporters fawned upon him completely unashamedly: 'although before this they had used up and exhausted all the honours that could be bestowed upon him, nevertheless devised a way to show themselves then also the

authors of new and fresh flatteries.’¹⁵ His successes, and this flattery, appear to have gone to Demetrius’ head. If Plutarch’s stories are to be believed he called the goddess Athena his sister and moved into the sacred Parthenon along with his mistress and various prostitutes. He was also notorious for his seduction of ‘free-born youth and native Athenian women.’¹⁶

No doubt this sort of behavior shocked most Athenians but perhaps worse was his interference in their political affairs. Plutarch records that when one citizen attempted to influence the assembly with a letter from Demetrius, the people voted to outlaw this type of manipulation. When Demetrius grew furious at this decree the people voted to rescind it, executed some of those who had proposed it and instead passed a new decree ‘that it was the pleasure of the Athenian people that whatsoever King Demetrius should ordain in future, this should be held righteous towards the gods and just towards men.’¹⁷ Apparently ‘among the many lawless and shocking things done by Demetrius in the city at this time, this is said to have given the Athenians most displeasure, namely, that after he had ordered them to procure speedily two hundred and fifty talents for his use’¹⁸ and to squander it on his mistresses. If true this would have been a breach of the alliance and the Athenians’ freedom. Demetrius, as commander in chief, might well expect to receive contributions from his allies for military expenditure but to use it for his own pleasure would have made it appear as receiving tribute from a subject people. Plutarch finishes his homily with the observation that ‘so fared it with the Athenians, who imagined that because they were rid of their garrison they therefore had their freedom.’¹⁹

It is difficult to know how much of Plutarch’s testimony to credit, as when pairing his *Lives* he often distorted his narrative in order to heighten their similarities. In his comparison of Demetrius and Anthony he sets the tone early, claiming that both were ‘insolent in prosperity, and abandoned themselves to luxury and enjoyment.’²⁰ Many of Demetrius’ supposed sins may have been

recorded by Plutarch to this end. Much of the material probably derives from the pen of Demochares, an Athenian opponent of Stratocles who was prosecuted and sent into exile. Plutarch also quotes from the playwright Philippides who, having mocked Stratocles and Demetrius, fled Athens to the court of Lysimachus. Plutarch was also a self-professed opponent of democracy and never missed an opportunity to display it in the worst possible light. What is more damning is epigraphic evidence that Antigonos and Demetrius held some Athenians, most likely their political opponents, prisoner in Asia.²¹ Nonetheless, for many Athenian citizens, particularly the poorest class, having their democracy back, even if compromised, would have seemed preferable to the mass expulsions and oligarchies of Antipater and Cassander.

Later events would show that Demetrius' disregard of the Athenian people's assembly and traditions was resented. Many of the honours paid to him during this period were possibly insincere, for as Plutarch observes 'it is certainly true that a people will often, in the very act of conferring its honours, have most hatred for those who accept such honours immoderately, ostentatiously, and from unwilling givers.'²² Athens' alliance with Demetrius came to be based purely on the maxim that my enemy's enemy is my friend. It was sustained due to Demetrius' military power and the Athenian peoples' undying hatred of Cassander.²³ In 301, after his power had waned, the Athenians cast off their alliance with him and determined to remain neutral. They refused him entry to the city 'on the ground that the people had passed a vote to admit none of the kings.'²⁴ They did, however, return to him his latest wife, belongings and ships. The Athenians would soon discover that in the era of kings, neutrality was a difficult position to maintain. Only two years later a pro-Cassander tyrant, Lachares, would seize power in the city, massacre his opponents and pillage the temples. Demetrius would retake the city but this time he would install a garrison.

With his position in Greece in tatters and an invasion of

Macedonia imminent, Cassander sent envoys to Antigonus to discuss terms. Antigonus, with the prize of Macedonia before him, was in an uncompromising mood. He replied to Cassander 'that he recognized only one basis for a settlement – Cassander's surrender of whatever he possessed.'²⁵ Cassander urgently requested help from Lysimachus 'because it was his invariable custom when facing the most alarming situations to call on Lysimachus for assistance.'²⁶ Lysimachus would have believed that if Cassander fell, he in neighbouring Thrace would be the next to be attacked. He was also Cassander's brother in law, although that did not necessarily secure friendship as he was Demetrius' as well. Antipater had been extremely successful in marrying off his daughters.

Lysimachus' role in the previous two decades is largely ignored by our sources except when he was confronting Antigonus. This may be a result of the supposed hatred that Hieronymus held for him for destroying his home city of Cardia when founding the city of Lysimachea in 309. His role in opposing Antigonus at the Hellespont in 313 had been crucial for Cassander's survival. Once again he would come to Cassander's rescue. For the next two summers he would lead the campaign against Antigonus.

Lysimachus was about sixty years of age at this point. He had been born into a leading Macedonian family, his father being a friend of Philip II. Lysimachus became one of Alexander's bodyguards and accompanied him on his Asian campaigns where he was awarded a crown for his courage. At the settlement of Babylon, Lysimachus was appointed governor of Thrace because it was inhabited by 'the most warlike nations' and he was 'the bravest of them all.'²⁷

He had ruled Thrace ever since. At some time, in emulation of the other Successors, he had adopted the title of king although the exact date is unclear. Like other kings, stories were told foretelling his rise to power and his superhuman achievements. Lysimachus is supposed to have killed a lion single handed, a feat even

Alexander envied. One a fantastic version of the story relates that Lysimachus was thrown to a lion in punishment by Alexander and, unarmed, killed it by tearing its tongue out.²⁸ Lysimachus clearly relished this tale and used the device of a lion on his coins. One of Alexander's actions is supposed to have prophesied Lysimachus' rise to kingship, for:

As he alighted from his horse, happened to wound Lysimachus in the forehead with the point of his spear, so severely that the blood could not by any means be stopped, till the king, taking off his diadem, placed it on his head by way of closing the wound; an act which was the first omen of royal dignity to Lysimachus.²⁹

Lysimachus had developed a real hatred of Demetrius due to the latter's attacks on his legitimacy as king and, unlike other kings, his reputed tight fistedness. This was part of the basis of the joke about him being a treasurer. The other part, being a eunuch, had implications beyond his manhood. Combined with another jibe, regarding the morals of his first wife, it also called into question the legitimacy of his children.³⁰

Cassander and Lysimachus sent envoys to Ptolemy and Seleucus warning that:

The danger arising from the war was common to all. For they said, if Antigonus should gain control of Macedonia, he would at once take their kingdoms from the others also; indeed he had given proof many times that he was grasping and regarded any command as a possession not to be shared.³¹

Both Ptolemy and Seleucus saw the threat and agreed to come to Cassander's assistance. Justin asserts that previously the:

Leaders of the opposite faction, perceiving that they were individually weakened by Antigonus, while each regarded

the war, not as the common concern of all, but as merely affecting himself, and all were unwilling to give assistance to one another, as if victory would be only for one, and not for all of them, appointed, after encouraging each other by letters, a time and place for an interview, and prepared for the contest with united strength.³²

Although it is prudent to consider that all the Successors always acted in their own interest, this is perhaps a little overstated. Cassander and Lysimachus had acted together before and Ptolemy had assisted Seleucus' rise to power. What is unique is that on this occasion they all appear to have agreed to act in unison. Nonetheless, in the coming campaign one of them, Ptolemy, would still look to his interests rather than directly assist his allies.

Plutarch claims that Antigonus' initial response to the alliance against him was to dismiss it with his usual arrogance:

Yet it would seem that if Antigonus had made some trifling concessions and had slackened his excessive passion for dominion, he might have always retained the supremacy for himself and have left it to his son. But he was naturally stern and haughty, and was harsh in what he said no less than in what he did, and therefore exasperated and incited against himself many young and powerful men; and their combination and partnership at this time he said he would scatter asunder with a single stone and a single shout, as if they were a flock of granivorous birds.³³

Plutarch here has the advantage of hindsight. For Antigonus to have made concessions would have meant acknowledging the claims to independent rule of the other Successors. Something Antigonus had never done. Nor had the Treaty of 311 brought any lasting results. Given the previous behaviour of the other dynasts, why should he make peace just as Demetrius' attack on Cassander appeared to be about to succeed? Antigonus, with Seleucus away

campaigning in India, no doubt believed he could deal with any threat to his Asian domains from Ptolemy and Lysimachus.

Cassander decided that it was best not to await attack but to take the war to the enemy. He gave part of his army under Prepelaus to Lysimachus who then invaded Asia. Lysimachus' attack appears to have caught Antigonus and Demetrius by surprise. Demetrius was busy in Greece and Antigonus was preparing to celebrate games and a festival in Antigonía. Lysimachus crossed the Hellespont unopposed and quickly took the cities of Lampsacus and Parium. Antigonus' policy of leaving cities ungarrisoned may have been politically useful but it left his allies vulnerable to sudden attack. Faced by overwhelming force, the cities surrendered to Lysimachus.

In Europe, Cassander with the rest of his forces marched through Thessaly and occupied the passes. Demetrius decided to outflank his position by sea. He gathered his fleet and army at Chalcis and sailed to the port of Larisa Cremaste, north of the pass of Thermopylae. The city was quickly taken by storm and freed from its garrison. Demetrius then marched north into Thessaly, capturing more cities as he went. Cassander strengthened his garrison in the Thessalian city of Pherae and marched to confront Demetrius with an army of 29,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. Demetrius' army outnumbered Cassander's by nearly two to one, consisting of 56,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry. Cassander wisely stood on the defensive and remained in his fortified camp. Demetrius camped near to him and the two armies confronted each other for weeks without risking battle.

Diodorus claims that both sides were 'awaiting the decision of the whole matter that would take place in Asia.'³⁴ This unwillingness to risk everything in battle is understandable on Cassander's part but less so by his opponent. Demetrius may have been distracted by having to repeatedly send forces to Asia to recue cities threatened by Lysimachus' advance. He had, however, clearly been using the time to undermine Cassander's position by

politics. The people of Pherae surrendered their city to Demetrius and Cassander's garrison surrendered on terms. Without risking his army in battle, Demetrius had opened the road north to Macedonia. Cassander would have to break camp and fight. At this crucial moment, events outside of Europe came to Cassander's rescue. Antigonus was in trouble in Asia and had sent an order to Demetrius to join him as swiftly as possible.

Demetrius, 'since he regarded obedience to his father's orders as obligatory'³⁵ came to terms with Cassander. For a second time Demetrius was forced to abandon his Greek allies at his father's orders. In a face saving arrangement, Demetrius included the proviso that the treaty should only be valid if his father agreed. As a concession to his Greek allies, he included the usual clause that the Greek cities were to be free as, 'Demetrius wished to make his withdrawal from Greece appear respectable and not like a flight.'³⁶ Demetrius then set sail with his entire fleet, and much of his army, for Asia. As before, Cassander would disregard the terms of the agreement, as soon as Demetrius departed he marched south and recaptured the cities of Thessaly.

Chapter 21

The Battle of Ipsus


In this way, then, the forces of the kings were being gathered together, since they all had determined to decide the war by force of arms during the coming summer.

Diodorus 20.113.


While Cassander and Demetrius were fighting one another in Thessaly another campaign was taking place in Asia Minor. Lysimachus, with an army of around 40,000 men had crossed the Hellespont and invaded the heartland of Antigonus' empire. At the time Antigonus had been busy arranging games and a festival in his capital of Antigonía. He appears to have been taken completely by surprise by Lysimachus' attack and the early success it achieved. The cities of Lampsacus and Parium surrendered to Lysimachus without a fight. Lysimachus then emulated Antigonus' policy and left the cities ungarrisoned. The city of Sigeum which resisted was stormed and a garrison installed. The lesson to the Greek cities of Asia was clear, surrender and no garrison will be imposed, resist and you will be occupied.

Despite this warning, the city of Abydus chose to resist. Lysimachus prepared to besiege it but abandoned the effort when Demetrius sent reinforcements to the city from Thessaly. Quitting Abydus, Lysimachus won over the rest of Hellespontine Phrygia. He then struck south and inland, marching through Phrygia. Here, Docimus, a former supporter of Perdiccas who had taken service under Antigonus, changed sides once more. He deserted to Lysimachus and surrendered to him Antigonus' royal treasury at Synnada. Lysimachus pressed on into Cappadocia where more of Antigonus' generals changed sides.

Meanwhile Lysimachus had dispatched a separate column under Prepelaus to win over the cities of Aeolis and Ionia. Ephesus, an important naval base of Antigonius, surrendered when threatened with an assault. The hundred Rhodian hostages that were being held in the city were returned to their homeland. Prepelaus showed himself to be a true follower of Cassander. He placed a garrison in the city, overthrew the previous government and replaced it with his friends, most likely a narrow oligarchy. As Antigonius had control of the sea, he also burnt all the ships in the harbour rather than risk them being captured.



BATTLE of IPSUS Death of Antigonus



1. Demetrius would have come to the assistance of his own infantry, he was not able as the enemy with their elephants had cut off his retreat.
2. Seleucus' light cavalry harasses flank and rear of Antigonus' infantry. Antigonus' phalanx begins to break up as units withdraw or surrender.
3. Antigonus, trying to rally his troops 'was overwhelmed by a cloud of javelins and fell'.

More cities surrendered to Prepelaus but Erythae and Clazomenae were saved when Demetrius sent in reinforcements by sea. Antigonus could claim that under their alliance he was supporting his allies but in effect he was placing garrisons within these cities to ensure their loyalty. Most of the cities of Asia, although they may have preferred the rule of Antigonus and his favour for democracies, had shown that they were not prepared to risk destruction in his cause.

Prepelaus then turned inland and marched on Sardis. Another of Antigonus' commanders deserted him, betraying the city to Prepelaus. Throughout the wars of the Successors many of the commanders showed a propensity to join the winning side. The death of Alexander IV had destroyed legitimate government for the Macedonians and it was only slowly being reconstructed by the remaining dynasts. This had created an era when alliances and loyalties changed rapidly and the commanders were always willing to bribe their opponents' subordinates to change sides. At a stroke of a pen individuals or whole communities might find themselves assigned a new ruler with no say in the matter. It is, therefore, difficult to condemn either the Greek cities or the Macedonian soldiers for their pragmatism. As Plutarch observes:

We see that kings have no reason to find fault with popular bodies for changing sides as suits their interests; for in doing this they are but imitating the kings themselves, who are their teachers in unfaithfulness and treachery, and think him most advantaged who least observes justice.¹

There were always exceptions to this trend. Philip, the commander of the near impregnable citadel of Sardis, refused to desert Antigonos and 'held firm his loyalty toward the man who had placed trust in him.'²

When Lysimachus had first invaded Asia, Antigonos had been preparing to celebrate a festival in Antigonía. He quickly abandoned his plans, paying off the gathered athletes and artists with 200 talents of compensation. With Demetrius in Thessaly, Antigonos, despite his age and failing health, was forced to once again take the field in person. The direct threat to his old heartland of Phrygia appears to have reinvigorated Antigonos who was 'eager beyond his years for the war.'³ He gathered together his army and marched rapidly into Cilicia. Taking funds from the treasury in Cyinda, he raised his troops morale by giving them three months pay in advance and took a further 3,000 talents to ensue further pay and provisions.

Antigonos crossed the Taurus Mountains and marched rapidly to confront Lysimachus. All the defectors once again changed sides, switching their allegiance back to Antigonos. Lysimachus retreated to unite with Prepelaus. They held a council to discuss strategy where it was decided to avoid battle with Antigonos until Seleucus had joined them from the eastern satrapies. Lysimachus selected a strong position and built a fortified camp, near the northern Phrygian city of Abassium. The campaign that followed would be a game of cat and mouse, with Antigonos attempting to trap and destroy his enemy while they attempted to avoid a decisive battle.

Antigonos marched against Lysimachus' camp and formed up his army, challenging him to battle. Lysimachus refused. There is

no mention in the sources of the size of Antigonus' army at this point but it probably outnumbered the enemy.⁴ Antigonus planned to starve Lysimachus into submission and occupied the routes into the camp. Lysimachus determined to escape before his supplies became exhausted. He broke camp during the night and force marched eighty kilometres north to the city of Dorylaeum which had ample stores of supplies. Here he built a new camp alongside a river, and began to fortify it with a deep ditch and three lines of palisades.

Antigonus pursued Lysimachus and once again challenged him to do battle. Lysimachus again refused. It was getting late in the year and Antigonus wanted to crush Lysimachus before the weather made campaigning difficult. He would also have been aware of an invasion of Coele-Syria by Ptolemy and perhaps of Seleucus approaching from the east. Time was growing short, Antigonus needed a decisive victory. He surrounded Lysimachus' camp with a ditch and ordered his artillery to be brought up in preparation to storm the camp. Yet for some reason he changed his mind and once again settled in to blockade Lysimachus. As Antigonus' siege works were near completion, Lysimachus' army again began to run short of food. Once more Lysimachus decided to break out. Using the cover of a stormy night, he managed to find a gap in Antigonus' lines and escaped through the hilly terrain to the north.

Antigonus pursued Lysimachus by marching through the plains parallel to his army. The rains continued, however, and soon the plains became a quagmire. Many of the pack animals and some of the soldiers died on the march. Realizing that his army was suffering and further pursuit was futile, Antigonus called off the march and divided his army into winter quarters north of Dorylaeum.

Twice during the campaign Antigonus had Lysimachus trapped but both times he had allowed him to escape using the same stratagem. Although Plutarch claims that he was eager for the

fight, his earlier appraisal that Antigonus was no longer fit to take the field again appears to have been demonstrated. Antigonus was perhaps unlucky in that his second son Philip had died and Ptolemaeus had betrayed him. His other nephew Dioscorides vanishes from the historical record in 313. Perhaps he joined his brother in rebellion but his fate is unknown. Other than Demetrius there were no other members of his family who could provide the necessary royal presence at the head of his main army.

Lysimachus continued his march north and went into winter quarters south of the city of Heraclea on the Black Sea. There he gained control of the city by marrying Amastris, a niece of the last Persian king Darius and the widow of both Craterus and of the city's former tyrant Dionysius. The marriage ensured that the city would supply his army over the winter. Memnon, a citizen of Heraclea, wrote in his history that Lysimachus:

Was very much in love with her, but when the pressure of events demanded it, he left her at Heraclea and went off to deal with urgent business. When he was free from his many troubles, he soon sent for her to join him at Sardis, where he showed her equal affection. But later he transferred his affection to the [daughter] of Ptolemaeus Philadelphus, who was called Arsinoe, and this caused Amastris to part from him.⁵

A less patriotic, or more cynical observer, might believe that the supplies and control of a secure port on the Black Sea opposite his own kingdom were the greater attraction. Amastris was another of the women of the Successor period who lived a tumultuous and dangerous life. Twice widowed, twice abandoned by husbands and finally drowned by her sons.

During the winter 2,000 Illyrians, and 800 Lycians and Pamphylians, deserted Lysimachus for Antigonus. He welcomed the deserters warmly, paying them their arrears in wages and giving them gifts. The reason for the desertions may have been the

arrears of pay although the Lycians and Pamphylians might have taken the opportunity to return to their long time ruler now that he appeared to be back in control. The rewards were no doubt to encourage others to desert. Lysimachus may have been short of money or he may have been deliberately keeping his soldiers in arrears of pay. This stratagem was one method of retaining their loyalty, the belief being that they were unlikely to desert if owed money. It was, however, a double edged sword as it could lead to dissatisfaction and even rebellion, as Antipater had found out. No longer trusting his Illyrian mercenaries, or perhaps to save more money, Lysimachus later massacred 5,000 of them.

As soon as Antigonus had marched north from Syria, Ptolemy invaded Coele-Syria and captured a number of cities. Advancing into Phoenicia he laid siege to Sidon. There he received a report, probably a fabrication of Antigonus, that Lysimachus and Seleucus had been defeated in battle. The cautious Ptolemy once again retreated back to Egypt after placing garrisons in the captured cities.

Since his defeat of Antigonus in Babylonia, Seleucus had been busy enforcing his rule over the eastern satrapies, 'as far as the river Indus.'⁶ According to Appian, Seleucus then 'crossed the Indus and waged war with Sandrocottus king of the Indians, who dwelt on the banks of that stream, until they came to an understanding with each other and contracted a marriage relationship.'⁷ Justin adds that Sandrocottus 'after the death of Alexander, had shaken, as it were, the yoke of servitude from its neck, and put his governors to death.' No details of this war survive. It probably began in 307 and ended with the treaty in late 303. It appears to have not been going well for Seleucus because he agreed to cede the regions of Paropamisos, Arachosia and Gedrosia, 'upon terms of intermarriage and of receiving in exchange five hundred elephants.'⁸

After the treaty was agreed, Seleucus most likely wintered in the east before returning to Persia in 302. It was probably there

that Seleucus received the request for an alliance from Cassander and Lysimachus.⁹ His decision to agree to the alliance was one of the great gambles of the age of the Successors. Ahead of him was a march of nearly 2,000 kilometres over mountains and deserts, further complicated by the need to feed and care for the 480 elephants he took with him. Indian elephants can eat up to 150 kg of food and drink 225 litres of water a day. Massive preparations must have been made but we have no details of the march. At the start of the winter of 302/301 he arrived in Cappadocia with a force of 20,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, 480 elephants and over 100 scythed chariots. The last part of Seleucus advance most likely passed through Syria and Cilicia, home of many of Antigonus' garrisons, yet he appears to have made no attempt to intercept or even delay it.¹⁰

While all this had been happening Demetrius had sailed to Asia, landing at Ephesus. He released the garrison of Prepelas on terms and replaced it with his own. The exigencies of war now overrode Antigonus' no garrisons policy, important ports such as Ephesus had to be protected. Both Demetrius and Cassander were ignoring the terms of their peace while the ink was still wet. Demetrius marched to the Hellespont, retaking Lampsacus, Parium and many other cities that had changed sides. At Chalcedon he left a force of 3,000 soldiers and thirty warships to guard the entrance into the Black Sea. The rest of the army was sent into winter quarters. In hindsight it may have been better to march the remaining 200 kilometres and join his father's army. Demetrius may, however, have been ignorant of the arrival of Seleucus and the urgency of the situation. Weather may have made further marching impossible or the ability to supply such a large force in one place over winter may have been impractical.

After Demetrius had withdrawn from Europe, Cassander, realizing that the decisive clash would be in Asia, dispatched his brother Pleistarchus with a force of 12,000 foot soldiers and 500 cavalry to reinforce Lysimachus. With Antigonus still controlling

the seas he marched to the Bosphorus to cross into Asia but found that Demetrius had already reclaimed the Asian side. Learning that Lysimachus was in winter quarters near Heraclea he marched to Odessus to take a ship across the Black Sea. There was insufficient shipping for the whole force to cross at one time so he divided his forces into three. The first section crossed safely but the second was captured by Demetrius' ships stationed at Chalcedon. Pleistarchus led the third crossing but his squadron was struck by a storm, most were sunk and Pleistarchus survived by clinging to a piece of wreckage. He and thirty two others from the 500 aboard his ship were saved and carried to Heraclea. Of the force of 12,500 men more than half had been lost.

The end of 302 saw four of the six kings in winter quarters in Asia Minor, Antigonus around Dorylaeum, Demetrius at the Bosphorus, Lysimachus near Heraclea and Seleucus in Cappadocia. Unfortunately Diodorus' Book 21, which began with the coming campaign and Battle of Ipsus, has been lost. All that remains are a few fragments. This makes any reconstruction of the campaign leading up to the battle largely speculative.

Antigonus' best hope the following spring would be to unite with Demetrius as quickly as possible and prevent the enemy from doing likewise. Despite being further north, Demetrius and Lysimachus may have been able to march sooner as the temperature minima get warmer earlier in the coastal plains than the mountains of central Turkey. Cappadocia is normally the last of these areas for the winter weather to break. Lysimachus would have marched south, hoping that Seleucus could march west. These appears to have happened and the two indeed united somewhere near Ancyra (Ankara).

Antigonus probably waited for Demetrius to join him. His best hope of isolating one of his opponents would have been to then march east and hope to intercept Lysimachus. Given the locations of the four armies' winter quarters, and the distances involved, this would have needed an early start and hard marching. There is

no evidence that Antigonus even attempted it. His best hope of crushing an isolated Lysimachus had been lost in the mud of the previous autumn.

Once Lysimachus and Seleucus had united, they marched southwest to threaten Antigonus' old capital of Celaenae. Antigonus responded by marching south. The two armies met at the plain near the town of Ipsus in Phrygia, near the modern city of Afyonkarahisar in Turkey.¹¹ A battle to settle the matter was now inevitable. If Antigonus won he would come close to realizing his dream of uniting the Macedonians once again under a single king. For the other side it would mean the survival of their dynasties and being able to strengthen their power by carving up Antigonus' empire.

According to Plutarch, Antigonus approached the battle with a sense of fatalism. Rather than his usual loud and jovial mood before a battle, designed to enthuse his troops, he was 'thoughtful and silent.'¹² He publically announced Demetrius to be his successor before the whole army. A series of bad omens were supposed to have occurred before the battle. Antigonus had a dream where Alexander, on hearing that his watchword would be 'Zeus and Victory' rather than 'Alexander and Victory' turned his back on the old man and left to join the other side. On the day of the battle when 'he was leaving his tent, stumbled and fell prone upon his face, injuring himself severely; but he rose to his feet, and stretching out his hands towards heaven prayed that the gods would grant him victory, or a painless death before his defeat.'¹³

The only detailed, surviving account we have of the battle derives from Plutarch. It concentrates largely on the deeds of his subject Demetrius and the pathos of Antigonus' death. Despite this it is possible to fashion a reasonable narrative of the battle. Fitting the occasion, Ipsus was one of the largest battles of the Hellenistic period. There were four kings and two future kings, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Antiochus, son of Seleucus, on the field. Antigonus' army consisted of 70,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry and seventy five

elephants. The army opposed to him was commanded by Lysimachus and Seleucus, and numbered 64,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry, 400 elephants and 120 scythed chariots.¹⁴

Antigonus, as was a common ploy among the Successor generals, massed most, and the best, of his cavalry on his right wing. His phalanx of heavy infantry occupied the centre and his left was held by a smaller force of cavalry. The elephants were spread out evenly along his front. Antigonus' plan was to attack rapidly on the right with his strike force of cavalry, engage the slightly smaller enemy infantry phalanx in the centre and to delay on his left. To facilitate this strategy his left wing may have been inclined back at an angle. The victorious right wing horse, commanded by Demetrius, were then to return to the field and attack the exposed flank and rear of the enemy infantry. This stratagem was orthodox but perhaps too obvious. It was a variation of the same tactics that Antigonus and Eumenes had used against one another. When Demetrius had tried similar tactics five years earlier at Gaza against the more experienced Ptolemy and Seleucus, he had been soundly defeated.

The dispositions of the enemy are less clear. They appear to have divided their superior numbers of cavalry evenly on both wings and massed their infantry in the centre. Some of their elephants were spread along in front of their battle line to oppose those of Antigonus but importantly a large number were held in reserve. The disposition of their chariots is unknown, but they are not recorded as playing any significant role in the battle. Spectacular as such weapons were, no Hellenistic army had any trouble in dealing with them, as Alexander had shown at Gaugamela. Alexander's light infantry had shot down the majority of the chariots, and the remainder had been channeled harmlessly through gaps deliberately opened in the ranks of the Macedonians.

Immediately the battle began, Demetrius led a successful attack on the enemy cavalry, commanded by Antiochus, and quickly put them to flight. This may have been a deliberate ploy by Antiochus

to lure Demetrius further away from the main battle. Demetrius failed to keep his own troops in hand. Plutarch now describes the crucial point of the battle, as Demetrius:

Followed the pursuit, in the pride and exultation of success, so eagerly, and so unwisely far, that it fatally lost him the day. For when, perceiving his error, he would have come in to the assistance of his own infantry, he was not able, as the enemy with their elephants had cut off his retreat.¹⁵

Seleucus had manoeuvred his elephant reserve, perhaps 300 animals, to block Demetrius' return to the battlefield and thereby prevent his planned charge against the vulnerable flank and rear of the allied phalanx. His troops' horses would not approach the elephants due to their fear of the larger animals' smell and noise. An increasingly anxious Demetrius could not find a way round this mobile roadblock.

Along the rest of the battle line the fighting had opened with a contest of the remaining elephants who 'fought as if nature had matched them equally in courage and strength.'¹⁶ This may have been a deliberate tactic on Lysimachus' part, as it would have delayed the clash with Antigonus' superior numbers of infantry.

With Demetrius still absent from the fighting, the allies were now in a strong position to exploit the situation, having superior numbers of cavalry on the field. They sent their light cavalry, both bow and javelin armed, to surround and harass Antigonus' infantry. The skirmishing cavalry fired missiles into the close packed ranks of Antigonus' phalanx and threatened to charge against their exposed right flank. Antigonus' phalanx, now threatened by infantry attacks to its front and threats to its exposed rear and flanks, began to panic. Soon whole units deserted, further exposing the remainder to attack. Loss of formation was fatal to the close packed infantry ranks of the Hellenistic armies. To the last, the eighty year old Antigonus bravely tried to rally his troops. He looked desperately for the

return of his son, who, even then, could have saved the battle.

Antigonus had always believed that death in battle was preferable to defeat and disgrace. Advanced age and poor health had perhaps intensified this belief. Even if flight had been possible he rejected it. The old warrior, despite the painful injury from his fall, placed himself at the front of his phalanx and determined to win or die fighting.

Plutarch dramatically describes the climax of the battle:

The old king Antigonus still kept his post, and when a strong body of the enemies drew up to charge him, and one of those about him cried out to him, "Sir, they are coming upon you," he only replied, "What else should they do? But Demetrius will come to my rescue." And in this hope he persisted to the last, looking out on every side for his son's approach, until he was overwhelmed by a cloud of javelins and fell.¹⁷

Antigonus' friends and bodyguards behaved disgracefully, abandoning the body of their king and fleeing the field. Only one, Thorax of Larissa, remained to guard his body. With Antigonus' death the battle was over and the remainder of his troops either fled or surrendered. It was left to his opponents to take his corpse from the field and give it a royal funeral.

The allies had outgeneralled Antigonus and Demetrius and won a decisive victory. Antigonus was dead and, for now, so was his dream of reuniting the Macedonians under the rule of his family. Despite this his dynasty was not at an end. Demetrius survived and was still considered a legitimate king by right of his descent and his own victories. Nor was all lost, Demetrius escaped the battlefield with 4,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry. He fled to Ephesus and his fleet.

The overwhelming nature of the victory, and Antigonus' death meant that his Asian Empire was shattered but Demetrius still had control of the sea, and therefore the islands. Although the

Athenians would desert him, some of the Greek cities would remain loyal. From Ephesus Demetrius sailed to Cilicia to rescue his mother and they fled to the safety of Cyprus.

Following their victory Cassander, Lysimachus and Seleucus 'carved up the entire domain which had been subject to Antigonos and Demetrius, as if it had been a great carcass, and took each his portion, adding thus to the provinces which the victors already had, those of the vanquished kings.'¹⁸ Here Plutarch exaggerates, only the Asian portion of their domain was divided up. Tyre and many of the Greek islands remained loyal. Nowhere are the details of the division explicitly recorded. It appears that Seleucus was given all the lands east of the Taurus Mountains and Lysimachus all of those to the north. Cassander's brother Pleistarchus was given Cilicia. Ptolemy was excluded from the division, for as Seleucus later explained 'it was only just that those who were victorious on the battlefield should dispose of the spoils.'¹⁹ Ptolemy's absence had obviously not been appreciated by his allies.

When Seleucus advanced into Coele-Syria he found that it had been occupied by Ptolemy who claimed that it was already subject to him before the battle. Seleucus, perhaps out of gratitude for Ptolemy's help in gaining his empire, decided that 'for friendship's sake he would not for the present interfere, but would consider later how best to deal with friends who chose to encroach.'²⁰

This argument between Ptolemy and Seleucus was only a foretaste of what was to come. The dream of a united Macedonian empire had not died with Antigonos. Within two years the victors were at war with one another. As Justin concludes his Book 15:

The allied generals, after thus terminating the war with the enemy, turned their arms again upon each other, and, as they could not agree about the spoil, were divided into two parties. Seleucus joined Demetrius, and Ptolemy Lysimachus. Cassander dying, Philip, his son, succeeded him. Thus new wars arose, as it were, from a fresh source,

for Macedonia.[21](#)

Chapter 22

Conclusion and Epilogue

Antigonus [Gonatas], however, when he saw and recognised the head [of Pyrrhus], drove his son away, smiting him with his staff and calling him impious and barbarous; then, covering his face with his cloak he burst into tears, calling to mind Antigonus his grandfather and Demetrius his father, who were examples in his own family of a reversal of fortune.

Plutarch, *Pyrrhus* 34.

Antigonus' ambition to re-unite the empire of Alexander the Great and his uncompromising attitude towards his rivals defined the attitudes of the ancient authors towards him. Plutarch claims 'that without his excessive passion for dominion, he might have always retained the supremacy for himself and have left it to his son. But he was naturally stern and haughty, and was harsh in what he said no less than in what he did.'¹ Diodorus asserts that Antigonus, although he 'became the mightiest king of his day, was not content with the gifts of Fortune, but undertook to bring unjustly into his own hands the kingdoms of all the others; thus he lost his own dominion and was deprived of life as well.'²

These attitudes appear to be the result of hindsight, a verdict based on the failure of his last campaign. They are also the opinions of authors who looked for divine justice in the affairs of men. Antigonus' fall could therefore be explained simply as a result of divine judgment on his hubris, his ambitious attempt to re-unite the empire of the divine Alexander.

Antigonus' life, such as we know of it, had been one of a ruler but above all as a military commander. In the end his failure was military. His life and much of his work were destroyed on the field

of Ipsus. Yet it was a battle that could have been won. More importantly, if Antigonus had shown more enterprise the previous year, it would not have been fought at all. Some commentators exonerate Antigonus by placing the blame for his ultimate failure squarely on Demetrius, citing his defeat at Gaza, his failures in Egypt and Rhodes, and his conduct at Ipsus.³

This judgment also appears to have been based on hindsight, the later inability of Demetrius to hold a kingdom together once he had won it. Yet it can be argued that all the military successes of the last six years of Antigonus' reign were won by Demetrius when campaigning alone, his two expeditions to Greece and his capture of Cyprus. Demetrius' only failure was the siege of Rhodes. It should be noted, however, that he was recalled by his father after being allowed less time than Antigonus had taken to capture Tyre. The two great failures, Egypt and Ipsus, both occurred when Antigonus was in command. The sources constantly emphasize Demetrius' loyalty and his obedience to Antigonus' orders even when he disagreed with them. In his later years Antigonus' strategy appears to have become increasingly erratic, switching Demetrius from one theatre to another. He appears to have lost the energy, and single mindedness of his earlier years.

Lysimachus and Seleucus were both approaching sixty at the time of Ipsus, nearly the same age Antigonus had been when he began his career of conquest. Both would campaign for another two decades, inferring that they were in robust health. Justin, in his description of events around Ipsus, emphasizes that Antigonus was facing a coalition of younger men. It is hard, therefore, not to conclude that Plutarch's judgment was largely correct, Antigonus in his later years was too unwell to effectively hold the supreme command.

Antigonus appears to have recognized his own shortcomings and was apparently content to spend his later years in the more peaceful pursuit of ruling his kingdom. The other roles of king, law giver and building a strong and stable kingdom, appear to

have had more appeal at this time of his life. Antigonus himself supposedly acknowledged this change in aspirations. For: 'when all men wondered that in his old age his government was mild and easy; Formerly, said he, I sought for power, but now for glory and good-will.'⁴ It was, perhaps, unfortunate for Antigonus in his later years that he was trapped in the paradigm of a Macedonian king. As noted earlier, the primary role of the monarch was to be leader of his nation in war, display personal courage in battle and win success in defending and expanding his kingdom. When Lysimachus invaded Asia, Antigonus was forced to once again take the field as he had no other relatives that he could rely on to represent the royal presence at the head of the army.

Although there has been no serious attempt to discuss the administration of the early kingdoms of the Successors, no account of Antigonus' life would be complete without some assessment of the nature of his rule. What information that has survived indicates that Antigonus was an effective ruler, took care to be seen as a fair law giver and was generally popular among his subjects. Much of this information derives from anecdotes recorded by Plutarch and such material should be viewed with some skepticism, as it was selected to highlight the supposed character of the individual rather than provide the literal truth. Nonetheless such material does provide an insight into how their subject was viewed by later writers.

The ability to organize on a grand scale demonstrates that Antigonus was an efficient administrator of his kingdom. This may, however, have been achieved by, at times, oppressive taxation for: 'Antigonus exacted money severely. When one told him that Alexander did not do so, It may be so, said he; Alexander reaped Asia, and I but glean after him.'⁵ This may refer to the early period of his reign when he was still winning his kingdom with more limited resources given the tradition that his rule was later much easier. It is very likely that this change of policy came from the later years of his life when he appears to have become

increasingly interested in the welfare of his subjects.

One stratagem recorded by Polyaeus demonstrates that Antigonus' court had an efficient bureaucracy which kept extensive records and that he was astute enough to make use of them:

Antigonus, when he received an embassy, used to inform himself beforehand from the public records, who were the persons that composed the last embassy from the same state, the purpose of their visit, and every particular relative to it. In the course of conversation, he would usually entertain the ambassadors with all these details; and by this means he achieved a degree of familiarity with them, and at the same time he impressed them by appearing to have an extraordinary memory.⁶

Antigonus also consciously nurtured a reputation as a just law giver, replying to the claim that 'all things in kings are just and honourable', he replied, 'indeed for barbarian kings; but for us only honourable things are honourable, and only just things are just.' When Marsyas, his half or step brother, brought a legal case before him and asked for it to be heard in private, Antigonus replied that 'it shall be heard in the judgment-hall, that all may hear whether we do exact justice or not.'⁷ According to Cicero, Antigonus' letters to his son Philip survived and in them he attempted to pass on his belief of moderation in government:

The authors of these letters were, as we are informed, three of the wisest men in history; and in them they instruct their sons to woo the hearts of the populace to affection by words of kindness and to keep their soldiers loyal by a winning address.⁸

Overall the evidence indicates that Antigonus was considered to be a fair and popular ruler. Among the Greek cities the popularity of his policy of freedom and autonomy, no matter how imperfectly

applied, is demonstrated by the impressively large number of inscriptions that survive bestowing honours on him, his family and his friends. The ancient literary evidence also records numerous memorials and cults dedicated to Antigonus. Much of this may have been self-serving and cynical but the sheer volume is impressive.⁹ These divine honours did not appear to have influenced his behaviour in the manner that it supposedly corrupted Demetrius. To the contrary he appears to have commented on them with his usual self-deprecatory sense of humour:

Recovering from a slight disease, he said: No harm; this distemper puts me in mind not to aim at great things, since we are mortal. Hermodotus in his poems called him Son of the Sun. He that attends my chamber-pot, said he, would say differently.¹⁰

Perhaps the last word on how Antigonus was viewed after his death should go to one of his former subjects:

At a later time, after Antigonus had been slain, and those who slew him began to oppress and vex the people, a peasant in Phrygia who was digging on his farm was asked by someone what he was doing, and answered: "I am looking for Antigonus." So now many were moved to speak, as they called to mind how the greatness and generosity of those illustrious kings made their wrath easy to appease.¹¹

Despite the catastrophic defeat at Ipsus, the war was not over. Five kings still survived and Demetrius would continue to campaign against the allies. Nor was the dream of uniting all the Macedonian conquests under one ruler dead. Lysimachus and Seleucus had won the greatest share of the spoils and became the two most powerful kings. Their rivalry would lead to a twenty year long struggle for dominance interrupted only by the later revival of Demetrius' fortunes.

It took less than two years for the victors to fall out when Ptolemy and Lysimachus formed an alliance against Seleucus. He in turn formed a union with Demetrius, sealing it by marriage with Demetrius' daughter Stratonice. Demetrius was soon able to drive Pleistarchus out of Cilicia. He then overplayed his hand, campaigning against Ptolemy in Coele-Syria. This was too much for Seleucus who coveted the region for himself. He began to fear his new ally more than his old friend. A new alliance was formed, based on the fear of an Antigonid revival in Asia, where the dynasty still appears to have been popular. Lysimachus, Ptolemy and Seleucus united to finally destroy Demetrius' presence in Asia. Demetrius was outmatched and retreated to Greece. This allowed the allies to overrun his Asian possessions and for Ptolemy to re-take Cyprus.

The situation was thrown into chaos when, in 297, Cassander died of disease. He was succeeded by his son Philip IV, but he too died of natural causes the following year. Cassander's, Thessalonice, favoured the younger son, Alexander, and connived to have the kingdom divided between him and his brother Antipater. Antipater was, quite justifiably, not satisfied with this arrangement. In 294 he committed the terrible sacrilege of murdering his mother, seized the whole of the country and drove his brother into exile.

Alexander sought alliances with both Demetrius and Pyrrhus of Epirus. Demetrius was tied up campaigning in the Peloponnesus and Pyrrhus moved first, conquering Macedonia and handing it over to Alexander in exchange for territorial concessions. Antipater appealed to his father in law Lysimachus for assistance but he was too busy mopping up Demetrius' last possessions in Asia. Meanwhile, Demetrius, having failed to take Sparta, had finally responded to Alexander's entreaty. He marched his forces to Macedonia and met the prince at the town of Dium, in southern Macedonia.

Alexander was now more afraid of his would be ally than his

brother. The two kings plotted against one another. The more experienced and wily Demetrius was the victor, he murdered Alexander at a banquet. Addressing an assembly of the Macedonian army, Demetrius claimed to be the legitimate king of Macedonia, as his father had been a follower of King Philip and Alexander the Great, and afterwards the rightful regent of the children of Alexander. He denounced Cassander and his sons as usurpers who had destroyed the royal house. Demetrius claimed he was merely exacting vengeance for these crimes. His speech appears to have won the Macedonians over and the assembly acclaimed him king. In 294, over two decades after Antigonos' last visit to Macedonia, the family had returned and won control of the kingdom.

None of the other kings were in a position to immediately oppose Demetrius. Antipater fled to Lysimachus. With his conquest of Macedonia secure, Demetrius controlled a strong empire that included Macedonia and most of Greece. With a powerful kingdom behind him, Demetrius revived his father's dream of reuniting the Macedonian empire under his own rule. He prepared to invade Asia by reputedly raising a force of 110,000 troops and 500 warships.¹² Even if the numbers are exaggerated, it was clearly an immense force. Faced by such a serious threat, the other kings, Ptolemy, Lysimachus, Seleucus and Pyrrhus, allied together against him, just as they had against his father. This time, however, the battleground would be Macedonia itself. As a product of these negotiations, Lysimachus put to death Cassander's last remaining son, Antipater. A rival claimant to the throne would have proved embarrassing, because, as events would show, Lysimachus planned to seize Macedonia for himself.

In 288 the kings attacked. Ptolemy sailed against Demetrius' Greek allies with a great fleet. Pyrrhus and Lysimachus invaded Macedonia. Demetrius' rule of Macedonia had shown his shortcomings as a king. He is recorded as being difficult to approach by his subjects, and being harsh and discourteous. In one

famous anecdote he threw their petitions into a river, and in another he told an old Macedonian woman that he had no time to hear her petition. She retorted by screaming at him, 'then don't be king.' Demetrius' ostentatious tastes offended the Macedonians and they, supposedly, 'were tired of waging war in support of his luxurious way of living'.¹³ His empire proved to be a house of cards as the Macedonians deserted in droves to Pyrrhus and Lysimachus. Once again Demetrius was forced to flee by sea. Pyrrhus and Lysimachus divided Macedonia between them but such an arrangement could never last.

The victors then attacked Demetrius' holdings in Greece. Demetrius responded by leaving his son Antigonus Gonatas in control while he made a desperate expedition to Asia. After some initial success he was overwhelmed by size of the forces against him and surrendered to Seleucus in 286. Antigonus Gonatas, who was as devoted to his father as Demetrius was to Antigonus, offered to surrender himself and all his possessions in exchange for his father's release. Seleucus was not, however, prepared to let Demetrius loose on the world once again. He placed him in luxurious but secure confinement. To his credit Seleucus resisted a bribe from his ally Lysimachus to execute the fallen king. The offer was supposed to have deeply offended Seleucus who thereafter regarded Lysimachus as 'a villain and a barbarian.'¹⁴ Demetrius died at the age of fifty four after three years of confinement, drinking himself to death. His remains were returned to Antigonus and honoured with a splendid funeral at the city of Demetrias in Thessaly.

With Demetrius now removed from the scene the surviving kings once again turned on one another. Lysimachus invaded Macedonia in 284 and forced Pyrrhus to flee. He then returned to Asia where he captured Heraclea and executed his stepsons for the murder of Amastris. The age old curse of multiple wives and households now fell upon Lysimachus. His latest wife, Arsinoe, poisoned his mind against his oldest and most capable son

Agathocles. Perhaps Lysimachus' paranoia was inflamed by Demetrius' accusations of the dubious paternity of his children by Nicaea. Lysimachus developed 'a hatred unnatural in him not only as a father but as a man'¹⁵ and had Agathocles murdered. Further executions of Agathocles' supporters followed. His widow, Lysandra, and her children fled to refuge at the court of Seleucus. This purge both weakened Lysimachus' rule and gave Seleucus an excuse for war.

The two old generals, both in their seventies, clashed at the Battle of Corupedium, near Sardis, in 281. Lysimachus was defeated and killed. His empire, weakened by internal divisions, collapsed. Lysimachus' body lay abandoned on the battlefield, protected only by his faithful dog. One of his sons, Alexander, who had fled to Seleucus after the murder of Agathocles 'searched for the body a long time and found it at last by means of the dog, and that it was already partly decomposed.'¹⁶ His bones were finally interred in a temple at Lysimachea.

Seleucus was now the most powerful of the Successors and the road to Macedonia was open. Memnon records that:

Seleucus, encouraged by his success against Lysimachus, set out to cross over to Macedonia. He longed to return to his fatherland, from which he had set out with Alexander, and he intended to spend the rest of his life there (he was already an old man), after handing over the government of Asia to his son Antiochus.¹⁷

This march was the closest that any of the Successors would come to reuniting the Macedonian throne. If Seleucus could gain control of Macedonia, in addition to Asia, then Ptolemy's days would be numbered. Accompanying Seleucus was an exiled son of Ptolemy, Ptolemy Ceraunus (Thunderbolt), so called because of his reckless behaviour. He had been captured with the court of Lysimachus where he had sought refuge. Supposedly he had executed Agathocles with his own hand. Seleucus decided to add him to his

court as a useful pretender to Ptolemy's throne. Ceraunus repaid Seleucus' hospitality by murdering him, stabbing him in the back while they were sightseeing at a temple in Thrace. The soldiers of Seleucus, a long way from home, 'were forced to accept him and call him king.'¹⁸ One of Seleucus' Friends was obliged to ransom the body from Ceraunus for a large sum of money. The ashes were sent to Antiochus who interred them at the city of Seleucia on the Syrian coast and erected a temple to honour his father.

Appian gives us a fitting epitaph for the two old warriors, Seleucus and Lysimachus:

Thus did these two kings, the bravest and most renowned for bodily size, come to their end at nearly the same time, one of them at the age of seventy, the other three years older, and both fighting with their own hands until the day of their death.¹⁹

With Seleucus army behind him, Ptolemy Ceraunus marched on Macedonia. Antigonus Gonatas attempted to stop him but was defeated in a sea battle. In 281 Ceraunus seized control of Macedonia. He was only on the throne for two years when he was killed in battle by an invading Galatian force and his army destroyed. The Galatians then ravaged Macedonia for the next three years as numerous claimants to the throne came and went.

In 277, Antigonus Gonatas defeated an army of Galatians in Thrace and used this victory as a basis to claim the throne of Macedonia. The country was in a terrible state and Gonatas' rule was for many years far from secure. In 272 he defeated and killed Pyrrhus of Epirus in a battle at Argos. Pyrrhus' death was generally seen by the ancient writers as the end of the Wars of Successors. In Asia, Antiochus had succeeded to his father's kingdom. In Egypt, Ptolemy II had become co-ruler in 289 and sole king in 283 when his father died naturally at the age of eighty four. In the last years of his life Ptolemy had become an historian, writing his memoirs of Alexander's campaigns. Perhaps he was

enjoying the type of semi-retirement that Antigonus had appeared to want. Alexander's empire had now been divided into three distinct kingdoms and this division would survive, bringing a measure of stability and security to the Hellenistic world, relative to the tumultuous four previous decades.

One thing the three new kings had in common was that they were either born after Alexander's death or soon before. Antiochus' birth date is unknown but cannot be prior to his parents' marriage in 324. They had therefore grown up in a world of multiple Macedonian kings. Unlike their fathers, they did not feel themselves under the shadow of Alexander and therefore did not possess their burning ambition to re-unite his empire. This does not mean that they would not go to war or conquer one another given the chance, only that they were more accommodating towards rival dynasties. They remained Macedonian kings and were therefore expected to be war leaders and conquerors.

This stability allowed Hellenistic civilisation to flourish throughout the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, as it became the common culture of the ruling classes. What followed was a brilliant period of cultural developments in art, science, literature and philosophy. All this was the product of the ability of Antigonus and the other Successors to lay the foundations of lasting states from the chaos that followed Alexander's death.

Appendix 1

The Chronology of the Successors

Few chronological problems are more controversial than those for the period of the Successors from Alexander's death in 323 until the Peace of 311. The complications arise primarily from Diodorus' attempts to superimpose his own system of identifying years by naming the Athenian archon, the Roman consuls and the winner of the Olympic single stade foot-race, over that of his principle source. This author, probably Hieronymus, was clearly using the method of Thucydides, dividing the narrative into campaigning seasons, denoting the close of each year by the mention of winter quarters, and supplementing it by astronomical data. In order to achieve this, Diodorus generally places the events of the first half of the year within that of the following archon year.¹ Diodorus' carelessness in inserting both the archons' years and the onset of winter further obscures an already complex situation. Two archon years are inexplicably omitted,² as are a number of winter quarters. Few fixed points exist on which to anchor a narrative that may span up to four different areas of operation.

Not surprisingly these problems have led to much debate and to different dating systems being proposed, traditionally known as the so-called "high" and "low" chronologies.³ The "high" chronology relies mostly on the order of events in Diodorus' narrative whereas the "low" chronology depends mainly on the epigraphic evidence of the Babylonian Chronicle and the Parian Marble.

The first major point of departure of the two systems is the death of Perdikkas, and the subsequent conference at Triparadeisus. These events fall within a section of Diodorus

where he has failed to record two archon years, and thereby contracted the events of three years into one disjointed narrative. The “high” chronology dates the death of Perdiccas and the conference of Triparadeisus to 321 and the “low” to 320. They come together again with the crossing of Antipater into Europe in the winter of 320/19 and his death in 319. In both chronologies the events between 323–319 are fixed around their differing dates for Perdiccas’ death.

Within the period of controversy there are, nonetheless, some fixed points where the dates are generally agreed:

June 323	Death of Alexander the Great.
Autumn 322	The change in regime in Athens following the end of Lamian War.
Winter 320/319	Return of Antipater and the kings to Europe.
Autumn 319	Death of Antipater.

From the death of Antipater the two chronologies briefly coincided until 318 when the “low” chronology again post dates events in relation to the “high” chronology. The methodology is to fix a chronological point and work back from it. On this occasion the key point is the death of Eumenes ‘since many other events are connected with it.’⁴ The “high” chronology dates this to the winter of 317/6 and the “low” chronology to 316/5. The consequences of these different dates flow on to the outbreak of the Third Successor War, which are 315 (“high”) and 314 (“low”).

Both chronologies have their problems. The reliance of the “low” chronology on the inscription from Paros known as the Parian Marble and Errington’s interpretations of Athenian inscriptions to post date the restoration of the Athenian democracy to November of 318 have been challenged by a number of scholars.

As the prescript of the Parian Marble is lost nothing is known

of its author or the motive for its commission, although it may be reasonably assumed that it was composed circa 264/3. There are numerous instances where dates recorded by the Parian Marble are demonstrably incorrect which makes its use in establishing an exact chronology extremely hazardous. In the era of the Successors the Parian Marble incorrectly records an eclipse of the sun for the year 309/8.⁵

Errington's dating of the restoration of the Athenian democracy to November of 318⁶ has also been questioned by a number of scholars.⁷ Osborne argues convincingly that an inscription, which he restores as coming from the tenth *prytany* of the archonship of Apollodorus, granting citizenships on the recommendation of Polyperchon, implies that the democracy had clearly been restored by the early summer of 318.⁸ If the restoration of the democracy did, as appears likely, occur in the spring of 318, then Phocion's execution may confidently be dated to May of the same year, and there is no longer any reason to post date by one year events occurring subsequently.

The "high" chronology also has its problems, particularly for the years 323 to 320. Diodorus notes that Perdiccas lost his life after three years of rule and Arrhidaeus spent two years constructing Alexander's funerary carriage.⁹ The dating of both events better fit within the "low" chronology.

Due to the erratic nature of Diodorus' narrative both chronologies have significant vacuums in their reconstruction of events. Most notably for the "high" chronology the period from the autumn of 313 to the autumn of 312 during which nothing appears to have happened in Asia, whereas the "low" chronology has a large gap in events for 317/6.

The failure of the classical evidence to solve these problems has led recently to scholars using evidence from other sources. Most notably these are the Babylonian Chronicle and an increasing amount of material of dated Aramaic *ostraca* from Idumea. This material is not without its own problems of interpretation and

both sides of the debate have used it to justify their own conclusions. As one writer recently observed, ‘such material often complicates rather than simplifies.’¹⁰

The use of this material has allowed the development of what are known as “mixed” or “hybrid” chronologies. The most influential of these is that published by Boiy¹¹ which largely follows the “low” chronology for the years 323 to 319 and the “high” chronology thereafter. This method has become increasingly popular in recent publications and is the chronology that I have adopted, albeit with some minor alterations, in this work.

In conclusion it is perhaps worth noting two points. The first is that none of the proposed chronologies is certain. As noted by Wheatley, an active participant in the discussion, that despite sixty years of debate, ‘the creation of a definitive and universally persuasive chronology for the early years of Alexander’s Successors is still a good way off.’¹² It should also be noted that whichever chronology is chosen, there is little or no difference, in the order and cause and effect of events. Fundamentally all that is being argued is to which of two adjacent years an event should be dated.

Appendix 2

The Literary Sources

The most obvious problem for an ancient historian studying the age of the Successors is the lack of any surviving contemporary, or near contemporary, literary source. Many such sources have been identified from the testimony of later authors, but only scattered fragments of their works survive. The most useful extant narratives we have for the years 323 to 301 are those of Diodorus and Justin, together with Plutarch's biographies of Demetrius and Eumenes. None of these works were written specifically as a history of the period. The usefulness and reliability of the accounts are conditioned by the aims of their respective authors, by their use of the primary sources, and by their methods of composition.

Duris of Samos¹ was at one time a tyrant of Samos and probably lived during the late fourth and early third centuries. Among other works, he wrote a history of the era entitled *Makedonika* which began with the year 370 and continued at least until the battle of Corupedium in 281. He has been variously described as a friend of Antigonos and Demetrius, or as a creature of Lysimachus and an embittered enemy of Demetrius. The majority of the fragments of his work record discreditable anecdotes of famous people, causing him to be described by one scholar as 'the ancient world's answer to tabloid journalism.'² Such a judgement, however, should be tempered by the fact that most of the fragments derive from Athenaeus and Plutarch, writers with a strong interest in anecdotal material.

The Athenian historian Diyllus³ wrote a number of works including a history of the period 357–297 in twenty six books. The limited number of the fragments makes any analysis of the quality and influence of his writing extremely difficult. Diodorus does,

however, mention Diyllus by name on a number of occasions which may indicate that he made use of his work.

Demochares of Athens,⁴ a nephew of Demosthenes, was a politician of some standing in his native city in the late fourth and early third centuries. At different times he was an opponent of Cassander, Demetrius of Phalerum and Demetrius, living much of his life in exile. His history has been criticised for its scandalous nature by the historian Timaeus and for its rhetoric by Cicero.⁵ Much of Plutarch's *Demetrius*, particularly the discreditable anecdotes concerning his stay in Athens, may be derived from Demochares. Some of the fragments which have survived demonstrate a strong prejudice against the regime brought into power by Demetrius in 307.

Another Athenian, Philochorus,⁶ lived between 340 and 260, and composed a history of his native city. He was executed by Antigonos Gonatas as a Ptolemaic sympathiser. It is assumed that he was conservative in political outlook and may be the source of the *apologia* for the Athenian politician Phocion in Diodorus (18.66–67).⁷

Nymphis of Heraclea Pontica⁸ wrote a history of his city, which was adapted by Memnon, and a more general history covering the period from Alexander to the second generation of the Successors. The influence of the work is unknown as it is not cited by any subsequent author. Nymphis was exiled from his native city by Lysimachus and returned after the latter's death in 281. It has been suggested that Nymphis may be the origin of the characterisation of Lysimachus as a ruthless schemer and dissembler.⁹

When assessing the accuracy, style and any perceived prejudices in the lost histories, it is perhaps well to keep a cautionary note in mind, that one should not be too confident in delineating the qualities of these works or their authors. The fragments and epitomes are more likely to reflect the interests and characteristics of those who cite or summarize them, rather than

those of the original author.

It is generally acknowledged that the most important of the contemporary historians was Hieronymus from the Greek city of Cardia.¹⁰ All surviving later accounts of the period of the Successors are believed to have derived in some degree from his work. Hieronymus was born sometime in the mid-fourth century, lived to describe the death of Pyrrhus and was reputed to have died at the age of one hundred and four. He was an associate, or perhaps a relative, of Eumenes, whose entourage he had joined by 322 at the latest. At Gabene he was wounded and captured by the forces of Antigonus. After the execution of Eumenes he joined Antigonus and continued to serve under his son Demetrius and grandson Antigonus Gonatas.

The title of his work is not known but it most likely began with an introduction on the career of Alexander and finished with the death of Pyrrhus. In addition he had the benefit of being both an eye-witness to, and a participant in, many of the events he described. The fragments demonstrate that the work contained numerous digressions and was probably of considerable length and detail.

As a long term servant of the family of Antigonus, Hieronymus may well have been sympathetic towards them. He was certainly viewed that way by Pausanias who claims that 'Hieronymus has above all a reputation as a king-hater in his writings, except for Antigonus, whom he unjustly favours.' In 309 Cardia was destroyed and the citizens incorporated in Lysimachus' foundation of Lysimachea. This act, according to Pausanias, caused Hieronymus to detest Lysimachus.¹¹

Hieronymus has a good reputation among modern historians, some believing that he was the equal of Thucydides or Polybius.¹² More recently he has been criticized for being biased in favour of Eumenes and for his elitist approach, 'which often privileges the interests of leaders while devaluing those of their followers.'¹³ This latter criticism could, however, apply to most of the ancient

historians who, being overwhelmingly aristocrats, reflected the interests of their class and believed that history was the result of the deeds of great men and women, or the will of the gods. This tendency also helps explain why so many modern works of ancient history are biographies.

By far the most detailed account of the period of the Successors is that given by Diodorus of Sicily in his *Library of History*. This work covered events, in forty books, from the legendary times prior to the Trojan War until the beginning of Caesar's campaigns against the Celts. Of these, Books 1–5 and 11–20 have been preserved and fragments of the other twenty five have been found, particularly in the works of Eusebius and other Byzantine excerptors. Fortunately for the student of the Successors, Books 18–20 of his work, which cover the period from the death of Alexander in 323 until the start of the winter of 302, were especially popular and have been passed down.

Diodorus was a citizen of the town of Agyrium in Sicily and probably wrote his history between the years 56–26. He claims that he sought to write an accessible account, surpassing all others in its usefulness, by reading the writings of other historians, visiting the sites to prevent errors and utilising the public records in Rome.¹⁴

Despite Diodorus' lofty ideals his value as a historian came under stinging attack by the German scholars of the nineteenth century. Much of this severe criticism derived from the belief that Diodorus was simply an epitomiser, and long sections of his work were merely an abbreviation of an earlier author or simply paraphrased another, intermediate universal history. In more recent times these views have been largely rejected.

A more commonly accepted opinion is that Diodorus followed closely a single source for long sections of his narrative.¹⁵ Sometimes this was done by rewriting his source, at other times he appears merely to have extracted whole passages and abbreviated the earlier text by omitting entire sections. This method is,

however, complicated by his habit of interjecting details from other sources into his main narrative.¹⁶ Diodorus may occasionally add something of his own but this seems to be for either stylistic reasons, as his language is consistent throughout his work, or to include his own, somewhat simplistic moralizing.¹⁷

In general the standard of Diodorus' narrative would seem to vary with the quality of his main source, as he appears to have followed it accurately, reflecting the facts, opinions and assumptions he found therein.¹⁸ It is generally accepted that Diodorus chose to use the work of Hieronymus of Cardia as his primary source for those sections of [chapters 18–20](#) which dealt with the Successors. This section of his work is considered to be superior to his norm. Gone are the ridiculous stories, divine interventions, lack of political insight and stylised battle narratives of the previous books. They are replaced by a narrative largely devoid of superstition and replete with political analysis and military understanding, both tactical and strategic. Numerous documents and statistics are cited, indicating that the original source valued primary evidence.¹⁹

Nonetheless a more cautious approach should be taken when claiming that any section of Diodorus' work as derived from Hieronymus. Although it is generally accepted that the major part of Diodorus' narrative comes primarily from Hieronymus, clearly other sources have been utilized. Therefore one cannot assume that any particular piece of information derives from Hieronymus unless it is matched to a similar account known to have derived from that author. Overall it would appear more profitable to assess Diodorus' narrative on its own merits, rather than seeking to assign any particular section to its source and then judge its worth on the perceived reliability of that author.

Diodorus' methods of composition do pose a number of problems for the historian using his work. Some narratives, for example his description of the naval aspects of the Lamian War, are abbreviated almost to the point of incomprehensibility.

Diodorus also omits whole episodes from the narrative, whereas others are treated in considerable detail. Antigonus' campaigns against Seleucus between 310 and 308 have completely vanished in Diodorus' account. This last omission may be a reflection of Diodorus' sources, but is more likely to be a result of the detailed account of events in his native Sicily following the renewed outbreak of the war between Agathocles of Syracuse and the Carthaginians in 312 which dominates much of the narrative in Book 20.

We should, nonetheless, be grateful that Diodorus' history for these years has survived. Even allowing for its faults, the judgement of Billows would appear to be sound in claiming that it is, 'in the main a very informative and reliable account of the period 323–301. The reliability of Diodorus' account can be demonstrated from surviving epigraphic and numismatic evidence.'²⁰ Without Diodorus' account no meaningful historical account of these years could be attempted.

The only other surviving continuous narrative of the Successor period is that of Justin, in his epitome of Pompeius Trogus' *Historiae Philippicae*. Little is known about Justin other than what he tells us in the preface to his work. Even the age of composition is in dispute, generally the period 144–230 ad is accepted,²¹ although dates up to 395 ad have been proposed. Justin described his work as an anthology, excerpted from the earlier work of the historian Pompeius Trogus, omitting all that was not pleasurable to read or did not supply a moral lesson. His professed motivation was to provide a reference for those who had studied history and for the instruction for those who had not.²²

The popularity of Justin's work among later readers has meant that the original work of Trogus has all but vanished, except for Justin's epitome and a few scattered fragments. From the prologues to the books of Trogus, and the number of digressions in Justin's epitome, it can be deduced that the earlier work was of substantial scope and size. Although Justin himself says he

excerpted from the original, the study of a number of passages, and Justin's use of language, would tend to indicate that he occasionally added his own observations and re-wrote the work in his own style.²³

Unfortunately Justin appears to have been extraordinarily careless in his method of composition. A number of individuals are wrongly named and other details incorrectly given.²⁴ At times the passages between the more lengthy excerpts are extremely compressed, resulting in errors or incomprehensibility. Perhaps the only sections of Justin's account which add to our knowledge of the era are his account of Eurydice's activities in Macedonia (14.5) and his brief outline of Seleucus' campaigns in the east between 308 and 303 (15.4).

Justin's narrative is too untrustworthy to be used in isolation with any confidence. It should be relied upon only when his account either agrees with those of the other historians, or it is possible within the context of their narratives and cannot be shown to be wrong.

The third author of importance for the study of the Successors is Plutarch, particularly his biographies of Demetrius, Eumenes and, to lesser extent, Phocion. From his own writings we know that Plutarch was most likely born around 46 ad, resided mostly in the Boeotian city of Chaeronea, and lived and wrote at least until 127 ad. Plutarch certainly read widely when preparing his lives. The authors from the period of the Successors he cites by name are: Hieronymus (*Pyrrhus* 17, 21, 27); Duris (*Eumenes* 1, *Pericles* 28); Diyllus (*Moralia* 862B); Philochorus (*Theseus* 14, 16, 17, 26, 29, 35); and Demochares (*Demetrius* 24). He also indicates that he valued primary evidence in his use of the letters of Eumenes and others.

Despite his use of primary sources Plutarch must be employed with care, as he did not write history but biographies. For Plutarch a chance remark or joke may tell more about his subject's character than any of his exploits. Plutarch's selection of evidence

is further distorted by his method of pairing lives, which influenced his choice of material, encouraging him to include or to omit actions depending on whether they fit pre-conceived characters of his subjects. The *Lives* of Demetrius and Eumenes have been distorted in numerous instances to match incidents or character traits in the parallel lives of Anthony and Sertorius.²⁵ The themes of his biographies are often determined early in the work.

Plutarch's motivation and method of composition therefore cause a number of problems. His selection of anecdotes to portray his subjects means that much of interest to historians is compressed or omitted. When such anecdotes are tapped for historical information, it is likely that present-day scholars are using them for reasons different from those their author intended. Writers in the Roman period employed anecdotes to highlight the supposed character of their subject. The assessment of their accuracy and reliability by the authors was often less important than their content.²⁶

Although Plutarch provides useful material with which to supplement the other sources, he is a much more questionable source when used in isolation. The historian attempting any reconstruction of events based solely on Plutarch would do well to keep the following warning firmly in mind: 'heaven help you if your evidence is the *Lives* and the *Lives* alone.'²⁷

In addition to the above authors, three writers' works merit comment: Polyaeus' *Stratagems*; Appian's *Syrian Wars*; and Arrian's *Successors (Ta Met' Alexandron)*.

Polyaeus wrote his *Stratagems* as an aid to the Roman Emperor Verus just before the latter set out on his expedition against the Parthians in 162 ad. It is a collection of stratagems, mostly military, allegedly employed by famous persons, both historical and mythical. Its main value is that it provides additional details which can, at times, be used to supplement Diodorus' narrative. Occasionally it also contributes unique pieces

of information not recorded in Diodorus. Nonetheless, care must be taken when using Polyaeus as he often confuses individuals of the same name.²⁸ It is generally considered that Hieronymus, either directly or indirectly, was the source of many of Polyaeus' stratagems of the various Successors.

Appian wrote a history of Rome's conquests around 160 ad, included a brief digression on the campaigns for Syria and the rise of Seleucus in his *Syrian Wars*. Appian's histories were much admired in earlier times, but came under attack from scholars towards the end of the nineteenth century. Much of the criticism is based on Appian's repeated errors in detail. More recent commentators have praised it for its objectivity and the material basis of its analysis.²⁹ Appian's account of the campaigns in Syria and further east is generally consistent with that of the other authors, however he does record details not found in any other source, particularly concerning Antigonos' eastern campaigns of 317/6 and Seleucus' return to Babylon. Unfortunately his carelessness in recording details makes it difficult to accept with any confidence details unique to his work.³⁰ Appian also had no interest in developing a systematic chronological narrative. An important asset of the *Syrian Wars* for the study of this period is its recording of the events of Seleucus' eastern campaigns, although the muddled chronology makes any definitive re-construction based solely on Appian's narrative impossible.

Arrian, who was born *circa* 85–90 ad in the Bithynian city of Nicomedia, composed, along with numerous other publications, a history of events after Alexander's death down to the return of Antipater to Europe in the winter of 320/19, in ten books, *Ta Met' Alexandron (Successors)*. This history survives mainly through the epitome of Photius together with three fragments possibly from the original work. Despite its brevity Photius' epitome provides useful information with which to supplement Diodorus' account. Its scope, covering less than four years in ten books, indicates that the account was extremely comprehensive. The details included in

Arrian's narrative imply that he had access to one or more of the works of the contemporary historians. This likelihood gives greater credibility to the proposition that an earlier author, such as Diodorus, would also have had direct access to these works. Another important fragment, the so called *Goteborg Palimpsest*, describes the campaigns of Antipater against Eumenes which are largely absent in both Diodorus and Photius' epitome.

As well as the literary sources there also exists a body of epigraphic and numismatic material. Epigraphic evidence is generally considered to be extremely reliable, and is therefore highly valued by historians. Despite the obvious importance of epigraphic evidence there is a relative scarcity for the period of the Successors when compared to the later, Roman eras.³¹

The widely held belief that primary evidence, in the form of contemporary inscriptions, is of more value than literary sources to the present day historian, as it is unbiased, must be questioned. Public pronouncements by any individual or government are rarely non-partisan and may reflect the propaganda of those commissioning the inscription, as observed by Swain, who believes they are possibly more partisan, as 'we generally have fewer controls over their intellectual provenance or context.'³²

Perhaps the major significance of numismatic evidence is that where sufficient numbers are extant, coins may provide testimony for the continuous chronological and geographical coverage of a regime. Another significant value of numismatic evidence is that it often demonstrates the self-image and propaganda of the issuer, which can on occasions be correlated to events in the historical record.

Although epigraphic and numismatic evidence are of demonstrable value their relative scarcity compels the modern historian to depend primarily on the extant literary record. Just as the historians of the Archaic and Classical Periods are forced to refer repeatedly to 'their Herodotus and Thucydides to a degree many Roman historians would find embarrassing',³³ the historian

of the period of the Successors is constrained to rely principally on the evidence contained in Diodorus' narrative.

Appendix 3

Antigonus and the Argeads

An intriguing statement of the historian Polybius is that Antigonus' descendant, Philip V, claimed to be descended from, or of the same stock as Philip II and Alexander. Plutarch also claims that the last Antigonid king, Perseus was descended from Philip II and Alexander.¹ The lack of references in the sources to any such relationship between the royal family and Antigonus, or his son Demetrius, should be damning, especially as false claims of descent from Philip II and Alexander were wide spread among the Hellenistic monarchies.² Nonetheless his claim was accepted by the citizens of Argos, the legendary ancestral home of the Argeads.³ The family had a special reverence for Hercules and endeavoured to trace their descent from him, as did the Argeads.⁴

Edson proposes that any descent from the Argeads came directly to Antigonus from his father Philip, this being a common name within the royal family. He rejects the possibility of royal ancestry coming from Antigonus' wife Stratonice, on the basis that her father's name Coragus does not appear among known names of the Argeads.⁵ The name Philip, however, is well attested outside the royal family. It is, however, possible that any link to the Argeads may be traced through Antigonus' wife Stratonice, whose name is uniquely attested within the royal family.⁶ All the archaeological and literary evidence cited by Edson dates from the reign of Antigonus Gonatas, Antigonus' grandson, or later.⁷ Antigonus appears to have been unique among the Successors in that he made no effort to associate his own image with that of Alexander.⁸ The coins bearing the image of Hercules issued in Demetrius' name are also Alexander issues, with the name Demetrius crudely stamped over that of Alexander. Demetrius'

own coins emphasized his relationship to Nike and Poseidon, glorifying his victory over Ptolemy at Salamis.⁹

The apparent indifference of both Antigonus and Demetrius to any link with the royal family makes it impossible to determine the origin of the later claim. It does appear probable that the family could at some stage claim a relationship with the Argeads, but this must have been extremely distant. Unlike many others, Antigonus is not considered a close enough relative to be disposed of as a threat to his succession by Alexander, nor was he considered as a possible claimant to the throne after Alexander's death. Stratonice appears therefore to be the most likely candidate if Antigonus' descendants could rightly claim royal lineage.

Most likely many of the Macedonian nobility could boast some sort of connection to the royal house. One example of this is Leonnatus who was claimed to be of royal blood and related to Eurydice, the mother of Philip II.¹⁰ Antigonus and Demetrius appear to be more interested in asserting their right to kingship by virtue of their own victories, as demonstrated by Demetrius' coins, rather than a distant relationship by marriage with the previous dynasty. This was in keeping with the spirit of the age, that kingdoms could be "spear won". Any distant ancestry to the royal family of Antigonus' descendants would have been politically more useful a century and a quarter later when Philip V boasted of it.

Appendix 4

The Cost of War

Although the total cost of maintaining an army during the period of the Successors cannot be calculated with precision, an estimate within a creditable range can be attempted.

The best discussion of the payment of troops in the Hellenistic period is still Griffith.¹ The contemporary view of a mercenary's pay was given in Menander (*Perikeiramenē* 189), as four obols per day (six obols = one drachma), the same as an unskilled labourer. Griffith interprets inscriptions from Attica and Epidaurus as giving the pay for Alexander's *hypapists* as one drachma per day and Demetrius' troops in 303/2 as one drachma per day for light infantry, two for citizen hoplites and five for cavalry.² He asserts that the total cost of troops was made up of their pay, *misthos*, and their provisions, *sitos*. Griffith further argues that the low figures were probably pay alone and the higher figures the composite amount. Menander's figure is dismissed as 'difficult to take seriously.'³ Parke rejects the concept of composite pay and accepts Menander's figure as the total wages for a mercenary soldier.⁴

A figure of one drachma per day will be used as a reasonable, although probably conservative compromise of the two views. If Parke is correct the cost of maintaining an army can be reduced by a third, if Griffith's higher figure is accepted the amount would double. A later study by Pritchett, although concentrating on an earlier period, largely agrees with Griffith, stating that the distinction between pay and rations developed with the increase in mercenary forces in the fourth century and that although *sitos* might be given in kind, or not at all, this was exceptional and payment for provisions was normal.⁵ One exception to this are when troops were marched through inhospitable regions and

supplies could not be bought by the troops. Antigonos' crossing of the deserts of Iran and Sinai are examples, supplies were carried and distributed to the troops in kind.

Working with the figures of one drachma per day for a heavy infantryman and two for a cavalryman, the pay and provisioning of an army of 70,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry would have amounted to some fifteen talents per day (a talent = 6,000 drachmas). Troops were generally paid by the month, which would give a monthly imposition of about 450 talents. If, as was usual for this period of constant warfare, troops remained in the field for nine months of the year, the total annual cost of maintaining Antigonos' army would have been at least 4,050 talents. If the troops were paid while in winter quarters then the cost would rise to about 5,400 talents. These figures do not include the cost of specialist troops such as engineers and elephants, or the higher rates of pay for officers.

In addition to the expense of maintaining land forces, naval forces also had a significant cost. By mid 315, Antigonos had two hundred and forty warships at sea. One hundred and thirteen were larger than triremes – another thirty were un-decked, presumably the other ninety seven were triremes. The cost of maintaining a fleet is even more complex to calculate than that of an army. Not only is it necessary to determine the wages of the sailors and marines but also the cost of fitting out and repairing the vessels. Unfortunately the sources have not recorded any of these figures for the period of the Successors and it is necessary to extrapolate from the numbers given for the Peloponnesian War, a century earlier. These figures will at least provide a yardstick. The range of pay rates for citizen hoplites and mercenaries recorded for the Peloponnesian War do not differ substantially from those recorded for the time of Antigonos,⁶ therefore it seems reasonable to assume that the payments made to seamen also remained relatively static. It would appear that the salaries paid depended on the availability of troops and money rather than as a product of

the time.

Daily rates of pay for a ship's crew (other than marines) during the period from 431 to 404 varied from three obols to one drachma.⁷ If we average these amounts a figure of four and a half obols per day for such crew would appear to provide a workable, conservative compromise. The total of rowers and deck crew for a trireme was generally one hundred and eighty seven and for a quinquereme at least three hundred.⁸ Using the figure of four and a half obols would give a monthly wages bill of about 4,200 drachmas for a trireme and 6,700 for a quinquereme. Averaging these figures would give about 5,500 drachmas per month for a quadrireme. It is generally accepted that the ratings given for ancient warships were for the number of rowers per tier. If the rates of pay for larger vessels are taken as proportionally larger than that of a five (although an exponential progression may be more appropriate), we would arrive at a monthly cost of 1.8 talents for a nine and two talents for a ten. Presuming that Antigonos' undecked vessels were penteconters with a crew of fifty their monthly cost would be just above 1,000 drachmas. Assuming an eight month sailing season,⁹ the annual cost in sailors' wages (excluding marines) for a fleet of Antigonos' size would have been about 1,500 talents.

In addition, warships also carried a complement of marines – a trireme usually between ten and forty while a quinquereme ready for a large scale battle could carry one hundred and twenty.¹⁰ The numbers of marines carried appears to have varied much according to tactical requirements, with ships on general duties normally taking less than their maximum capacity. For major battles the number of marines could be topped up from adjacent land forces. Although the larger vessels may have carried higher numbers if a figure of twenty marines, is accepted for day to day service (excluding the undecked vessels), and assuming a soldier's rate of pay, another 168 talents must be added to the annual expenditure.

In addition to the cost of their crews the ships also had to be fitted out and repaired. The Athenians met these costs through a system of *trierarchies*, with wealthy individuals chosen to finance the costs of a trireme for one year. From Lysias (32.24) we know that this could cost as much as ninety six *minae*, (about one and a half talents) per year. Most likely Antigonus' larger ships would have cost more to fit out. However, using the figure of a talent and a half per year as for ships rated three or larger another 315 talents must be added to the year's expenditure. If Antigonus had kept his entire fleet active throughout the campaigning year the minimum cost to him would have been around 1,983 talents. A number of assumptions and approximations have been made in arriving at this figure, but these have generally been made conservatively, the actual cost was probably considerably greater.¹¹

From these calculations it can be seen that Antigonus needed to pay out at least 6,033 talents per year to keep his forces active during the campaigning season. Again this figure is based on conservative estimates and the true cost was probably greater. Using the same figures, his opponent Ptolemy would have needed to pay out around 2,700 talents annually for an army of 22,000 and a fleet of 200 ships, assuming all the latter were triremes. Added to these expenses, a leader would also have needed to support his court and friends, meet the other costs of making war such as the construction of ships and war engines.¹² Just as important was the cost to win over potential allies or bribe enemies. The possible size of such bribes is shown by the story of the 100 talents sent to Phocion by Alexander or the 100 talents paid by Demetrius to the garrisons of Argos, Sicyon and Corinth.¹³

Similar computations were most likely made by the rival commanders themselves in assessing their own operational capabilities and those of their enemies. Diodorus (19.57) describes Antigonus as reckoning the extent of the threat against him before making his plans for the coming war.

The payment of troops was a heavy impost upon the finances of the leaders, but the use of large numbers of mercenaries in this era made it an essential one. Troops who went unpaid for long periods were likely to rebel or desert. In order to maintain oneself as a legitimate contender each leader would have to be financially capable of maintaining his forces in the field. Antigonos, with an annual income of 11,000 talents and considerable accumulated wealth, would have had few financial limitations placed on his initial operations.

Aristotle lists six methods, in order of importance, by which a governor of a region could raise regular revenue: by a tithe on produce; special products, for example gold or silver; levies on markets or merchandise; taxes on land and its sale; taxes on cattle or other livestock; and both poll taxes and taxes on industry or trade.¹⁴ From this list it can be seen that tithes on agricultural produce and land taxes were the most numerous and important. The control and exploitation of agricultural land was still the major source of wealth throughout the Hellenistic world. The conquest of new territories was the most reliable method of increasing a ruler's revenue base as Demetrius himself noted. The relationship between the control of territory and power was simple: 'Increase of territory meant increase of revenues hence of power, while decrease of territory had the opposite effect and might send the dynasty into decline.'¹⁵

Although the making of war imposed huge costs, a successful campaign it might bring remarkable financial benefit. The enormous wealth plundered by Alexander was still fresh in the minds of the Successors, particularly as several had participated in the pillaging. Alexander's conquest of Asia is recorded as having brought in 120,000 talents from the capture of Persepolis alone.¹⁶ Despite the fact that Alexander's colossal seizures were the fortunate result of decades of Persian hoarding, war continued to be a highly profitable activity for the successful general. Ptolemy III in the 'Third Syrian War' of 246/5 acquired 40,000 talents of

booty – a figure to be compared to the annual revenue of Ptolemy II of 14,800 talents.¹⁷ The possibility of winning large amounts of booty was a considerable motivation for both generals and common troopers. Austin appears to be correct in claiming that ‘war might be described as a risk business that could be big business, even when it did not lead to the acquisition of more tributary territory.’¹⁸

Appendix 5

Antigonus' Policy of "Freedom" for the Greeks

Antigonus' publicly declared policy towards the Greek cities is well attested in the ancient sources. The two most important documents are the resolution he put to his army assembly at Tyre in 315, as recorded by Diodorus, and the second his letter to the people of Scepsis written following the peace of 311. The first most likely derives from a contemporary source and the second is an original document. In the earlier pronouncement, in addition to denouncing the policies and actions of Cassander, Antigonus stated clearly that: 'all the Greeks are to be free, without garrisons, and autonomous.'¹

After the soldiers had voted in favour of the proposal, Antigonus dispatched messengers to broadcast the decree as widely as possible, hoping that the promise of freedom would convince the Greek cities to ally themselves with him against Cassander. Diodorus emphasized that this was Antigonus' public policy, describing repeatedly the generals of Antigonus as forcing out Cassander's garrisons, freeing the Greek cities and leaving them ungarrisoned in accordance with the decree of Antigonus. Antigonus himself carried out a similar program in Caria, driving out the garrisons of Asander and leaving the cities autonomous.

Antigonus' desire to be associated with the concept of autonomy for the Greek cities is further displayed in the peace treaty made in his name with Cassander, Ptolemy and Lysimachus. In the Peace of 311, after the territories of the dynasts are defined, the only additional clause recorded by Diodorus is that 'the Greeks be autonomous.'² In his letter to Scepsis, following the peace,

Antigonus emphasised the efforts he had made on behalf of the 'freedom of the Greeks'. He also assured his Greek allies that their 'freedom and autonomy' had been guaranteed not only by them swearing 'to guard together one another', but also by the oaths of both themselves and the 'men holding office'. Antigonus made it clear that it was he who had insisted on this clause being included in the treaty to ensure the continued 'freedom and autonomy' of the Greeks.

Abstract political concepts such as freedom and autonomy are difficult to define in modern times and their meanings appear to be equally as nebulous in the ancient world. The Greek Lexicon defines *autonomia*, autonomy, as 'freedom to use its own laws, independence'; and *eleutheria*, freedom, simply as 'freedom, liberty'.³ Although a comprehensive analysis of the full political implications of these two terms is beyond the scope of this discussion, some attempt at a meaningful definition must be attempted in order to discuss more fully the relationship between Antigonus and the Greek cities.

The Greek word generally used for political freedom was *autonomia*, which literally means "own laws". A useful definition of what it meant in practice is that 'basically an autonomous city was one where the people were governed according to their own laws and not according to any dictated from elsewhere.'⁴ Such a situation was fairly rare, as cities might have their freedom of action restricted in a number of ways, such as alliances with neighbouring or more powerful states. Foreign conquest and the imposition of a governor, puppet oligarchy or tyranny might also destroy this concept of freedom.

The context of autonomy is usually that of interstate relationships and the opposite is the imposition of laws by another state. It has been argued that *autonomia* more specifically related to relationships between the cities or with other powers. The concept may have originated with the members of Athens' Delian League attempting to safeguard their independence and to prevent

‘the arbitrary use of force by a major state against minor states moving into its orbit.’⁵ As such *autonomia* was something granted by a major power to a weaker ally.

The tradition of looking to a powerful state to guarantee autonomy appears to have derived from the Peloponnesian War and its aftermath. According to Thucydides at least some of the Athenians recognised that they subjugated free cities, forcing them to revolt if they wished to regain their autonomy, and even the most imperialistic Athenian acknowledged that the empire was a tyranny.⁶ The avowed reason for the Spartans going to war with Athens was to restore freedom and autonomy to the Greeks. The reality though was somewhat different, with Isocrates claiming that the Spartans had compromised the independence of their allies by imposing governments favourable to Spartan interests. Sparta’s dominance, rather than liberating the cities, imposed a new regime where, ‘so far are the cities from freedom and autonomy that some are under tyrants, some under foreign governors, some destroyed and some have become slaves to the barbarians.’⁷

There are indications in the sources of what sort of demands the smaller states resented. The first such reference is that of the complaints of the people of Aegina against the conditions imposed by the Athenians after they had forced the former to surrender in 457/6: to destroy their fortifications, hand over their fleet and agree to pay tribute.⁸

The foundation of Athens’ so called Second Delian League, supposedly a formation to protect the autonomy of the Aegean island states in accordance with the King’s Peace of 387, supplies another example of the concerns of smaller cities and the guarantees they might seek when forming an alliance with a more powerful partner. The Athenians affirmed that any city, which joined, would be ‘free and autonomous, governed according to the constitution of its choice, and free from the imposition of tribute or of a foreign governor or garrison.’⁹

Thucydides had defined the payment of tribute as the dividing line between autonomy and enslavement. The demands made by Athens' allies in 378 shows that they considered tribute to be an infringement of their autonomy. What evidence there is from Demetrius, reformation of the Corinthian League, suggests that under Antigonos his Greek allies remained free from taxation or tribute, but under their treaty obligations were required to provide men, ships and/or money. Such exactions of money were euphemistically called "contributions" or "expenses". Money could also be raised from fines imposed for the failure to provide the levied forces. Such irregular contributions were not considered "tribute", and so did not compromise the cities' autonomy.¹⁰

It was the perceived interference of hegemonic powers that led to the tradition of smaller cities looking to a greater power to guarantee their autonomy. The first such example was the so called King's Peace of 387, where the Persian King Artaxerxes asserted that: 'the other Hellenic cities both small and large should be autonomous ... and whoever does not observe this peace, against them I shall make war, both by land and sea, with ships and money.'¹¹ The peace did not last long, and Persia was not strong enough to enforce its threats, but the tradition had been begun. In the next half century there are at least six more known examples of a "common peace".¹²

The limitations placed on freedom of the Greek cities by the various hegemonic powers led to *autonomia* becoming coupled with the expression *eleutheria*, and eventually the two words become almost synonymous.¹³ *Eleutheria*, is perhaps best defined, as freedom is in English, as the opposite of slavery.¹⁴ Given this, it is interesting that in his decree Antigonos chose to use the word *eleutheros* rather than the more usual *eleutharia*.¹⁵ This is generally used of persons and is even more strongly contrasted to slavery or freedom from something, usually when a change of status is threatened.¹⁶ It is conceivable that Antigonos used this evocative expression deliberately in order to highlight the supposed state of

slavery of the Greeks under Cassander's oligarchies, and was implying that liberation was imminent.

Perhaps of more relevance to the policies of Antigonos were those of his immediate predecessors and rivals: Philip II, Alexander the Great, Antipater and Cassander. Philip appears to have employed a pragmatic policy in his dealings with the Greeks. Those northern Greek cities which opposed him were taken militarily, Potidaea and Olynthus had their populations sold into slavery, and the more economically important Amphipolis had those citizens who opposed Philip exiled. After his annexation of the neighbouring and therefore strategically important Thessaly, Philip imposed garrisons and governors over the Thessalians, while making himself chief magistrate.¹⁷

In his early interventions in central and southern Greece Philip relied on the historically successful method of taking advantage of the ongoing civil conflict within the Greek cities, backing one faction (usually oligarchic), and supporting it with money and/or mercenaries. On coming to power the new rulers would be reliant on, or at least sympathetic to Philip. Following his decisive victory over the Greeks at the battle of Chaeronea a more flexible policy was followed. The overwhelming nature of this success meant that Philip could impose whatever terms he chose on those cities that had opposed him.¹⁸ Determined to break the military power of the Boeotians, he imposed upon the Thebans both a garrison and an oligarchy of former exiles.

Athens, more distant and with a fleet which would be vital for the coming war against the Persians was treated far more leniently. No Macedonian troops entered Attica, the democracy was allowed to remain and a treaty of "friendship and alliance" was concluded. The only penalties imposed upon Athens were the breakup of her existing alliance and perhaps the loss of the Thracian Chersonese, which bordered Philip's kingdom.¹⁹

Philip's success also allowed factions supporting him to seize control in a number of cities. Garrisons were placed in Corinth,

Ambracia and Chalcis,²⁰ ensuring continued Macedonian military and political dominance. Overall Philip's policy in dealing with the Greek cities would appear to have been based primarily on strategic considerations rather than any pre-conceived dogma. He did not hesitate to impose garrisons or interfere with a city's internal politics if he considered it essential to Macedonia's defence, but was willing to allow "freedom and autonomy" where this would achieve his aims without direct intervention.

Once his dominance was secure Philip followed historical precedent by enacting another "common peace" uniting all the Greek states with the exception of Sparta. In this treaty the territorial integrity and the existing constitutions of the members were guaranteed, with all agreeing to wage war on any transgressors. Philip was also elected commander in chief (*hegemon*) of the armed forces of the alliance for his proposed war against Persia.²¹ His control was ensued by the dominance of Macedonian arms and the presence of his garrisons at strategic points, justified on the grounds of general security. In effect Philip had ensured his supremacy and the survival of those regimes favourable to him, while presenting himself as the protector of the "freedom and autonomy" of the Greeks.

The immediate unrest following Philip's death showed the underlying disaffection with the settlements he had imposed prior to formalizing the "common peace". The Ambracians expelled their garrison and introduced a democracy. The Thebans voted to do likewise.²² The Messenians, who should have been natural allies of Macedonia, both being enemies of Sparta, drove out their oligarchic regime supported by Philip.²³ The Aetolians voted to restore exiles to Acarnania in contravention of the peace. Athens made secret overtures to Attalus, a potential rival to Alexander's throne, and began organising another alliance against Macedonia. Elsewhere there was agitation in Argos, Elis and the Arcadian League.²⁴ Alexander the Great acted quickly to suppress this dissent, marching on Thebes. Those cities which had opposed him

panicked at this sign of strength and rushed to renew their allegiance. Having demonstrated his military superiority Alexander convened a meeting of the Corinthian League, which reconfirmed the terms of the common peace and elected Alexander as supreme commander for the war against Persia.

The next year, taking advantage of Alexander's long absence campaigning in the north, the Thebans rebelled, attacking the garrison on the Cadmeia and calling on their friends for assistance. Athens sent arms and equipment but no troops. The Arcadians, Argives and Eleans sent troops but these remained at the Isthmus as Alexander had already marched into Boeotia. Thebes was quickly taken, sacked and destroyed, the population massacred or sold into slavery. Only the citadel remained, again to house a Macedonian garrison.

Throughout Greece those politicians who had advocated opposing Alexander were deposed, exiled or executed, and pro-Macedonian exiles recalled. Athens alone tentatively stood up to Alexander, refusing to hand over the ten anti-Macedonian leaders that he had demanded, instead exiling only one. The defeat of Thebes however ensured that those politicians more favourable to Alexander would, at least temporarily, be in control in Athens. As Diodorus explains, Alexander had used all possible methods in order to win over the Greeks – persuasion, diplomacy, fear and force. Finally by destroying Thebes he ‘presented possible rebels among the Greeks with a terrible warning’²⁵ and thereby ensured that Macedonia's grip on the Greek states was again secure.

Alexander's policy towards the cities he captured in Asia varied with the individual circumstances. Generally speaking those Greek cities which surrendered willingly were allowed to replace their Persian imposed tyrants with democracies and freed from tribute.²⁶ Cities which opposed him he felt free to deal with as he chose: they might be garrisoned, fined and/or have a governor imposed over them.²⁷

After Alexander's return from India his attitude towards the

Greek cities appears to have undergone a change. In 324 Alexander issued an edict demanding that all the Greek cities allow their exiles to return. In addition Athens was to return Samos to its original inhabitants and the Aetolians were to withdraw from Oeniadae. This edict was issued as a command, not as a joint decision of the League of Corinth, and was a direct violation of the League's founding charter. The facade of the cities being allies was abandoned, and they were now to be treated as subjects. The decree was greatly resented, especially in Athens and Aetolia, and was most likely one of the main causes of the Lamian War following Alexander's death. This war was waged publically for the cause of "freedom and autonomy" against a dominant foreign power.

After Antipater's victory in the Lamian War he imposed a new relationship between the Macedonians and the Greek cities. Like Philip before him Antipater insisted on exacting terms on the cities individually, but the facade of a "common peace" and an alliance was done away with. Oligarchies with leaders acceptable to the Macedonians were imposed, their continued loyalty ensured by the placement of garrisons and the mass exiling of potential opponents.²⁸

The unpopularity of such regimes was demonstrated by the response to Polyperchon's edict of 318 ordering the overthrow of the oligarchies imposed by Antipater, the return of the exiles and the restoration of the democracies. The cities of the Peloponnesus (except Megalopolis) staged revolutions, massacred or exiled the partisans of Cassander and began to form alliances with Polyperchon. Polyperchon claimed, somewhat artfully, that he was reviving the policies of Philip and Alexander and restoring "freedom and autonomy" to the Greeks. It was only his military failures that allowed Cassander to recover his position and to reinstate his father's regimes and garrisons. The unpopularity of the oligarchies imposed by Antipater and Cassander led eventually to the equating of "freedom' and autonomy" with some form of a

democratic constitution.²⁹

From the history of the previous century it is possible to deduce what Antigonus may have suggested in promising “freedom and autonomy” and what the Greeks may have assumed he meant. Freedom from garrisons was explicitly promised. The Greeks, however, may have also inferred that they would be permitted to govern themselves by their own laws, their territory would remain inviolate, and that they would be allowed to maintain their own fortifications and armed forces. Tribute would not be arbitrarily imposed, although as allies of Antigonus they would be expected to provide troops and/ or money under their treaty obligations and a formal alliance would be made guaranteeing these rights. Their “freedom” would be assured by Antigonus, the *hegemonic* leader, not introducing governors or garrisons into the cities. The Greeks may also have assumed that, by promising freedom, Antigonus was pledging himself to assist them in overthrowing the oligarchies imposed by Cassander, and supporting the introduction of democratic regimes.

As a subordinate of both Philip and Alexander, Antigonus would have had first hand experience of all their methods of dealing with the Greek cities. This was a period of innovation and improvisation for both the Macedonian kings and the Greeks. Both Philip and Alexander used a variety of methods in their dealings with the cities, ranging from outright conquest and destruction to, as later became the preferred option, alliance and a common peace. Whatever superficial form these relationships took, however, they were in reality Macedonian domination backed by what was the total military supremacy of Macedonian arms. The victories at Chaeronea in 338 and Crannon in 322 had made this point forcibly. The material question for the Greek city states was how much freedom and autonomy they could retain under the new political reality.

Following the outbreak of the First Successor War, Antigonus allied himself with Antipater and Craterus. As such he was

associated with Antipater's oligarchic allies in Greece, such contacts are demonstrated by his evacuation from Asia Minor on Athenian ships. After the death of his ally and patron Antipater in 319, Antigonus took the side of Cassander and rebelled against Polyperchon, the newly appointed regent and ruler of Macedonia. As such he was in direct opposition to Polyperchon's decree denouncing both the oligarchies and garrisons of Antipater. Antigonus further provided ships and men to Cassander, allowing him to return to Greece, overthrow the newly restored democracy in Athens and begin to revive the policies of his father.

In 318 Antigonus condemned Arrhidaeus' attack on the city of Cyzicus on the grounds that it was an allied city guilty of no offence. Later that year he drove both Arrhidaeus and Cleitus out of their satrapies. The city of Ephesus supposedly captured with the aid of partisans within the walls. Antigonus then expelled the garrisons of Cleitus from those cities so occupied. It has been argued that these actions, and his experience at Priene, hinted at Antigonus' later attitude towards the Greeks.³⁰ This judgement appears to suppose too much. Antigonus may have simply been seeking a pretext for his attacks on his enemies. As there is no evidence for the following actions Antigonus took in order to secure his control of the region. Although as he was later in a position to denounce garrisons, it might be reasonably supposed that he did not follow this policy himself. In 317 Antigonus marched east in pursuit of Eumenes and had no further dealings with the Greek cities until his return in late 316.

Only on the return from East and the war with other Successors did Antigonus declare his policy of freedom and autonomy for the Greek cities. When considering the possible motives for such a policy Antigonus' strategic considerations must be taken into account. Antigonus' long term strategic goal was most likely the capture of Macedonia, and therefore the removal of his major rival was Cassander. As such it is reasonable to presume that the Tyre proclamation was aimed primarily at Cassander and his policy of

imposed oligarchies and garrisons within the Greek cities. The other denunciations of Cassander made at Tyre make this presumption even more conceivable.

The proclamation of freedom and autonomy would also condemn the actions of his other major enemies Lysimachus and Ptolemy, as both had placed garrisons in the Greek cities within their territories. When analysing the motives behind Antigonos' policy it should be remembered that this was in fact a reversal of the program that his allies had been carrying out, and he had supported – at least materially – for the previous eight years. The possible effectiveness of the decree in winning the support of the Greeks is demonstrated by Ptolemy's publishing of a similar decree. As Diodorus (19.62) states, it was a matter of no little importance to have gained the goodwill of the Greeks. Ptolemy's credibility must, however, have been undermined by the governor and garrison he had placed in Cyrene and the garrisons he would later install in Corinth and Sicyon.

It is difficult to believe that a leading Macedonian aristocrat such as Antigonos could have any genuine regard for democracy or the freedom and autonomy of the Greek cities. The decree was almost certainly a stratagem aimed at his enemies, particularly Cassander. His conduct prior to the Tyre decree supports this accusation. That said, however, of all the Successors Antigonos appears to have been the only one who consistently followed a policy both of not imposing garrisons in the Greek cities, and liberating them from the garrisons of his opponents.

During the Third Successor War of 315 –311 Antigonos' generals in Greece carried out this policy liberating many cities from Cassander's garrisons. Meanwhile Antigonos drove out the garrisons of Asander from the cities of Caria. The rival Successors supported opposed political factions, with Antigonos always assisting the democratic faction, and provoked civil war in order to win over the alliance of the Greek cities, just as the Athenians and Spartans had a century earlier. In the Peace of 311 it is

Antigonus who introduced clauses guaranteeing the freedom of the Greek states.

During the period 311 to 309, Antigonus concentrated his efforts on his failed attempt to defeat Seleucus in Babylonia. His absence allowed Cassander to regain much lost ground in Greece and Ptolemy to conquer and garrison Corinth and Sicyon. Antigonus responded by sending his son Demetrius to once again free the Greeks from the garrisons of the other Successors. Demetrius was spectacularly successful, most famously capturing Athens, ending the ten year tyranny of Demetrius of Phalerum and restoring the democracy. Despite the urgings of his advisors Antigonus refused to install a garrison claiming he needed only the people's goodwill. Antigonus, like Philip and Alexander before him, then bound the Greek states to him by treaty.

Unfortunately for the Greek cities Antigonus' policy did not survive his death at the battle of Ipsus. Both his son, and grandson Antigonus Gonatas, tired of the fickleness the democratic regimes, forced both garrisons and oligarchies on the Greeks.

Despite this, from the age of the Successors onwards many a would-be conqueror of Greece – the Roman general Flamminius and Antiochus the Great of Syria to name but two – would claim to be bringing freedom and democracy to the Greeks.³¹ It remained a useful catchcry with which to raise Greek military support against one's enemies. All would, if successful, turn into new despots and the political freedom of the Greeks would decline. Under the rule of Rome, although ostensibly democratic, free and autonomous, the Greek cities would cease to be independent nation states, but instead would become little more than town councils. As Plutarch (*Moralia* 811–822), himself a magistrate of Chaeronea under Roman rule, lamented: 'Nowadays, when the affairs of the cities do not include leadership in war, or the overthrow of tyrannies, or the making of alliances ... you who rule are a subject, and the state you rule is dominated by proconsuls, the agents of Caesar'.

Notes

Preface

1. Curtius 4.11.21.

Chapter 1

1. Hammond, NGL, *A History of Macedonia* Vol. 1 (Oxford, 1972), p. 430.
2. Herodotus 8.137–8.
3. Thucydides 2.88–9.
4. Herodotus 5.22; Justin 7.2. Probably the Olympics of 504.
5. This fragment of Arrian (*PSI XII* 1284) is easiest located in Goralski, WJ, ‘Arrians’ Events After Alexander Summary of Photius and Selected Fragments’, in *Ancient World* 19 (1989), p. 95. See also, Plutarch, *Alexander* 51, *Eumenes* 14; Curtius 6.10.23, 6.11.4.
6. For a recent, well argued account see Worthington, I, *Philip II of Macedonia* (New Haven, 2008), pp. 216–9. Also Billows, RA, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* (Berkeley, 1990), pp. 18–9. In recent years the question of a distinct Macedonia language has become contentious due to the creation of the independent nation, the Republic of Macedonia, formerly a part of Yugoslavia. For patriotic reasons many in the new state argue that the ancient Macedonians to have a separate identity and language from the Greeks. See for example the website: <http://www.historyofmacedonia.org> For the counter arguments: <http://macedonia-evidence.org/>
7. See for example the arguments of O’Neil, J at: <http://history-of-macedonia.com/2009/03/20/scientific-analysis-of-the-pella-curse-tablet-james-oneil-university-sydney/>
8. Plutarch, *Moralia* 182D.
9. Theopompus F225B.
10. *Hetairoi* appears to have had two overlapping meanings. One being the entire Macedonian nobility serving in the cavalry and the other the more exclusive meaning of the king’s inner circle. During the period of the Successors the later meaning became more common. For a description of the role and status of the companions see Hammond,

NGL, *A History of Macedonia* Vol. 2 (Oxford, 1972), pp. 395–409. For use of the term companions for the heavy cavalry see Bosworth, AB, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander* Vol. 1, (Oxford, 1980), p. 117, as opposed to the inner council of friends and advisers pp. 161–2.

11. Demosthenes 2.18–19. For Theopompus' similar account of Philip's court see Athenaeus, *The Deipnosophists* 6.76.
12. Demosthenes 9.31
13. Not all go as far as Errington, RM, *A History of Macedonia*, (Berkeley, 1993), p. 4, in claiming that: 'Ancient allegations that the Macedonians were non-Greeks all had their origin in Athens at the time of the struggle with Philip II. Then as now, political struggle created the prejudice. The orator Aeschines once even found it necessary, in order to counteract the prejudice vigorously fomented by his opponents, to defend Philip on this issue and describe him at a meeting of the Athenian Popular Assembly as being 'Entirely Greek'. Demosthenes' allegations were lent an appearance of credibility by the fact, apparent to every observer, that the life-style of the Macedonians, being determined by specific geographical and historical conditions, was different from that of a Greek city-state.' Unfortunately for his argument, Errington disregards the fifth century testimony of Herodotus. Nor were such accusations limited to the opponents of Macedonia, Demosthenes' rival, Dinarchus (1.24) also refers to the Macedonians as barbarians.
14. Plutarch, *Pyrrhus* 9.
15. Thucydides 2.100.
16. Diodorus 16.3. Justin 7.5 claims that Philip was initially appointed regent and only seized the throne: 'Philip, for a long time, acted, not as king, but as guardian to this infant; but, when dangerous wars threatened, and it was too long to wait for the co-operation of a prince who was yet a child, he was forced by the people to take the government upon himself.' For the arguments against the regency see Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia*, pp. 20–1.
17. Diodorus 16.3.
18. Diodorus 16.3.
19. Polyaeus 4.2.10; Theophrastus *Historia Plantarum* 3.12.
20. Plutarch, *Aemilius Paulus* 20.
21. Polyaeus 2.29.2.

22. Demosthenes, 9.49–50.
23. For a comparison, at the start of the Peloponnesian War Athens collected 600 talents from its subject allies (Thucydides 2.13). A talent was both a unit of weight and a measure of currency. An Athenian talent was about 26 kilograms. As a unit of currency it was generally this amount of weight in silver. An Athenian talent was the equivalent of 6,000 drachmae or sixty minae.
24. Aelian, *Varia Historia* 6.1.
25. Justin 9.7.

Chapter 2

1. Tod, MN, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* vol. 2 (Oxford, 1948). no. 186. Despite the restoration of the democracy Priene's independence was severely limited: a garrison was installed, the government regulated and a *syntaxis* (forced contributions to Alexander's war effort) imposed.
2. Aelian, *Varia Historia* 12.43. Diodorus 21.1, can also be interpreted as having Antigonos come from a common background.
3. Arrian, *Anabasis* 1.15; Heckel, W, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire* (New York, 1992), p. 259.
4. Demetrius was the first husband of Antigonos' wife Stratonice (Plutarch, *Demetrius* 2). Demetrius was 22 at the battle of Gaza in 312 (Plutarch *Demetrius* 5).
5. Suda, 'Marsuas'; Plutarch, *Moralia* 182C.
6. Diodorus 18.62, the assumption is made because no other possible parent can be identified.
7. Phila, the daughter of Antipater and widow of Craterus, married Demetrius in 321 or 320 (Diodorus 19.59, Plutarch, *Demetrius*. 14). The younger Craterus became a loyal supporter of his half brother Antigonos Gonatas (Plutarch *Moralia* 250F-253O, 486A; Polyaeus 2.29.1; Frontinus, 3.6.7). Antigonos Gonatas was born 320/19. [Lucian], *Macrobia* 11, makes him 80 at the time of his death in 240/39. Stratonice was old enough to be married to Seleucus soon after the battle of Ipsus (Plutarch *Demetrius* 31).
8. Arrian, *Successors* R25.1, refers to him as 'genos', which can be translated as relative, friend or countryman. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, pp. 435–6, attempts to make Telesphorus, a general of Antigonos, a nephew, and proposes

yet another, unrecorded brother. This identification relies on Diogenes Laertius 5.79, identifying the Demetrius named as Demetrius Poliorcetes, rather than the alternative, Demetrius of Phalerum. This reading of the passage appears to be flawed. The context demands that it be Demetrius of Phalerum, and the identification of this Telesphorus as a nephew of Antigonus should be rejected.

9. Justin 16.1; Aelian, *Varia Historia* 14.47A.
10. Arrian, *Anabasis* 1.29, when Antigonus is appointed satrap of Phrygia a new commander, Balacrus, is appointed to lead the allies in his place.
11. Early in his reign Philip II fielded 600 cavalry against the Illyrians, although he did not at that time control the whole of Macedonia (Diodorus 16.14). Alexander took 2,100 Macedonian cavalry to Asia with him, and was able to leave 1,500 with Antipater in Europe (Diodorus 17.17).
12. Billows, *Antigonus the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, p. 17 n. 6, only one of Alexander's commanders can be shown to be from a non-noble family. Hammond, *A History of Macedonia* Vol. 2 (Oxford, 1972), pp. 403–4, emphasizes the hierarchical nature of Macedonian society, even within the elite. Those Greeks admitted to the ranks of the companions also appear to be from noble backgrounds. Eumenes' father was a guest-friend of Philip II (Plutarch, *Eumenes* 1).
13. Aelian, *Varia Historia* 12.43, includes a number of equally unlikely backgrounds for famous individuals. For example, Plutarch, *Eumenes* 1, claims that Eumenes' father was a wagoner, despite being a guest-friend of Philip II.
14. The possibility of a link between Antigonus or his descendants and the royal house is discussed in [Appendix 3](#).
15. Plutarch, *Moralia*. 182E, *Demetrius* 14.
16. Billows, *Antigonus the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, pp. 27–9, attempt to place him at the siege of Perinthus is convoluted and unconvincing. For the argument against see Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire*, p. 51 n.158.
17. For Antigonus' friendship with Eumenes, Plutarch *Eumenes* 10. With Antipater, Diodorus 18.23, 18.54, 19.44. Eumenes maintained his position as secretary to the king following Alexander's succession, and his loyalty is stressed by Plutarch (*Eumenes* 1).

18. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 28.
19. Diodorus 20.75.
20. Plutarch, *Moralia* 182A.
21. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 3.
22. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 19.
23. Diodorus 18.23; Plutarch, *Moralia* 791E.
24. Curtius 4.1.34–5.
25. Curtius 4.5.13.
26. Burn, AR, 'Notes on Alexander's Campaigns', in *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 72 (1957), pp. 81–4; Briant, P, *Antigone le Borgne : les debuts de sa carriere et les problemes de l'Assemblee macedonienne* (Paris, 1973) 57–80; Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, pp. 43–5. For the appointment of Asander as satrap of Lydia, see Arrian, *Anabasis* 1.17.
27. Tarn, WW, *Alexander the Great*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1948), pp. 110–11. Supported by Atkinson, *A commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni Books 3 and 4* (Amsterdam, 1980), pp. 286–8.
28. Anson, EM, 'Antigonos, the Satrap of Phrygia', in *Historia* 37 (1988), pp. 471–7.
29. Briant, *Antigone le Borgne*, p. 57, estimates a minimum of 20,000 troops involved. Antigonos was given 1,500 mercenaries when appointed satrap, but these had already been returned to Alexander prior to Issus. He had probably gained 1,100 Greek and Carian mercenaries after the surrender of Celenae. This leaves the question of where he managed to raise sufficient troops to defeat the Persians. Burn, 'Notes on Alexander's Campaigns', p. 83, has argued that he had combined the forces of the neighbouring satraps plus the use of 4,000 mercenaries under the command of Cleander. Anson has systematically rebutted Burn's arguments. He asserts that Antigonos enrolled large numbers of local troops with which to defeat the Persians, citing the numbers later raised by Eumenes and Antigonos during the wars of the Successors. His argument would be further strengthened by citing in addition the 6,000 Pisidians who fought for Alcetas and remained loyal even in defeat. (Diodorus 19.45–46.) Antigonos was able to raise local troops in 320 (Arrian, R25.3), when he 'mustered the greatest number possible from the countryside'. Zopyrion, satrap of Pontus supposedly gathered an army of 30,000 to fight the Scythians, but the date is uncertain.

30. Anson, 'Antigonus, the Satrap of Phrygia', p. 471.
31. Phrygia, together with five other areas, paid an annual tribute of only 300 talents overall. This compared to 1,000 talents from Babylonia and 500 talents from Cilicia (Herodotus, 3.90–97). These figures are of course over 160 years old but according to Olmstead, AT, *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948), pp. 297–8, the high rates of tribute imposed by the Persians drained wealth from the satrapies, stifling economic development. The 9,880 talents of silver paid in tribute to the Persians (Herodotus 3.95) is remarkably similar to the 11,000 talents of revenue able to be collected by Antigonus in 316 (Diodorus 19.56) from much the same area, less Egypt but including Persia.
32. Badian, E, 'Harpalus', in *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 81 (1961), p. 24.
33. Plutarch, *Alexander* 47, *Eumenes* 6
34. Plutarch, *Alexander* 74.
35. Diodorus 18.1.

Chapter 3

1. Diodorus 18.2; Plutarch, *Alexander* 77. The exact nature and severity of Arrhidaeus' malady is not known and much debated.
2. Curtius 10.6.21.
3. Curtius 10.9.19.
4. Arrian (*Successors* 1.7) and Curtius (10.7.9) state that he was to share the rule of Antipater. Justin (13.4.) places him in charge of the Royal Treasury; the two epitomes of Arrian, Photius (Arrian, *Successors*. 1.3) and Dexippos (F 8) make him *prostates*, which Dexippos states is 'the first position of honour among the Macedonians'. There is no recorded precedent for the use of the term.
5. Plutarch, *Eumenes* 3.
6. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, pp. 57–8. According to Diodorus (18.16) the Cappadocians could field an army of 45,000 men. If Anson's surmise is correct Antigonus may have been unwilling to have moved against a former ally.
7. Diodorus 18.23; Arrian, *Successors* 9.21, 26; Justin 13.6.
8. Arrian, *Successors* 9.20–24, 26; Diodorus 18.23; Justin 13.6. Diodorus claims that the charges were unjust. The precise charge is unknown, but Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, pp. 58–9, accepts as probable that it was for refusing to obey

the legitimate command of Perdiccas to aid Eumenes in conquering Cappadocia. Citing Diodorus he doubts the legitimacy of the charges. Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire*, p. 54 n. 166, sees 'no good reason for suspecting ... the truth of the charges' as this 'is just the kind of defence one would expect from Hieronymos' Nonetheless, if Antigonos was involved in some sort of alliance with Ariarathes then his actions could certainly be seen as treasonable.

9. Diodorus 18.25.
10. Diodorus 18.24; Arrian, *Successors* 9.26; Justin 13.6. Ptolemy was in dispute with Perdiccas over his hijacking of Alexander's body (Arrian, *Successors* 1.25; Diodorus 18.28.3) and his increasing power (Diodorus 19.29.1; Justin 13.6.) – probably as a result of his war of conquest against the Greek cities of Cyrenaeca (Arrian, *Successors* 9.29; Diodorus 18.21; Justin 13.6–8).
11. Arrian, *Successors* 9.30.
12. See Heckel, W, 'Factions and Macedonian Politics in the Reign of Alexander the Great', in *Ancient Macedonia* 4 (Thessaloniki, 1986), p. 305.
13. Diodorus 18.36.6–7; Arrian, *Successors* 9.29–30. From Diodorus it is clear that Ptolemy could have assumed the regency but deliberately chose not to. Errington, RM, 'From Babylon to Tripuradeisis: 323–320 bc', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 90 (1970) pp. 65–7, argues that he had already done a deal with Pithon. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, p. 67, suggests that Ptolemy feared a possible confrontation with Antipater and Antigonos. Both proposals are plausible enough. Certainly whoever assumed the regency would soon have to come to some arrangement with Antipater.
14. Polyaeus 4.6.4.
15. Arrian, *Successors* 9.32–33.
16. Diodorus 18.39; Arrian, *Successors* 9.33. Diodorus has Antipater appointed regent before his arrival but due to the obvious antipathy of Perdiccas' former army to Antipater I have preferred Arrian's chronology.
17. Diodorus 18.39; Arrian, *Successors* 9.34–38; Justin 13.8.10. Arrian (1.38) states that Antigonos was given command of Perdiccas' former army and appointed 'to guard and attend to the kings.' Diodorus says that Antigonos was given command of the 'royal army'. However if the

kings remained with him then his army would continue to be the 'royal army'. Antigonos' appointment as *strategos autocrator*, general with full power, was most likely at Triparadeisus as Diodorus clearly states that Antigonos was appointed 'supreme commander' of Asia at the same time that he was given command of a great army (Diodorus 18.50). Arguments that Antigonos' command were to last only for the duration of the campaign against Eumenes have been rebutted by Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, pp. 70–71.

18. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 14; Diodorus 19.59. As the birth of Antigonos Gonatas is usually dated to 320/19, 320 must be the latest date for the marriage. It was therefore most likely arranged at Triparadeisus.
19. Diodorus 18.39; Arrian, *Successors* 9.37–38. Errington, 'From Babylon to Triparadeisus: 323– 320 bc', pp. 69–70, proposes that Antipater made his appointments with an eye to containing the power of Antigonos.
20. Arrian, *Successors* 9.38.
21. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, pp. 66–8, claims that his reputation was due to his victory over the Perdiccans on Cyprus. Whilst this is also possible, Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire*, pp. 54–5) points out it can only be speculation as we have no details of the campaign or its outcome. Perdiccas had sent a large force to Cyprus, but its fate is not recorded. The only evidence that Antigonos participated in this campaign is the passing reference to his coming to Triparadeisus from Cyprus (Arrian, *Successors* 9.30).
22. For example Seleucus, Pithon, Cleitus and Arrhidaeus, all of whom were transferred to satrapies. It is also possible that they had had enough of the problems of the court and the rebellious royal army, and requested satrapies. Pithon and Arrhidaeus had proved incapable of holding the regency: both would later try to use force to enlarge their domains (Diodorus 18.51, 19.14). They may also have been influenced by Ptolemy's success.
23. Arrian, *Goteborg Palimpsest*; Plutarch, *Eumenes* 8; Arrian, *Successors* 9.39–43. The *Goteborg Palimpsest* is translated at: <http://www.attalus.org/translate/fgh.html#156.0>
24. Arrian, *Goteborg Palimpsest*.
25. Arrian, *Goteborg Palimpsest*.

26. Arrian, *Successors* 11.43.

Chapter 4

1. Plutarch, *Eumenes* 8.
2. Polyaeus 4.6.6.
3. Justin 13.2.
4. Diodorus 18.30. For Eumenes' reliance on his cavalry against Craterus see Diodorus 18.30 and Plutarch, *Eumenes* 7. Plutarch describes Eumenes as having some Macedonians in his army but clearly they were not a significant component.
5. Polyaeus 4.6.19.
6. Diodorus 18.40. Plutarch, *Eumenes* 9, also blames treachery for Eumenes' defeat: 'For, to begin with, he was defeated by Antigonus at Orcynii in Cappadocia through treachery, and yet, though in flight, he did not suffer the traitor to make his escape out of the rout to the enemy, but seized and hanged him.'
7. Nepos, *Eumenes* 5.
8. Plutarch, *Eumenes* 10.
9. Diodorus 18.41.
10. Diodorus 18.7.
11. Diodorus 18.44.
12. Diodorus 18.47.
13. Athenaeus 1.18A. Diodorus 18.48 gives youth as the reason, yet thirty was the minimum age to serve as general or archon in Athens (Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 4.3)
14. Adams, WL, 'The Dynamics of Internal Macedonian Politics in the Time of Cassander', in *Ancient Macedonia* 3 (Thessaloniki, 1989), p. 18.
15. Errington, RM, 'The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy', *Chiron* 8, (1978), pp. 131–3.
16. For example, Diodorus 18.48, 19.46, 19.51, 19.55.
17. Pausanias 9.7.2.
18. Pausanias 1.6.7.
19. Diodorus 18.47; Plutarch, *Eumenes* 12. Antipater' demise may have prevented an open breach between the two.
20. Diodorus. 18.47, 18.50. The word "Friend"(*philos*) appears to have replaced "Companion" when describing the immediate entourage of the Successor generals. See Hammond, NGL, *A History of Macedonia* Vol. 2 , pp. 154, 159, 161 n. 1.

21. Antigonus' ambitions are described as aspiring to be *olon hegemonian*, supreme commander (Diodorus 18.50). The same words are used to describe Polyperchon's power as regent (Diodorus 18.47). Four years later Antigonus would claim that he was the legitimate regent (Diodorus 19.61).
22. Diodorus 18.52.
23. Diodorus 18.55.
24. Lysimachus is never mentioned as a member of this alliance. Nevertheless, his actions, allowing Cassander to flee across his satrapy and later murdering Cleitus, would infer that he was, at the very least, sympathetic to their cause.

Chapter 5

1. Diodorus 18.53.
2. Plutarch, *Eumenes* 12. Nepos, *Eumenes* 5: 'He, however, kept himself in that one place as long as the winter lasted; but, as the fortress could have no relief from without, and the spring was coming on, he pretended to be desirous of surrendering, and, while he was treating about the terms, eluded the officers of Antigonus, and brought himself and all his men off safe.'
3. See Bosworth, AB, 'History and Artifice in *Eumenes*', in *Plutarch and the Historical Tradition* (London, 1992), pp. 65–6.
4. Diodorus 18.57.
5. Diodorus 18.60.
6. Diodorus 18.57.
7. Diodorus 19.41. Also, Plutarch, *Demetrius* 16: 'And indeed they were the oldest soldiers of Philip and Alexander, war's athletes as it were, without a defeat or a fall up to that time, many of them now seventy years old, and not a man younger than sixty.'
8. Baynham, E, 'Alexander's Argyraspids: Tough Old Fighters or Antigonid Myth', in *After Alexander the Time of the Diadochi (323–281)* (Oxford, 2013), p.117.
9. Plutarch, *Eumenes* 13.
10. Polyaeus 4.8.2.
11. Diodorus 18.60.
12. See [Appendix 4](#).
13. Diodorus 18.62.
14. Diodorus 18.63.

15. Diodorus 18.54, 18.68. Cassander's arrival in Athens took place shortly after the death of Phocion, which can be dated to May or June of 318. (Plutarch, *Phocion* 37).
16. Diodorus 18.69.
17. Diodorus 18.72.
18. No figures are given for the Macedonian fleet. The only indication for numbers is that in 322 Cleitus commanded a Macedonian fleet of 240 ships (Diodorus 18.15).
19. Polyaeus 4.6.8. Diodorus (18.72) numbers Antigonus' fleet as over a hundred and puts his losses on the first days fighting as seventeen sunk and forty captured.
20. Diodorus 18.73.
21. Diodorus 18.63.
22. Polyaeus 4.6.9.
23. Diodorus 19.14.
24. Diodorus 19.14.
25. Diodorus 19.12.
26. Diodorus 18.74

Chapter 6

1. Diodorus 19.13
2. Diodorus 19.17.
3. Diodorus 19.15.
4. Plutarch, *Eumenes* 13. Plutarch was a royalist and no supporter of democracy.
5. Diodorus 19.15.
6. Diodorus 19.5.
7. The average daytime maximum in summer is a horrendous 47°C and minima, even at night, 30°C.
8. Diodorus 19.17 says the distance from Susa to the Pasitigris was one days march, in 17.67 he gives a different distance of four days march, as does Curtius 5.3.1.
9. Diodorus 19.18. See, Bosworth, AB, *The Legacy of Alexander. Politics, Warfare, and Propaganda under the Successors* (Oxford, 2002), p. 116 n. 77.
10. Diodorus 19.19.
11. Diodorus 19.19.
12. Diodorus 19.20.

13. Plutarch, *Eumenes* 13. Diodorus 19.24 records the amount of the loan as 400 talents.
14. Diodorus 19.24.
15. Diodorus 19.27.
16. Ueda-Sarson, L, *The Evolution of Hellenistic Infantry* part 2, in *Slingshot* 223 (July 2002), pp. 23–8 argues that most infantry mercenaries of this time may have been armed in the manner of Iphicrates: ‘clearly the mercenaries who fought in such phalanxes were not traditional skirmishing peltasts. It is just possible that some mercenaries were being trained to fight in the Macedonian manner with the *sarissa* rather than Iphikrates’ equipment, although there is no direct evidence for it, and the likelihood remains that the great majority were Iphikratean-style hoplites.’
17. Diodorus 19.29.
18. It is unlikely that they all came from Taras. The name is more likely a general term for troops so armed. Aelian 2, describes two types of Tarantines but ‘proper Tarantines’ are the ‘one that throws small javelins from far off’.
19. Arrian, *Anabasis* 5.16–17.
20. Arrian, *Anabasis* 5.17.

Chapter 7

1. See for example Curtius 4.13.30–31.
2. Diodorus 19.27.
3. Diodorus 19.28.
4. Diodorus 19.29.
5. Diodorus 19.29.
6. As suggested by Bosworth, *The Legacy of Alexander. Politics, Warfare, and Propaganda under the Successors*, p. 134. Another possibility is that Eumenes would have known that Antigonus’ heavy infantry outnumbered his and made his own line shallower than normal. Billows’ map of the battle, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, pp. 96–7, suggests that Eumenes extended his infantry line by using light infantry to fill in gaps between his heavy infantry units. Roisman, J, *Alexander’s Veterans and the Early Wars of the Successors* (Austin, 2012), pp. 216–9, argues that the left of Antigonus’ phalanx extended beyond the right of Eumenes’ but as it was refused it did not matter. In his reconstruction the Silver Shields

fight Antigonus' *pantapodoi*. On balance Bosworth's explanation appears to be the most plausible.

7. The advance guard protecting Eumenes also consisted of *paidos*.
8. I agree with Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, p. 95 n.2 who rejects this argument.
9. Diodorus 19.30.
10. Diodorus 19.30.
11. A century earlier, at the Battle of Mantinea, the Spartan king Agis, fearing that he was being outflanked, had attempted to move units from his other wing only for the orders to be ignored. The confusion opened up a dangerous breach in his battle line. (Thucydides 5.71–2.) At Gaugamela, by contrast, Alexander, despite being in full pursuit of Darius, had been able to respond to Parmenion's requests for assistance (Arrian, *Anabasis* 3.15, Curtius 4.16.2–3). Earlier in the battle Alexander and Parmenion had been able to exchange messages (Curtius 4.15.6–7).
12. Diodorus 19.30. Alexander had used a similar mixed formation of light infantry and cavalry to defeat the Scythian light cavalry at the Jaxartes River (Arrian, *Anabasis* 4.4).
13. Diodorus 19.30.
14. Diodorus 19.30, describes Pithon's cavalry, as having 'no stability or any advance guard worth mentioning.'
15. Diodorus 19.30.
16. Diodorus 19.30.
17. Polyaeus 4.6.5.
18. Diodorus 19.30.
19. Plato, *Symposium*.
20. Diodorus 19.31.
21. Polyaeus 4.6.10.

Chapter 8

1. Plutarch, *Eumenes* 15.
2. Nepos, *Eumenes* 8. Nepos writing during the Roman civil wars of the 1st century bc, compares the lack of discipline of Eumenes' veterans to that of the capricious Roman veterans of his own time who were also fighting in civil wars.
3. Polyaeus 4.6.11.
4. Plutarch, *Moralia* 182C.

5. Diodorus 19.38.
6. Polyaeus 6.8.4.
7. Roisman, *Alexander's Veterans and the Early Wars of the Successors*, pp. 222–3. See also [Appendix 2](#).
8. Polyaeus 6.4.11.
9. Plutarch, *Eumenes* 16.
10. Diodorus 19.41.
11. Diodorus 19.41
12. Diodorus 19.42.
13. Diodorus 19.42.
14. Diodorus 19.42.
15. Polybius 5.84.
16. Plutarch, *Eumenes* 16; Diodorus 19.42.
17. Diodorus 19.43.
18. Curtius 4.15.7. Compare to Diodorus 19.43: 'for he hoped that if superior in battle, not only to save his own baggage but also to capture that of the enemy.'
19. Diodorus 19.43.
20. Polyaeus 4.6.13.
21. Plutarch, *Eumenes* 18.
22. Justin 14.4, claims that Eumenes surrendered himself and his army to Antigonus but this is not supported by the other sources.
23. Plutarch, *Eumenes* 18; Justin 14.4.
24. Nepos, *Eumenes* 10; Plutarch, *Eumenes* 18.
25. Nepos, *Eumenes* 12, claims that Eumenes 'was killed by his guards on the removal of the camp, without Antigonus's knowledge.'
26. Diodorus 19.44.
27. Plutarch, *Eumenes* 19.

Chapter 9

1. Diodorus 19.49.
2. Diodorus 19.49.; Polyaeus 4.6.14.
3. As suggested by Bosworth, *The Legacy of Alexander. Politics, Warfare, and Propaganda under the Successors*, pp. 160–1. Who suggests that if Pithon was plotting revolt, 'He behaved with guileless naivety.' He suggests that the rumours of the plot came from Hieronymus, now in Antigonus' service. Some credence is given to this theory as Antigonus was to use this subterfuge of promised advancement before dismissal

three times in succession. Peucestes and Xenophilus, the governor of the Susa treasury, were also to fall victim to it, although they kept their lives (Diodorus 19.48)

4. Diodorus 19.48.
5. After the battle of Gaza in 312, Diodorus (19.85) refers to Demetrius' 'royal baggage'.
6. Diodorus 19.48.
7. Plutarch, *Eumenes* 19.
8. Diodorus 19.56.
9. Diodorus 19.55.
10. Diodorus 19.55. Appian, *Syrian Wars* 53, states that the breach between Antigonus and Seleucus started over the latter's punishment of a subordinate. Antigonus became angry and demanded the accounting. Appian adds that the otherwise unknown Blitor, governor of Mesopotamia, was removed for allowing Seleucus to escape.
11. Diodorus 19.48.
12. Plutarch, *Dion* 24, *Nicias* 23.
13. Diodorus 19.11.
14. Diodorus 19.11.
15. Diodorus 19.36.
16. Diodorus 19.49.
17. Diodorus 19.51.
18. Diodorus 19.52.
19. Justin 15.1.
20. Cassius Dio 42.49.
21. Arrian, *Anabasis* 2.14; Diodorus 18.39, 19.105; Plutarch, *Alexander* 34.
22. Grainger, JD, *Seleukos Nikator: Constructing a Hellenistic Kingdom* (London, 1990), p. 87, states that 'the character of Antigonos was the real issue. He aimed at the empire of the world ... just as, later, did Seleukos.' Green, P, *From Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age* (London, 1990), pp. 20, 119, has an even more extreme view, claiming that Ptolemy was the only one of Alexander's marshals to have realized 'that limited ambitions ... offered the only viable solution.' Will, E, 'The succession to Alexander', *Cambridge Ancient History* vol. 7 part 2, 2nd.ed. (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 28–29, sums up this school of thought by asserting that the early wars of the Successors were 'conflicts between the unitary idea, the legacy of Alexander's thinking and particularist tendencies.' I agree with Lund,

HS, *Lysimachus: A Study in Early Hellenistic Kingship* (Abingdon, 1992), p. 52, who argues that 'such a view owes too much to hindsight.'

23. Diodorus 20.19, 20.27, 20.37.

24. Plutarch, *Pyrrhus* 14.

25. *Anthologia Palatina* 9.518.

Chapter 10

1. Diodorus 19.68–69. In 314 Ptolemaeus had 9,000 troops to watch Caria, but this does not appear to be his entire force. The same year Demetrius was left with 19,000 troops to guard Phoenicia. In 312 Nicanor was able to gather 17,000 troops from the garrisons of Persia and Media (Diodorus 19.92).
2. Diodorus 18.61. With only five hundred talents Eumenes had been able to recruit over 10,000 mercenaries in a short period in 318. Diodorus (18.50) confirms that as long as the money was available mercenaries were easy enough to raise.
3. Cassander: Diodorus 18.68. Athenians had served Cassander on Euboea (*Inscriptiones Graecae* II² 682). Ptolemy: Diodorus 19.80. Lysimachus: Diodorus 18.14. The latter figure is calculated by using Plutarch's figures for the entire army at Ipsus (*Demetrius* 28) less the figures supplied by Seleucus (Diodorus 20.113) and Cassander (Diodorus 20.112), although Plutarch's cavalry figures are difficult to reconcile with those of Diodorus.
4. In 315 Ptolemy put a hundred warships to sea under Seleucus (Diodorus 19.58) and another hundred under Polycleitus (Diodorus 19.62). Antigonus' lack of ships is problematic, since at the battle in the Hellespont he still had sixty after the first day's fighting and captured the surviving ships of Cleitus' fleet (Diodorus 18.72; Polyaeus 4.6.8). Presumably the Athenian and Macedonian contingents of the fleet returned to Athens with Nicanor and the others sailed home to their respective cities. Over forty ships came from the Hellespont to Antigonus in 315 (Diodorus 19.62).
5. Diodorus 19.57.
6. Lysimachus' position after his victory over the Thracian king Seuthes in 323 (Diodorus 18.14.) is not recorded by the sources. Lund, *Lysimachus: A Study in Early Hellenistic Kingship*, pp. 25–26, doubts that this victory made Seuthes subject to Lysimachus as is generally supposed. If she is correct Lysimachus may have felt his own domain

to have been under sufficient threat from the Thracians to make him unwilling to play an active role in the campaigns of 315.

7. Diodorus 19.57. Thereby copying the Persian king. By these methods news could be sent in a single day from the most distant parts of the empire to Susa and Ecbatana (Aristotle, *De Mundo*, 398B).
8. Diodorus 19.58. According to Grainger, JD, *Hellenistic Phoenicia* (Oxford, 1991), pp. 50–1, after the sacks of Sidon in 345 by the Persians and Tyre in 332 by Alexander, the Phoenicians took the lessons to heart and refused to resist their numerous invaders unless already garrisoned by their current ruler. Antigonos' conquest of the northern cities may have been a mere formality.
9. Diodorus 19.58.
10. Just how massive an undertaking this was is described by Diodorus 19.58: Antigonos employed 8,000 men to cut timber and 2,000 draught animals to transport the wood from the hills of Lebanon to the sea. About 9 tonnes of wheat was collected to feed the workers.
11. Olynthus had been destroyed by Philip II and Thebes by Alexander. Cassander had restored Thebes (Diodorus 19.54) but not Olynthus. Cassander forced the surviving population, who had reoccupied a fraction of their old city, to move in his new city of Cassandreia.
12. For a full discussion see [Appendix 5](#).
13. Diodorus 19.61. Justin (15.1) merely states that Antigonos sought to make his motives honourable by claiming he meant to avenge Olympias and free from imprisonment Roxane and the king. Simpson, RH, 'Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Greeks', in *Historia* 8 (1959), pp. 389–91 has stated that the second aim was: 'the true purpose of the meeting: the launching of a propaganda offensive to win Greek opinion everywhere for Antigonos as the true champion of the cities' freedom. It was undoubtedly one of the boldest, most effective acts of propaganda in Greek history.'
14. Thucydides 3.82.
15. Polybius 1.26.
16. See [Appendix 4](#).
17. For a full discussion see Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, pp. 220–5.
18. Diodorus 19.64. See Cary, M, *A History of the Greek World from 323 to 14 BC*. (London, 1932), pp. 82–94, especially pp. 82–3 for the underlying motives; also Green, *From Alexander to Actium*, p. 35.

Chapter 11

1. Diodorus 19.68.
2. Lund, *Lysimachus: A Study in Early Hellenistic Kingship*, p. 39; and Waterfield, R, *Dividing the Spoils The War for Alexander the Great's Empire* (Oxford, 2011), p. 119.
3. The siege of Callantia was still underway in 310 (Diodorus 20.25).
4. *The Inscription of Scepsis*. As Antigonus refers to the Hellespont, I believe this comment refers to these negotiations. A translation of this important document, by MM Austin, can be easiest found at: http://www.livius.org/di-dn/diadochi/diadochi_t10.html
5. Simpson, RH, 'The Historical Circumstances of the Peace of 311', in *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 74 (1954), pp. 27–9. Simpson suggests that Antigonus' terms were excessive, requiring that 'Cassander submit himself to the decisions taken by the Tyre assembly' and become again a subordinate of Antigonus. Comparing this incident to the demand of unconditional surrender made to Cassander in 302, Simpson demonstrates that 'Antigonus had a tendency to impose harsh terms wherever the situation allowed.'
6. Diodorus 19.77.
7. It is at this point that my narrative varies from the orthodox "high" chronology which usually places the beginning of 312 in Diodorus' text at 19.80.3. Diodorus 19.73.3 has Ptolemy, after Cyrene is recaptured, campaigning in Cyprus. I believe that even if this campaign began in 313 it continued well into 312. Hauben, H, 'On the Chronology of the Years 313–311', in *American Journal of Philology* 94 (1973) 261–3, dates 312 for the change of regime on Cyprus, based on a Phoenician inscription from Idalium. Hauben places the campaign in the fall of 312 but, only because it happened after the fall of Cyrene which he dates to summer 312. If the fall of Cyrene is in the summer of 313 then the successful end of Ptolemy's campaign in Cyprus can be dated as early as April of 312 and his raids in Syria and Cilicia in the summer of that year.

Chapter 12

1. This gap is one of the biggest problems for the "high" chronology, see [Appendix 1](#). Recent attempts to fill it have been by: Bosworth, *The Legacy of Alexander. Politics, Warfare, and Propaganda under the Successors* (Oxford, 2002), pp. 225–229, who argues to reinstate the

traditional date of the Battle of Gaza, the spring of 312; and Meeus, A, 'Diodorus and the Chronology of the Third Diadoch War', in *Phoenix* 66 (2012), pp. 84–8, who posits that Ptolemaeus' campaigns in Boeotia and Antigonus' dash to the Hellespont took place in 312, not 313.

2. The traditional date for the battle of Gaza was the spring of 312. Since the work of Smith, LC, 'The Chronology of Books 18–20 of Diodorus Siculus', in *American Journal of Philology* 82 (1961), pp. 288–290, a date of autumn 312 for the battle has been accepted by most scholars but see above, n. 1.
3. Diodorus 19.80.
4. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 2–3.
5. Diodorus 19.81.
6. Pausanias 1.6.5.
7. Diodorus 19.80.
8. Diodorus 19.81.
9. Diodorus 19.80.
10. Diodorus 19.83.
11. Diodorus 19.84.
12. Diodorus 19.84.
13. As some of Ptolemy's troops did in Cyprus after being captured by Demetrius, see Diodorus 20.47.
14. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 5.
15. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 5.

Chapter 13

1. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 6.
2. Bosworth, *The Legacy of Alexander. Politics, Warfare, and Propaganda under the Successors*, p. 242.
3. Diodorus 19.100.
4. Before his invasion of Egypt, the Persian king Cambyses had also sought to pacify the Arabs but in a different manner: 'in accordance with what he was told by his Halicarnassian guest, sent envoys to the Arabian king and from him asked and obtained the safe passage, having given him pledges of friendship and received them from him in return' (Herodotus 3.7). Some authors believe, however, that there was little strategic reason for this campaign and it was merely a pillaging operation by Antigonus. This is a plausible proposal but the

two motives are not incompatible.

5. Bosworth, *The Legacy of Alexander. Politics, Warfare, and Propaganda under the Successors*, pp. 234–5.
6. Diodorus 19.92.
7. Diodorus 19.100.
8. Plutarch (*Demetrius* 7), concludes this passage with Demetrius relieving Ptolemy's siege of Halicarnassus. Plutarch appears to have jumped a few years here as the siege should most likely be dated to Ptolemy's campaign of 309 (Diod. 20.27).
9. It had taken Alexander six weeks to cover much the same ground, albeit with a much larger army (Arrian, *Anabasis* 3.7).
10. Herodotus 3.90–7.
11. Diodorus 19.105.
12. *The Inscription of Scepsis*: 'because we understood that a settlement with Ptolemy too would speed up a solution to the question of Polyperchon, since he would have no allies, and because of our relationship with him'.
13. *The Inscription of Scepsis*.
14. Hammond, NGL, *A History of Macedonia* Vol. 3 (Oxford, 1972), p. 162. In the face of lack of extant evidence Hammond's view of an age of majority of eighteen has, with hesitancy, been accepted. Alexander, however, had become regent of the kingdom at the age of sixteen and had already played a role in the greeting of an embassy from Persia (Plutarch *Alexander* 5, 9).
15. Diodorus 19.105.
16. Diodorus 19.105; Justin 15.2; Pausanias 9.7.2. Hammond, NGL, *A History of Macedonia* Vol. 3 (Oxford, 1972), pp. 165–6), following Justin 15.2, argues that this passage of Diodorus looks forward to the future and the king was not in fact murdered until Polyperchon's attempted invasion of Macedonia accompanied by the pretender Hercules in 309, as there was no need to kill the boy until 309 when he would have turned fourteen, the age when boys became royal pages. Grainger, *Seleukos Nikator*, pp. 93, 102–3, believes that although Alexander IV was murdered in 310, it remained a secret until 308.
17. Diodorus 19.61.

Chapter 14

1. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 2.
2. Grayson, AK, *Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles*, (Locust Valley, 1975), pp. 115–119; photographs plate xviii. Available at http://www.livius.org/cg-cm/chronicles/bchp-diadochi/diadochi_01.html
3. *Diadochi Chronicle*, Reverse, column 4 lines 20–21.
4. Arrian, *Anabasis* 3.8. *Diadochi Chronicle*, Reverse, column 4, lines 36–39, mentions somebody being assembled and ‘the Babylonian(s)?, half of them’
5. *Diadochi Chronicle*, Reverse, column 4, lines 24–25.
6. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 7.
7. *Diadochi Chronicle*, Reverse, column 4 lines 25–37.
8. *Diadochi Chronicle*, Reverse, column 4, left edge, line 2.
9. Polyaeus 4.9.1. For the attribution, see Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, pp. 146–7, although he dates the battle to 308.
10. Lendering, J, *Polyaeus on the Babylonian War*, at <http://www.livius.org/cg-cm/chronicles/bchp-diadochi/polyaeus.html>. Bosworth, *The Legacy of Alexander. Politics, Warfare, and Propaganda under the Successors*, p. 224, notes that it is ‘possibly the oldest and most repeated strategy in Greek military history.’
11. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 19. The quote refers to Demetrius’ campaigns against Cyprus and Rhodes, three years later.
12. Diodorus 20.28. Justin 15.2 adds that Cassander feared that as Hercules might ‘be called to the throne of Macedonia through the influence of his father’s name, he sent secret orders that he should be put to death, together with his mother Barsine, and that their bodies should be privately buried in the earth lest the murder should be betrayed by a regular funeral.’ Unfortunately Justin appears to have hopelessly confused the murders of Alexander IV and Hercules.
13. Plutarch, *Moralia* 530B
14. Diodorus 20.37.
15. Statira, a Persian princess was murdered after Alexander’s death by Roxane and Perdikkas (Plutarch, *Alexander* 77).
16. The cities of Caria and Lycia were certainly back under Antigonos’ control by 306, see Diodorus 20.46–47, 20.82.

Chapter 15

1. Diodorus 20.45.

2. Plutarch *Demetrius* 8.
3. Presumably the same Athenians who on Ptolemaeus approach to the city in 313 'kept sending secretly to Antigonos, begging him to free the city' (Diodorus 19.78).
4. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 1.
5. Athenaeus 542B.
6. Diogenes Laertius, *Life of Demetrius* 2; Diodorus 18.74.
7. Polyaeus 7.4.2. This was a common method of ensuring secrecy. Dionysius the tyrant of Syracuse had used it a century earlier. He, being a paranoid tyrant, had also used it to test the loyalty of his captains: 'he hurried around the fleet in a swift-sailing vessel, and ordered every captain to return his tablet. Those, who had broken their seals, he ordered to be executed for breach of orders; to the rest he gave tablets, in which was written the real name of the city, which was the object of their expedition' (Polyaeus 5.2.12).
8. Polyaeus 4.7.6.
9. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 8.
10. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 9.
11. Plutarch *Demetrius* 9.
12. Diodorus 20.46.
13. Diodorus 20.46.
14. Hyperides, *Funeral Oration* 21.
15. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 12.
16. Diodorus 20.46.
17. Another possible example is the city of Aegium in the Peloponnese which Aristodemus had garrisoned, 'although he wished to he wished to establish freedom for the people of Aegium according to the decree', apparently to protect the population from pillaging soldiers (Diodorus 19.66).
18. Diodorus 20.46. Plutarch (*Demetrius* 9), claims that Demetrius sailed to Megara and took the city while still besieging Munychia but his version is impossible if Diodorus is correct in saying that Demetrius stormed Munychia in two days.
19. Diodorus 20.46.
20. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, p. 443, based on an Athenian decree of 306/5 proposed by Stratocles.
21. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, p. 389.

22. *Inscriptiones Graecae* II2 469. Translated in Bayliss, AJ, *After Demosthenes: The Politics of Early Hellenistic Athens* (London, 2011), p.180.
23. *Inscriptiones Graecae* II2 469.
24. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 15.
25. See, however, Grainger, JD, *Hellenistic and Roman Naval Wars 336–31 BC* (Barnsley, 2001), p. 32 who claims that the decision ‘made good strategic sense. Possession of the island would cut Ptolemaic naval communications with the Aegean’ and isolate Ptolemy’s outposts such as Corinth and Sicyon.’
26. Diodorus 20.47.
27. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, pp. 296–301. For a discussion of the negative impacts of colonization by the kings, see Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire. The Reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 245–250.

Chapter 16

1. Diodorus 20.46. For a discussion of the concept of a “Common Peace” see [Appendix 5](#).
2. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 19.
3. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 15.
4. For a full discussion see Grainger, *Hellenistic and Roman Naval Wars 336–31 BC*, pp. 31–2.
5. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 15.
6. Plutarch *Demetrius* 16; Diodorus 20.49.
7. Diodorus 20.47; Plutarch, *Demetrius* 16; Polyaeus 4.7.7.
8. Diodorus 20.51.
9. Diodorus 20.52. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 16, states that Ptolemy fled the battle with only eight ships and seventy had been captured with their crews. This would make his total losses 102 ships.
10. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 16.
11. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 17.
12. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 17; Appian, *Syrian Wars* 54. See, however, Gruen, ES, ‘The Coronation of the Diadochi’, in *The Craft of the Ancient Historian: Essays in Honor of Chester G. Starr* (Lanham, 1985), p. 256, who claims that ‘novelty rather than tradition stands out here. Antigonos made no appeal to the past, relied on no fixed conventions, called upon no predecessors to legitimize his ascendancy.’

13. Diodorus 20.53.
14. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 25.
15. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 16
16. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 25.
17. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 14.
18. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 19.
19. Plutarch, *Moralia* 182B
20. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 45. After her death Demetrius would marry her sister, another Eurydice, an ex-wife of Ptolemy.
21. According to Diodorus (20.37), Antigonos had been one of Cleopatra's many suitors. If so he cannot have been too serious in the matter. Cleopatra was his virtual prisoner for over a decade and it is difficult to believe she could have refused him if he was determined in the matter. The reluctance of Antigonos to marry again gives some credence to the possibility that Stratonice may have been connected to the Argeads.
22. Diodorus 20.72, records that in 306 'King Antigonos, the younger of whose sons, Phoenix, had died, buried this son with royal honours'. This is generally taken to mean Philip, with either Diodorus or a copyist making an error in recording the name.

Chapter 17

1. Diodorus 1.30.
2. Strabo 16.2.26.
3. A camel can carry about 200 kgs easily or about 400 kgs if overloaded. At the start of the march they were probably overloaded as their loads would decrease. To carry the men's rations alone would have required between 12,500 and 25,000 camels.
4. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 19.
5. Diodorus 20.73.
6. Diodorus 20.74.
7. Diodorus 20.76.
8. Diodorus 20.76.
9. Diodorus 20.76.
10. Appian, *Syrian Wars* 54; Justin 15.2. The elevation of Ptolemy as a result of this victory would appear logical but his coinage does not show him adopting the title until late 305. The Parian marble dates his ascension to 305/4 but it is not the most reliable source.

Proclamations in Egypt were still issued in the name of Alexander IV for several years. What is most likely is that Ptolemy allowed his army to proclaim him king but was more cautious in using the title in official documents, as was Cassander after he took the title. For a recent discussion of the problem see Wheatley, P, and Heckel, W, *Justin Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus Volume II Books 13–15: The Successors to Alexander the Great* (Oxford, 2011), pp. 244–5.

11. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, p. 164.
12. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, p. 163.
13. Grainger, *Hellenistic and Roman Naval Wars 336–31 BC*, p. 38
14. Polyaeus 4.7.1.
15. The Nile usually reaches its highest point in October and then gradually subsides until June. It can, however, rise briefly again after October

Chapter 18

1. Diodorus 20.93.
2. Thucydides 1.98
3. Thucydides 3.37.
4. Thucydides 5.116.
5. Livy 24.37.
6. Strabo 14.2.5.
7. Diodorus 20.81.
8. Berthold, RM, *Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age* (Ithaca, 1984), p. 67; Hauben, ‘Rhodes, Alexander and the Diadochi from 333/332 to 304 bc’, in *Historia* 26 (1987), pp. 311–3, 319; Hornblower, J, *Hieronymus of Cardia* (Oxford, 1981), pp. 56–60, 274–7, 280–1.
9. Diodorus 18.8.
10. Diodorus 20.81.
11. Diodorus 20.81. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, p. 166 n. 5.4 denies the strength of these ties citing Polyaeus 4.6.16 which mentions merchants from Syria, Phoenicia, Cilicia and Pamphylia. In my opinion this passage does not directly contradict Diodorus. Berholdt, *Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age*, pp. 61–2 and Hauben, ‘Rhodes, Alexander and the Diadochi from 333/332 to

304 bc', pp 336–7, appear to be more convincing in emphasizing the close economic ties between Egypt and Rhodes.

12. Hauben, 'Rhodes, Alexander and the Diadochi from 333/332 to 304 bc', pp. 331 – 334, argues that after the 311 Rhodes and the other Greek cities entered into a Common Peace with each other and the dynasts which allowed them to deny Antigonos' demands. Even if correct this ignores the reality of the situation. A Common Peace was a creation of a major power and designed to work in their interests, see [Appendix 5](#).

13. Diodorus 20.82.

14. Diodorus 20.82.

15. Diodorus 20.82.

16. Diodorus 20.82.

17. Diodorus 20.84.

18. Diodorus 20.88.

Chapter 19

1. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 21; Diodorus 20.91.
2. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 20. Although shortly after he comments that Demetrius 'did not apply his ingenuity to things that would afford useless pleasure or diversion' See also Diodorus 20.92: 'For it was in his time that the greatest weapons were perfected and engines of all kinds far surpassing those that had existed among others; and this man launched the greatest ships after this siege and after the death of his father.'
3. Diodorus 20.93.
4. Diodorus 20.93.
5. Diodorus 20.93.
6. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 22.
7. Diodorus 20.94.
8. Diodorus 16.54.
9. Diodorus 20.94.
10. Diodorus 20.96.
11. Diodorus 20.96:
12. Diodorus 20.95.
13. Diodorus 20.98.
14. Diodorus 20.98.
15. Diodorus 20.99; also Plutarch, *Demetrius* 22: 'As for the Rhodians, they

continued their strenuous resistance in the war until Demetrius, who wanted a pretext for abandoning it, was induced to make terms with them by a deputation of Athenians, on condition that the Rhodians should be allies of Antigonos and Demetrius, except in a war against Ptolemy.'

16. Diodorus 20.99.

17. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, p. 168. He further claims that with 200 ships Demetrius 'could surely have had squadrons of them patrolling turn and turn about to and fro in front of the harbour entrance to prevent access and egress.' This ignores the testimony of Diodorus 20.96, as well as the inability of similar sized fleets of the Athenians and Romans to successfully blockade the ports of Syracuse and Lilybaeum during their sieges.

18. Grossman, D & Siddle, BK, 'Psychological Effects of Combat', Academic Press, 2000 @ http://www.killology.com/print/print_psychological.htm The authors claim that: 'It must be understood that the kind of continuous, protracted combat that produces such high psychiatric casualty rates is largely a product of 20th century warfare. The Battle of Waterloo lasted only a day. Gettysburg lasted only three days-and they took the nights off.' Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that the continuous nature of siege warfare, especially Demetrius' constant attacks, would produce a similar effect.

19. Diodorus 20.92.

20. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 22.

21. Beckby, H, *Anthologia Graeca* 4 (Munich 1957), 171H.

Chapter 20

1. This is a composite, but I believe plausible, reconstruction based on two contemporary tablets. The names come from Gager, G, ed., *Curse Tablets and Binding Spells from the Ancient World* (New York, 1999), no. 57. I have added the opening from another tablet translated in Parker, R, *Polytheism and Society at Athens* (New York, 2005), p. 130. Pleistarchus was Cassander's brother and Eupolemos one of his generals.

2. Diodorus 20.100.

3. Diodorus 20.100.

4. Pausanias 1.15.1.

5. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 23

6. Diodorus 20.102.
7. Diodorus 20.102.
8. Diodorus 20.102.
9. Diodorus 20.103.
10. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 25, claims that Demetrius won over Argos, Sicyon and Corinth by bribing their garrisons with 100 talents. It is quite possible that some sort of bribe was included in their surrender terms but the case of both Sicyon and Corinth this was only after hard fighting.
11. Diodorus 20.103.
12. Diodorus 20.103.
13. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 23.
14. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, pp. 229–30. For the full discussion pp. 228–30.
15. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 23.
16. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 24.
17. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 24.
18. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 27.
19. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 24.
20. Plutarch, *Comparison of Demetrius and Anthony* 3.
21. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, p. 227. These were later freed and returned by Lysimachus, inferring that that they were his or Cassander's supporters.
22. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 30.
23. Habicht, C, *Athens from Alexander to Anthony* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 75, sums up the Athenian opinion recorded in their inscriptions as 'Cassander represented pure evil and the aim of his offensive was the "enslavement" of Greece'.
24. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 30.
25. Diodorus 20.106.
26. Diodorus 20.106.
27. Justin 15.3.
28. Justin 15.3; Curtius 8.1.14–18.
29. Justin 15.3.13–14.
30. Bosworth, *The Legacy of Alexander. Politics, Warfare, and Propaganda under the Successors*, pp. 273–274. Accepting Bosworth's identification of 'Penelope' being a euphemism for Lysimachus' wife Nicaea.
31. Diodorus 20.106.

32. Justin 15.2. The same motives are repeated in Diodorus 21.2: 'Ptolemy, Seleucus, and Lysimachus united against King Antigonus; not so much prompted by goodwill towards one another as compelled by the fears each had for himself, they moved readily to make common cause in the supreme struggle.'
33. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 28.
34. Diodorus 20.110.
35. Diodorus 20.111.
36. Diodorus 20.111.

Chapter 21

1. Plutarch, *Pyrrhus* 12.
2. Diodorus 20.107.
3. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 28.
4. The following year Antigonus commanded 80,000 troops at Ipsus but this was after he had been joined by Demetrius.
5. Memnon, *History of Heracleia* 4. Arsinoe was in fact the daughter of Ptolemy I Soter.
6. Appian, *Syrian Wars* 55.
7. Appian, *Syrian Wars* 55. Sandrocottus was the Greek name for the Indian King Chandragupta Maurya (340–298 bc) who had founded the Mauryan Empire c. 322 and was the first emperor to unify India into one state.
8. Strabo 15.2.9. The figure of 500 elephants is often rejected as too round and too large, being based on Indian mathematical conventions. This reasoning does not explain why Diodorus (20.113) numbers the elephants which came west as 480 and Plutarch (*Demetrius* 28) as 400. Eppler, C, 'War Elephants the Hellenistic World', in *Alexander's Empire. Formulation to Decay* (Claremont, 2007), p. 222, proposes that the surrender of such a large number of these symbolic animals might indicate a face saving peace, with Sandracottus accepting the provinces as a nominal subordinate to Seleucus. In my opinion the surrender of such a large area, and therefore source of revenue, makes this reasoning unlikely.
9. For the likely dating see Grainger, *Seleucus Nikator*, p. 112.
10. The account of Antigonus sending a raiding force to Babylon to divert Seleucus is based on a dubious reading of the source. See Lund, *Lysimachus: A Study in Early Hellenistic Kingship*, p. 73 n. 68.

11. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, p. 181, especially n. 32.
12. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 28.
13. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 29.
14. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 28. Plutarch records that the allies had ‘five hundred more horse’ than Antigonos, giving them a total of 10,500 cavalry. Seleucus had brought 12,000 with him and Lysimachus had cavalry of his own – Prepelaus detached force had contained 1,000 cavalry (Diodorus 20.107). The figure is usually considered to be corrupted and should read 5,000 more horse.
15. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 29.
16. Diodorus 21.2.
17. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 29.
18. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 30.
19. Diodorus 21.5.
20. Diodorus 21.5.
21. Justin 15.4.

Chapter 22

1. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 28.
2. Diodorus 21.1.
3. See Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, p. 186, blames all the defeats on the errors of Demetrius, ‘who simply lacked the consistent political, strategic, and tactical sureness of touch which marked out Antigonos as the greatest of the Diadochi’.
4. Plutarch, *Moralia* 182A.
5. Plutarch, *Moralia* 182A.
6. Polyaeus 4.6.2.
7. Plutarch, *Moralia* 182C.
8. Cicero, *De officiis* 2.48.
9. For a full discussion see Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, pp. 231–6.
10. Plutarch, *Moralia* 182B.
11. Plutarch, *Phocian* 29.
12. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 43, *Pyrrhus* 10.
13. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 42, 44.
14. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 51.
15. Justin 17.1. Lund, *Lysimachus: A Study in Early Hellenistic Kingship*, pp.

199 argues that Agathocles may have rebelled against his father but to my mind her evidence is not compelling.

16. Appian, *Syrian Wars* 64.
17. Memnon 8.
18. Memnon 8.
19. Appian, *Syrian Wars* 64. Appian underestimates both ages by six or seven years.

Appendix 1

1. Hornblower, *Hieronymus of Cardia*, pp. 101–2, 108–9.
2. Diodorus 18.26, records the archonship of Philocles (322/1). The next archon year to be named (18.44) is that of Apollodorus (319/8). The archons for the years 321/0 and 320/19 are not mentioned by Diodorus.
3. The “high” chronology was first tabulated by Beloch, KJ, *Greichische Geschichte* vol. 4 pt. 2 (Berlin, 1967), pp. 624–9. The “low” chronology was first detailed in English by Errington, ‘From Babylon to Triparadeisus: 323–320 bc’, *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 90 (1970), pp. 49–77 and ‘Diodorus Siculus and the Chronology of the Early Diadochi 320–311’, in *Hermes* 105 (1977), pp. 478–504.
4. Errington, ‘Diodorus Siculus and the Chronology of the Early Diadochi 320–311’, p. 482.
5. Jacoby, F, *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker II B* 670, in his commentary, recognized that its numerous errors of fact corrupted its value as evidence. He concluded scathingly that the author was not ‘a historian or a chronographer by profession.’ He found that the nearest possible eclipse was August 310, not 309/8. Bosworth, AB, ‘Philip III Arrhidaeus and the Chronology of the Successors’, in *Chiron* 22 (Munich, 1992), p.74, lists a number of instances of where the marble is inaccurate in recording the events of Alexander’s reign.
6. Errington, ‘Diodorus Siculus and the chronology of the of the early Diadochi 320–311’, pp. 490–1.
7. Osborne, MJ, *Naturalization in Athens: A Corpus of Athenian Decrees Granting Citizenship* vol. 2 (Brussels, 1982), pp. 98–101; Bosworth, AB, ‘Philip III Arrhidaeus and the Chronology of the Successors’, pp. 68–9.
8. Osborne, MJ, *Naturalization in Athens: A Corpus of Athenian Decrees Granting Citizenship* vol. 1 (Brussels, 1981), pp. 95–6, D35.
9. Diodorus 18.36, 18.28, respectively.

10. Wheatley, P, "An Introduction to the Chronological Problems in Early Diadoch Sources and Scholarship," in *Alexander's Empire: Formulation to Decay*, p. 183.
11. Boiy, T, 'Cuneiform Tablets & Aramaic Ostraca. Between the Low and High Chronologies for the Early Diadoch Period,' in *Alexander's Empire: Formulation to Decay*, pp. 199–207.
12. Yardley, J, Wheatley, P & Heckel, W, *Justin Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus* vol. 2 (Oxford,2011), pp 14–15.

Appendix 2

1. For the fragments and *testimonia* see Jacoby, F, *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* no.76.
2. Lund, *Lysimachus: A Study in Early Hellenistic Kingship*, p. 124.
3. For the fragments and *testimonia* see Jacoby, *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* no.73. The precise beginning and end of the work are known from Diodorus' citations at 16.14 and 21.5.
4. For the fragments and *testimonia* see Jacoby, *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* no.75.
5. Polybius 12.13-14.7. Polybius, however, defends Demochares' reputation. Cicero, *Brutus* 286.
6. For the fragments and *testimonia* see Jacoby, *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* no.328
7. Jacoby, F, *Atthis: The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens* (Oxford, 1949), pp. 78–9.
8. For the fragments and *testimonia* see Jacoby, *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* no.432
9. Lund, *Lysimachus: A Study in Early Hellenistic Kingship*, pp. 187–91.
10. For the fragments and *testimonia* see Jacoby, *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* 154. A concise description of Hieronymus' life with full references is found in Brown, TS, 'Hieronymus of Cardia', in *The American History Review* 53 (1947), pp. 684–6, A longer, although more speculative biography is in Hornblower, *Hieronymus of Cardia*, pp. 5–16.
11. Pausanias 1.9.10; Diodorus. 20.29.
12. Bury, JB, *Ancient Greek Historians* (New York, 1958), pp. 177, 190.
13. Roisman, J, *Alexander's Veterans and the Early Wars of the Successors*, p.11. For the pro-Eumenes bias see also Hornblower, *Hieronymus of Cardia*, pp. 196–211 and Westlake, HD, 'Eumenes of Cardia', in *Essays*

on the Greek Historians and Greek History (London, 1969) 313–30.

14. Diodorus 1.3–4. What information there is on Diodorus' life and work is contained within his own work, with one exception. St. Jerome's, *Chronology*, which records for the year 49 that: 'Diodorus of Sicily, a writer of Greek history first became illustrious'.
15. Hornblower, *Hieronymus of Cardia*, pp. 27–32, cites numerous examples where it can be shown that Diodorus has closely followed an earlier source, either by paraphrasing it or by extracting whole sections.
16. For a recent discussion of pro and anti Seleucid biases in Diodorus' narrative stemming from different sources, see Gattinoni, FL, 'Seleucus vs. Antigonos: A Study of the Sources', in *After Alexander The Time of the Diadochi (323–281)* (Oxford, 2013), pp. 30–42.
17. Hornblower, *Hieronymus of Cardia*, pp. 28–9. Drews, R 'Diodorus and his Sources', in *The American Journal of Philology* 83 (1962), p. 385, argues that Diodorus' main motivation for including supplementary sources was to find evidence for divine retribution.
18. Hornblower, *Hieronymus of Cardia*, p. 32.
19. Hornblower, *Hieronymus of Cardia*, pp. 35–8. Rosen, K, 'Political Documents in Hieronymus of Cardia', in *Acta Classica* 10 (1967), pp. 45–94, has identified seventy four possible uses of original documents in Diodorus' account of the Successors, comparing this to the relative dearth of such usage in the rest of his work.
20. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, pp. 345–6.
21. Walbank, FW, in his introduction to JC Yardley's translation of *Justin Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus Books 11–12: Alexander the Great* (Oxford, 1997) 1–13, based on the internal evidence in those parts of the work believed to be Justin's own insertions
22. Justin, *Praefatio* 1–5.
23. Walbank, *Justin Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus Books 11–12: Alexander the Great*, pp. 5–6
24. Some examples are: the naming of Polyperchon instead of Craterus (14.8, 15.1); misplacing the battle of Gaza at Gamala (15.1.); and incorrectly identifying Eurydice as Philip III Arrhidaeus' daughter (14.6.).
25. Pelling, CBR, *Life of Anthony* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 18–26; Bosworth,

‘History and Artifice in Eumenes’, pp. 70–1.

26. Saller, R, ‘Anecdotes as Historical Evidence for the Principate’, in *Greece and Rome* 27 (1980), pp. 69–74.
27. Bosworth, ‘History and Artifice in *Eumenes*’, p. 80.
28. Polyaeus 4.6.1, 3, 17, 18 and 20 must all refer to Antigonus Gonatas not the One-Eyed
29. Gowing, AM, *The Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio* (Ann Arbor, 1992) 9–18; Swain, S, *Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World, AD 50–250* (Oxford, 1996), p. 249.
30. For example, Appian misnames the Roman tribunes for the years 58 bc (*BC* 2.14) and 57 bc (*BC* 2.16). In the very first book of the *Syrian Wars* he confuses Ptolemy Philopator for Ptolemy Epiphanes. Errors such as this throw doubt on his identification of the otherwise unknown Blitor as satrap of Mesopotamia in 316.
31. Seibert, J, *Das Zeitaler der Diadochen* (Darmstadt, 1983).
32. Swain, *Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World, AD 50–250* pp. 12–3.
33. Swain, *Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World, AD 50–250*, p.13

Appendix 3

1. Polybius 5.10; Plutarch, *Amelius Paullus* 12. Pausanias 7.7.5 denies that there was any relationship between Philip II and Philip V.
2. Tarn, WW, ‘Two Notes on Ptolemaic History’, in *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 53 (1933), p. 61.
3. Livy 27.30.9, 32.22.11. Edson, CF, ‘The Antigonids, Heracles and Beroea’, in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 45 (1934), pp. 217, 223, points out that the claim was not denied by his contemporaries especially his ‘bitter enemy’ Polybius.
4. Edson, ‘The Antigonids, Heracles and Beroea’, pp. 213–46.
5. Edson, ‘The Antigonids, Heracles and Beroea’, p. 226.
6. Thucydides 2.101.
7. Contrary to Edson’s statement Antigonus the One-Eyed issued no coins in his own name, only reissues of Alexander’s coinage. Unfortunately for Edson coins previously identified as being issued by Antigonus are now identified as those of Antigonus Doson, see Newell, ET, *The Coinages of Demetrius Poliorcetes* (Chicago, 1978), pp. 14–15.

8. Stewart, AF, *Faces of Power: Alexander's Image and Hellenistic Politics* (Berkeley, 1993), pp. 278–9.
9. Newell, *The Coinages of Demetrius Poliorcetes*, pp. 24–27, 31–37, 44–47.
10. Curtius 10.7.8; Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire*, p. 91.

Appendix 4

1. Griffith, GT, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge, 1935), pp. 264–316.
2. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World*, pp. 297–301.
3. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World*, pp. 264–5, 297–301.
4. Parke, HW, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* (Oxford, 1933), pp. 232–3.
5. Pritchett, WK, *Ancient Greek Military Practices Part 1* (Berkeley, 1971), pp. 3–52.
6. Thucydides 3.17, 5.47. The total paid to a citizen hoplite at the start of the war was two drachmas, and later 3 Aegintan obols (4.2 Attic obols) per day. Again it is not stated whether the latter rate includes *sitos*, whereas the former figure almost certainly does. This range of figures matches those recorded for the period of the Successors.
7. Jordan, B, *The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period* (Berkeley, 1975), pp. 113–6, again it is impossible to determine if the rates of pay are composite or pay alone. The most important references are Thucydides. 3.17, 6.31; Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.5.4–7; and Jordan's interpretation of *Inscriptiones Graecae* I2 99. Thucydides (3.17) calls the one drachma payment *misthos*. Morrison, JS, & Williams, RT, *Greek Oared Ships 900–322 BC* (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 258–9, think that this was *misthos* only and another two obols per day was provided for *sitos*, citing Demosthenes 4.28.
8. Polybius 1.26, records a figure of three hundred rowers for a quinquereme, using the specific term *eretas* (rower) rather than the more general *nautes* (seaman). It is therefore possible that the total sailing crew of a quinquereme was well in excess of three hundred.
9. Plutarch, *Pericles* 11. The sailing season may well have been longer as Antigonos' fleet moved from Phoenicia to Phrygia, winning an engagement along the way, after snow had fallen in the mountains and Antigonos' army had entered winter quarters (Diodorus 19.69.2).
10. The most important references for a trireme are: Herodotus 6.15.1; Thucydides 3.94–95. Jameson, MH, 'A Decree of Themistokles from Troizen', in *Hesperia* 29 (1960), pp. 199–200, states that commanders

should recruit twenty marines and four archers for each trireme. The generic term 'marine' is being used to include any fighting men aboard a vessel, including *peltasts* and archers. For a quinquereme see Polybius 1.26.

11. Using these figures the total monthly cost for operating a trireme would have been about 5,600 drachmas. Rodgers, WL, *Greek and Roman Naval Warfare* (Annapolis, 1937), pp. 262–3, uses a figure of 10,000 drachmas per month when calculating total fleet costs.
12. The Rhodians were supposed to have been able to finance the construction of their famous statue of Helios, valued at three hundred talents, from part of the proceeds of the sale of Demetrius' abandoned siege engines (Pliny 34.18.41). The cost of constructing the hull of a trireme has been calculated as 5,000 drachmas, Jordan, *The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period* pp. 95–96.
13. Plutarch, *Phocion* 18; *Demetrius* 25
14. Aristotle, *Oeconomica* 2.1.4. The work also contains a number of scurrilous methods of extracting one-off sums.
15. Austin, MM, 'Hellenistic Kings War and the Economy', in *Classical Quarterly* 36 (1986) 460– 461.
16. Diodorus 17.71; Curtius 5.6.11.
17. Porphyry of Tyre, F42, F43.
18. Austin, 'Hellenistic Kings War and the Economy', p. 465.

Appendix 5

1. Diodorus.19.61.
2. Diodorus 19.105.
3. Liddell & Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon* 8th ed. (Oxford, 1991), pp. 253, 453.
4. Ryder, TTB, *Koine Eirene: General Peace and Local Independence in Ancient Greece* (1965), p. 20; Simpson, RH, 'Antigonus the One-eyed and the Greeks', in *Historia* 8 (1959), p. 385, believes that autonomy also included the right to absolute freedom in its relationship with outside powers. Billows, *Antigonus the One-Eyed*, 197, argues more realistically that not even the most 'freedom-loving king permitted the Greeks cities to have a fully independent foreign policy.'
5. Ostwald, M, *Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History* (1982), p. 1.
6. Thucydides 2.63, 3.37. 'You should remember that your empire is a despotism exercised over unwilling subjects.'

7. Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 117.
8. Thucydides 1.108.
9. Tod, MN, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* vol. 2 (Oxford, 1948), no. 123.
10. Simpson, RH, 'Antigonos the One-eyed and the Greeks', pp. 403–4. Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, pp. 21–22, alternatively suggests that mutually agreed financial contributions, as opposed to those arbitrarily levied and forcibly collected, were not considered to be tribute.
11. Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.1.31.
12. Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, pp. 122–64.
13. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, pp. 195. Jones, AHM, *The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian* (Oxford, 1940), p. 96. The first attested use is in the foundation of the second Delian League, see n. 9.
14. As, for example, Plato does in *Laws* 694A.
15. Diodorus uses this expression solely when relating the decree itself (19.61), elsewhere, and immediately later (19.61), he writes the more usual *eleutheria*.
16. See for example Homer, *Iliad* 6.455, 16.831; Thucydides 8.15.
17. For Philip as chief magistrate (*tagos*) of the Thessalian League see Justin 11.3; Demosthenes 1.22. Demosthenes (19.260) spoke as if a number of Thessalian cities were garrisoned but the only one which can be positively identified is Pherae ([Demosthenes] 7.32) and perhaps Larissa (Aristotle, *Politics*. 1306a). These were, however, two of the largest and most powerful Thessalian cities. Both Theopompus (F 208, F209) and Demosthenes (9.26) speak of *tetrarchies*, four governors, being set up over the Thessalians. Demosthenes claimed that this made the Thessalians subjects of Philip.
18. Aelian (*Varia Historia* 6.1) described the Greeks as surrendering 'city by city in terror'; see Roebuck, C, 'The Settlements of Philip II with the Greek States in 338 bc', in *Classical Philology* 43 (1948), pp. 73–4.
19. Diodorus 16.87; Polybius 5.10; Pausanias 1.25.3, 1.34.1; Justin 9.4.
20. Corinth: Plutarch *Aratus* 23; Polybius 38.3; Dinarchus 1.18; Ambracia: Diodorus 17.3; Chalcis: Strabo 10.1.8; Polybius 38.3; Arrian, *Anabasis* 2.2.4.
21. Diodorus 16.89, 17.4; Justin 9.5, 11.3; [Demosthenes] 17.2–4. Plutarch *Phocion* 16. A more cynical view of the alliance as an instrument of Macedoniaian domination may be found in Bosworth,

Conquest and Empire. The Reign of Alexander the Great, pp. 187–197. For placing the settlement within the tradition of a “common peace” see Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, pp. 190–194 and Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, pp. 150–162.

22. Diodorus 17.3. That the Thebans had introduced a democracy is demonstrated by Diodorus (17.9).
23. Polybius 18.14.5–7; [Demosthenes] 17.2–4.
24. Diodorus 17.3; Justin 11.2. Diodorus appears to have confused the roles of the Spartans and the Arcadians.
25. Diodorus 17.14.
26. Arrian, *Anabasis* 1.17–18; Diodorus 17.24.
27. Halicarnassus was garrisoned, Diodorus 17.27; Arrian, *Anabasis* 1.23. Soli was fined and garrisoned, although allowed to retain its democratic constitution, Arrian, *Anabasis* 2.5. Aspendus was fined and subjected to a satrap, Arrian, *Anabasis* 1.27.
28. The best-documented example of Antipater’s settlements is that dictated to Athens, Diodorus 18.18; Plutarch *Phocion* 27.
29. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, pp. 196–7; Jones, *The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian*, pp. 101, 111, 157–60; De Ste. Croix, GEM, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (London, 1981), pp. 300–4.
30. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, pp. 197–8.
31. Appian, *Macedonian Wars* 12, *Syrian Wars* 12; Polybius 18.46.

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